Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials
- Kadish, Schulhofer
- 8th Edition
- ISBN: 0735557942
| Page | Case Name | Citation | Court | Audio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19 | People v. Zackowitz | 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 | New York Court of Appeals, 1930 |  Download |
| 33 | Patterson v. New York | 432 U.S. 197 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 | Download |
| 42 | Duncan v. Louisiana | 391 U.S. 145 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 | Download |
| 51 | United States v. Dougherty | 473 F.2d 1113 | United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1972 | Download |
| 73 | Regina v. Dudley and Stephens | 14 Q.B.D. 273 | Queen's Bench Division, 1884 | Download |
| 112 | United States v. Jackson | 835 F.2d 1195 | United States Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, 1987 | Download |
| 146 | Keeler v. Superior Court | 470 P.2d 617 | Supreme Court of California, 1970 | Download |
| 154 | City of Chicago v. Morales | 527 U.S. 41 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 | Download |
| 182 | Martin v. State | 31 Ala. App. 334, 17 So. 2d 427 | Alabama Court of Appeals, 1944 | Download |
| 184 | People v. Newton | 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 | California District Court of Appeal, 1970 | Download |
| 192 | Jones v. United States | 308 F.2d 307 | United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1962 | Download |
| 194 | Pope v. State | 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 | Maryland Court of Appeals, 1979 | Download |
| 208 | Barber v. Superior Court | 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 | California District Court of Appeal, 1983 | Download |
| 214 | Regina v. Cunningham | 2 Q.B. 396 | Court of Criminal Appeal, 1957 | Download |
| 229 | United States v. Jewell | 532 F.2d 697 | United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 1976 | Download |
| 234 | Regina v. Prince | L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 | Court of Crown Cases Reserved, 1875 | Download |
| 239 | People v. Olsen | 36 Cal. 2d 638, 685 P.2d 52 | Supreme Court of California, 1984 | Download |
| 250 | Morissette v. United States | 342 U.S. 246 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1952 | Download |
| 254 | Staples v. United States | 511 U.S. 600 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 | Download |
| 257 | State v. Guminga | 395 N.W.2d 344 | Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1986 | Download |
| 260 | State v. Baker | 571 P.2d 65 | Kansas Court of Appeal, 1977 | Download |
| 262 | Regina v. City of Sault Ste. Marie | 85 D.L.R.3d 161 | Supreme Court of Canada, 1978 | Download |
| 267 | People v. Marrero | 69 N.Y.2d 382, 507 N.E.2d 1068 | New York Court of Appeals, 1987 | Download |
| 275 | Cheek v. United States | 498 U.S. 192 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1991 | Download |
| 282 | Lambert v. California | 355 U.S. 225 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1957 | Download |
| 302 | State v. Rusk | 289 Md. 230, 424 A.2d 720 | Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1981 | Download |
| 318 | State in the Interest of M.T.S. | 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 | New Jersey Supreme Court, 1992 | Download |
| 337 | People v. Evans | 85 Misc. 2d 1088, 379 N.Y.S. 2d 912 | Supreme Court, New York County, Trial Term, 1975 | Download |
| 342 | Commonwealth v. Sherry | 386 Mass. 682, 437 N.E. 2d 224 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1982 | Download |
| 344 | Commonwealth v. Fischer | 721 A.2d 1111 | Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1998 | Download |
| 359 | United States v. Wiley | 492 F.2d 547 | United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, 1974 | Download |
| 365 | State v. DeLawder | 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 | Maryland Court of Special Appeals, 1975 | Download |
| 369 | Government of the Virgin Islands v. Scuito | 623 F.2d 869 | United States Court of Appeals, 3d Circuit, 1980 | Download |
| 381 | Commonwealth v. Carroll | 412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d 911 | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1963 | Download |
| 386 | State v. Guthrie | 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 | Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 1995 | Download |
| 390 | Girouard v. State | 321 Md. 532, 583 A.2d 718 | Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1991 | Download |
| 392 | Maher v. People | 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dec. 781 | Supreme Court of Michigan, 1862 | Download |
| 401 | People v. Casassa | 49 N.Y.2d 668, 404 N.E.2d 1310 | New York Court of Appeals, 1980 | Download |
| 411 | Commonwealth v. Welansky | 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 | Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1944 | Download |
| 418 | State v. Williams | 4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 | Washington Court of Appeals, 1971 | Download |
| 426 | Commonwealth v. Malone | 354 Pa. 180, 47 A.2d 445 | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1946 | Download |
| 431 | United States v. Fleming | 739 F.2d 945 | United States Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit, 1984 | Download |
| 447 | People v. Phillips | 64 Cal.2d 574, 414 P.2d 353 | Supreme Court of California, 1966 | Download |
| 448 | People v. Stewart | 663 A.2d 912 | Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1995 | Download |
| 460 | State v. Canola | 73 N.J. 206, 374 A.2d 20 | Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1977 | Download |
| 499 | McCleskey v. Kemp | 481 U.S. 279 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 | Download |
| 510 | People v. Acosta | 284 Cal. Rptr. 117 | Court of Appeal of California, 4th Appellate District, 1991 | Download |
| 514 | People v. Arzon | 92 Misc. 2d 739, 401 N.Y.S.2d 156 | Supreme Court, New York County, 1978 | Download |
| 523 | People v. Campbell | 124 Mich. App. 333, 335 N.W.2d 27 | Court of Appeals of Michigan, 1983 | Download |
| 524 | People v. Kevorkian | 447 Mich. 436, 527 N.W.2d 714 | Supreme Court of Michigan, 1994 | Download |
| 538 | Commonwealth v. Root | 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1961 | Download |
| 540 | State v. McFadden | 320 N.W.2d 608 | Supreme Court of Iowa, 1982 | Download |
| 542 | Commonwealth v. Atencio | 345 Mass. 627, 189 N.E.2d 323 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1963 | Download |
| 547 | Smallwood v. State | 343 Md. 97, 680 A.2d 512, 1996 | Court of Appeals, Maryland, 1996 | Download |
| 555 | People v. Rizzo | 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1927 | Download |
| 558 | McQuirter v. State | 36 Ala. App. 707, 63 So. 2d 388 | Alabama Court of Appeals, 1953 | Download |
| 565 | United States v. Jackson | 560 F.2d 112 | United States Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit, 1977 | Download |
| 571 | State v. Davis | 319 Mo. 1222, 6 S.W.2d 609 | Supreme Court of Missouri, 1928 | Download |
| 575 | People v. Jaffe | 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 | New York Court of Appeals, 1906 | Download |
| 577 | People v. Dlugash | 41 N.Y.2d 725, 363 N.E.2d 1155 | New York Court of Appeals, 1977 | Download |
| 593 | Hicks v. United States | 150 U.S. 442 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1893 | Download |
| 595 | State v. Gladstone | 78 Wash. 2d 306, 474 P.2d 274 | Supreme Court of Washington, 1980 | Download |
| 604 | People v. Luparello | 187 Cal. App. 3d 410, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832 | California Court of Appeal, 4th District, 1987 | Download |
| 610 | State v. McVay | 47 R.I. 292, 132 A. 436 | Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1926 | Download |
| 616 | Wilcox v. Jeffery | 1 All E.R. 464 | King's Bench Division, 1951 | Download |
| 633 | New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States | 212 U.S. 481 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1909 | Download |
| 635 | United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp. | 467 F.2d 1000 | United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 1972 | Download |
| 651 | Gordon v. United States | 203 F.2d 248, rev'd, 347 U.S. 909 | United States Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit, 1954 | Download |
| 653 | United States v. Park | 421 U.S. 658 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1975 | Download |
| 659 | United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co. | 933 F.2d 35 | United States Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit, 1991 | Download |
| 664 | Krulewitch v. United States | 336 U.S. 440 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1949 | |
| 677 | Pinkerton v. United States | 328 U.S. 640 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1946 | Download |
| 688 | Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States | 306 U.S. 208 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1939 | Download |
| 695 | People v. Lauria | 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628 | California District Court of Appeal, 1967 | Download |
| 705 | Kotteakos v. United States | 328 U.S. 750 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1946 | Download |
| 708 | United States v. Bruno | 308 U.S. 287 | United States Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit, 1939 | Download |
| 717 | Garcia v. State | 71 Ind. 366, 394 N.E. 2d 106 | Supreme Court of Indiana, 1979 | Download |
| 732 | United States v. Elliott | 571 F.2d 880 | United States Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit | Download |
| 738 | United States v. Peterson | 483 F.2d 1222 | United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1973 | Download |
| 739 | People v. Goetz | 68 N.Y.2d 96, 497 N.E.2d 41 | New York Court of Appeals, 1986 | Download |
| 750 | State v. Kelly | 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 | Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1984 | Download |
| 763 | State v. Norman | 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 | Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1989 | |
| 777 | State v. Abbott | 36 N.J. 63, 174 A.2d 881 | Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1961 | Download |
| 786 | People v. Ceballos | 12 Cal. 3d 470, 526 P.2d 241 | Supreme Court of California, 1974 | Download |
| 792 | Durham v. State | 199 Ind. 567, 159 N.E. 145 | Supreme Court of Indiana, 1927 | Download |
| 793 | Tennessee v. Garner | 471 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 | |
