Constitutional Law
- Chemerinsky
- 2nd Edition
- ISBN: 073554946X
| Page | Case Name | Citation | Court | Audio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | Marbury v. Madison | 5 U.S. 137 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1803 |  Download |
| 14 | United States v. Emerson | 270 F.3d 203 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2001 | Download |
| 19 | Silveira v. Lockyer | 312 F.3d 1052 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2002 | Download |
| 25 | Ex Parte McCardle | 74 U.S. 506 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1868 | Download |
| 27 | United States v. Klein | 80 U.S. 128 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1871 | Download |
| 32 | Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. | 514 U.S. 211 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 | Download |
| 35 | Allen v. Wright | 468 U.S. 737 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 | Download |
| 42 | City of Los Angeles v. Lyons | 461 U.S. 95 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 | Download |
| 43 | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | 504 U.S. 555 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 | Download |
| 50 | Singleton v. Wulff | 428 U.S. 106 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | Download |
| 53 | Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow | 124 U.S. 2301 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 | Download |
| 58 | United States v. Richardson | 418 U.S. 166 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 | Download |
| 61 | Flast v. Cohen | 392 U.S. 83 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 | Download |
| 64 | Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. | 454 U.S. 464 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 | Download |
| 69 | Poe v. Ullman | 367 U.S. 497 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1961 | Download |
| 70 | Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner | 387 U.S. 136 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 | Download |
| 74 | Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services | 528 U.S. 167 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 | Download |
| 76 | United States Parole Commn. v. Geraghty | 445 U.S. 388 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1980 | Download |
| 78 | Baker v. Carr | 369 U.S. 186 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1962 | Download |
| 81 | Vieth v. Jubelirer | 541 U.S. 267 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 | Download |
| 90 | Powell v. McCormack | 395 U.S. 486 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1969 | Download |
| 92 | Goldwater v. Carter | 444 U.S. 996 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 | Download |
| 95 | Nixon v. United States | 506 U.S. 224 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1993 | Download |
| 101 | McCulloch v. Maryland | 17 U.S. 316 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1819 | Download |
| 113 | Gibbons v. Ogden | 22 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1824 | Download |
| 117 | United States v. E.C. Knight Co. | 156 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1895 | Download |
| 118 | Carter v. Carter Coal Co. | 298 U.S. 238 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1936 | Download |
| 120 | Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States | 234 U.S. 342 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1914 | Download |
| 122 | A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States | 295 U.S. 495 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1935 | Download |
| 125 | Hammer v. Dagenhart | 247 U.S. 251 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1918 | Download |
| 128 | Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case) | 188 U.S. 321 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1903 | Download |
| 131 | NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. | 301 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1937 | Download |
| 134 | United States v. Darby | 312 U.S. 100 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1941 | Download |
| 136 | Wickard v. Filburn | 317 U.S. 111 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 | Download |
| 139 | Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States | 379 U.S. 241 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 | Download |
| 141 | Katzenbach v. McClung | 379 U.S. 294 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 | Download |
| 145 | National League of Cities v. Usery | 426 U.S. 833 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | Download |
| 148 | Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority | 469 U.S. 528 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 | Download |
| 153 | United States v. Lopez | 514 U.S. 549 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 | Download |
| 170 | Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers | 531 U.S. 159 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 | Download |
| 175 | Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen | 123 U.S. 720 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 | Download |
| 177 | New York v. United States | 505 U.S. 144 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 | Download |
| 186 | Printz v. United States | 521 U.S. 898 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 | Download |
| 195 | Reno v. Condon | 528 U.S. 141 | The Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 | Download |
| 198 | United States v. Butler | 297 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1936 | Download |
| 201 | Sabri v. United States | 541 U.S. 600 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 | Download |
| 204 | South Dakota v. Dole | 483 U.S. 203 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 | Download |
| 209 | United States v. Morrison | 529 U.S. 598 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 | Download |
| 212 | Katzenbach v. Morgan | 384 U.S. 641 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1966 | Download |
| 216 | City of Boerne v. Flores | 521 U.S. 507 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 | Download |
| 224 | Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer | 427 U.S. 445 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | Download |
| 226 | Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida | 517 U.S. 44 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 | Download |
| 231 | Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank and United States | 527 U.S. 627 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 | Download |
| 235 | Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents | 120 S. Ct. 631 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 | Download |
| 239 | Board of Trustees, University of Alabama v. Garrett | 531 U.S. 356 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 | |
| 246 | Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs | 538 U.S. 721 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 | Download |
| 251 | Tennessee v. Lane | 541 U.S. 509 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 | Download |
| 258 | Alden v. Maine | 527 U.S. 706 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 | |
| 272 | Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer | 343 U.S. 579 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1952 | Download |
| 282 | United States v. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States | 418 U.S. 683 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 | Download |
| 288 | William J. Clinton, President of the United States v. City of New York | 524 U.S. 417 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1998 | Download |
| 294 | Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan | 293 U.S. 388 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1935 | Download |
| 296 | Whitman v. American Trucking Assn., Inc. | 531 U.S. 457 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 | Download |
| 299 | Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jagdish Rai Chadha | 462 U.S. 919 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 | Download |
| 307 | Alexia Morrison, Independent Counsel v. Theodore B. Olson | 487 U.S. 654 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1988 | Download |
| 313 | Myers v. United States | 272 U.S. 52 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1926 | Download |
| 314 | Humphrey's Executor v. United States | 295 U.S. 602 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1935 | Download |
| 315 | Wiener v. United States | 357 U.S. 349 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1958 | Download |
| 317 | Bowsher v. Synar | 478 U.S. 714 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1986 | Download |
| 321 | United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. | 299 U.S. 304 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1936 | Download |
| 325 | Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury | 453 U.S. 654 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 | Download |
| 332 | Hamdi v. Rumsfeld | 542 U.S. 507 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 | Download |
| 347 | Ex Parte Quirin | 317 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 | Download |
| 354 | Richard Nixon v. A. Ernest Fitzgerald | 457 U.S. 731 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 | Download |
| 357 | William Jefferson Clinton v. Paula Corbin Jones | 520 U.S. 681 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 | Download |
| 368 | Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly | 533 U.S. 525 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 | Download |
| 374 | Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, Director Dept. of Agriculture of California | 373 U.S. 132 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1963 | Download |
| 375 | Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commn. | 461 U.S. 190 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 | Download |
| 379 | Hines, Secretary of Labor and Industry of Pennsylvania v. Davidowitz | 312 U.S. 52 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1941 | Download |
| 382 | H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of New York | 336 U.S. 529 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1939 | Download |
| 388 | Aaron B. Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia | 53 U.S. 299 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1851 | Download |
| 390 | South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc. | 303 U.S. 177 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1938 | Download |
| 391 | Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona Ex Rel. Sullivan, Attorney General | 325 U.S. 761 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1945 | Download |
| 395 | City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey | 437 U.S. 617 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 | Download |
| 397 | C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York | 511 U.S. 383 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 | Download |
| 401 | Hughes v. Oklahoma | 441 U.S. 322 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 | Download |
| 402 | Hunt, Governor of the State of North Carolina v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n | 432 U.S. 333 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 | Download |
| 404 | Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland | 437 U.S. 117 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 | Download |
| 407 | West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, Commissioner of Massachusetts Dept. of Food and Agriculture | 512 U.S. 186 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 | Download |
| 409 | State of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. | 449 U.S. 456 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 | Download |
| 411 | Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin | 340 U.S. 349 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1951 | Download |
| 412 | Maine v. Taylor and United States | 477 U.S. 131 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1986 | Download |
| 415 | Loren J. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. | 397 U.S. 137 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1970 | Download |
| 416 | Bibb, Director, Dept. of Public Safety of Illinois v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. | 359 U.S. 520 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1959 | Download |
| 418 | Raymond Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware | 455 U.S. 329 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 | Download |
| 421 | CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America | 481 U.S. 69 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 | Download |
| 424 | Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California | 451 U.S. 648 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 | Download |
| 426 | Reeves, Inc. v. William Stake | 447 U.S. 429 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1980 | Download |
| 429 | South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Commissioner, Dept. of Natural Resources of Alaska | 467 U.S. 82 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 | Download |
| 435 | Toomer v. Witsell | 334 U.S. 385 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1948 | Download |
| 436 | United Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden County v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden | 465 U.S. 208 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 | Download |
| 438 | Lester Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commn. of Montana | 436 U.S. 371 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 | Download |
| 439 | Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Kathryn A. Piper | 470 U.S. 274 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 | Download |
| 447 | Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore | 32 U.S. 243 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1833 | Download |
| 449 | Slaughter-House Cases | 83 U.S. 36 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1873 | Download |
| 456 | Saenz v. Roe | 526 U.S. 489 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 | Download |
| 458 | Twining v. New Jersey | 211 U.S. 78 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1908 | Download |
| 461 | Adamson v. California | 332 U.S. 46 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1947 | Download |
| 469 | United States v. Stanley | 109 U.S. 3 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1883 | Download |
| 474 | Marsh v. Alabama | 326 U.S. 501 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1946 | Download |
| 476 | Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. | 419 U.S. 345 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 | Download |
| 479 | Terry v. Adams | 345 U.S. 461 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1953 | Download |
| 480 | Evans v. Newton | 382 U.S. 296 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1966 | Download |
| 482 | Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local, 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. | 391 U.S. 308 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 | Download |
| 484 | Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner | 407 U.S. 551 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 | Download |
| 485 | Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board | 424 U.S. 507 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | Download |
| 487 | Shelley v. Kraemer | 334 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1948 | Download |
| 490 | Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. | 457 U.S. 922 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 | Download |
| 493 | Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. | 500 U.S. 614 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1991 | Download |
| 495 | Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority | 365 U.S. 715 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1961 | Download |
| 497 | Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis | 407 U.S. 163 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 | Download |
| 499 | Norwood v. Harrison | 413 U.S. 455 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 | Download |
| 501 | Rendell-Baker v. Kohn | 457 U.S. 830 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 | Download |
| 504 | Blum v. Yaretsky | 457 U.S. 991 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 | Download |
| 508 | Reitman v. Mulkey | 387 U.S. 369 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 | Download |
| 512 | Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association | 531 U.S. 288 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 | Download |
| 524 | Allgeyer v. Louisiana | 165 U.S. 578 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1897 | Download |
| 526 | Lochner v. New York | 198 U.S. 45 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1905 | Download |
| 531 | Coppage v. Kansas | 236 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1915 | Download |
| 534 | Muller v. Oregon | 208 U.S. 412 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1908 | Download |
| 536 | Adkins v. Children's Hospital | 261 U.S. 525 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1923 | Download |
| 537 | Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co. | 270 U.S. 402 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1926 | Download |
| 539 | Nebbia v. New York | 291 U.S. 502 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1934 | Download |
| 541 | West Coast Hotel v. Parrish | 300 U.S. 379 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1937 | Download |
| 543 | United States v. Carolene Products Co. | 304 U.S. 144 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1938 | Download |
| 545 | Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. | 348 U.S. 483 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1955 | Download |
| 547 | BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore | 517 U.S. 559 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 | Download |
| 551 | State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell | 123 U.S. 1513 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 | Download |
| 559 | Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell | 290 U.S. 398 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1934 | Download |
| 562 | Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. | 459 U.S. 400 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 | Download |
| 565 | Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus | 438 U.S. 234 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 | Download |
| 569 | United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey | 431 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 | Download |
| 580 | Miller v. Schoene | 276 U.S. 272 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1928 | Download |
| 610 | Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff | 467 U.S. 229 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 | Download |
| 613 | Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington | 538 U.S. 216 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 | Download |
| 625 | Romer v. Evans | 517 U.S. 620 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 | Download |
| 630 | United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz | 449 U.S. 166 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1980 | Download |
| 634 | Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York | 336 U.S. 106 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1949 | Download |
| 637 | New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer | 440 U.S. 568 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 | Download |
| 640 | U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno | 413 U.S. 528 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 | Download |
| 643 | City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. | 473 U.S. 432 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 | Download |
| 649 | Dred Scott v. Sandford | 60 U.S. 393 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1856 | Download |
| 654 | Korematsu v. United States | 323 U.S. 214 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1944 | Download |
| 659 | Loving v. Virginia | 388 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 | Download |
| 661 | Palmore v. Sidoti | 466 U.S. 429 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 | Download |
| 663 | Plessy v. Ferguson | 163 U.S. 537 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1896 | Download |
| 667 | Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) | 347 U.S. 483 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1954 | Download |
| 671 | Washington v. Davis | 426 U.S. 229 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | Download |
| 680 | City of Mobile v. Bolden | 446 U.S. 55 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1980 | Download |
| 684 | Palmer v. Thompson | 403 U.S. 217 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 | Download |
| 686 | Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney | 442 U.S. 256 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 | Download |
| 688 | Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. | 429 U.S. 252 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 | Download |
| 692 | Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II) | 349 U.S. 294 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1955 | Download |
| 697 | Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education | 402 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 | Download |
| 700 | Milliken v. Bradley | 418 U.S. 717 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 | Download |
| 703 | Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell | 498 U.S. 237 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1991 | Download |
| 708 | Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. | 488 U.S. 469 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1989 | Download |
| 716 | Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena | 515 U.S. 200 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 | Download |
| 722 | Grutter v. Bollinger | 539 U.S. 306 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 | |
