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Evidence

Fisher
1st Edition
ISBN: 158778176X
Page Case Name Citation Court Audio
7 Tanner v. United States 483 U.S. 107 Supreme Court of the United States, 1987
66 Old Chief v. United States 519 U.S. 172 Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 Download
85 Truer v. McDonald 701 A.2d 1101 Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1997
175 Huddleston v. United States 485 U.S. 681 Supreme Court of the United States, 1988 Download
208 Michelson v. United States 335 U.S. 469 Supreme Court of the United States, 1948
369 Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc. 588 F.2d 626 United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1978 Download
375 Bourjaily v. United States 483 U.S. 171 Supreme Court of the United States, 1987
389 United States v. Barrett 539 F.2d 244 United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 1976
417 United States v. Owens 484 U.S. 554 Supreme Court of the United States, 1988 Download
434 Williamson v. United States 512 U.S. 594 Supreme Court of the United States, 1994
445 Shepard v. United States 290 U.S. 96 Supreme Court of the United States, 1933 Download
459 Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hillmon 145 U.S. 285 Supreme Court of the United States, 1892 Download
Case Information Fact Summary Rule of Law
Tanner v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States, 1987
483 U.S. 107
Pg. 7 		Petitioners were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of committing mail fraud. After the trial, Tanner's attorney received an unsolicited phone call from one of the jurors, who informed Tanner's attorney that several of the jurors consumed alcohol during the lunch breaks at various times throughout the trial, causing them to sleep through the afternoons. Tanner's attorney also received a visit at his house from a second juror who reported "he felt like . . . the jury was on one big party." The second juror additionally reported that jurors used alcohol, marijuana and cocaine during the trial. The issue was whether the District Court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing, including juror testimony, on juror alcohol and drug use during the trial. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) states "Competency of Juror as Witness . . . Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention, (2) or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes." In this case, the Court held that the allegations of substance abuse were an internal matter and thus the jury testimony could not be permitted pursuant to F.R.E. 606(b).
Old Chief v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States, 1997
519 U.S. 172
Pg. 66 		Old Chief was arrested for assault with a dangerous weapon and violation of a statute which made it unlawful for any felon to possess a firearm. Relevant evidence may be excluded when it has a prejudicial effect and there is alternative evidence on point.
Truer v. McDonald
Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1997
701 A.2d 1101
Pg. 85 		Plaintiff's surgery was delayed. The hospital discontinued the use of Heparin. The Plaintiff had a heart attack and died. Subsequently, the hospital changed their policy regarding discontinuing the use of Heparin prior to surgery. The plaintiffs try to make use of the feasibility aspect of Fed R. Evid. 407, which establishes that you can circumvent the subsequent remedial measures rule, if it is used to controvert feasibility. The feasibility exception of Fed R. Evid. 407 establishes that you can circumvent the subsequent remedial measures rule, if it is used to controvert feasibility. NOTE: If the defense had just continued to say that they made the best use of the information they had at the time rather than saying it would have been dangerous, they would not have fallen into the feasibility trap of Fed. R. Evid. 407.
Huddleston v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States, 1988
485 U.S. 681
Pg. 175 		Petitioner Guy Huddleston was charged with selling stolen goods in interstate commerce and possessing stolen property in interstate commerce in connection with the sale of video cassette tapes. There was no dispute at trial that the video cassette tapes were stolen. There only issue was whether Huddleston knew they were stolen. The District Court allowed the Government to introduce evidence of "similar acts" under Rule 404(b). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the trial court must make a preliminary finding before "similar acts" and other Rule 404(b) evidence is submitted to the jury. "Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) - which applies in both civil and criminal cases - generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of extrinsic acts that might adversely reflect on the actor's character, unless that evidence bears upon a relevant issue in the case such as motive, opportunity, or knowledge." The Supreme Court held, pursuant to Rule 404(b), that the court need not make, prior to admitting past acts introduced to show motive or knowledge, a preliminary finding that the acts occurred.
Michelson v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States, 1948
335 U.S. 469
Pg. 208 		In 1947 petitioner Michelson was convicted of bribing a federal revenue agent. The Government proved a large payment by accused to the agent for the purpose of influencing his official action. The defendant, as a witness on his own behalf, admitted passing the money but claimed it was done in response to the agent's demands, threats, solicitations, and inducements that amounted to entrapment. The determination of the issue turned on whether the jury believed the agent or the accused. Michelson introduced evidence of his own good character through witness testimony. The prosecution responded by asking the character witnesses whether they had heard of Michelson's previous conviction twenty years earlier for receiving stolen goods. The Court overruled Michelson's objection and Michelson was found guilty. When a defendant introduces character evidence through witness testimony, the prosecution may question those witnesses regarding the prior bad acts of the defendant.
Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1978
588 F.2d 626
Pg. 369 		Plaintiff was bitten by a wolf (named Sophie) maintained at the home of Kenneth Poos, the Director of Education of Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc. Poos left a note on the door of the President of the company, which stated, ". . . Sophie bit a child that came in our back yard. . . ." Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) "Statements which are not hearsay. . . . A statement is not hearsay if-- . . . (2)Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is . . . (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. . . ." In addition, there is no implied requirement that the declarant have personal knowledge of the facts underlying his statement.
Bourjaily v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States, 1987
483 U.S. 171
Pg. 375 		Petitioner was charged with possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. The government introduced statements of a co-conspirator. The petitioner contended that the admission of the evidence was a violation of his Constitutional right to confront the witness. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) (a statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is a statement by a co-conspirator of a party made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy) does not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution.
United States v. Barrett
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 1976
539 F.2d 244
Pg. 389 		The defendant's co-conspirator in a stamp theft operation stated in an alleged conversation that the defendant was not involved in the crime. After the co-conspirator died, thus making him an unavailable witness, defendant contended that the co-conspirator's statements were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under the theory that they were against self-interest. In criminal cases, where testimony is offered tending to exculpate the accused and inculpate the out-of-court declarant, there must be independent corroboration of the testimony's trustworthiness.
United States v. Owens
Supreme Court of the United States, 1988
484 U.S. 554
Pg. 417 		John Foster, a correctional counselor at the federal prison in Lompoc, California, was attacked and brutally beaten with a metal pipe. As a result of his injuries, his memory was severely impaired. An FBI agent twice interviewed Foster while Foster was in the hospital. Foster was unable to remember his attacker's name during the first interview, but identified Owens as the attacker in the second interview. He later lost his recollection of the attack, but remembered identifying Owens as the attacker in the hospital. Owens was sentenced to 20 years' improsonment. The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court based on the Confrontation Clause and Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) "Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-- (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person. . ." In this case, the Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) provided an exception. Although the witness could not remember the attack, the Court held that the witness was subject to cross-examination. The Court further ruled that the statement didn't violate the Confrontation Clause, as it is "sufficient that the defendant has the opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness's bias . . . and even the very fact that he has a bad memory."
Williamson v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States, 1994
512 U.S. 594
Pg. 434 		Williamson's employee, Harris, was stopped by the police with 19 kilograms of cocaine in his car. A DEA agent interviewed Harris after his arrest. Harris told the agent that he was transporting the cocaine for Williamson. Harris freely implicated himself, but did not want his story to be recorded and refused to sign a written version of the statement. Harris refused to testify at trial and the judge admitted Harris's statements pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), as a self-inculpatory statement and exception to the hearsay rule. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) "does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory."
Shepard v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States, 1933
290 U.S. 96
Pg. 445 		The petitioner, Charles Shepard - a major in the medical corps of the United States Army - was convicted for murdering his wife by poisoning her with bichloride of mercury. It was alleged that his motive was that he was in love with another woman. The testimony at issue was when his wife, under the care of a nurse, exclaimed in the presence of her nurse, "Dr. Shepard has poisoned me." The government sought to have the evidence admitted under two possible exceptions to the hearsay rule: (1) that it was a dying declaration; and (2) that the evidence showed a state of mind. The Court rejected the dying declaration proposition, as she did not have an impending sense of death, but considered the state of mind theory, as the defendant had offered evidence of his wife's weariness towards life through declarations from friends and thus drawing the inference that his wife had committed suicide. Testimony that faces backward and not forward is not admissible as a state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. In this case, the testimony was regarding a previous act and not admissible as a state of mind exception.
Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hillmon
Supreme Court of the United States, 1892
145 U.S. 285
Pg. 459 		Mrs. Hillmon sought to collect on life insurance policies for the death of her husband. The insurance companies refused to pay alleging that it could not adequately be established that Mrs. Hillmon's husband had died, as the remains of her husband (found at Crooked Creek) could have been mistaken for those of one Walters. The defendants offered letters showing that Walters had intended to go to Crooked Creek at the time the body was discovered. ". . . When the intention to be proved is important only as qualifying an act, its connection with that act must be shown, in order to warrant the admission of declarations of the intention. But whenever the intention is of itself a distinct and material fact in a chain of circumstances, it may be proved by contemporaneous oral or written declarations of the party." In this case, the letters could be used to show that Walters INTENDED to go to Crooked Creek and not that he actually did go there. His intention was material because it allowed for the inference to be drawn that it was more likely than not that he did go to Crooked Creek.