| 798 | People v. Unger | 66 Ill. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 | Supreme Court of Illinois, 1977 | Download |
| 807 | United States v. Schoon | 971 F.2d 193 | United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 1992 | Download |
| 821 | Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health | 497 U.S. 261 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1989 | Download |
| 823 | Washington v. Glucksberg | 521 U.S. 702 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 | Download |
| 833 | State v. Toscano | 74 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755 | Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1977 | Download |
| 850 | People v. Hood | 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370 | Supreme Court of California, 1969 | Download |
| 873 | M'Naghten's Case | 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 | House of Lords, 1843 | Download |
| 875 | Blake v. United States | 407 F.2d 908 | United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 1969 | Download |
| 879 | United States v. Lyons | 731 F.2d 243, 739 F.2d 994 | United States Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, en banc, 1984 | Download |
| 889 | State v. Crenshaw | 98 Wash. 2d 789, 659 P.2d 488 | Washington Supreme Court, 1983 | Download |
| 893 | State v. Guido | 40 N.J. 191, 191 A.2d 45 | New Jersey Supreme Court, 1993 | Download |
| 901 | United States v. Brawner | 471 F.2d 969 | United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1972 | Download |
| 911 | Robinson v. California | 370 U.S. 660 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1962 | Download |
| 914 | Powell v. Texas | 392 U.S. 514 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 | Download |
| 922 | United States v. Moore | 486 F.2d 1139 | United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1973 | Download |
| 935 | Commonwealth v. Tluchak | 166 Pa. Super. 16, 70 A.2d 657 | Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1950 | Download |
| 938 | Topolewski v. State | 130 Wis. 244, 109 N.W. 1037 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1906 | Download |
| 942 | Nolan v. State | 213 Md. 298, 131 A.2d 851 | Maryland Court of Appeals, 1957 | Download |
| 945 | Burns v. State | 145 Wis. 373, 128 N.W. 987 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1911 | Download |
| 950 | State v. Riggins | 8 Ill. 2d 78, 132 N.E.2d 519 | Supreme Court of Illinois, 1956 | Download |
| 958 | Hufstetler v. State | 37 Ala. App. 71, 63 So. 2d 730 | Alabama Court of Appeals, 1953 | Download |
| 959 | Graham v. United States | 187 F. 2d 87 | United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1950 | Download |
| 961 | People v. Ashley | 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271 | Supreme Court of California, 1954 | Download |
| 965 | Nelson v. United States | 227 F.2d 21 | United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1955 | Download |
| 969 | State v. Harrington | 128 Vt. 242, 260 A.2d 692 | Supreme Court of Vermont, 1969 | Download |
| 973 | People v. Fichtner | 281 A.D. 159, 118 N.Y.S.2d 392, aff'd without opinion, 305 N.Y. 864, 114 N.E.2d 212 | New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, 1953 | Download |
| 979 | State v. Miller | 192 Or. 188, 233 P.2d 786 | Supreme Court of Oregon, 1951 | Download |
| 983 | United States v. Girard | 601 F.2d 69 | United States Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit, 1969 | Download |
| 987 | Regina v. Stewart | 50 D.L.R.4th 1, 41 C.C.C.2d 481 | Supreme Court of Canada, 1988 | Download |
| 989 | United States v. Siegel | 717 F.2d 9 | United States Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit, 1983 | Download |
| 996 | People v. Brown | 105 Cal. 66, 38 P. 518 | Supreme Court of California, 1894 | Download |
| 1002 | People v. Reid | 69 N.Y.2d 469, 508 N.E.2d 661 | New York Court of Appeals, 1987 | Download |
| Case Information | Fact Summary | Rule of Law |
|---|---|---|
|
People v. Zackowitz New York Court of Appeals, 1930 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 Pg. 19 |
A man and his wife were walking through their Brooklyn neighborhood. They walked by some young men who insulted the defendant's wife, causing her to break into tears. The couple continued walking down the street, but when they arrived at their apartment, the wife told the defendant that one of the young men had asked the wife to sleep with him and offered her two dollars. The defendant armed himself and went back to where the young men were located, engaging them in a fist fight. One of the young men went for him with a wrench and the defendant shot and killed the victim. | Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. . . ." |
|
Patterson v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 432 U.S. 197 Pg. 33 |
Patterson and his wife seperated. His wife resumed a relationship with a neighbor, John Northrup. Patterson found them together and killed Northrup. | All elements of the offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not necessary that affirmative defenses be disproved. |
|
Duncan v. Louisiana Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 391 U.S. 145 Pg. 42 |
Duncan, an African American, was driving in Louisiana when he noticed his cousins in an altercation with some white teens. His cousins had moved to an all white school. One of the white boys alleged that Duncan slapped him while leaving the scene and Duncan was charged with assault and battery. The African Americans testified that Duncan had not slapped one of the boys, but had merely touched him. The Louisiana Court denied a jury trial, because under the Louisana Constitution individuals were only guaranteed jury trials in cases in which, "capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor..." may have been imposed. | The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to trial by jury in state prosecutions where sentences greater than two years may be imposed. |
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United States v. Dougherty United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1972 473 F.2d 1113 Pg. 51 |
Defendants, in order to protest the Vietnam war, broke into and vandalized a Dow Chemical Company office in Washington. Defendants wanted a jury instruction on jury nullification. | A judge is not required to instruct a jury on the practice of jury nullification. |
|
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens Queen's Bench Division, 1884 14 Q.B.D. 273 Pg. 73 |
A group of guys went sailing. They got caught in a storm and pushed out to sea. After days without food, two of the men decided to eat the cabin boy. | Extreme hunger does not justify murder and is therefore punishable. |
|
United States v. Jackson United States Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, 1987 835 F.2d 1195 Pg. 112 |
Thirty minutes after being released from prison Mr. Jackson robbed another bank. Mr. Jackson was captured shortly thereafter and returned to jail. His principle sentence came under 18 U.S.C. section 1202, which forbids the possession of weapons by career criminals. Under the provisions of section 1202 Mr. Jackson was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Mr. Jackson appealed the sentence. | The statute reflects a judgment that career criminals should be dealt with most severely, thus the imposition of life in prison without parole on Mr. Jackson was permissible under the statute. |
|
Keeler v. Superior Court Supreme Court of California, 1970 470 P.2d 617 Pg. 146 |
Petitioner put his knee into the stomach of Mrs. Keeler, who was pregnant at the time, in an effort to stomp the fetus out of her. The trauma crushed the skull of the fetus causing it to be delivered stillborn. The issue put before the court was whether petitioner could be tried for murder. | The court issued a peremptory writ of prohibition restraining the trial court from proceeding with prosecution for murder because an unborn fetus was not a human being within the meaning of California's murder statute. |
|
City of Chicago v. Morales Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 527 U.S. 41 Pg. 154 |
In 1992, the City of Chicago enacted the Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits people from loitering with one another in any public place. The question is whether the ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | The Court held that the the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. It did not provide sufficiently specific limits on the enforcement discretion of the police, nor did it provide sufficient notice to citizens who wish to use the public streets. |
|
Martin v. State Alabama Court of Appeals, 1944 31 Ala. App. 334, 17 So. 2d 427 Pg. 182 |
Police officers arrested Martin at his home, where he was drunk, and then took him to a highway and then arrested him for being drunk on the highway. | To satisfy the actus reus element of a crime, the defendant must act voluntarily. In other words, the brain must command the defendant's actions. |
|
People v. Newton California District Court of Appeal, 1970 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 Pg. 184 |
Newton was pulled over by a police officer. The two became engaged in a struggle. Newton had a gun, which went off and wounded another police officer. Newton was then shot in the stomach. He then fired several shots at the arresting officer, killing him. Newton testified that he was in shock and had no recollection of killing the police officer | Model Penal Code, Section 2.01(1) provides, "A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act . . . ." |
|
Jones v. United States United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1962 308 F.2d 307 Pg. 192 |
Mother of illegitimate baby placed the baby with the defendant. The defendant did not provide the baby with food and necessities and the baby died. | "There are at least four situations in which the failure to act may constitute a breach of a legal duty. One can be held criminally liabile: first, where a statute imposes a duty to care for another; third, where one has assumed a contractual duty to care for another; fourth, where one has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others from rendering aid." |
|
Pope v. State Maryland Court of Appeals, 1979 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 Pg. 194 |
Woman took mother and infant into her home, because the mother was suffering from mental illness. The mother "ripped and tore" at the infant in the presence of the defendant. The defendant did nothing, but took the mother to church. The infant died. | There is no legal duty to act to save an infant if you have not voluntarily taken responsibility of the child. |