| 740 | Gratz v. Bollinger | 539 U.S. 244 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 | Download |
| 748 | Easley v. Cromartie | 532 U.S. 234 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 | Download |
| 755 | Frontiero v. Richardson | 411 U.S. 677 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 | Download |
| 758 | Craig v. Boren | 429 U.S. 190 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | Download |
| 761 | United States v. Virginia | 518 U.S. 515 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 | Download |
| 766 | Geduldig v. Aiello | 417 U.S. 484 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 | Download |
| 769 | Orr v. Orr | 440 U.S. 268 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 | Download |
| 771 | Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan | 458 U.S. 718 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 | Download |
| 774 | Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County | 450 U.S. 464 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 | Download |
| 777 | Rostker v. Goldberg | 453 U.S. 57 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 | Download |
| 780 | Califano v. Webster | 430 U.S. 313 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 | Download |
| 782 | Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service | 533 U.S. 53 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 | Download |
| 790 | Graham v. Richardson | 403 U.S. 365 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 | Download |
| 792 | Foley v. Connelie | 435 U.S. 291 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 | Download |
| 795 | Ambach v. Norwick | 441 U.S. 68 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 | Download |
| 799 | Plyler v. Doe | 457 U.S. 202 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 | |
| 807 | Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia | 427 U.S. 307 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | Download |
| 822 | Zablocki v. Redhail | 434 U.S. 374 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 | Download |
| 827 | Stanley v. Illinois | 405 U.S. 645 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 | Download |
| 829 | Michael H. v. Gerald D. | 491 U.S. 110 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1989 | Download |
| 835 | Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio | 431 U.S. 494 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 | Download |
| 839 | Meyer v. Nebraska | 262 U.S. 390 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1923 | Download |
| 842 | Troxel v. Granville | 530 U.S. 57 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 | Download |
| 848 | Buck v. Bell | 274 U.S. 200 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1927 | Download |
| 849 | Skinner v. Oklahoma | 316 U.S. 535 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 | Download |
| 856 | Eisenstadt v. Baird | 405 U.S. 438 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 | Download |
| 859 | Roe v. Wade | 410 U.S. 113 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 | Download |
| 867 | Planned Parenthood v. Casey | 505 U.S. 833 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 | |
| 901 | Bellotti v. Baird | 443 U.S. 622 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 | |
| 948 | Ball v. James | 451 U.S. 355 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 | Download |
| 985 | Boddie v. Connecticut | 401 U.S. 371 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 | Download |
| 995 | Bounds v. Smith | 430 U.S. 817 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 | Download |
| 1021 | Board of Regents v. Roth | 408 U.S. 564 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 | Download |
| 1058 | Boos v. Barry | 485 U.S. 312 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1988 | Download |
| 1090 | Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. | 482 U.S. 569 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 | Download |
| 1109 | Alexander v. United States | 509 U.S. 544 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1993 | Download |
| 1112 | Lovell v. City of Griffin, GA | 303 U.S. 444 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1938 | Download |
| 1156 | Abrams v. United States | 250 U.S. 616 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1919 | Download |
| 1216 | Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition | 535 U.S. 234 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2002 | Download |
| 1245 | Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union | 124 S.Ct. 2783 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 | Download |
| 1258 | Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. | 463 U.S. 60 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 | Download |
| 1306 | Bartnicki v. Vopper | 532 U.S. 514 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 | Download |
| 1325 | Buckley v. Valeo | 424 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | Download |
| 1343 | Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization | 307 U.S. 496 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1939 | Download |
| Case Information | Fact Summary | Rule of Law |
|---|---|---|
|
Marbury v. Madison Supreme Court of the United States, 1803 5 U.S. 137 Pg. 2 |
An 1801 Congressional Act (Organic Act) created 42 new federal judgeships called "Justices of the Peace." President Adams appointed several Federalists to these new positions. After the appointees were approved by the Senate, Adams signed the commissions, but the commission was not delivered to William Marbury before President Jefferson entered office. Jefferson's Secretary of State, Madison, refused to deliver Marbury's commission. Marbury sued Madison on a writ of mandamus claim, claiming the Judiciary Act of 1789 - which stated that the U.S. Supreme Court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus - gave the Court the power to issue the writ and compel Marbury to deliver the commission. | If the Supreme Court identifies a conflict between a Constitutional provision and a Congressional statute, the Court has the authority to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. The Constitution is supreme and the Supreme Court has the right to be the final interpreter of it, NOT the legislature. |
|
United States v. Emerson United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2001 270 F.3d 203 Pg. 14 |
Dr. Timothy Joe Emerson was indicted under a section of the U.S. Code that prohibited any person subject to a restraining order in a domestic violence case from possessing any firearm which was shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. | We hold, consistent with Miller, that the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals, including those not then actually a member of any militia or engaged in active military service or training, to privately possess and bear their own firearms, such as the pistol involved here, that are suitable as personal, individual weapons. |
|
Silveira v. Lockyer United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2002 312 F.3d 1052 Pg. 19 |
The State of California enacted amendments to its gun control laws that significantly strengthened the state's restrictions on the possession, use, and transfer of the semi-automatic weapons popularly known as "assault weapons." | The court reaffirmed its conclusion in Hickman v. Block, that it is the collective rights model which provides the best interpretation of the Second Amendment and held that the Second Amendment imposes no limitation on California's ability to enact legislation regulating or prohibiting the possession or use of firearms, including dangerous weapons such as assault weapons. |
|
Ex Parte McCardle Supreme Court of the United States, 1868 74 U.S. 506 Pg. 25 |
McCardle was arrested for writing a series of newspaper articles that were highly critical of Reconstruction and military rule in the South following the Civil War. The question of jurisdiction was determined by the Court. | The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases by appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously excercised. |
|
United States v. Klein Supreme Court of the United States, 1871 80 U.S. 128 Pg. 27 |
In 1863, Congress adopted a statute providing that individuals whose property was seized during the Civil War could recover the property, or compensation for it, upon proof that they had not offered aid or comfort to the enemy during the war. The Supreme Court held that a presidential pardon fulfilled this requirement. In response, Congress adopted a statute providing that a presidential pardon was not evidence in a claim for return of seized property. | The Court held that Congress inadvertantly passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power, and that these powers ought to be kept distinct. |
|
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 514 U.S. 211 Pg. 32 |
In 1991, the Court ruled that actions brought under the securities laws had to be brought within one year of discovering the facts giving rise to the violation and three years of the violation. Congress then amended the law to allow cases that were filed before this decision to go forward if they could have been brought under the prior law. | Section 27A(b) contravenes the Constitution's separation of powers to the extent that it requires federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment. |
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Allen v. Wright Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 468 U.S. 737 Pg. 35 |
Parents of black public school children allege in this nationwide class action that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has not adopted sufficient standards and procedures to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. They assert that the IRS thereby harms them directly and interferes with the ability of their children to receive an education in desegregated public schools. The issue before us is whether plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit. | The "case or controversy" requirement of Art. III of the Constitution defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded, and the Art. III doctrine of "standing" has a core constitutional component that a plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. The concepts of standing doctrine present questions that must be answered by reference to the Art. III notion that federal courts may exercise power only in the last resort and as a necessity, and only when adjudication is consistent with a system of separated powers and the dispute is one traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process. |
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City of Los Angeles v. Lyons Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 461 U.S. 95 Pg. 42 |
Adolph Lyons filed a complaint alleging that four police officers, without provocation or justification, seized him and applied a chokehold rendering him unconscious and causing damage to his larynx. | The case is not rendered moot even though while it was pending in this Court, city police authorities prohibited use of a certain type of chokehold in any circumstances and imposed a 6-month moratorium on the use of another type of chokehold except under circumstances where deadly force was authorized. The moratorium by its terms was not permanent, and thus intervening events have not irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged misconduct. |
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 504 U.S. 555 Pg. 43 |
The Department of the Interior sought to challenge regulations concerning when the federal government could comply with the Endangered Species Act. Under the regulations, the federal government would comply with the Act only for actions taken in the United States or the high seas. | The Court held that respondents lacked standing to bring this action and that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the summary judgment motion filed by the United States. |
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Singleton v. Wulff Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 428 U.S. 106 Pg. 50 |
This case involves a claim of State's unconstitutional interference with the decision to terminate pregnancy. A Missouri statute excludes abortions that are not "medically indicated" from the purposes for which Medicaid benefits are available to needy persons. The case concerns whether physicians who perform nonmedically indicated abortions, have standing to maintain the suit. | The Court concluded that it is generally appropriate to allow a physician to assert the rights of women patients as against governmental interference with the abortion decision. |
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Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 124 U.S. 2301 Pg. 53 |
Petitioner school district requires each elementary school class to recite daily the Pledge of Allegiance. Respondent Newdow's daughter participates in this exercise. Newdow, an atheist, filed suit alleging that, because the Pledge contains the words "under God," it constitutes religious indoctrination of his child in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. | Because California law deprives Newdow of the right to sue as next friend, he lacks prudential standing to challenge the school district's policy in federal court. The standing requirement derives from the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary. |
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United States v. Richardson Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 418 U.S. 166 Pg. 58 |
The Court granted certiorari to determine whether the respondent has standing to bring an action as a federal taxpayer alleging that certain provisions concerning public reporting of expenditures under the CIA Act of 1949 violate the Constitution. | The acceptance of new categories of judicially cognizable injury has not eliminated the basic principle that to invoke judicial power the claimant must have a "personal stake in the outcome," in short, something more than "generalized grievances. Thus, the Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring this suit. |
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Flast v. Cohen Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 392 U.S. 83 Pg. 61 |
The Court upheld a taxpayer's standing to challenge federal subsidies to parochial schools as violating the First Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion. Under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the federal government provided funds for instruction in secular subjects in parochial schools. | The Court held that the ability of the plaintiff to sue as a taxpayer depends on whether (1) there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated and whether (2) the taxpayer has established a logical nexus between the status and the precise nature of the Constitutional infringement alleged. |
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Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 454 U.S. 464 Pg. 64 |
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare conveyed a 77-acre tract of land to Valley Forge Christian College. Americans United for Separation of Church and State brought suit to challenge the conveyance as unconstitutional under the First Amendment Establishment Clause. | Respondents do not have standing, either in their capacity as taxpayers or as citizens, to challenge the conveyance in question. |
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Poe v. Ullman Supreme Court of the United States, 1961 367 U.S. 497 Pg. 69 |
These appeals challenge the constitutionality of Connecticut statutes that prohibit the use of contraceptive devices. | The Court held that the controversy in question did not raise a justiciable question, and therefore declined to adjudicate on the constitutionality of the Connecticut statutes. |
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Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 387 U.S. 136 Pg. 70 |
In 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require manufactures of prescription drugs to print the "established name" of the drug prominently on labels. The underlying purpose of the amendment was to bring to the attention of doctors and patients the fact that many of the drugs sold under familiar trade names are actually identical to drugs sold under their "established" or less familiar trade names at significantly lower prices. | The Court held that this case presented a controversy ripe for resolution and remanded it to the lower courts for further adjudication. |
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Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 528 U.S. 167 Pg. 74 |
Environmental groups brought a lawsuit pursuant to a citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act against the holder of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit, alleging that it was violating mercury discharge limits. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. | A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. The heavy burden of persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the party asserting mootness. |
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United States Parole Commn. v. Geraghty Supreme Court of the United States, 1980 445 U.S. 388 Pg. 76 |
A federal prisoner, after twice being denied parole from a federal prison, brought suit challenging the validity of the United States Parole Commission's Parole Release Guidelines. The District Court denied respondent's request for certification of the suit as a class action on behalf of "all federal prisoners who are or who will become eligible for release on parole. | An action brought on behalf of a class does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff's substantive claim, even though class certification has been denied, since the proposed representative of the class retains a "personal stake" in obtaining class certification sufficient to assure that Art. III values are not undermined. |
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Baker v. Carr Supreme Court of the United States, 1962 369 U.S. 186 Pg. 78 |
Tennessee did not reapportion its voting districts for 60 years, resulting in distorted representation, putatively in violation of the US Constitution's guarantee of a "republican form of government to the states. | Political rights can be litigated; they do not per se represented nonjusticiable political questions. For example, a challenge to a state's failure to reapportion voting districts is justiciable. |
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Vieth v. Jubelirer Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 541 U.S. 267 Pg. 81 |
Plaintiffs, registered democrats who vote in Pennsylvania, brought suit seeking to enjoin implementation of Act 1, a redistricting plan passed by republicans. | Political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable because no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating such claims exist. |
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Powell v. McCormack Supreme Court of the United States, 1969 395 U.S. 486 Pg. 90 |
A congressman (Powell) was "excluded" from taking his seat in Congress for misconduct by a simple majority. | Though the power of "expulsion" has been clearly committed to a coordinate branch (Congress), "exclusion" has not. Since Congress required only a simple majority to "exclude" Powell, the question is justiciable. |
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Goldwater v. Carter Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 444 U.S. 996 Pg. 92 |
President Carter rescinded the United State's treaty with Taiwan as part of recognizing the People's Republic of China. Senator Barry Goldwater brought a constitutional challenge arguing that the Senate must rescind a treaty, just as the Senate must ratify the making of a treaty. | The issue presented in this action is a political question and therefore nonjusticiable. |
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Nixon v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1993 506 U.S. 224 Pg. 95 |
Walter Nixon asked the Court to decide wether Senate Rule XI, which allows a committee of Senators to hear evidence against an individual who has been impeached and to report that evidence to the full Senate, violates the Impeachment Trial Clause. Nixon was convicted by a jury for making false statements before a federal grand jury. | Nixon's claim that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause is nonjusticiable. |
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McCulloch v. Maryland Supreme Court of the United States, 1819 17 U.S. 316 Pg. 101 |
In an attempt to raise revenue, Congress created the Second Bank of the United States. Maryland responded by enacting a law that taxed any bank not chartered by the state. | The Court held that the Constitution grants Congress implied powers to be used in implementing the express enumerated powers and that state action may not impede a valid constitutional exercise of power by the Federal government. |
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Gibbons v. Ogden Supreme Court of the United States, 1824 22 U.S. 1 Pg. 113 |
Defendant had a New York granted monopoly on steamboat operations between New York and New Jersey. Plaintiff began operating like routes, under a license based on a federal Congressional statute. Defendant got a New York injunction forcing plaintiff to stop. | Congress may regulate commerce that has INTERSTATE effects even if the commerce occurs within one state. So, in this case, Congress has the exclusive power, pursuant to the commerce clause, to regulate navigation between the waters of two states. |
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United States v. E.C. Knight Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1895 156 U.S. 1 Pg. 117 |
The American Sugar Refining Company acquired nearly complete control of the manufacture of refined sugar within the United States. It was charged that this aquisition constituted a combination in restraint of trade and commerce. | The power of Congress to regulate commerce may operate to suppress monopoly whenever it comes within the rules by which commerce is governed, or whenever the transaction is itself a monopoly of commerce. |