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Barber v. Superior Court California District Court of Appeal, 1983 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 Pg. 208 |
A man underwent surgery, during which he suffered from cardio-respiratory arrest. He was revived, but was left in a vegetative state. The family decided to take the patient off life support. | A doctor has no legal duty to continue life support, once it has become futile. However, the doctor must obtain consent to stop life support and must present an objective calculation of the patient's chance of living. |
|
Regina v. Cunningham Court of Criminal Appeal, 1957 2 Q.B. 396 Pg. 214 |
The appellant stole money behind a gas meter, which released noxious gas, endagering the life of his prospective mother-in-law. | "In any statutory definition of a crime, malice must be taken not in the old vague sense of wickedness in general but as requiring either (1) An actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done; or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not. . . ." |
|
United States v. Jewell United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 1976 532 F.2d 697 Pg. 229 |
Defendant was convicted of transporting marijuana in his car from Mexico to the United States, but deliberately avoided obtaining positive knowledge as to whether marijuana was present in his vehicle. | "The Government can complete their burden of proof by proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the defendant was not actually aware that there was marijuana in the vehicle he was driving when he entered the United States his ignorance in that regard was solely and entirely a result of his having made a conscious purpose to disregard the nature of that which was in the vehicle, with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth." |
|
Regina v. Prince Court of Crown Cases Reserved, 1875 L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 Pg. 234 |
Defendant was charged with taking a girl younger than sixteen years old from her father. The defendant did not know whether the girl whether the girl was under sixteen years old. | Bramwell's position is that as long as morality serves notice that the act is immoral or unlawful, then the defendant runs the risk of crime. |
|
People v. Olsen Supreme Court of California, 1984 36 Cal. 2d 638, 685 P.2d 52 Pg. 239 |
Man has sex with a minor, but is mistaken about her age. | The mistake of fact defense is not available in statutory rape cases, where strict liability applies. |
|
Morissette v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1952 342 U.S. 246 Pg. 250 |
A junk dealer took bomb casings, which had been laying in the open and were rusting, from an Air Force bombing range. | Strict liability does not apply where the offense is not a public welfare offense. |
|
Staples v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 511 U.S. 600 Pg. 254 |
Defendant failed to register his firearm. The defendant didn't know that his firearm had been altered, making it a semi-automatic weapon and rendering it subject to the statute under which he was prosecuted. | Although a statute doesn't mention a mens rea requirement, the Court will impute mens rea to the offense. |
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State v. Guminga Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1986 395 N.W.2d 344 Pg. 257 |
Waitress delivered alcoholic beverages to minors. The statute imposed vicarious strict liability against the employer. | There is no vicarious criminal liability in Minnesota. "We find that criminal penalties based on vicarious liability under Minn. Stat. Sec. 340.941 are a violation of substantive due process and that only civil penalties would be constitutional...." |
|
State v. Baker Kansas Court of Appeal, 1977 571 P.2d 65 Pg. 260 |
Defendant was convicted of speeding, but his cruise control was stuck in the "accelerate position." | In placing the cruise control to the "on" position, defendant satisfied the voluntary act requirement and became the agent of the vehicle. |
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Regina v. City of Sault Ste. Marie Supreme Court of Canada, 1978 85 D.L.R.3d 161 Pg. 262 |
The City of Sault Ste. Marie was charged with polution in violation of a statute and held strictly liable. | Although the public interest is involved, mens rea should still be proved unless expressly provided by the legislature. "...Offences of absolute liability would be those in respect of which the Legislature had made it clear that guilt would follow proof merely of the proscribed act." |
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People v. Marrero New York Court of Appeals, 1987 69 N.Y.2d 382, 507 N.E.2d 1068 Pg. 267 |
Federal corrections officer was arrested at a club for carrying an unregistered weapon; he thought he was included in the exceptions for peace officers in the statute. | In general, a mistaken belief as to the meaning of a criminal statute (even a good faith or reasonable one) is NOT a defense to a violation of the statute. "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." |
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Cheek v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1991 498 U.S. 192 Pg. 275 |
An American Airlines pilot was convicted for failing to pay income taxes. He alleged that his failure to pay taxes was not "wilfull" as required by the statute. | A mistake may be a valid defense if it negates the mens rea element of a crime. |
|
Lambert v. California Supreme Court of the United States, 1957 355 U.S. 225 Pg. 282 |
Defendant, a felon, was convicted of failing to register pursuant to a California statute requiring registration. | Knowledge or probability of knowledge of a statute is generally required to convict someone of a notice offense. |
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State v. Rusk Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1981 289 Md. 230, 424 A.2d 720 Pg. 302 |
Plaintiff takes defendant home in plaintiff's car. Defendant takes plaintiff up to his room and has sexual intercourse with plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that she was raped. The question is whether there was sufficient evidence shown to support the conviction. | The court concluded that the jury could have rationally found that the essential elements of second degree rape had been established. |
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State in the Interest of M.T.S. New Jersey Supreme Court, 1992 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 Pg. 318 |
Defendant, a 17 year-old male, had sex with the 15 year-old plaintiff in the plaintiff's bedroom late one night. Plaintiff claimed it was rape. Defendant claimed it was consensual. | Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that the girl had not expressed consent, either through her words or actions, to the act of intercourse. |
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People v. Evans Supreme Court, New York County, Trial Term, 1975 85 Misc. 2d 1088, 379 N.Y.S. 2d 912 Pg. 337 |
Defendant, through a string of lies, induced the plaintiff to enter an apartment where he had sexual intercourse with her several times. | Dececption, by itself, is not enough to sustain a charge of rape. There must exist force, or the threat of force. |
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Commonwealth v. Sherry Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1982 386 Mass. 682, 437 N.E. 2d 224 Pg. 342 |
Three doctors became acquainted wih a nurse at a party. The three doctors took the nurse away from the party and had sexual intercourse with her, each in turn. The doctors claim that it was consensual. The nurse claims that she was gang raped. After being convicted the doctors sought to have the case dismissed. | The court found no error in the record nor any cause to reverse the judgment. Thus, the conviction was sustained. |
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Commonwealth v. Fischer Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1998 721 A.2d 1111 Pg. 344 |
Two freshman college students engaged in a consensual sexual encounter followed a short time later by another sexual encounter. The girl claimed she was sexually assaulted the second time, the boy claimed that it was consensual. The boy was convicted. On appeal the boy's new attorney raised an ineffective assistance of counsel defense. | The court held that the boy did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to argue for a change in the sexual assault law. Thus, the conviction and sentence was affirmed. |
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United States v. Wiley United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, 1974 492 F.2d 547 Pg. 359 |
Plaintiff claimed that she was raped by the defendant. The court concluded that her testimony of the events was not sufficiently corroborated to sustain a conviction. | The court concluded that the flexible corroboration rule developed by the court provided the best accommodation of numerous conflicting considerations. |
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State v. DeLawder Maryland Court of Special Appeals, 1975 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 Pg. 365 |
Defendant was found guily of having carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 14. The question was whether the trial court erred in sustaining objections that the child had had intercourse with other men on other occasions. | The court concluded that the desirability that the prosecutrix fulfill her public duty to testify free from embarrassment and with her reputation unblemished must fall before the right of an accused to seek out the truth in the process of defending himself. |
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Government of the Virgin Islands v. Scuito United States Court of Appeals, 3d Circuit, 1980 623 F.2d 869 Pg. 369 |
On appeal from a conviction for forcible rape, the defendant asserts that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a psychiatric examination of the complainant. | Evidence that the complainant was thought by members of the community to indulge in drugs leading to "altered states of consciousness" or to dress in a manner "indicative of socially aberrant behavior" could be introduced by direct rather than expert testimony. If, however, such matters are not relevant or otherwise admissible, there is no justification for letting them into the trial by allowing an expert to give his opinion regarding them. |
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Commonwealth v. Carroll Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1963 412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d 911 Pg. 381 |