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Carter v. Carter Coal Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1936 298 U.S. 238 Pg. 118 |
This case challenged the constitutional validity of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. The Act, among other things, levied a tax on the production of coal in an effort to conserve it as a national resource. | The Court held that the relations of employer and employee in this case are of local concern and only have a secondary or indirect relationship upon commerce. Therefore, the evils at issue are local evils, which the federal government has no legislative control over. |
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Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1914 234 U.S. 342 Pg. 120 |
The Interstate Commerce Commission found that the interstate class rates out of Shreveport to named Texas points were unreasonable, and it established maximum class rates for this traffic. The objection is that this correction was beyond the Comission's power, because the rates should have been maintained under state authority. | Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that the government of the one involves the control of the other, it is the Congress, and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule. |
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A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1935 295 U.S. 495 Pg. 122 |
Petitioners were convicted on eighteen counts of violating the "Live Poultry Code." The Code required sellers to sell only entire coops or half coops of chickens and regulated employment by requiring collective bargaining, prohibiting child labor, and establishing a 40 hour work week. | As far the poultry here in question is concerned, the flow in interstate commerce had ceased. The poultry had come to a permanent rest within the state. Thus, the poultry was not subject to congressional regulation. |
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Hammer v. Dagenhart Supreme Court of the United States, 1918 247 U.S. 251 Pg. 125 |
Father filed bill to enjoin act of Congress which prohibited the shipment in interstate or foreign commerce any product of a cotton mill situated in the United States, in which within 30 days before the removal of the product children under 14 have been employed, or children between 14 and 16 have been employed more than 8 hours in one day, or more than six days in any week, or between 7 in the evening and 6 in the morning. | The Court rules that the making of goods is not commerce. This ruling is later overruled. |
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Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case) Supreme Court of the United States, 1903 188 U.S. 321 Pg. 128 |
Congress criminalized the interstate transportation of lottery tickets. | The Power to regulate is the Power to exclude. |
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NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. Supreme Court of the United States, 1937 301 U.S. 1 Pg. 131 |
The National Labor Relations Board found that the respondent had violated the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 by engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce. | The Court concluded that the order of the Board was within its competency and that the act is valid as here applied. |
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United States v. Darby Supreme Court of the United States, 1941 312 U.S. 100 Pg. 134 |
Darby was a furniture maker who violated Fair Labor Standards Act, which capped employees' hours and set minimum wages. Defended on grounds that the Act exceeded Congress' Commerce Power. | Regulation of labor conditions for production of goods moving interstate IS within Congress' Commerce Power. |
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Wickard v. Filburn Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 317 U.S. 111 Pg. 136 |
Fulburn only produces wheat for home consumption and to feed his cattle, which are traded on interstate commerce, to make seeds for next year's crops, and sells a bit locally. Court holds that he is bound by Congress' wheat acreage and production allotment even though none of his wheat is sold in interstate commerce. | Congress may regulate a purely local activity if the cumulative effect of such activitiy is that it would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. |
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Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 379 U.S. 241 Pg. 139 |
The Heart of Atlanta Motel benefited from interstate commerce, but refused to lodge blacks. | Congress has power to regulate motel practices under the Commerce Power, to the extent that those practices impede the free flow of people traveling in interstate commerce. The fact that Congress was also, if not primarily, legislating against a moral wrong, does not undermine its Commerce Power. |
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Katzenbach v. McClung Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 379 U.S. 294 Pg. 141 |
Ollie's Barbecue served blacks in its carry-out window, but refused to seat them, though whites were allowed to dine in. Ollie's Barbecue was not located near an interstate highway, and the majority of its patrons were not travelers in interstate commerce. | Congress' commerce power allows it to forbid non-commercial acts if these acts can be found, if only in the aggregate, to exert a substantial impact on interstate commerce. |
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National League of Cities v. Usery Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 426 U.S. 833 Pg. 145 |
Congress regulated the working conditions (wages, overtime, labor standards) of public employees of the states. | The Court held that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the State's freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, section 8, cl.3. |
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Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 469 U.S. 528 Pg. 148 |
A Federal District Court concluded that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit system is a traditional governmental function and thus, under National League of Cities, is exempt from the obligations imposed by the FLSA. The Court revisited the issues raised in National League of Cities v. Usery, which held that Congress lacked authority to impose the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and local governments. | The Court held that in affording SAMTA employees the protection of the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA, Congress contravened no affirmative limit on its power under the Commerce Clause. There is nothing in the overtime and minimum-wage requirements of the FLSA, as applied to SAMTA, that is destructive of state sovereignty or violative of any constitutional provision. The Court also concluded that National League of Cities v. Usery is overruled. |
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United States v. Lopez Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 514 U.S. 549 Pg. 153 |
In the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Congress made it a federal offense for any individual to knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone. The question is whether the Act exceeds congressional authority. | The Court held that the Act exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause authority. |
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Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 531 U.S. 159 Pg. 170 |
Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), regulates the discharge of dredged or fill material into "navigable waters." The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, has interpreted section 404(a) to confer federal authority over an abandoned sand and gravel pit in northern Illinois which provides a habitat for migratory birds. The question is whether section 404(a) may be fairly extended to these waters, and, if so, whether Congress could exercise such authority consistent with the Commerce Clause. | Title 33 CFR section 328.3(a)(3), as clarified and applied to petitioner's site pursuant to the Migratory Bird Rule, exceeds the authority granted to respondents under section 404(a) of the CWA. |
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Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 123 U.S. 720 Pg. 175 |
The Court addressed whether 23 U.S.C. section 409, which protects information "compiled or collected" in connection with certain federal highway safety programs from being discovered or admitted in certain federal or state trials, is a valid exercise of Congress's authority under the Constitution. | This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the tort portion of the case but has jurisdiction to hear the Public Disclosure Act portion. Certain state-court judgments can be treated as final for jurisdictional purposes even though further proceedings are to take place in the state courts. |
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New York v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 505 U.S. 144 Pg. 177 |
The Court addressed the constitutionality of three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. The Act provided three types of incentives to encourage States to comply with their statutory obligation to provide for the disposal of waste generated within their borders. | The Act's monetary incentives and access incentives provisons are consistent with the Constitution's allocation of power between the Federal and State Governments, but the take title provision is not. |
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Printz v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 521 U.S. 898 Pg. 186 |
Court compelled states to comply with Brady act by committing state resources. | In exercising its commerce power, Congress can not commandeer local functions. |
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Reno v. Condon The Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 528 U.S. 141 Pg. 195 |
The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in records of state motor vehicle departments. The DPPA establishes a regulatory scheme that restricts the State's ability to disclose a driver's personal information without the driver's consent. South Carolina law conflicts with the DPPA's provisions. | In enacting the DPPA, Congress did not run afoul of the federalism principles enunciated in New York v. United States, and Printz v. United States. The Federal Government correctly asserts that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, |
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United States v. Butler Supreme Court of the United States, 1936 297 U.S. 1 Pg. 198 |
In this case the Court was left to determine whether certain provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933, conflict with the Constitution. The Act declared that because of a crisis in agricultural production, the Secretary of Agriculture could set limits on production of certain crops and impose taxes on production in excess of these limits. | The Court held that there was no power in Congress to impose the contested exaction, it could not lawfully ratify or confirm what an executive officer had done in that regard. |
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Sabri v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 541 U.S. 600 Pg. 201 |
Petitioner, Sabri, offered three separate bribes to a city councilman. He was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. section 666(a)(2), which imposes federal criminal penalties on anyone who corruptly gives anything of value to officers of the state. The question is whether this statute is a valid exercise of congressional authority. | "Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate federal monies to promote the general welfare, and it has corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that power are in fact spent for the general welfare, and not frittered away in graft or on projects undermined when funds are siphoned off or corrupt public officers are derelict about demanding value for dollars." |
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South Dakota v. Dole Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 483 U.S. 203 Pg. 204 |
Congress conditioned funding of federal highways on conforming to national drinking age. | Spending must be (1) in the general welfare (deference is given to Congress on whether the program is in the general welfare); (2) the condition must be clearly and unambiguously stated; and (3) the condition must be clearly related to the federal interest, i.e., there must be a nexus between the condition and the federal interest for a legitimate exercise of spending power. |
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United States v. Morrison Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 529 U.S. 598 Pg. 209 |
Congress included a civil damages provision in the Violence Against Women Act. | In order for Congress to regulate something under it's commerce power, the thing being regulated must be economic in nature. |
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Katzenbach v. Morgan Supreme Court of the United States, 1966 384 U.S. 641 Pg. 212 |
These cases concern the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which provided that no person who has successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public or private school accredited by Puerto Rico, in which the language of instruction was other than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of an inability to read or write in English. | The Court concluded that section 4(e), in the application challenged in this case, is appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. |
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City of Boerne v. Flores Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 521 U.S. 507 Pg. 216 |
A catholic Archbishop brought this suit challenging a permit denial to expand a church in the city of Boerne. The Archbishop relied upon the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as one basis for relief. | The Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeds Congress' power. |
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Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 427 U.S. 445 Pg. 224 |
In the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress authorized federal courts to award money damages in favor of a private individual against a state government found to have subjected the person to employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The question is whether Congress has this authority under the Constitution. | The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a backpay award to petitioners, since that Amendment and the principle of state sovereignty that it embodies are limited by the enforcement provisions of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress authority to enforce "by appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. |
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Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 517 U.S. 44 Pg. 226 |
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provides that an Indian tribe may conduct certain gaming activities only in conformance with a valid compact between the tribe and the State in which the gaming activities are located. The Act imposes upon a State a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of a compact and authorizes a tribe to bring suit in federal court in order to compel a State to perform that duty. The question is whether the Act abrogates a States' sovereign immunity. | The Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. |
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Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank and United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 527 U.S. 627 Pg. 231 |
In 1992, Congress amended the patent laws and expressly abrogated the States' sovereign immunity from claims of patent infringement. College savings then sued the State of Florida for patent infringement, claiming that in the course of administering its tuition prepayment program, Florida Prepaid directly and indirectly infringed College Savings' Patent. | The Act's abrogation of States' sovereign immunity is invalid because it cannot be sustained as legislation enacted to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. |
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Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 120 S. Ct. 631 Pg. 235 |
The Age Discrimination Act of 1967, makes it unlawful for an employer, including a State, to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual because of such individual's age. Plaintiff's filed suit under the Act, claiming unlawful discrimination on the basis of age. The Court was left to determine whether the ADEA provided a clear statement of Congress's intent to abrogate State's immunity, and if that abrogation exceeded Congress's authority. | Although the ADEA does contain a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the States' immunity, that abrogation exceeded Congress' authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Board of Trustees, University of Alabama v. Garrett Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 531 U.S. 356 Pg. 239 |
The Court decided whether employees of the State of Alabama may recover money damages by reason of the State's failure to comply with the provisions of Title I of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990. Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, was diagnosed with breast cancer, and subsequently demoted at work from a director to a nurse manager position. | Suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the State's failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. |
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Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 538 U.S. 721 Pg. 246 |
Petitioner's are employees of the Nevada Department of Human Resources. One petitioner sought leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act to take care of his ailing wife. After being granted leave, he was terminated, before he could return to work. | State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court if it makes its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Tennessee v. Lane Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 541 U.S. 509 Pg. 251 |
Respondents allege past and ongoing violations of Title II. They claim they were denied access to, and the services of, the state court system by reason of their disabilities. One respondent had to crawl up two flights of stairs to get to the courtroom. | As it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, Title II constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce that Amendment's substantive guarantees. |
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Alden v. Maine Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 527 U.S. 706 Pg. 258 |
Alden and other probation officers filed suit against the state of Maine asking for damages that arose from FLSA violations. | State immunity in state courts is consistent with structure of constitution because of the essential principles of federalism and role of state courts. |
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer Supreme Court of the United States, 1952 343 U.S. 579 Pg. 272 |
President Truman ordered the federal government to seize control of American steel mills in an effort to avoid a strike that he believed would hinder the ability of the United States to prosecute the conflict in Korea. | The president may take any action not prohibited by the Constitution or a statute. The most frequently cited test for analysis comes from Jackson's delineation of three zones of presidential powers: (1) when the President acts with the authority of Congress, the President's acts are presumptively valid; (2) when there is no Congressional grant or denial of authority, but there is a gray area in which the President and Congress may have concurrent authority, the test of power in this area depends on imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law; (3) when the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, the President must rely on his Constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. In this case, because the president is disobeying a federal law, such presidential actions will be allowed only if the law enacted by Congress is unconstitutional. |
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United States v. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 418 U.S. 683 Pg. 282 |
The President was issued a subpoena to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aides and advisers. The court rejected the President's claims of absolute privilege, or lack of jurisdiction, and of failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 17(c). | The Court concluded that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. |
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William J. Clinton, President of the United States v. City of New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1998 524 U.S. 417 Pg. 288 |
Plaintiffs, the City of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, two unions representing health care employees, and a farmers' cooperative consisting of about 30 potato growers in Idaho, filed two separate actions against the President and other federal officials challenging two cancellations that the President made to a bill pursuant to the President's line item veto authority. | The Court concluded that if there is to be a new procedure in which the President will play a different role in determining the final text of what may "become a law," such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution. |
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Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan Supreme Court of the United States, 1935 293 U.S. 388 Pg. 294 |
A provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorized the President to prohibit transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum produced in excess of the amount permitted by state. | The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. If section 9(c) were held valid, it would idle to pretend that anything would be left of limitations upon the power of the Congress to delegate its lawmaking function. |
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Whitman v. American Trucking Assn., Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 531 U.S. 457 Pg. 296 |
These cases present the question of whether section 109 of the Clean Air Act delegates legilative power to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. | Section 109(b) does not permit the Administrator to consider implementation costs in setting NAAQS. Because the CAA often expressly grants the EPA the authority to consider implementation costs, a provision for costs will not be inferred from its ambiguous provisions. |
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Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jagdish Rai Chadha Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 462 U.S. 919 Pg. 299 |
Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds a British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the U.S., but stayed longer than his visa allowed. Later an immigration judge suspended his deportation under section 244(a)(1). After that, Representative Eilberg introduced a resolution opposing the granting of permanent residence in the U.S. to certain illegal aliens including Chadha. | We hold that the congressional veto provision in 244(c)(2) is severable from the Act and that it is unconstitutional. |
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Alexia Morrison, Independent Counsel v. Theodore B. Olson Supreme Court of the United States, 1988 487 U.S. 654 Pg. 307 |
Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act allows for the appointment of an "independent counsel" to investigate and prosecute government officials for violations of federal criminal laws. Pursuant to the Act, the Attorney General is required to report to a special court for the purpose of appointing independent counsels, if there is reasonable grounds to believe further investigation into a criminal matter is warranted. This case presents a challenge to the independent counsel provisions of the Act. | It does not violate the Appointments Clause for Congress to vest the appointment of independent counsel in the Special Division. The powers vested in the Special Division do not violate Article III, under which executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under Article III. |
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Myers v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1926 272 U.S. 52 Pg. 313 |
Myers was appointed by the President to be postmaster of the first class at Portland. Later, Myers was removed from office by the Postmaster General. Myers protested to the demand for his removal and continued to do until the end of his term. He filed suit to recover a portion of his salarly that was not paid. | The Court held that the provision of the law of 1876 by which the unrestricted power of removal of first-class postmasters is denied to the President is in violation of the Constitution and invalid. This leads to an affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Claims. |
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Humphrey's Executor v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1935 295 U.S. 602 Pg. 314 |
Plaintiff brought suit to recover salary allegedly owed to the deceased for salary as a Federal Trade Commissioner. President Roosevelt had removed the deceased from office, but the deceased had refused to resign. | Under the Constitution, illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the President in respect of officers that in any proper sense cannot be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive. |
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Wiener v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1958 357 U.S. 349 Pg. 315 |
President Eisenhower removed the petitioner from the War Claims Commission because the President wanted to appoint some of his own people. Petitioner refused to resign and subsequently sued for back pay. | The Court concluded that the President had no such power to remove a member of an adjudicatory body, like the War Claims Commission, merely because he wanted his own appointees on such a Commission. |
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Bowsher v. Synar Supreme Court of the United States, 1986 478 U.S. 714 Pg. 317 |
The question presented by these appeals is whether the assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States of certain functions under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the doctrine of separation of powers. | The powers vested in the Comptroller General under 251 violate the Constitution's command that Congress play no direct role in the execution of the laws. There is no merit to the contention that the Comptroller General performs his duties independently and is not subservient to Congress. Although nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the Comptroller General is removable only at the initiative of Congress |
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United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. Supreme Court of the United States, 1936 299 U.S. 304 Pg. 321 |
Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President to stop sales of arms to countries involved in the Chaco border dispute. President Roosevelt immediately issued an order prohibiting munitions sales to the warring nations in the Chaco border dispute. Later, an indictment was issued that charged the appellees with conspiring to sell arms of war to Bolivia, a country engaged in the Chaco conflict, in violation of the Joint Resolution issued by Congress. | The President, under the plenary and exclusive power granted to him by the Constitution, is the sole organ of the nation in his external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. |
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Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 453 U.S. 654 Pg. 325 |
In 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran was seized and the U.S. diplomatic personnel were captured and held hostage. In response, President Carter declared a national emergency and blocked the removal or transfer of all property and interests in property of the government of Iran. The hostages were later released under an agreement to terminate all litigation between the nationals of each country and bring about the settlement of all such claims through binding arbitration. | The President was authorized to nullify the attachments and order the transfer of Iranian assets by the provision of the IEEPA, which empowers the President to "compel," "nullify," or "prohibit" any "transfer" with respect to, or transactions involving, any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in which any foreign country has any interest. While it is not concluded that the President has plenary power to settle claims, even against foreign governmental entities, nevertheless, where, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between this country and another, and Congress has acquiesced in the President's action, it cannot be said that the President lacks the power to settle such claims. |
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 542 U.S. 507 Pg. 332 |
Hamdi was detained after the U.S. government determined that he took up arms with the Taliban. The government contends that Hamdi is an enemy combatant, and that this status justifies holding him indefinitely. | The Court conclued that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged in this case, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. |
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Ex Parte Quirin Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 317 U.S. 1 Pg. 347 |
Citizens of the German Reich, who had lived in the United States, were captured and detained by the U.S., after they were arrested with explosives in an apparent attempt to attack U.S. citizens. The President subjected them to a military tribunal. | The Court held that the charges preferred against petitioners on which they are being tried by military commission appointed by the order of the President of July 2, 1942, allege an offense or offenses which the President is authorized to order tried before a military commission, and that the military commission was lawfully constituted, and that petitioners are held in lawful custody, for trial before the military commission, and have not shown cause for being discharged by writ of habeas corpus. |
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Richard Nixon v. A. Ernest Fitzgerald Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 457 U.S. 731 Pg. 354 |
Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force. Fitzerald had attracted unusual attention a year earlier by embarrassing his superiors when he revealed that a cost-overrun on a transport plane would cost nearly 2 billion. President Nixon initially said he approved the firing, but later recanted. | The Court held that petitioner, as a former president of the U.S., is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. |
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William Jefferson Clinton v. Paula Corbin Jones Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 520 U.S. 681 Pg. 357 |
Jones claimed that then President Clinton had made abhorrent sexual advances towards her while he was Governor of Arkansas. | The Court held that the the President is not entitled to immunity from liability for his unofficial acts. |
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Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 533 U.S. 525 Pg. 368 |
In early 1999, the Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. The question presented was whether certain adverstising regulations were pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. | The Court held that the Attorney General's outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations targeting cigarettes are pre-empted by the FCLAA. |
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Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, Director Dept. of Agriculture of California Supreme Court of the United States, 1963 373 U.S. 132 Pg. 374 |
Section 792 of California's Agriculture Code prohibits the transportation or sale in California of avocados which contain "less than 8 per cent of oil, by weight excluding the skin and seed. The regulation excluded from the California market certain Florida avocados, which did not meet the requirement. | The Court concluded that the present record demonstrates no inevitable collision between the two schemes of regulation, despite the dissimilarity of the standards. Thus, it upheld the California regulation. |
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Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commn. Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 461 U.S. 190 Pg. 375 |
At issue in this case was whether provisions in the 1976 amendments to California's Warren-Alquist Act, which condition the construction of nuclear plants on findings by the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission that adequate storage facilities and means of disposal are available for nuclear waste, are preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. | The Court held that Congress has left sufficient authority in the States to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons, and that the courts should not assume the role that our system assigns to Congress. |
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Hines, Secretary of Labor and Industry of Pennsylvania v. Davidowitz Supreme Court of the United States, 1941 312 U.S. 52 Pg. 379 |
This case concerns the validity of an Alien Registration Act, adopted by Pennsylvania. The Act requires, among other things, that every alien 18 years or over register once a year, pay a $1 registration fee, and receive and carry an alien identification card. | The Court concluded that Congress has already provided a standard for alien registration in a single integrated and all-embracing system in order to obtain the information deemed to be desirable in connection with aliens. Thus, it held that the Act should not be enforced. |
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H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1939 336 U.S. 529 Pg. 382 |
This case concerns the power of New York to deny additional facilities to acquire and ship milk in interstate commerce where the grounds of denial are that such limitation upon interstate business will protect and advance local economic interests. | "Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his export, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality." |
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Aaron B. Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia Supreme Court of the United States, 1851 53 U.S. 299 Pg. 388 |
A Pennsylvania law required all ships entering or leaving the Port of Philadelphia to use a local pilot or to pay a fine that went to support retired pilots. | The Court concluded that it did not perceive anything in the nature of this particular discrimination in favor of vessels in the coal trade, which would enable us to declare it to be other than a fair exercise of legislative discretion. |
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South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1938 303 U.S. 177 Pg. 390 |
South Carolina forbade trucks exceeding size and weight limits from operating on South Carolina roads. | States may burden interstate commerce only if the burden serves a legitimate police power interest (it cannot merely favor intrastate industry). |
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Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona Ex Rel. Sullivan, Attorney General Supreme Court of the United States, 1945 325 U.S. 761 Pg. 391 |
An Arizona Train Limit Law made it unlawful for any person or corporation to operate within the state a railroad train of more than fourteen passenger or seventy freight cars, and authorizes the state to recover a money penalty for each violation of the Act. | "The decisive question is whether in the circumstances the total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it and subject it to local regulation which does not have a uniform effect on the interstate train journey which it interrupts." |
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City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 437 U.S. 617 Pg. 395 |
A New Jersey law prohibits the importation of most solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the state. | The Court concluded that the Commerce Clause will protect New Jersey in the future, just as it protects her neighbors now, from efforts by one State to isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared by all. Thus, the Court struck down the law. |
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C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 511 U.S. 383 Pg. 397 |
In 1989, the town of Clarkston entered into a consent decree with the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. As part of the decree, the town agreed to close its landfill located on Route 33 and build a new solid waste transfer station on the same site. In order to meet a yearly flow guarantee, the town adopted the flow control ordinance here in question. | The Court found that the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce. State and local governments may not use their regulatory power to favor local enterprise by prohibiting patronage of out-of-state competitors or their facilities. |
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Hughes v. Oklahoma Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 441 U.S. 322 Pg. 401 |
An Oklahoma statute was passed providing that no person may transport or ship minnows for sale outside the state which were seized or procured within the waters of the state. | The Court held that the statute discriminates against interstate commerce. |
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Hunt, Governor of the State of North Carolina v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 432 U.S. 333 Pg. 402 |
In order to protect and enhance the reputation of Washington apples, the state legislature adopted a stringent, mandatory inspection program, which required all apples shipped in interstate commerce to be tested under strict quality standards and graded accordingly. | "When discrimination against commerce . . . is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake." |
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Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 437 U.S. 117 Pg. 404 |
A Maryland statute provided that a producer or refiner of petroleum products may not operate any retail service station within the state, and must extend all "voluntary allowances" uniformly to all service stations it supplies. | The Court concluded that the Commerce Clause was intended to protect the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations. Thus, the Court held that the statute was not invalid. |
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West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, Commissioner of Massachusetts Dept. of Food and Agriculture Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 512 U.S. 186 Pg. 407 |
A Massachusetts pricing order imposed an assessment on all fluid milk sold by dealers to Massachusetts retailers. About two-thirds of that milk is produced out of state. The entire assessment, however, is distributed to Massachusetts dairy farmers. | The Court held that the pricing order unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce. |
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State of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 449 U.S. 456 Pg. 409 |
In 1977, the Minnesota legislature enacted a statute banning the retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but permitting such sale in other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard milk cartons. | The Court held that the ban on plastic nonreturnable milk containers bears a rational relation to the State's objectives and must be sustained under the Equal Protection Clause. Furthermore, the statute does not impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce and is therefore not a violation of the Commerce Clause. |
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Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin Supreme Court of the United States, 1951 340 U.S. 349 Pg. 411 |
This appeal challenges the validity of a section of an ordinance passed by the City of Madison, Wisconsin. The ordinance regulates the sale of milk and milk products within the municipality's jurisdiction. The section makes it unlawful to sell any milk as pasteurized unless it has been processed and bottled at an approved pasteurization plant. | The Court held that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause and that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation. |
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Maine v. Taylor and United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1986 477 U.S. 131 Pg. 412 |
Despite a Maine statute prohibiting the importation of live baitfish, appellee arranged to have 158,000 live golden shiners delivered to him from out of state. The shipment was intercepted and appellee was arrested. | The Court held that the Maine statute is constitutional. Maine was justified in passing the statute in order to protect against a legitimate risk to the environment. |
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Loren J. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1970 397 U.S. 137 Pg. 415 |
The Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act requires that all cantaloupes grown in Arizona and offered for sale must be packed in regular compact arrangements in closed standard containers approved by the supervisor. A company doing business in violation of the Act brought suit to enjoin the order as unconstitutional. | The burden on interstate commerce imposed by appellant's order is unconstitutional because Arizona's minimal interest in identifying the origin of appellee's cantaloupes to enhance the reputation of Arizona producers cannot justify subjecting appellee to the substantial capital expenditure of building and operating in Arizona a packing plant that it does not need. |
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Bibb, Director, Dept. of Public Safety of Illinois v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1959 359 U.S. 520 Pg. 416 |
An Illinois statute required, among other things, that a specific type of mudguard must extend downward to within 10 inches from the ground when the truck is loaded to its maximum capacity and that the guards must be wide enough to cover the width of the protected tire. Various interstate motor carriers challenged the constitutional validity of the statute. | "[S]afety measures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in court. . . . Unless we can conclude on the whole record that 'the total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it' we must uphold the statute." |
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Raymond Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 455 U.S. 329 Pg. 418 |
The State of Iowa restricts, by statute, the length of vehicles that may use its highways. Unlike all other States in the West and Midwest, Iowa generally prohibits the use of 65-foot doubles within its borders. Because of Iowa's statutory scheme, Consolidated cannot use its 65-foot doubles to move commodities through the State. | The Court held that the state law impermissibly burdened interstate commerce and was therefore unconstitutional. |
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CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 481 U.S. 69 Pg. 421 |
An Indiana law limited corporate takeovers by requiring that a purchaser who acquired "control shares" in an Indiana corporation would acquire voting rights only if the transaction was approved by a majority vote of the preexisting disinterested shareholders. | The Indiana Act does not violate the Commerce Clause. The Act's limited effect on interstate commerce is justified by the State's interests in defining attributes of its corporations' shares and in protecting shareholders. |
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Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 451 U.S. 648 Pg. 424 |