Defendant pleaded guilty to the murder of his wife. During the course of an argument, defendant became enraged with his wife, who suffered from a psychiatric disorder, and shot her in the back of the head. He did this impulsively. | Whether the intention to kill and the killing, that is, the premeditation and the fatal act, were within a brief space of time or a long space of time is immaterial if the killing was in fact intentional, wilful, deliberate and premediated. |
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State v. Guthrie Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 1995 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 Pg. 386 |
Defendant suffered from severe psychiatric problems. Among his psychological maladies was an obsession with his nose. The victim was his co-worker. The two worked as dishwashers. The victim was teasing and joking with the defendant and snapped a towel at him several times. The victim finally snapped a towel, which flipped the defendant on the nose. The defendant took a knife from his pocket and stabbed the victim in the neck. | There must be some length of time that lapses between the intent to kill and the actual murder. |
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Girouard v. State Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1991 321 Md. 532, 583 A.2d 718 Pg. 390 |
Defendant stabs wife 19 times after repeated verbal provocation by his wife, including telling him that she wanted a divorce, never loved him, and had filed charges against him for abuse. | Verbal provocation alone is not enough to mitigate a charge of murder to manslaughter. |
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Maher v. People Supreme Court of Michigan, 1862 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dec. 781 Pg. 392 |
Defendant, after learning that his wife was having sexual intercourse with the victim, walked into a saloon and shot the victim in the ear. The wound was serious, but non-fatal. | It is a question of fact whether the defendant was provoked by knowledge of an adulterous relationship between his spouse and the victim. |
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People v. Casassa New York Court of Appeals, 1980 49 N.Y.2d 668, 404 N.E.2d 1310 Pg. 401 |
Defendant kills a woman he was dating after she breaks up with him, and was charged with second-degree murder. The killing was preceded by a number of bizare actions on the part of the defendant. At trial, defendant argued that he was under the influence of an "extreme emotional disturbance" at the time of the killings, in order to reduce the conviction to manslaughter. | The affirmative defense of "extreme emotional disturbance" is judged by both a subjective and objective standard. Whether the defendant did in fact act under an "extreme emotional disturbance is determined by a subjective standard. Whether there was a "reasonable explination or excuse" for the defendant's disturbance is determined by an objective standard. |
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Commonwealth v. Welansky Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1944 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 Pg. 411 |
The Cocoanut Grove - a Boston night club - was overcrowded after a football game on November 28, 1942. A fire broke out in the night club and because of the dimensions of the club and the lack of available exits, a great number of people died. Although Welanski (the club's proprietor) was not present at the club when the fire broke out, he was still found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. | In determining whether civil or criminal liability exists for unintended homicide the Court considers (1) a higher liklihood of harm; (2) risk of a particularly serious harm; and (3) actual awareness, or greater liklihood of awareness, of that harm. |
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State v. Williams Washington Court of Appeals, 1971 4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 Pg. 418 |
Child of defendant parents died when an abcessed tooth became gangrenous, preventing the child from eating and eventually leading to pneumonia. They did not take him to a doctor because they thought he simply had a toothache, and because they were afraid that the child would be taken away from them due to the appearance of neglect. | When the statutory standard of negligence is "ordinary or simple," parents are negligent when they fail to "measure up to the conduct required for a man of reasonable prudence ... If such negligence proximately causes the death of the victim, the defendant ... is guilty of statutory manslaughter." |
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Commonwealth v. Malone Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1946 354 Pa. 180, 47 A.2d 445 Pg. 426 |
Defendant kills his friend while playing russian roulette. Defendant claimed that the killing was accidental. | Malice is shown where there is an "act intentionally done by the [defendant], in reckless and wanton disregard of the consequences..." to others. So long as the act itself was intentional, it is irrelevant that the death of the victim was unintended. Where malice is shown, a killing is a murder. |
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United States v. Fleming United States Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit, 1984 739 F.2d 945 Pg. 431 |
Defendant kills the victim when his car struck hers in a head-on collision. Defendant was driving with extreme recklessness, crossing between the northbound and southbound lanes of traffic and going 70 to 100 mph when the speed limit was 45 mph. After the accident, defendant's BAC was measured at .315. Defendant was charged with murder, rather than vehicular manslaughter. | A drunk driver can be convicted of murder, even where there is a separate vehicular manslaughter statute. "The difference between malice, which will support conviction for murder, and gross negligence, which will permit of conviction only for manslaughter, is one of degree rather than kind." |
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People v. Phillips Supreme Court of California, 1966 64 Cal.2d 574, 414 P.2d 353 Pg. 447 |
Defendant, a chiropractor, promised the parents of an eight-year-old girl that he could cure her eye cancer without surgery. In reliance on defendant's representations, the parents of the victim chose not to consent to surgery, and gave defendant $700 for his services. The victim's discontinued treatment when there was no improvement. The child died approximatley four months later. Defendant was charged with felony murder, with Grand Theft as the underlying offense. | "[O]nly such felonies as are in themselves 'inherently dangerous to human life' can support the application of the felony-murder rule." Grand Theft is not inherently dangerous to human life. |
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People v. Stewart Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1995 663 A.2d 912 Pg. 448 |
Defendant goes on a 2 to 3 day cocaine binge, during which time her child dies of dehydration due to negligent care. Defendant is charged with felony murder, with the underlying felony of "wrongfully permitting a child to be a habitual sufferer." | Whether a felony is inherently dangerous to human life, and therefore a basis for a felony murder conviction, is a question of fact for the jury, to be answered based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. |
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State v. Canola Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1977 73 N.J. 206, 374 A.2d 20 Pg. 460 |
Defendant is charged with felony murder when a co-felon was shot and killed by a jewelery store owner during an armed robbery. | A felon cannot be charged with felony murder for the death of a co-felon, caused "by the act of one other than the felon himself or those associated with him in the unlawful enterprise." |
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McCleskey v. Kemp Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 481 U.S. 279 Pg. 499 |
Defendant, a black man, was convicted of two counts of robbery and one count of murder. He was sentenced to death. On appeal, defendant presented a complex statistical study that indicated a risk that racial considerations enter into capital sentencing determinations. Defendant, claimed that this was a violation of his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights. | The court held that the study did not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias as to violate the defendant's constitutional rights. |
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People v. Acosta Court of Appeal of California, 4th Appellate District, 1991 284 Cal. Rptr. 117 Pg. 510 |
Defendant was sitting in a parked car that was stolen. When approached by police, he sped away, and a 48-mile police chance ensued. Defendant was followed by four police helicopters. Due to the negligence of one of the pilots, two of the helicopters collided while attempting a lead change, and three crew members died. Defendant was charged with murder as a result. | In determining whether a defendant's acts were the proximate cause of the death of another, the analysis is as follows: "(1) was the defendant's conduct the actual cause of the harm (but for his actions would it have occurred as it did)? (2) was the result an intended consequence of the act? (3) was the defendant's action a substantial factor in the harm? and (4) was the result highly extraordinary in light of the circumstances?" Two helicopters crashing into each other while following a car in a high speed chase is not "highly extraordinary", and therefore unforeseeable, simply because it has never happened before. |
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People v. Arzon Supreme Court, New York County, 1978 92 Misc. 2d 739, 401 N.Y.S.2d 156 Pg. 514 |
Defendant set fire to a couch in an abandoned building in an attempt to burn it down, so that "winos" and "junkies" could not use it. A fireman died in responding to the fire set by defenadant, but the death was in part due to a second fire that sprang up independently from defendant's actions. | "The defendant's conduct need not be the sole and exclusive factor in the victim's death. ...An individual is criminally liable if his conduct was a sufficiently direct cause of the death, and the ultimate harm is something which should have been foreseen is being reasonably related to his acts." |
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People v. Campbell Court of Appeals of Michigan, 1983 124 Mich. App. 333, 335 N.W.2d 27 Pg. 523 |
Defendant caught his wife sleeping with Basnaw, the deceased. Two weeks later, while drinking heavily, defendant and Basnaw began discussing suicide. After encouraging Basnaw to kill himself, defendant got him a gun and bullets. Basnaw commited suicide after defendant left his house. Defendant was charged with "open murder" for inciting suicide. | "The term suicide excludes by definition homicide," therefore giving a person a gun to kill himself with is not murder. The defendant must have the present intention to kill to commit murder; "...hope alone is not the degree of intention requisite to a charge of murder." |
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People v. Kevorkian Supreme Court of Michigan, 1994 447 Mich. 436, 527 N.W.2d 714 Pg. 524 |
Defendant, Dr. Kevorkian, assisted two women in committing suicide. He set up devices that allowed the women to kill themselves, and the women performed the final act that initiated the killing processes. Dr. Kevorkian was charged with two counts of murder, since the events occured before Michigan had passed a statute prohibiting assisted-suicide. | "Only where there is probable cause to believe that death was the direct and natural result of a defendant's act can the defendant be properly bound over on a charge of murder." Merely providing the means with which a person kills themselves is not enough. |
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Commonwealth v. Root Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1961 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 Pg. 538 |
Defendant was racing the decedent on a public road. While in a no-passing zone, the decedent attempted to pass the defendant in the left lane, where traffic was traveling in the opposite direction. The decedent's car was struck by an on-coming truck, and was killed. Defendant was convicted on involuntary manslaughter. | To convict a defendant of manslaughter, his conduct must be both reckless and a sufficiently direct cause of the death of another. |
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State v. McFadden Supreme Court of Iowa, 1982 320 N.W.2d 608 Pg. 540 |
Defendant was drag racing against Sulgrove, when Sulgrove lost control of his vehicle, and crashed into the vehicle of an innocent third party. A child passenger in the third car and Sulgrove were both killed in the accident. Although he did not directly cause the accident, defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. | The fact that a victim of a drag racing accident was a participant in the race does not bar another participant from being convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Ordinary proximate cause principles should be used to determine causation in a criminal prosecution; a "direct casual connection" need not be shown. |
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Commonwealth v. Atencio Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1963 345 Mass. 627, 189 N.E.2d 323 Pg. 542 |
Defendants played a game of "russian roulette" with the decedent. Each defendant took a turn spinning the barrel and pulling the trigger while pointing the gun at their head, but the gun did not fire. When the decedent did the same, the gun fired, and he died. Defendants were both charged with involuntary manslaughter. | Wanton or reckless conduct, giving rise to a charge of manslaughter, can "be found in the concerted action and cooperation of [others] in helping to bring about [a person's] foolish act."; Persons who participate in a game of "russian roulette" can be convicted of manslaughter for the death of one of them. |
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Smallwood v. State Court of Appeals, Maryland, 1996 343 Md. 97, 680 A.2d 512, 1996 Pg. 547 |
Defendant raped several women. He was aware that he was HIV positive and nevertheless did not use a condom, despite being warned by his social worker that he could contiminate his partners if he had unprotected sex with them. | Attempted murder requires a specific attempt to kill. |
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People v. Rizzo Court of Appeals of New York, 1927 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 Pg. 555 |
Defendant was arrested, along with three accomplices, for attempted robbery. At the time of their arrest, they were driving around looking for a particular person who carried a $1,200 payroll, but had not yet found the person. | When determining whether the overt acts of a defendant rise to the level of a criminal attempt, "The law ... considers those acts only as tending to the commission of the crime which are so near to its accomplishment that in all reasonable probability the crime itself would have been committed but for timely interference." |
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McQuirter v. State Alabama Court of Appeals, 1953 36 Ala. App. 707, 63 So. 2d 388 Pg. 558 |
Defendant, a black man, was convicted of an attempt to commit an assault with intent to rape. The prosecutrix, a white woman, testified that defendant followed her home, and that he only went away when she went into the house of a male neighbor. The police testified that defendant admitted that he wanted to rape the prosecutrix. Defendant denied that he tried to follow or rape the prosecutrix, that he made any statements to the police, and testified that he had stopped in town on his way back home and was walking towards the colored section of town when the prosecutrix thought he was following her. | "...To justify a conviction for an attempt to commit an assault with intent to rape the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to have sexual intercourse with prosecutrix againast her will, by force, or by putting in fear ... In determining the question of intention the jury may consider social conditions and customs founded uupon racial differences, such as that the prosecutrix was a white woman and defendant was a Negro man." |
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United States v. Jackson United States Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit, 1977 560 F.2d 112 Pg. 565 |
Defendants conspired to rob a bank. They had formed a plan to rob the bank a week prior to their arrest, but decided to try it the following week after scouting the bank. After one of the conspirators was arrested on separate charges and told the police of the plan, the remaining conspirators were arrested while driving towards the bank on the morning they were going to attempt the robbery. Their car had a fake license plate, and it contained a suitcase, two shotguns, a revolver, handcuffs, and masks. | To be guilty of an attempt, "First, the defendant must have been acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime which he is charged with attempting... Second, the defendant must have engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime. A substantial step must be conduct strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant's criminal intent." |
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State v. Davis Supreme Court of Missouri, 1928 319 Mo. 1222, 6 S.W.2d 609 Pg. 571 |
Defendant and his lover, Alberdina, tried to hire an ex-convict to kill her husband and collect on his life insurance. They offered $600 and $3,000 in diamonds to Dill, a policeman posing as an ex-con, to kill Alberdina's husband. They plan called for Dill to stage a robbery, during which he would kill the husband. On the night that the husband was to be killed, Dill arrested defendant and Albertina for attempted murder. | "...Mere solicitation, unaccompanied by an act moving directly toward the commission of the intended crime, is not an overt act constituting an element of the crime of attempt. Solicitation of itself is a distinct offense when declared so by law." |
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People v. Jaffe New York Court of Appeals, 1906 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 Pg. 575 |
Defendant is charged with attempting to recieve stolen goods. Defendant believed that he was purchasing stolen cloth, but it was not actually stolen. The owner of the cloth had given it to the police for the purpose of catching defendant attempting to purchase the cloth. | If a person intends to commit an act that would not be a crime if it were consummated, the person cannot be convicted of an attempt. |
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People v. Dlugash New York Court of Appeals, 1977 41 N.Y.2d 725, 363 N.E.2d 1155 Pg. 577 |
Defendant shot the victim in the head five times, a few minutes after the victim had already been shot in the chest twice. Defendant claimed that he thought the victim was already dead. There was medical testimony that the victim may have still been alive when he was shot by defendant. | "... A person is guilty of an attempt when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime. It is no defense that, under the attendant circumstances, the crime was factually or legally impossible of commission, 'if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as such person believed them to be.' Thus, if defendant believed the victim to be alive at the time of the shooting, it is no defense to the charge of attempted murder that the victim may have been dead." |
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Hicks v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1893 150 U.S. 442 Pg. 593 |
Defendant is convicted of murder as an accomplice. Defendant was present when Rowe, the shooter, killed Colvard. Witnesses standing 100 yards away testified that defendant encouraged Rowe to kill Colvard, while defendant claimed that his statements were meant to discourage Rowe from killing Colvard and himself. | An accomplice must intentionally aid, abet, or encourage the prinicpal in order to be found guilty as a principal; If the accomplice was not acting with the intention to aid, abet, or encourage, then there is no criminal liability. |
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State v. Gladstone Supreme Court of Washington, 1980 78 Wash. 2d 306, 474 P.2d 274 Pg. 595 |
Undercover police officer went to defendant's home looking to buy marijuana. The defendant did not have any marijuana, but offered the name of someone who did have marijuana. | There must be a nexus between the individual accused and the party whom he is charged with aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime. |
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People v. Luparello California Court of Appeal, 4th District, 1987 187 Cal. App. 3d 410, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832 Pg. 604 |