The California Insurance Code imposes a retaliatory tax on out-of-state insurers doing business in California, when the insurer's State of incorporation imposes higher taxes on California insurers doing business in that State than California would otherwise impose on that State's insurers doing business in California. | The retaliatory tax does not violate the Commerce Clause. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, which leaves the regulation and taxation of insurance companies to the States, removes entirely any Commerce Clause restriction upon California's power to tax the insurance business. Neither the language nor the history of that Act suggests that it does not permit, as appellant argues, "anti-competitive state taxation that discriminates against out-of-state insurers. |
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Reeves, Inc. v. William Stake Supreme Court of the United States, 1980 447 U.S. 429 Pg. 426 |
Facing a serious cement shortage, South Dakota reaffirmed its policy of supplying all South Dakota's customers first and to honor all contract commitments, with the remaining volume allocated on a first come, first served basis. | South Dakota's resident-preference program for the sale of cement does not violate the Commerce Clause. |
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South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Commissioner, Dept. of Natural Resources of Alaska Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 467 U.S. 82 Pg. 429 |
In September 1980, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources published a notice that it would sell approximately 49 million board-feet of timber in the area of Icy Cape. The notice of sale provided that primary manunfacturer within Alaska will be required as a special provision of the contract. The purpose of the requirement was to protect existing industries, provide for the establishment of new industries, derive revenue from all timber resources, and manage the State's forests on a sustained yield basis. | The Court concluded that the State may not avail itself of the market-participant doctrine to immunize its downstream regulation of the timber-processing market in which it is not a participant. Thus, Alaska's requirement that timber taken from Alaska lands be processed within Alaska before export was not authorized by Congress and is a violation of the Commerce Clause. |
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Toomer v. Witsell Supreme Court of the United States, 1948 334 U.S. 385 Pg. 435 |
The statutes appellants challenge relate to shrimping during the open season in a three-mile belt off the coast of South Carolina. The Code provides that the waters in the area shall be a common for the people of the State for the taking of fish. It also requires payment of a license fee of $ 25 for each shrimp boat owned by a resident, and of $ 2,500 for each one owned by a non-resident. | The Court held that through section 3379 South Carolina plainly and frankly discriminates against non-residents, and the record leaves litte doubt but what the discrimination is so great that its practical effect is virtually exclusionary. Thus, section 3379 is unconstitutional. |
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United Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden County v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 465 U.S. 208 Pg. 436 |
A municipal ordinance of the City of Camden requires that at least 40% of the employees of contractors and subcontractors working on city construction projects be Camden residents. | The ordinance is properly subject to the strictures of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. That the ordinance is a municipal, rather than a state, law does not place it outside the Clause's scope. |
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Lester Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commn. of Montana Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 436 U.S. 371 Pg. 438 |
Montana required that a non-resident purchase a hunting license for $225 in order to hunt elk. A resident of Montana could purchase a similar license for only $30. Appellants argue this is a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. | Access by nonresidents to recreational big-game hunting in Montana does not fall within the category of rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Only with respect to those "privileges" and "immunities" bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must a State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally, and here equality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union. |
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Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Kathryn A. Piper Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 470 U.S. 274 Pg. 439 |
The Rules of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire limit bar admission to state residents. | A State may discriminate against nonresidents only where its reasons are "substantial" and the difference in treatment bears a close or substantial relationship to those reasons. None of the reasons offered by appellant for its refusal to admit nonresidents to the bar meets the test of "substantiality," and the means chosen do not bear the necessary relationship to the State's objectives. Thus, rule 42 violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. |
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Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Supreme Court of the United States, 1833 32 U.S. 243 Pg. 447 |
Barron owned a wharf in the city of Baltimore. The city deposited sand and gravel near the wharf, rendering it worthless. Barron claimed that he was due compensation pursuant to the 5th Amendment of the Constitution. | The Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government and cannot be applied to the States. |
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Slaughter-House Cases Supreme Court of the United States, 1873 83 U.S. 36 Pg. 449 |
The city of New Orleans created a monopoly by granting a contract to a slaughter house, so that the city could accommodate the influx of cattle from Texas. The butchers in New Orleans brought suit, challenging the granting of the monopoly as an impermissible barrier to trade. | The Court refused to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, but did |
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Saenz v. Roe Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 526 U.S. 489 Pg. 456 |
In 1992, California enacted a statute limiting the maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents. The scheme limits the amount payable to a family that has resided in the State for less than 12 months to the amount payable by the State of the family's prior residence. | Section 11450.03 violates the Fourteenth Amendment because the right to travel embraces a citizen's right to be treated equally in her new State of residence, a discriminatory classification is itself a penalty. California's classifications are defined entirely by the period of residency and the location of the disfavored class members' prior residences. |
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Twining v. New Jersey Supreme Court of the United States, 1908 211 U.S. 78 Pg. 458 |
In this case, the jury was instructed that they could draw an unfavorable inference against the defendant from his failure to testify. The question, therefore, is whether such instruction violates the 14th Amendment. | The State had the authority to issue the jury instruction as long as it only infringed upon the right of self-incrimination. The 14th Amendment applies to fundamental principles of liberty and justice. |
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Adamson v. California Supreme Court of the United States, 1947 332 U.S. 46 Pg. 461 |
Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree. Appellent did not testify during his trial. The provisions of California law permit the failure of a defendant to testify to be commented upon by court and by counsel and to be considered by court and by jury. | The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not draw all the rights of the federal Bill of Rights under its protection. Thus, there is no error in the California provision that allows the jury and court to consider a defendant's failure to testify. |
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United States v. Stanley Supreme Court of the United States, 1883 109 U.S. 3 Pg. 469 |
These cases arise out of denying accommodations to persons of color at a hotel and denying colored persons a seat in a theater. | The Court held that until some state law is passed, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said Amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity, for the prohibitions of the Amendment are against state laws and acts done under state authority. |
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Marsh v. Alabama Supreme Court of the United States, 1946 326 U.S. 501 Pg. 474 |
A Jehovah's Witness was arrested and convicted for distributing religious literature near the post office in Chickasaw Alabama. The Jehova's Witness claimed that her right to freedom of press and religion was obstructed contrary to the Constitution. | The Court held that insofar as the State had attempted to impose criminal punishment on the Jehova's Witness for undertaking to distribute religious literature in a company town, its action cannot stand and is a violation of the Constitution. |
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Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 419 U.S. 345 Pg. 476 |
Petitioner, a resident of York, had her electricity service discontinued because of an asserted delinquency in payments. | The Court concluded that the State of Pennsylvania is not sufficiently connected with respondent's action in terminating petitioner's service so as to make respondent's conduct in so doing attributable to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Terry v. Adams Supreme Court of the United States, 1953 345 U.S. 461 Pg. 479 |
The Jaybird activities follow a plan purposefully designed to exclude Negroes from voting and at the same time to escape the Fifteenth Amendment's command that the right of citizens to vote shall neither be denied nor abridged on account of race. | The combined election machinery of the Association and the Democratic Party deprives petitioners of their right to vote on account of their race and color, contrary to the Fifteenth Amendment. |
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Evans v. Newton Supreme Court of the United States, 1966 382 U.S. 296 Pg. 480 |
A U.S. Senator, Augustus O. Bacon, executed a will that devised to the Mayor and Council of the City of Macon, Georgia a tract of land which, after the death of the Senator's wife and daughters, was to be used as a "park and pleasure ground" for white people only. | Where private individuals or groups exercise powers or carry on functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. The services rendered by a park are municipal in nature and, under the circumstances of this case, the park is subject to the equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local, 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 391 U.S. 308 Pg. 482 |
Members of the Amalgamated Food Employees Union began picketing Weis Markets, Inc., which was an occupant of Logan Valley Mall. The picketers held signs saying that Weis employees were not receiving union benefits or wages. The picketing was carried out almost entirely in the parcel pickup area. | Peaceful picketing carried on in a location open generally to the public is, absent other factors involving the purpose or the manner of the picketing, protected by the First Amendment. |
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Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 407 U.S. 551 Pg. 484 |
A group of individuals wished to distribute handbills within a mall. The handbills had nothing to do with the mall's operation. | The Court held that there had been no such dedication of Lloyd's privately owned and operated shopping center to public use as to entitle respondents to exercise therein the asserted First Amendment Right of distributing handbills. |
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Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 424 U.S. 507 Pg. 485 |
A group of union members who engaged in peaceful primary picketing within the confines of a privately owned shopping center were threatened by an agent of the owner with arrest for criminal trespass if they did not depart. | Under the present state of the law the constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as this, and the pickets here did not have a First Amendment right to enter the shopping center for the purpose of advertising their strike against their employer. |
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Shelley v. Kraemer Supreme Court of the United States, 1948 334 U.S. 1 Pg. 487 |
In 1911, numerous owners of property fronting both sides of Labadie Avenue in the City of St. Louis signed an agreement restricting the use of that property to every person not of the Caucasian race. | The Court held that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the states have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand. |
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Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 457 U.S. 922 Pg. 490 |
Petitioner alleged in his complaint that in attaching his property respondents had acted jointly with the State to deprive him of his property without due process of law. Petitioner's property was attached in a garnishment proceeding against him. | Conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a constitutional right protected against infringement by a State must be fairly attributable to the State. In determining the question of "fair attribution," (a) the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by it or by a person for whom it is responsible, and (b) the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor, either because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State. |
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Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1991 500 U.S. 614 Pg. 493 |
A black construction worker was injured at a jobsite accident. The worker sued a construction company for negligence. During Voir Dire, the construction company used two of its three premptory challenges to strike black jurors from the prospective jury. The resulting jury had 11 whites and 1 black. | A private litigant in a civil case may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of race. |
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Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority Supreme Court of the United States, 1961 365 U.S. 715 Pg. 495 |
Eagle Coffee Shop, a restuarant located within a parking building, refused to serve appellant food or drink solely because he was a negro. The parking building was owned and operated by an agency of the State of Deleware. | In view of all the circumstances of this case, including the facts that the restaurant was physically and financially an integral part of a public building, built and maintained with public funds, devoted to a public parking service, and owned and operated by an agency of the State for public purposes, the State was a joint participant in the operation of the restaurant, and its refusal to serve appellant violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 407 U.S. 163 Pg. 497 |
Appellee Irvis, a negro, was denied service by appellant Moose Lodge, a local branch of the national fraternal organization located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Appellant claimed that because the Pennsylvania liquor board had issued Moose Lodge a license authorizing the sale of liquor that the club's refusal to serve him was state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. | The operation of Pennsylvania's regulatory scheme enforced by the state liquor board, except as noted below, does not sufficiently implicate the State in appellant's discriminatory guest practices so as to make those practices "state action" within the purview of the Equal Protection Clause, and there is no suggestion in the record that the State's regulation of the sale of liquor is intended overtly or covertly to encourage discrimination. |
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Norwood v. Harrison Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 413 U.S. 455 Pg. 499 |
A three-judge District Court sustained the validity of a Mississippi statutory program under which textbooks are purchased by the State and lent to students in both public and private schools, without reference to whether any participating private school has racially discriminatory policies. Appellants, parents of four schoolchildren, filed a claim alleging that by supplying textbooks to student of private schools that the state provided direct aid to racially segregated education. | Private schools have the right to exist and to operate, but the State is not required by the Equal Protection Clause to provide assistance to private schools equivalent to that it provides to public schools without regard to whether the private schools discriminate on racial grounds. Free textbooks, like tuition grants directed to students in private schools, are a form of tangible financial assistance benefiting the schools themselves, and the State's constitutional obligation requires it to avoid not only operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools but also providing tangible aid to schools that practice racial or other invidious discrimination. |
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Rendell-Baker v. Kohn Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 457 U.S. 830 Pg. 501 |
Rendell-Baker was discharged by the New Perspectives School, a non-profit institution located on privately owned property. Five others were discharged shortly thereafter. The discharges resulted from a disagreement over the role of a student-staff council in making hiring decisions. Petitioners allege they were discharged in violation of their First Amendment right of free speech. | Respondent school did not act under color of state law when it discharged petitioner employees, and hence petitioners have not stated a claim for relief. |
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Blum v. Yaretsky Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 457 U.S. 991 Pg. 504 |
Respondents were recipients under the Medicaid program, and were patients in the Amercan Nursing Home located in New York City. The nursing home decided that respondents did not need the level of care they were receiving and transferred them to a lower level of care. Medicaid then made a decision to reduce or terminate payments to the nursing home for respondent's care. | Respondents failed to establish "state action" in the nursing homes' decisions to discharge or transfer Medicaid patients to lower levels of care and thus failed to prove that petitioners have violated rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Reitman v. Mulkey Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 387 U.S. 369 Pg. 508 |
Respondents, husband and wife, sued alleging that petitioners denied to rent them an apartment solely on account of their race. | The Court held that the potential passage and impact of section 26 would involve the State in private racial discriminations to an unconstitutional degree. |
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Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 531 U.S. 288 Pg. 512 |
The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association's board of control found that Brentwood violated a rule prohibiting undue influence in recruiting athletes, when it wrote to incoming students and their parents about spring football practice. The Association accordingly put Brentwood's athletic program on probation for four years. | The Association's regulatory activity is state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the Association's structure, there being no offsetting reason to see the Association's acts in any other way. |
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Allgeyer v. Louisiana Supreme Court of the United States, 1897 165 U.S. 578 Pg. 524 |
The State of Louisiana forbid foreign insurance companies from doing business in that state. In supposed violtion of this policy, a letter was sent through the mail notifying a company of the property to be covered by a policy already delivered. The contract was made in New York, outside the jurisdiction of Louisiana. | For these reasons we think the statute in question was a violation of the federal constitution, and afforded no justification for the judgment awarded by that court against the plaintiffs in error. |
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Lochner v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1905 198 U.S. 45 Pg. 526 |
The 1895 "Bakeshop Act," enacted by the New York legislature, limited the hours bakers could work. Lochner, a New York baker, was fined for working employees overtime. He appealed his conviction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | The right to enter into a contract is a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the "Bakeshop Act" was not a valid exercise of the State's police powers and therefore was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. NOTE: This is no longer good law. |
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Coppage v. Kansas Supreme Court of the United States, 1915 236 U.S. 1 Pg. 531 |
A Kansas statute made it illegal for an employer or his agent to prescribe, as a condition upon which one may secure certain employment or remain in such employment, that the employee shall enter into an agreement not to become a member or any labor organization while so employed. | The Kansas act of March 13, 1903, as construed and applied so as to punish with fine or imprisonment an employer or his agent for merely prescribing, as a condition upon which one may secure employment under or remain in the service of such employer, that the employee shall enter into an agreement not to become or remain a member of any labor organization while so employed, is repugnant to the 'due process' clause of the 14th Amendment, and therefore void. |
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Muller v. Oregon Supreme Court of the United States, 1908 208 U.S. 412 Pg. 534 |