Defendant was having an affair with a married woman, Terri. Terri reconciled with her husband, Ed, and moved to another county, while pregnant with defendant's child. In an effort to find Terri and Ed, defendant and some friends planned to get their location from a friend of Ed's named Martin by beating him up. After a failed attempt to beat up Martin at his home, two of defendant's friends returned to Martin's house and killed him. Defendant was not present at the murder. | "...A defendant whose liability is predicated on his status as an aider and abettor need not have intended to encourage or facilitate the particular offense ultimately committed by the perpetrator. His knowledge that an act which is criminal was intended, and his action taken with the intent that the act be encouraged or facilitated, are sufficient to impose liability on him for any reasonably foreseeable offense committed as a consequence by the perpetrator." |
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State v. McVay Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1926 47 R.I. 292, 132 A. 436 Pg. 610 |
The captain and engineer of a steamer were indicted for manslaughter when the steamer's boiler burst, killing several people. | In an involuntary manslaughter case, it is possible for someone to be an accessory before the fact, if their actions contribute to negligence which results in the death of human beings. |
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Wilcox v. Jeffery King's Bench Division, 1951 1 All E.R. 464 Pg. 616 |
Defendant was convicted of unlawfully aiding jazz musician in obtaining employment in the United Kingdom, because he went to the concert and paid for a ticket. | When someone acts to encourage another in the commission of an illegal act, they satisfy the actus reus of accomplice liability. |
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New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1909 212 U.S. 481 Pg. 633 |
Defendant, a railroad company, along with one of its managers, was convicted of giving illegally giving favorable shipping rates to certain suger companies. Defendant argued that Congress has no authority to impute to a corporation the commission of criminal offenses by its employees. | "We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation, which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents and officers, shall be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to whom it has intrusted authority to act in the subject-matter of making and fixing rates of transportation, and whose knowledge and purposes may well be attributed to the corporation for which the agents act." |
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United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp. United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 1972 467 F.2d 1000 Pg. 635 |
"Operators of hotels, restaurants, hotel and restaurant supply companies, and other businesses in Portland, Oregon, organized an association to attract conventions to their city. To finance the association, members were asked to make contributions in predetermined amounts. Companies selling supplies to hotels were asked to contribute an amount equal to one per cent of their sales to hotel members. To aid collections, hotel members, including appellant, agreed to give preferential treatment to suppliers who paid their assessments, and to curtail purchases from those who did not." | "...As a general rule a corporation is liable under the Sherman Act for the acts of its agents in the scope of their employment, even though contrary to general corporate policy and express instructions to the agent." |
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Gordon v. United States United States Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit, 1954 203 F.2d 248, rev'd, 347 U.S. 909 Pg. 651 |
Defendants, partners in a sewing machine business, were convicted of violating a federal statute and regulation prohibiting the sale of sewing machines by installment sales contracts where the downpayment was less than 25% fo the price of the sewing machine. The employees of defendants, not the defendants themselves, actually sold the machines. | Where the law places a duty on an employer, and wilfulness is an essential element of an offense, employers may be charged with the guilty knowledge and acts of the employees in determining the question of wilfulness. |
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United States v. Park Supreme Court of the United States, 1975 421 U.S. 658 Pg. 653 |
The government charged Acme and respondent with violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, because Acme held food in a building accessible to rodents. Acme plead guilty to each count, but respondent pleaded not guilty. | The court did not agree with the Court of Appeals that it was incumbent upon the District court to instruct the jury that the Government had the burden of establishing "wrongful action." It is clear that the government establishes a prima facie case when it introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of fact that the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct the violation complained of. |
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United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co. United States Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit, 1991 933 F.2d 35 Pg. 659 |
Defendant, president of a waste disposal company, was convicted of illegally disposing waste under RCRA. The statute had a knowledge requirement. There was no evidence establishing direct knowledge on the part of defendant. The jury was instructed that the knowledge requirement was satisfied if they found that defendant was a "responsible corporate officer." | "In a crime having knowledge as an express element, a mere showing of official responsibility ... is not an adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of knowledge." |
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Krulewitch v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1949 336 U.S. 440 Pg. 664 |
Defendant is convicted of conspiring to transport a woman across state lines for the purpose of prostitution. During his trial, hearsay statements were introduced, under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, to prove that there was a conspiracy to commit the crime. | Where the chief object of a conspiracy has ended, subsequent statements made by co-conspirators will not be allowed as evidence under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Statements by co-conspirators made persuant to an "implied agreement" on the "subsidary objective" of avoiding detection, conviction, and punishment will not be admitted under the co-conspirator exception. |
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Pinkerton v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1946 328 U.S. 640 Pg. 677 |
Two brothers were indicted for violations of the Internal Revenue Code. There was no evidence to support the conviction of one of the brothers on the substantive offense. | An overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act. Motive or intent may be proved by the acts or declarations of some of the conspirators in furtherance of the common objective. |
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Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1939 306 U.S. 208 Pg. 688 |
Two related movie theater chains and eight distributors of motion pictures conspired to regulate movie prices and in so doing restrained commerce and violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. | An unlawful conspiracy may be formed without the simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators. |
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People v. Lauria California District Court of Appeal, 1967 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628 Pg. 695 |
Defendant was indicted on conspiracy to commit prostitution. Defendant ran a phone answering service. He admitted that he knew some prostitutes used his service to set up appointments for their services. | "With respect to misdemeanors, we conclude that positive knowledge of the supplier that his products or services are being used for criminal purposes does not, without more, establish an intent of the supplier to participate in the misdemeanors..." With respect to felonies, "...the intent of a supplier who knows of the criminal use to which his supplies are put to participate in the criminal activity connected with the use of his supplies may be established by (1) direct evidence that he intends to participate, or (2) through an inference that he intends to participate based on, (a) his special interest in the activity, or (b) the aggravated nature of the crime itself." |
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Kotteakos v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1946 328 U.S. 750 Pg. 705 |
Defendants are convicted as part of a conspiracy to fraudulently procure government loans. In the instructions to the jury, the trial court told the jury that there was only one conspiracy. The government admitted, however, that the eveidence actually proved eight or more separate conspiracies with one key figure, defendant Brown. The government argued that the error in the jury instructions was "harmless error." | Though defendants may all be engaged in a similar criminal enterprise, they are not necessarily involved in the same criminal conspiracy. There is prejudicial error where a jury instruction charges that there was one conspiracy between all defendants, when the evidence showed that there were numerous separate conspiracies, since it allows the jury to impute the acts and statements of each defendant to every other defendant without showing that they were actually engaged in a common criminal enterprise. |
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United States v. Bruno United States Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit, 1939 308 U.S. 287 Pg. 708 |
Defendants were indicted along with 86 others for a conspiracy to import, sell, and possess narcotics. Defendants complain that, if the evidence proved anything, it proved a series of separate conspiracies and not a single one. | Each link knew that the other links were necessary components in the scheme of distribution and were all parts of a single undertaking. Thus, the court held that there was only one conspiracy. |
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Garcia v. State Supreme Court of Indiana, 1979 71 Ind. 366, 394 N.E. 2d 106 Pg. 717 |