Defendant was convicted for violating a statute that prohibited females from working in a laundary. | "The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long continued labor, particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference justifies a difference in legislation. . ." |
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Adkins v. Children's Hospital Supreme Court of the United States, 1923 261 U.S. 525 Pg. 536 |
A D.C. statute fixed the minimum wages for women and children in the District of Columbia. The statute is attacked on the ground that it authorizes an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract. | The act in question passes the limit prescribed by the Constitution. |
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Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1926 270 U.S. 402 Pg. 537 |
The provision in question absolutely forbade the use of shoddy in comfortables. A company that used shoddy in comfortables brought this action to determine whether the provision was constitutional. | The constitutional guaranties may not be made to yield to mere convenience. The business here involved is legitimate and useful; and, while it is subject to all reasonable regulation, the absolute prohibition of the use of shoddy in the manufacture of comfortables is purely arbitrary and violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Nebbia v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1934 291 U.S. 502 Pg. 539 |
The Milk Control Board of New York fixed nine cents as the price to be charged by a store for a quart of milk. Nebbia, the proprietor of a grocery store in Rochester, sold two quarts and a 5 cent loaf of bread for 18 cents; and was convicted for violating the board's order. | The Court found no basis in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for condemning the provisions of the Agriculture and Markets Law here drawn into question. |
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West Coast Hotel v. Parrish Supreme Court of the United States, 1937 300 U.S. 379 Pg. 541 |
Appellee was employed as chambermaid at a hotel. She brought the suit to recover the difference between the wage paid her and the statutory minimum as required by Washington State of $14.50 per week. | The Court overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital and held that the community may direct its law-making power to correct the abuse which springs from an employers selfish disregard of the public interest. Thus, the Washington minimum wage statute was not a violation of the Constitution. |
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United States v. Carolene Products Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1938 304 U.S. 144 Pg. 543 |
The "Filled Milk Act" of Congress prohibited the shipment of certain milk products in interstate commerce. Appellee was indicted for shipping "Milnut," a variant of milk that violated the act. The appellee claimed that the act was a violation of the due process clause and the commerce clause. | Economic regulations will be upheld as long as they are supported by a conceivable rational basis (even if it cannot be proved that it was the legislature's intent). NOTE: Footnote 4 is the most famous part of this opinion. It states that the judiciary will generally defer to the legislature and uphold laws so long as they are reasonable, but such deference will not extent to laws interfering with fundamental rights, discriminating against discrete and insular minorites, or restraining the political process. |
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Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1955 348 U.S. 483 Pg. 545 |
An Oklahoma statute made it unlawful for any person not a licensed optometrist or opthalmologist to fit lenses to a face or to duplicate or replace into frames lenses or other optical appliances, except upon written prescriptive authority of an Oklahoma licensed opthamologist or optometrist. | The Court upheld the statute. The Court says that even though this law may be wasteful, it is not for the court to determine the economic advantages and disadvantages. "The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought." The Supreme Court held that business regulation will be subject to mere rational basis review. |
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BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 517 U.S. 559 Pg. 547 |
Dr. Gore sued BMW when he found out that his recently purchased car had been repainted before it was purchased as new. The jury awarded Dr. Gore 4 thousand dollars in compensatory damages and assessed BMW $ 4 million in punitive damages. The Alabama Supreme Court knocked the punitive damage award down to $ 2 million. | The $2 million punitive damages award is grossly excessive and therefore exceeds the constitutional limit. |
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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 123 U.S. 1513 Pg. 551 |
Although investigators and witnesses concluded that Curtis Campbell caused an accident in which one person was killed and another permanently disabled, his insurer, petitioner State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), contested liability, declined to settle the ensuing claims for the $50,000 policy limit, ignored its own investigators' advice, and took the case to trial, assuring Campbell and his wife that they had no liability for the accident, that State Farm would represent their interests, and that they did not need separate counsel. Later, the Campbells pursued a bad faith claim against State farm in which the jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages. | A punitive damages award of $145 million, where full compensatory damages are $1 million, is excessive and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell Supreme Court of the United States, 1934 290 U.S. 398 Pg. 559 |
Appellant contests the validity of chapter 339 of the Laws of Minnesota, as being repugnant to the Contract Clause and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute provides that, during an emergency declared to exist, relief may be had through authorized judicial proceedings with respect to foreclosures of mortgages, and execution sales, of real estate; that sales may be postponed and periods of redemption may be extended. | The Minnesota statute as here applied does not violate the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. |
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Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 459 U.S. 400 Pg. 562 |
A contract for natural gas provided that the price to be paid would be increased if government regulators fixed a higher price than that specified in the contract. Subsequently, Kansas adopted a law that provided that the price to be paid for natural gas under a contract could not be increased because of prices set by federal authorities. The state law prevented the natural gas producer from charging the higher prices that it was entitled to under the contract. | The Kansas Act does not impair appellant's contracts with appellee in violation of the Contract Clause, and thus the contract price may be escalated under either escalator clause only to the ceiling under section 109 of the federal Act, not to the section 102 ceiling. |
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Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 438 U.S. 234 Pg. 565 |
Under appellant's pension plan, adopted in 1963 and qualified under 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, employees were entitled to retire and receive a pension at age 65 regardless of length of service, and an employee's pension right became vested if he satisfied certain conditions as to length of service and age. Appellant was the sole contributor to the pension trust fund, and each year made contributions to the fund based on actuarial predictions of eventual payout needs. But the plan neither required appellant to make specific contributions nor imposed any sanction on it for failing to make adequate contributions, and appellant retained a right not only to amend the plan but also to terminate it at any time and for any reason. In 1974, Minnesota enacted the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act (Act), under which a private employer of 100 employees or more (at least one of whom was a Minnesota resident) who provided pension benefits under a plan meeting the qualifications of 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, was subject to a "pension funding charge" if he terminated the plan or closed a Minnesota office. Shortly thereafter, in a move planned before passage of the Act, appellant closed its Minnesota office, and several of its employees, who were then discharged, had no vested pension rights under appellant's plan but had worked for appellant for 10 years or more, thus qualifying as pension obligees under the Act. | The impact of the Act upon appellant's contractual obligations was both substantial and severe. Thus, the Act does not possess the attributes of those state laws that have survived challenge under the Contract Clause. It was not even purportedly enacted to deal with a broad, generalized economic or social problem, but has an extremely narrow focus and enters an area never before subject to regulation by the State. |
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United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 431 U.S. 1 Pg. 569 |
A 1962 statutory covenant between New Jersey and New York limited the ability of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to subsidize rail passenger transportation from revenues and reserves pledged as security for consolidated bonds issued by the Port Authority. A 1974 New Jersey statute, together with a concurrent and parallel New York statute, retroactively repealed the 1962 covenant. Appellant, both as a trustee for, and as a holder of, Port Authority bonds, brought suit in the New Jersey Superior Court for declaratory relief, claiming that the 1974 New Jersey statute impaired the obligation of the States' contract with the bondholders in violation of the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. | An impairment of contract such as is involved in this case can only be upheld if it is both reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose, but here the impairment was neither necessary to achieve the States' plan to encourage private automobile users to shift to public transportation nor reasonable in light of changed circumstances. |
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Miller v. Schoene Supreme Court of the United States, 1928 276 U.S. 272 Pg. 580 |
The State ordered the plaintiffs to cut down a large number of ornamental red cedar trees growing on their property, as a means of preventing the communication of a rust or plant disease with which they were infected to the apple orchards in the vicinity. | The state was under the necessity of making a choice between the preservation of one class of property and that of another wherever both existed in dangerous proximity. Thus, the Court held that the reasonable exercise of state power, controlled by considerations of social policy, did not involve any denial of due process. |
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Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 467 U.S. 229 Pg. 610 |
The Hawaii legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967, which created a mechanism for condemning residential tracts and for transferring ownership of the condemned fees simple to existing lessees. By condeming the land in question, the Hawaii Legislature intended to make the land sales involuntary, thereby making the federal tax consequences less severe while still facilitating the redistribution of fees simple. | The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose. Government does not itself have to use property to legitimate the taking; it is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause. And the fact that a state legislature, and not Congress, made the public use determination does not mean that judicial deference is less appropriate. |
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Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 538 U.S. 216 Pg. 613 |
Attorneys often hold client's funds in a single trust account called an IOLTA. Florida adopted an IOLTA program in 1981 authorizing that interest accumulated on client accounts be used for charitable purposes. Subsequently, every state in the nation followed Florida's lead and set up similar programs. The question is whether this constitutes an unconstitutional taking. | A state law requiring that client funds that could not otherwise generate net earnings for the client be deposited in an IOLTA account is not a "regulatory taking," but a law requiring that the interest on those funds be transferred to a different owner for a legitimate public use could be a per se taking requiring the payment of "just compensation" to the client. |
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Romer v. Evans Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 517 U.S. 620 Pg. 625 |
Various Colorado municipalities passed ordinances banning discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, health and welfare services, and other transactions and activities. In response, Colorado voters adopted by statewide referendum "Amendment 2" to the State Constitution, which precludes all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the status of persons based on their "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Respondents, who include aggrieved homosexuals and municipalities, commenced this litigation to declare Amendment 2 invalid and enjoin its enforcement. | Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause. |
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United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz Supreme Court of the United States, 1980 449 U.S. 166 Pg. 630 |
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana held unconstitutional a section of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, and the United States Railroad Retirement Board has appealed to this Court. | The challenged provisions of the 1974 Act do not deny the plaintiff class equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. |
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Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1949 336 U.S. 106 Pg. 634 |
Appellant is engaged in a nation-wide express business. It operates 1,900 trucks in New York City and sells space on the side of those trucks for advertising. Appellant was convicted of violating a traffic regulation of New York City that prohibited vehicles from being used mainly or merely for advertising. | The fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of distraction but does not touch what may be even greater ones in a different category, such as the vivid displays on Times Square is immaterial. It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all. |
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New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 440 U.S. 568 Pg. 637 |
Petitioner, New York City Transit Authority enforces a general policy against employing persons who use narcotic drugs. TA interprets its drug regulation to encompass current users of methadone, including those receiving methadone maintenance treatment for curing heroin addiction. Respondents, two former employees of TA who were dismissed while they were receiving methadone treatment, and two persons who were refused employment because they were receiving methadone treatment, brought a class action, alleging, inter alia, that TA's blanket exclusion of all former heroin addicts receiving methadone treatments was illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | TA's blanket exclusion of persons who regularly use narcotic drugs, including methadone, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause for failing to include more precise special rules for methadone users who have progressed satisfactorily with their treatment for one year and who, when examined individually, satisfy TA's employment criteria for nonsensitive jobs. |
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U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 413 U.S. 528 Pg. 640 |
This case determines the constitutionality of section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act, which, with certain exceptions, excludes from particpation in the food stamp program any household containing an individual who is unrelated to any other member of the household. Appellees in this case are individuals that have been excluded from the program solely because the persons in each group are not all related to one another. | The legislative classification here involved cannot be sustained, the classification being clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act and not rationally furthering any other legitimate governmental interest. In practical operation, the Act excludes, not those who are "likely to abuse the program." but, rather, only those who so desperately need aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility. |
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City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 473 U.S. 432 Pg. 643 |
Respondent Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC), which anticipated leasing a certain building for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded, was informed by petitioner city that a special use permit would be required, the city having concluded that the proposed group home should be classified as a "hospital for the feebleminded" under the zoning ordinance covering the area in which the proposed home would be located. Accordingly, CLC applied for a special use permit, but the City Council, after a public hearing, denied the permit. | "To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. . . . The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. . . ." The Court goes on to hold that the home does not threaten legitimate interests of the city and therefore the ordinance is invalid. |
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Dred Scott v. Sandford Supreme Court of the United States, 1856 60 U.S. 393 Pg. 649 |
Dred Scott was a slave purchased by Dr. John Emerson, a surgeon in the U.S. Army. Scott was with Emerson while he served in Illinois and Wisconsin, which were free states. Emerson died, leaving Scott to his wife, Irene Sandford Emerson. Scott tried to buy his freedom, but Irene Emerson rejected him. Scott then sued for his freedom under the theory that since he had been in a free state he had been legally freed and could not later be subjected to slavery. | The Court held that people of African decent could never be citizens of any state, that Congress did not have the power to prohibit slavery in federal territories, and that the Fifth amendment barred the taking of slaves from slaveholders. |
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Korematsu v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1944 323 U.S. 214 Pg. 654 |
Fred Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a "Military Area," contrary to a civilian exclusion order, which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area. No question was raised as to petitioner's loyalty to the United States. | Classifications based on race are subject to strict scrutiny. During times of war, the protection against espionage can be sufficient to justify race-based classifications and thus satisfy the compelling justification test of strict scrutiny. "It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can." |
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Loving v. Virginia Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 388 U.S. 1 Pg. 659 |
The Loving's left Virginia to get married in Washington D.C. When they returned to Virginia, they were prosecuted under a state law prohibiting interacial marriage. | "Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival.... To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State." |
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Palmore v. Sidoti Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 466 U.S. 429 Pg. 661 |
Linda and Anthony Sidoti (both caucasians) divorced in Florida. The mother was awarded custody of their daughter. Subsequently, the mother began cohabitating with an African American man, Clarence Palmore, whom she later married. Anthony Sidoti filed suit to regain custody of his daughter and the Florida Court ruled in his favor. | ". . .Such classifications are subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary . . . to the accomplishment' of their legitimate purpose. . . ." In this case, the legitimate purpose asserted was that the child would suffer from growing up in biracial home. However, the Court held that the effects of racial prejudice cannot justify using a racial classification to remove a child from a parent. |
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Plessy v. Ferguson Supreme Court of the United States, 1896 163 U.S. 537 Pg. 663 |
Homer Plessy, who was one-eighth black, purchased a first-class ticket on the East Louisiana Railway from New Orleans, challenging an 1890 Jim Crow law in the State of Louisiana, which required blacks and whites to occupy different rail cars. Plessy was arrested and refused to leave his seat. | "Separate but equal" |
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Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) Supreme Court of the United States, 1954 347 U.S. 483 Pg. 667 |
A group of parents filed a class action suit against the Topeka, Kansas Board of Education in response to segragated elementary schools made possible by an 1879 Kansas law. | "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." |
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Washington v. Davis Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 426 U.S. 229 Pg. 671 |
Respondents Harley and Sellers, both Negroes, whose applications to become police officers in the District of Columbia had been rejected, in an action against District of Columbia officials and others, claimed that the Police Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test, were racially discriminatory and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. | Though the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting the Government from invidious discrimination, it does not follow that a law or other official act is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact regardless of whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose. |