Defendant is convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. She asked a friend to help her find someone whom she could hire to kill her husband. The friend went to the police, and an undercover detective pretended to agree to kill defendant's husband in exchange for money. At no time did the friend or the detective intend to help carry out the conspiracy. | Under the "unilateral" approach to conspiracy, it is no defense to a defendant's guilt that other party's agreement was feigned. |
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United States v. Elliott United States Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit 571 F.2d 880 Pg. 732 |
The court reviewed the convictions of six persons accused of violating the RICO statute. According to the defendants, the court is dealing with separate entities unaffected by the RICO provisions. The government claims that the court is dealing with a large conspiracy. | The court affirmed all of the conspiracy convictions except Elliot's. The court held that Elliot may have conspired to distribute stolen meat, but not that he conspired to violate RICO. |
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United States v. Peterson United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1973 483 F.2d 1222 Pg. 738 |
Defendant was indicted of second-degree murder and convicted of manslaughter. Defendant now urges that the judge erred in the instructions given the jury in relation to his claim that the homicide was committed in self-defense. | The court sustained the trial judge's action in remitting the issue of self-defense to the jury for determination and found no error in the trial judge's instruction. |
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People v. Goetz New York Court of Appeals, 1986 68 N.Y.2d 96, 497 N.E.2d 41 Pg. 739 |
Defendant was approached by 4 youths on a subway car. The youths demanded money from defendant. Fearing that he was about to be robbed, defendant decided to shoot each youth with an unregistered handgun he had with him to fend off muggers. A grand jury indicted defendant on 4 charges of attempted murder. Defendant challenged the prosecutors charge to the grand jury on the defense of justification. | In New York, whether a defendant is justified in killing another is determined by an objective, or "reasonable man", standard, not a subjective standard; whether the actions of the defendant were reasonable is "based on the circumstances facing a defendant or his situation..." |
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State v. Kelly Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1984 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 Pg. 750 |
Defendant killed her husband by stabbing him with a pair of scissors. Defendant claims that it was done in self-defense, and that she was a victim of battered-woman's syndrome. The question left to the court was whether an expert should be allowed to testify on the effects of battered woman's syndrome. | The court held that the battered-woman's syndrome is an appropriate subject for expert testimony; that the experts' conclusions, despite the relative newness of the field, are sufficiently reliable under New Jersey's standards for scientific testimony; and that defendant's expert was sufficiently qualified. |
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State v. Norman Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1989 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 Pg. 763 |
A wife killed her husband by shooting him three times in the back of the head while he was sleeping. The husband had beaten and degraded the wife for more than twenty years. The question is whether the wife can assert she acted out of self-defense due to battered woman's syndrome. | The court held that the wife could not assert self-defense because she lacked the belief that she was under a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm. |
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State v. Abbott Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1961 36 N.J. 63, 174 A.2d 881 Pg. 777 |
Defendant gets into a fist fight with his neighbor's son over improvements to their common driveway. The son was the initial aggressor, but defendant knocked him down. The neighbor (the father) then came at defendant with a hatchet, and the neighbor's wife followed with a carving knife and large fork. A scuffle ensued, and all parties suffered injuries from the weapons. At trial for assault and battery, Defendant claimed self-defense, and appealed on the issue of whether he was required to retreat. | New Jersey follows the prinicple of retreat in self-defence cases. "The issue of retreat arises only of the defendant restorted to a deadly force." Where defendant uses deadly force, it is not justifiable "if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retrating..." |
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People v. Ceballos Supreme Court of California, 1974 12 Cal. 3d 470, 526 P.2d 241 Pg. 786 |
Defendant set up a spring gun to protect his garage from intruders after some of his property had been stolen. Two teenagers subsequently tried to break into his garage, whereupon one was shot in the face. | "Where the character and manner of [a] burglary [does] not reasonably create a fear of great bodily harm [or death], there is no cause for exaction of human life." Where no one but the alleged burglar is on the premises, there is no fear of great bodily harm or death. |
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Durham v. State Supreme Court of Indiana, 1927 199 Ind. 567, 159 N.E. 145 Pg. 792 |
Defendant, a game warden, attepted to arrest two men for illegal fishing. The men attempted to escape in their boat, while defendant grabbed the boat in an attempt to detain them. Long, one of the men under arrest, repeatedly hit defendant on the head and shoulders with an oar. After numerous warnings to stop resisting, defendant shot in the arm. | "...(A) ... an officer having the right to arrest a misdemeanant may use all the force that is reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest, except (B) that he may not, merely for the purpose of effecting the arrest, kill or inflict great bodily harm endangering the life of the misdemeanant; thus an officer may not kill or shed blood in attempting to arrest a misdemeanant who is fleeing, but not resisting. (C) That if the defendant physically resists, the officer need not retreat, but may press forward and repel the resistance with such force, short of taking life, as is necessary to effect the arrest; and if in so doing, the officer is absolutely obliged to seriously wound or take the life of the accused, in order to prevent the accused from seriously wounding or killing him, he will be justified." |
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Tennessee v. Garner Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 471 U.S. 1 Pg. 793 |
A policeman shoot and killed a suspect that was fleeing from the scene of a buglary after ordering him to halt. The suspect was a minor, had a slight build, and was not armed. The policeman shot the suspect solely to prevent him from escaping. | A police officer may not use deadly force against a fleeing felony suspect unless he has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others. |
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People v. Unger Supreme Court of Illinois, 1977 66 Ill. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 Pg. 798 |
Defendant was convicted of escape after he walked off of an "honor farm" while serving a sentence for auto theft. Defendant claimed that he escaped because other inmates threatened to rape and kill him. Defendant wanted to assert the defenses of necessity and compulsion at trial, but was denied instructions on these defenses. | Necessity can be an affirmative defense to the crime of escape. Relevant factors to be used in assessing claims of necessity are: "(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; (2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result from such complaints illusory; (3) There is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts; (4) There is no evidence of force or violence used towards prison personnel or other 'innocent' persons in the escape; and (5) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat." The defense of necessity is not, however, expressly conditioned on the above factors. |
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United States v. Schoon United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 1992 971 F.2d 193 Pg. 807 |
Defendants appeal their conviction for obstructing the activities of the IRS office in Tucson, Arizona and failing to comply with the order of a federal officer. The convictions stemmed from a protest staged by the defendants in order to bring attention to United States involvment in El Salvador. | The court held that the necessity defense was not intended as justification for illegal acts taken in indirect political protest. |
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Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health Supreme Court of the United States, 1989 497 U.S. 261 Pg. 821 |
Nancy Cruzan was living in a persistant vegatative state in a Missouri hospital. Her parents asked hospital employees to terminate her life. The State of Missouri would not allow allow Cruzan's life to be terminated because there was not sufficient evidence to support that it was Cruzan's intent. | The Court held that the State of Missouri did not committ any constitutional error. |
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Washington v. Glucksberg Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 521 U.S. 702 Pg. 823 |
Several terminally ill patients and their physicians sued the State of Washington for a declaratory judgment that the state's ban on assisted suicide was a violation of a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. | Washington's prohibition against "caus[ing]" or "aid[ing]" a suicide does not violate the Due Process Clause. |
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State v. Toscano Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1977 74 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755 Pg. 833 |
Defendant Joseph Toscano was convicted of creating a false medical report used in a scheme to defraud insurance companies. Toscano claimed that he acted under duress because he feared for his safety and that of his family. | We hold that duress is an affirmative defense to a crime other than murder, and that it need not be based upon an alleged threat of immediate bodily injury |
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People v. Hood Supreme Court of California, 1969 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370 Pg. 850 |