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City of Mobile v. Bolden Supreme Court of the United States, 1980 446 U.S. 55 Pg. 680 |
Mobile, Alabama is governed by a Commission consisting of three members elected at large who jointly exercise all legislative, executive, and administrative power in the city. Appellees brought a class action in Federal District Court against the city and the incumbent Commissioners on behalf of all Negro citizens of the city, alleging, inter alia, that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at large unfairly diluted the voting strength of Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. | Mobile's at-large electoral system does not violate the rights of the city's Negro voters in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. Racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation. The Amendment does not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected but prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." |
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Palmer v. Thompson Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 403 U.S. 217 Pg. 684 |
Following the Court of Appeals' affirmance of a District Court judgment invalidating enforced segregation on equal protection grounds, the city council of Jackson, Mississippi, desegregated its public recreational facilities, including its five public parks, except for their swimming pools. Stating that the pools could not be operated safely and economically on an integrated basis, the council closed four city-owned pools and surrendered its lease on a fifth, which the lessor, the YMCA, continued to operate for whites only. Petitioners, Negro citizens of Jackson, then brought this action, mainly on equal protection grounds, to force the city to reopen and operate the pools on a desegregated basis. | The closing of the pools to all persons did not constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Negroes. |
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Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 442 U.S. 256 Pg. 686 |
During her 12-year tenure as a state employee, appellee, who is not a veteran, had passed a number of open competitive civil service examinations for better jobs, but because of Massachusetts' veterans' preference statute, she was ranked in each instance below male veterans who had achieved lower test scores than appellee. Under the statute, all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans. Appellee brought an action in Federal District Court, alleging that the absolute-preference formula established in the Massachusetts statute inevitably operates to exclude women from consideration for the best state civil service jobs and thus discriminates against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | Massachusetts, in granting an absolute lifetime preference to veterans, has not discriminated against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 429 U.S. 252 Pg. 688 |
Respondent Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC), a nonprofit developer, contracted to purchase a tract within the boundaries of petitioner Village in order to build racially integrated low- and moderate-income housing. The contract was contingent upon securing rezoning as well as federal housing assistance. After the Village denied rezoning, MHDC and individual minority respondents filed this suit for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act. | Official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. "[Such] impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination." A racially discriminatory intent, as evidenced by such factors as disproportionate impact, the historical background of the challenged decision, the specific antecedent events, departures from normal procedures, and contemporary statements of the decisionmakers, must be shown. |
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Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II) Supreme Court of the United States, 1955 349 U.S. 294 Pg. 692 |
The Supreme Court considered implementing, as a practical matter, desegragation. | Desegregation must occur "with all deliberate speed. . ." |
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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 402 U.S. 1 Pg. 697 |
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system, which includes the city of Charlotte, North Carolina, had more than 84,000 students in 107 schools in the 1968-1969 school year. Approximately 29% (24,000) of the pupils were Negro, about 14,000 of whom attended 21 schools that were at least 99% Negro. This resulted from a desegregation plan approved by the District Court in 1965, at the commencement of this litigation. In 1968 petitioner Swann moved for further relief based on Green v. County School Board, which required school boards to "come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed." | In devising remedies to eliminate legally imposed segregation, local authorities and district courts must see to it that future school construction and abandonment are not used and do not serve to perpetuate or re-establish a dual system. In addition, neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once a unitary system has been achieved. |
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Milliken v. Bradley Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 418 U.S. 717 Pg. 700 |
Respondents brought this class action, alleging that the Detroit public school system is racially segregated as a result of the official policies and actions of petitioner state and city officials, and seeking implementation of a plan to eliminate the segregation and establish a unitary nonracial school system. | Assuming, arguendo, that the State was derivatively responsible for Detroit's segregated school conditions, it does not follow that an interdistrict remedy is constitutionally justified or required, since there has been virtually no showing that either the State or any of the 85 outlying districts engaged in any activity that had a cross-district effect. |
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Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell Supreme Court of the United States, 1991 498 U.S. 237 Pg. 703 |
In 1972, finding that previous efforts had not been successful at eliminating de jure segregation, the District Court entered a decree imposing a school desegregation plan on petitioner Oklahoma City Board of Education. In 1977, finding that the school district had achieved "unitary" status, the court issued an order terminating the case which respondents, black students and their parents, did not appeal. In 1984, the Board adopted its Student Reassignment Plan, under which a number of previously desegregated schools would return to primarily one-race status for the asserted purpose of alleviating greater busing burdens on young black children caused by demographic changes. | The Court of Appeals' test for dissolving a desegregation decree is more stringent than is required either by this Court's decisions dealing with injunctions or by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1989 488 U.S. 469 Pg. 708 |
Richmond adopted a Minority Business Utilization Plan requiring prime contractors awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract to one or more "Minority Business Enterprises", which the Plan defined to include a business from anywhere in the country at least 51% of which is owned and controlled by black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut citizens. Although the Plan declared that it was "remedial" in nature, it was adopted after a public hearing at which no direct evidence was presented that the city had discriminated on the basis of race in letting contracts or that its prime contractors had discriminated against minority subcontractors. | The city has failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest justifying the Plan, since the factual predicate supporting the Plan does not establish the type of identified past discrimination in the city's construction industry that would authorize race-based relief under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. |
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 515 U.S. 200 Pg. 716 |
Petitioner was the low-bidder on a sub-contract to a prime governmental contract. However, the contract was awarded to another business, because of a governmental program, which incentivized prime contractors to hire minority controlled businesses. | Strict scrutiny is the proper review to apply to all cases that involve race-based classifications. Raced-based classifications are only constitutional if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. |
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Grutter v. Bollinger Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 539 U.S. 306 Pg. 722 |
The University of Michigan Law School follows an official admissions policy that seeks to achieve student body diversity. The policy requires admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on all the information available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of recommendation, an essay describing how the applicant will contribute to Law School life and diversity, and the applicant's undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School Admission Test (LSAT) score. The policy does not define diversity solely in terms of racial and ethnic status and does not restrict the types of diversity contributions eligible for "substantial weight," but it does reaffirm the Law School's commitment to diversity with special reference to the inclusion of African-American, Hispanic, and Native-American students, who otherwise might not be represented in the student body in meaningful numbers. By enrolling a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students, the policy seeks to ensure their ability to contribute to the Law School's character and to the legal profession. When the Law School denied admission to petitioner Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT score, she filed this suit, alleging that respondents had discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. | The Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body is not prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. |
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Gratz v. Bollinger Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 539 U.S. 244 Pg. 740 |
Petitioners Gratz and Hamacher, both of whom are Michigan residents and Caucasian, applied for admission to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts in 1995 and 1997, respectively. Although the LSA considered Gratz to be well qualified and Hamacher to be within the qualified range, both were denied early admission and were ultimately denied admission. The current admission guidelines to the program use a selection method under which every applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group is automatically awarded 20 points of the 100 needed to guarantee admission. Petitioners filed this class action alleging that the University's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | Because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted interest in diversity, the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause. |
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Easley v. Cromartie Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 532 U.S. 234 Pg. 748 |
In this decision the Court reviewed a determination by a three-judge District Court that North Carolina used race as a "predominant factor" in drawing its 12th Congressional District's 1997 boundaries. | The District Court's conclusion that the State violated the Equal Protection Clause in drawing the 1997 boundaries is based on clearly erroneous findings. |
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Frontiero v. Richardson Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 411 U.S. 677 Pg. 755 |
A married woman Air Force officer sought increased benefits for her husband as a "dependent." When her application was denied for failure to satisfy the statutory dependency standard, her and her husband brought this suit in District Court, contending that the statutes deprived servicewomen of due process. | By according differential treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience, the challenged statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment insofar as they require a female member to prove the dependency of her husband. |
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Craig v. Boren Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 429 U.S. 190 Pg. 758 |
Appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20 years of age the equal protection of the laws. | Oklahoma's gender-based differential constitutes an invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. |
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United States v. Virginia Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 518 U.S. 515 Pg. 761 |
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is the sole single-sex school among Virginia's public institutions of higher learning. VMI's distinctive mission is to produce "citizen-soldiers," men prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service. Using an "adversative method" of training not available elsewhere in Virginia, VMI endeavors to instill physical and mental discipline in its cadets and impart to them a strong moral code. The United States sued Virginia and VMI, alleging that VMI's exclusively male admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. | Virginia's categorical exclusion of women from the educational opportunities that VMI provides denies equal protection to women. |
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Geduldig v. Aiello Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 417 U.S. 484 Pg. 766 |
California has a disability insurance system for private employees temporarily disabled from working by an injury or illness not covered by workmen's compensation, under which an employee contributes to an Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund one percent of his salary up to an annual maximum of $85. A disability lasting less than eight days is not compensable, except when the employee is hospitalized. Benefits are not payable for a single disability exceeding 26 weeks. A disability resulting from an individual's court commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict, or sexual psychopath is not compensable, nor are certain disabilities attributable to pregnancy. Appellees, four women otherwise qualified under the program who have suffered employment disability because of pregnancies, only one of which was normal, challenged the pregnancy exclusion. | California's decision not to insure under its program the risk of disability resulting from normal pregnancy does not constitute an invidious discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause. |
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Orr v. Orr Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 440 U.S. 268 Pg. 769 |
Following a stipulation between appellant husband and appellee wife, in which appellant agreed to pay appellee alimony, an Alabama court, acting pursuant to state alimony statutes under which husbands but not wives may be required to pay alimony upon divorce, ordered appellant to make monthly alimony payments. Some two years thereafter appellee filed a petition seeking to have appellant adjudged in contempt for failing to maintain the alimony payments. At the hearing on the petition appellant, though made the contention that the Alabama statutes, by virtue of their reliance on a gender-based classification, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | The Alabama statutory scheme of imposing alimony obligations on husbands but not wives violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 458 U.S. 718 Pg. 771 |
A state statute excludes males from enrolling in a state-supported professional nursing school. | The policy of petitioner Mississippi University for Women (MUW), a state-supported university which has from its inception limited its enrollment to women, of denying otherwise qualified males the right to enroll for credit in its School of Nursing violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 450 U.S. 464 Pg. 774 |
Petitioner, then a 17 1/2-year-old male, was charged with violating California's "statutory rape" law, which defines unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." Prior to trial, petitioner sought to set aside the information on both state and federal constitutional grounds, asserting that the statute unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender since men alone were criminally liable thereunder. | One of the purposes of the California statute in which the State has a strong interest is the prevention of illegitimate teenage pregnancies. The statute protects women from sexual intercourse and pregnancy at an age when the physical, emotional, and psychological consequences are particularly severe. Because virtually all of the significant harmful and identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. |
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Rostker v. Goldberg Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 453 U.S. 57 Pg. 777 |
The Military Selective Service Act authorizes the President to require the registration for possible military service of males but not females, the purpose of registration being to facilitate any eventual conscription under the Act. Registration for the draft was discontinued by Presidential Proclamation in 1975, but as the result of a crisis in Southwestern Asia, President Carter decided in 1980 that it was necessary to reactivate the registration process. Although agreeing that it was necessary to reactivate the registration process, Congress allocated only those funds necessary to register males and declined to amend the Act to permit the registration of women. Thereafter, the President ordered the registration of specified groups of young men. In a lawsuit brought by several men challenging the Act's constitutionality, a three-judge District Court ultimately held that the Act's gender-based discrimination violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and enjoined registration under the Act. | The Act's registration provisions do not violate the Fifth Amendment. Congress acted well within its constitutional authority to raise and regulate armies and navies when it authorized the registration of men and not women. |
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Califano v. Webster Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 430 U.S. 313 Pg. 780 |
According to how the age-old benefits were calculated under the Social Security Act, a female could exclude from the computation of her "average monthly wage" three more lower earning years than a similarly situated male could exclude, and this would result in a slightly higher "average monthly wage" and correspondingly higher monthly old-age benefits for the retired female wage earner. Appellee challenged this as a violation of equal protection. | The statutory scheme itself, and the legislative history of former 215 (b) (3), demonstrate that the statute was deliberately enacted to "redres[s] our society's longstanding disparate treatment of women," and was not "the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females." The statute operated directly to compensate women for past economic discrimination by allowing them to eliminate additional low-earning years from the calculation of their retirement benefits, and in no way penalized women wage earners. |
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Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 533 U.S. 53 Pg. 782 |
Petitioner Tuan Anh Nguyen was born out of wedlock in Vietnam to a Vietnamese citizen and copetitioner Joseph Boulais, a United States citizen. Nguyen became a lawful permanent United States resident at age six and was raised by Boulais. At age 22, Nguyen pleaded guilty in a Texas state court to two counts of sexual assault on a child. Subsequently, respondent Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings against him based on his serious criminal offenses. The Immigration Judge ordered him deportable. | Section 1409 is consistent with the equal protection guarantee embedded in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. |
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Graham v. Richardson Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 403 U.S. 365 Pg. 790 |
The issue in this case was whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a State from conditioning welfare benefits either upon the beneficiary's possession of U.S. citizenship, or if the beneficiary is an alien, upon his having resided in this country for a specified number of years. | State statutes, like the Arizona and Pennsylvania statutes here involved, that deny welfare benefits to resident aliens or to aliens who have not resided in the United States for a specified number of years are violative of the Equal Protection Clause and encroach upon the exclusive federal power over the entrance and residence of aliens. |
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Foley v. Connelie Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 435 U.S. 291 Pg. 792 |
Edmund Foley, an alien eligible in due course to become a naturalized citizen, applied for appointment as a New York state trooper, a position which is filled on the basis of competitive examinations. Pursuant to New York statute, state authorities refused to allow Foley to sit for the examination. | New York statute limiting appointment of members of state police force to citizens of the United States held not to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Ambach v. Norwick Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 441 U.S. 68 Pg. 795 |
Norwick was born in Scotland and is a subject of Great Britain. She lives in the U.S. and is married to a U.S. citizen. Norwick applied in 1973 for a teaching certificate covering nursery school through sixth grade. Her application was denied because she was not a citizen. | A New York statute forbidding permanent certification as a public school teacher of any person who is not a United States citizen unless that person has manifested an intention to apply for citizenship, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Plyler v. Doe Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 457 U.S. 202 Pg. 799 |
Texas law denied free public education to undocumented school-age children. The law was challenged as an Equal Protection violation of the Constitution. | A Texas statute which withholds from local school districts any state funds for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States, and which authorizes local school districts to deny enrollment to such children, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 427 U.S. 307 Pg. 807 |
A Massachusetts state law requires that a uniformed police officer retire at the age of fifty. | "Equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." The Court held that a Massachusetts statute making it mandatory for a uniformed state police officer to retire at age 50 does not to deny equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the right to earn a living is not a fundamental right and police officers are not a suspect class. |
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Zablocki v. Redhail Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 434 U.S. 374 Pg. 822 |
A Wisconsin statute requires individuals to obtain a court order granting permission to marry if they have a child who they are responsible for paying child support on behalf of. | The right to marry is a fundamental right, which will require that any regulation that interferes with that right meet the strict scrutiny challenge. |
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Stanley v. Illinois Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 405 U.S. 645 Pg. 827 |
Petitioner, an unwed father whose children, on the mother's death, were declared state wards and placed in guardianship, attacked the Illinois statutory scheme as violative of equal protection. Under that scheme the children of unmarried fathers, upon the death of the mother, are declared dependents without any hearing on parental fitness and without proof of neglect, though such hearing and proof are required before the State assumes custody of children of married or divorced parents and unmarried mothers. | Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment petitioner was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him. |
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Michael H. v. Gerald D. Supreme Court of the United States, 1989 491 U.S. 110 Pg. 829 |
In May 1981, appellant Victoria D. was born to Carole D., who was married to, and resided with, appellee Gerald D. in California. Although Gerald was listed as father on the birth certificate and has always claimed Victoria as his daughter, blood tests showed a 98.07% probability that appellant Michael H., with whom Carole had had an adulterous affair, was Victoria's father. During Victoria's first three years, she and her mother resided at times with Michael, who held her out as his own, at times with another man, and at times with Gerald, with whom they have lived since June 1984. In November 1982, Michael filed a filiation action in California Superior Court to establish his paternity and right to visitation. Victoria, through her court-appointed guardian ad litem, filed a cross-complaint asserting that she was entitled to maintain filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald. The court ultimately granted Gerald summary judgment on the ground that there were no triable issues of fact as to paternity under Cal. Evid. Code 621, which provides that a child born to a married woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent nor sterile, is presumed to be a child of the marriage, and that this presumption may be rebutted only by the husband or wife, and then only in limited circumstances. | The 621 presumption does not infringe upon the due process rights of a man wishing to establish his paternity of a child born to the wife of another man. |
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Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 431 U.S. 494 Pg. 835 |
Appellant lives in her East Cleveland, Ohio, home with her son and two grandsons (who are first cousins). An East Cleveland housing ordinance limits occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family, but defines "family" in such a way that appellant's household does not qualify. Appellant was convicted of a criminal violation of the ordinance. Her conviction was upheld on appeal over her claim that the ordinance is unconstitutional. | The ordinance deprived appellant of her liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Meyer v. Nebraska Supreme Court of the United States, 1923 262 U.S. 390 Pg. 839 |
Plaintiff was tried and convicted for teaching German to a 10 year-old child. The statute he was tried under prohibited individuals to teach any subjects to any person in any language other than the English language. | Due process guarantees the right to teach and the right of parents to direct the education of their children. The Court held that the statute was arbitrary and without any reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state. |
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Troxel v. Granville Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 530 U.S. 57 Pg. 842 |
Washington Rev. Code section 26.10.160(3) permits "[a]ny person" to petition for visitation rights "at any time" and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child's best interest. Petitioners Troxel petitioned for the right to visit their deceased son's daughters. Respondent Granville, the girls' mother, did not oppose all visitation, but objected to the amount sought by the Troxels. The Superior Court ordered more visitation than Granville desired, and she appealed. The State Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the Troxels' petition. In affirming, the State Supreme Court held, inter alia, that section 26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally infringes on parents' fundamental right to rear their children. | The Court concluded that section 26.10.160(3), as applied to Granville and her family, violates her due process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters. |
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Buck v. Bell Supreme Court of the United States, 1927 274 U.S. 200 Pg. 848 |
The superintendent of the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded, was ordered to perform a salpingectomy upon Carrie Buck, a feeble-minded white woman who was committed to the State Colony above mentioned. | The statute authorizing the surgery was held not to violate due process or equal protection of the laws. |
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Skinner v. Oklahoma Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 316 U.S. 535 Pg. 849 |
Under Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, felons were subjected to compulsory sterilization. Petitioner was convicted of stealing chickens and of armed robbery. He was subject to a judgment directing a vasectomy. | A law that permits a state attorney general to have habitual criminals sterilized, unless the felonies arise from violations of prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political acts, violates the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. The right to procreate is viewed as a fundamental right. Therefore the statute is subject to strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling purpose with means necessary for that purpose. |
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Eisenstadt v. Baird Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 405 U.S. 438 Pg. 856 |
Appellee attacks his conviction of violating Massachusetts law for giving a woman a contraceptive foam at the close of his lecture to students on contraception. That law makes it a felony for anyone to give away a drug, medicine, instrument, or article for the prevention of conception except in the case of (1) a registered physician administering or prescribing it for a married person or (2) an active registered pharmacist furnishing it to a married person presenting a registered physician's prescription. | By providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated, the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Roe v. Wade Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 410 U.S. 113 Pg. 859 |
A Texas woman, who alleged she was raped, challenged a Texas statute which prohibited abortion. | Most State laws prohibiting abortions violate a woman's Constitutional right to privacy. The Court adopts a trimester framework for determining whether the State may regulate abortions, holding that in the third trimester, the fetus is viable and the State has a compelling interest in the fetus. |
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 505 U.S. 833 Pg. 867 |
At issue are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982: section 3205, which requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed; section 3206, which mandates the informed consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but provides a judicial bypass procedure; section 3209, which commands that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband; section 3203, which defines a "medical emergency" that will excuse compliance with the foregoing requirements; and sections 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f), which impose certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services. | To protect the central right recognized by Roe while at the same time accommodating the State's profound interest in potential life, the undue burden standard should be employed. An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. |
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Bellotti v. Baird Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 443 U.S. 622 Pg. 901 |
A Massachusetts law required a pregnant minor to obtain the consent of both parents before getting an abortion. No abortion rights are contemplated absent such consent. | Although such consent is desirable, "if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained." |
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Ball v. James Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 451 U.S. 355 Pg. 948 |
A governmental agency, the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District delivers water to the owners of vast acres of land in central Arizona, and and sells electricity to many Phoenix residents. The District's directors are determined by landowners' votes according to how many acres they own. Certain residents demanded that no individual(s) receive more than one vote, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | "[T}he purpose of the District is sufficiently specialized and narrow and . . . its activities bear on landowners so disproportionately" that a voting scheme that would otherwise be held unconstitutional (in broader-based or general elections) is proper and lawful. |
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Boddie v. Connecticut Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 401 U.S. 371 Pg. 985 |
An indigent person sought divorce in "good faith," but could not afford the $60 per litigant filing fee. Petitioner sought relief through due process, arguing that if freely entering marriage is a constitutionally protected right, then filing fee requirements for dissolving marriage are unconstitutional. | "[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages." |
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Bounds v. Smith Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 430 U.S. 817 Pg. 995 |
Prisoners alleged they were denied access to the courts (and thus their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated) because they were not provided law libraries and other forms of legal assistance. | "[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." |
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Board of Regents v. Roth Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 408 U.S. 564 Pg. 1021 |
A non-tenured professor was hired by a state university. Occasionally during the year, the professor criticized university officials. Subsequently, the professor was informed that he would not be retained for the next school year. He was provided neither a reason for the nonrenewal nor the opportunity to challenge the decision. Did he have a property interest, under the Fourteenth Amendment, in the retention of his university position? | "The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge . . . of dishonesty or immorality. . . . '[W]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.' . . . [H]owever, there is no suggestion whatever that the respondent's "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity" is at stake. Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. . . . It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another." |
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Boos v. Barry Supreme Court of the United States, 1988 485 U.S. 312 Pg. 1058 |
The District of Columbia adopted a law that prohibits displaying signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy that bring the foreign government into "public odium" or "public disrepute." American political protesters claimed that this law violated their right of free speech under the First Amendment. | "[T]he display clause of [District of Columbia law] is unconstitutional on its face. It is a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, and it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." The government may not prohibit expression of an idea merely because it may be deemed offensive or disagreeable. |
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Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 482 U.S. 569 Pg. 1090 |
Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) commissioners adopted a resolution that banned all First Amendment activities within the central terminal area. Subsequently, a representative of a nonprofit religious corporation was ordered not to distribute leaflets in the LAX terminal. The religious organization filed an action challenging that the resolution was facially unconstitutional. | "[T]he result of this vague limiting construction would be to give LAX officials alone the power to decide . . . whether a given activity is airport related. Such a law that 'confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation' of the resolution is unconstitutional because 'the opportunity for abuse, especially where a statute has received a virtually open-ended interpretation, is self-evident.' . . . [T]he resolution is substantially overbroad, and . . . violates the First Amendment." |
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Alexander v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1993 509 U.S. 544 Pg. 1109 |
A Minnesota man distributed sexually explicit media in his chain of adult-oriented stores and theaters. He was found guilty of violating federal obscenity laws and the RICO Act, ordered to forfeit his businesses, pay a $100,000 fine and serve a six year prison sentence. The man appealed, claiming that the confiscation of his stores amounted to 'prior restraint,' and thus he invoked his First Amendment rights, and the fine and prison sentence denied his Eighth Amendment protections. | "By lumping the forfeiture imposed in this case after a full criminal trial with an injunction enjoining future speech, petitioner stretches the term 'prior restraint' well beyond the limits established by our cases. To accept petitioner's argument would virtually obliterate the distinction . . . between prior restraints and subsequent punishments." |
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Lovell v. City of Griffin, GA Supreme Court of the United States, 1938 303 U.S. 444 Pg. 1112 |
Woman is fined for distributing religious tracts without a permit. She argues that, as she is doing God's work and the First Amendment protects her, she does not need a permit. | "Liberty of circulating is as essential [to the First Amendment regarding freedom of expression] as liberty of publishing." |
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Abrams v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1919 250 U.S. 616 Pg. 1156 |
For printing two leaflets (one in Yiddish) that chiefly expressed solidarity with the Russian Revolution, and then distributing these leaflets mostly by heaving them out a window, defendants were charged with violating the Espionage Act, convicted for inciting resistance to the war effort and sentenced to 20 years in prison. | Punishing criticism of U.S. war efforts outweigh First Amendment protections. However, this case is known today for Justice Holmes' eloquent dissent: "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. . . I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe . . ., unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country." |
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Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition Supreme Court of the United States, 2002 535 U.S. 234 Pg. 1216 |
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) prohibits visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Adult-entertainment trade associations argued that the "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" provisions are vague and overbroad, thus curtailing their First Amendment protections. | "The CPPA prohibits speech despite its serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. . . . Under the CPPA, images are prohibited so long as the persons appear to be under 18 years of age. . . . It is, of course, undeniable that some youths engage in sexual activity before the legal age, either on their own inclination or because they are victims of sexual abuse. . . . If . . . films . . . contain a single graphic depiction of sexual activity within the statutory definition, the possessor of the film would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work's redeeming value. This is inconsistent with an essential First Amendment rule: The artistic merit of a work does not depend on the presence of a single explicit scene. . . . For this reason, . . . the CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity, because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by the definition of obscenity." |
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Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 124 S.Ct. 2783 Pg. 1245 |
The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) sought to prevent minors from accessing Internet pornography. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), arguing that COPA's language was overbroad (i.e. its "community standards" test), claimed that COPA violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. To what extent may protected speech be restricted if the purpose is to children from access to "material that is harmful to minors"? What is the least restrictive safeguard? | "[R]espondents . . . prevail . . . because . . .there are a number of plausible, less restrictive alternatives to the statute. [For example, b]locking and filtering software is an alternative that is less restrictive than COPA, and, in addition, likely more effective as a means of restricting children's access to materials harmful to them." |
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Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 463 U.S. 60 Pg. 1258 |
Federal postal laws prohibit mailing any unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. A contraceptives manufacturer challenged the law as violative of the First Amendment. Were the companies printed materials (including informational pamphlets) constitutionally protected forms of "commercial speech"? | "The mailings constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important public issues such as venereal disease and family planning. [A]dvertising which 'links a product to a current public debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech. . . . We conclude, therefore, that all of the mailings in this case are entitled to the qualified but nonetheless substantial protection accorded to commercial speech." |
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Bartnicki v. Vopper Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 532 U.S. 514 Pg. 1306 |
A radio host was sued for airing an intercepted cell phone conversation (given to him by a third party) between local labor leaders during heated negotiations between a teachers union and a school board. | Broadcasters cannot be held civilly liable for publishing truthful documents or tapes, no matter how they were obtained. However, this protection should not be assumed to be absolute. "Privacy of communication is an important interest, and [the statute]'s restrictions are intended to protect that interest, thereby 'encouraging the uninhibited exchange of ideas and information among private parties . . . .' Moreover, the fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech." |
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Buckley v. Valeo Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 424 U.S. 1 Pg. 1325 |
This appeal presented constitutional challenges to key provisions of the Federal Election Campaing Act of 1971. | The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests by imposing significantly more restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions. In addition, the court held that section 608(a)'s restriction on a candidate's personal expenditures is unconstitutional. Furthermore, the court held section 608(c)'s limitations on overall campaign expenditures restricted the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression and thus violated the First Amendment. |
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Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization Supreme Court of the United States, 1939 307 U.S. 496 Pg. 1343 |
Petitioners, acting in their official capacities, adopted and enforced a policy of removing from Jersey City the agents of the respondents, a labor union, and prohibited the distribution of informational material. | The Court held that Hague's ban on political meetings violated the First Amendment right to freedom of assembly, and so the ordinances were void. |
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