Defendant, while resisting arrest, grabbed the officer's gun and shot the officer twice in the leg. He was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon of a peace officer. The trial court gave hopelessly conflicting instructions on the effect of intoxication resulting in an appeal. | The court held that on re-trial the court should not instruct the jury to consider evidence of defendant's intoxication in determining whether he committed the crime. |
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M'Naghten's Case House of Lords, 1843 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 Pg. 873 |
A Scottish woodsman murdered an Englishman while suffering paranoid delusions. | The M'Naghten rule states that to be legally insane the defendant must have either (1) not known what he/she was doing at the time; or (2) not known that what he/she was doing was wrong. One illustration of this would be if someone thought they were squeezing a lemon, when in fact they were squeezing someone's head. |
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Blake v. United States United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 1969 407 F.2d 908 Pg. 875 |
Defendant robbed a bank and pleaded insanity. During trial, he claimed several errors. Among those errors he claimed that that the instructions to the jury as to the burden of proof on the issue of insanity were confusing and erroneous, and that the definition of insanity given the jury in charge for determining the issue of not guilty by reason of insanity was outmoded and prejudicial. | The court held that if the trial court freely admits all evidence which appears to be relevant and if the charge appropriately embraces and requires positive conclusions by the jury as to the defendant's cognition, his volition, and his capacity to control his behavior, and if these three elements of knowledge, will and choice are emphasized in the charge as essential and critical constituents of legal sanity, it shall usually regard the charge as legally sufficient. |
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United States v. Lyons United States Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, en banc, 1984 731 F.2d 243, 739 F.2d 994 Pg. 879 |
Defendant was convicted of several narcotics violations. He claimed that he was unable to conform to the law due to a drug addiction that caused him to go insane. The court revisited the issue of insanity. | The court held that a person is not responsible for criminal conduct on the grounds of insanity only if at the time of that conduct, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct. |
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State v. Crenshaw Washington Supreme Court, 1983 98 Wash. 2d 789, 659 P.2d 488 Pg. 889 |
Defendant brutally murdered his wife after he suspected that she had been unfaithful to him. Defendant claimed that he followed the Moscovite faith and that it would have been improper for him not to kill his wife if she had committed adultery. | The court concluded that the defendant knew his acts were morally wrong from society's viewpoint and also knew his acts were illegal. His personal belief that it was his duty to kill his wife for her alleged adultery cannot serve to exculpate him from legal responsibility for his acts. |
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State v. Guido New Jersey Supreme Court, 1993 40 N.J. 191, 191 A.2d 45 Pg. 893 |
Defendant was so distraught in her marriage that she decided to end her life. At the last moment, however, she turned the gun on her husband and killed him instead. The expert's initial report showed that the defendant was legally sane at the time of the shooting. After meeting with defense counsel, however, the expert's changed their opinion to find that the defendant was legally insane. | The court would not fault defense counsel, defendant, or defendant's witnesses because the witnesses changed what their understanding of what the law means by disease. |
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United States v. Brawner United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1972 471 F.2d 969 Pg. 901 |
After examining the test of legal insanity as a complete defense, the court considered whether mental health evidence should be admissible apart from its bearing on the insanity issue. | The court found a rule that permits the introduction of expert testimony as to abnormal conditions if it is relevant to negate, or establish the specific mental condition that is an element of the crime. |
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Robinson v. California Supreme Court of the United States, 1962 370 U.S. 660 Pg. 911 |
Defendant was convicted of being addicted to narcotics after two police officers witnessed scar tissue and needle marks on his forearm. | The court held that the California statute making addiction to narcotics a crime violated the Constitution because it was a cruel and unusual punishment. |
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Powell v. Texas Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 392 U.S. 514 Pg. 914 |
Defendant was convicted under a Texas Statute prohibiting public drunkeness. Defendant claimed that he could not help being drunk due to his alcoholism, and that to punish him for being an addict was a violation of his constitutional rights. | Court held that it was not a violation of defendant's constitutional rights because he wasn't being punished for being drunk, but for being drunk in a public place. |
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United States v. Moore United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1973 486 F.2d 1139 Pg. 922 |
Appellant contends that his conviction for possession of heroin was improper because, as a heroin addict, he should not be held responsible for being in possession of the drug. | The court held that the conviction should be sustained, and that mere addiction to heroin is not a sufficient defense to the crime of possession of a narcotic. |
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Commonwealth v. Tluchak Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1950 166 Pa. Super. 16, 70 A.2d 657 Pg. 935 |
Appellants agreed to sell their farm to the prosecutor and his wife. When the purchasers took possession, they discovered that several items which had been on the premises at the time of the purchase were missing. As a result, appellants were convicted of larceny. | Sellers that refuse to deliver goods sold to purchasers are not guily of larceny. They could be found liable, however, for fraudulent conversion or of larceny by bailee. |
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Topolewski v. State Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1906 130 Wis. 244, 109 N.W. 1037 Pg. 938 |
The accused arranged to have an employee of the Plankinton Packing Company place three barrels of the company's meat on the loading platform, the plan being that the accused would load the barrels on his wagon and drive away as if he were a customer. The employee notified the company of the plan. Accused then took the barrels as planned and was arrested. | Where the owner of the property by himself or through his agent, actually or constructively, aids in the commission of the offense the would-be criminal cannot be found guilty on all the elements of the offense. |
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Nolan v. State Maryland Court of Appeals, 1957 213 Md. 298, 131 A.2d 851 Pg. 942 |
Defendant was convicted of embezzlement for appropriating money from his employer. On appeal, defendant contended that the evidence produced made the crime larceny and not embezzlement. | The court concluded that under the evidence presented and authorities cited there was not enough evidence to convict the defendant of embezzlement. |
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Burns v. State Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1911 145 Wis. 373, 128 N.W. 987 Pg. 945 |
Upon taking an insane man in charge, a constable received from another of the pursuers a roll of money that had been thrown away by the man in his flight. The constable kept the money and was convicted of larceny by bailee. | It follows that acquittal of the accused of the offense of larceny is not inconsistent with his conviction of the statute offense of larceny as bailee. |
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State v. Riggins Supreme Court of Illinois, 1956 8 Ill. 2d 78, 132 N.E.2d 519 Pg. 950 |
Defendant owned and operated a credit agency. One of his clients complained that he had collected several debts for her, but had kept all of the money for himself. As a result, the defendant was convicted of embezzlement. | The court found that the the defendant was an agent of the complaining witness receiving money in a fiduciary capacity and therefore not able to be convicted under the embezzlement statute. |
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Hufstetler v. State Alabama Court of Appeals, 1953 37 Ala. App. 71, 63 So. 2d 730 Pg. 958 |
Defendant was convicted of petit larceny for stealing 6 1/2 gallons of gasoline. Defendant asked for some gasoline at a service station. After the attendant filled up the car, the defendant then asked for some oil. While the attendant was getting the oil, the defendant took off without paying for the gasoline. The defendant argued that the service station attendant voluntarily parted with the gasoline. | The service station attendant had no intention of parting with the gasoline without being paid, thus the attendant did not voluntarily part with the gasoline and the conviction should be sustained. |
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Graham v. United States United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1950 187 F. 2d 87 Pg. 959 |
Appellant, an attorney, was convicted of larceny for having taken money from one of his clients. Appellant claimed the money was his fee. The client claimed, however, that the appellant had fraudently obtained the money by saying that it was necessary to bribe the police. | The conviction is sustained. The appellant was found guilty of larceny by trick. |
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People v. Ashley Supreme Court of California, 1954 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271 Pg. 961 |
Defendant was charged with feloniously taking money from two women and convicted of grand theft. Defendant took the money from the two women promising that it would go towards investments in various real estate ventures. | To support a conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses, it must be shown that the defendant made a false representation with intent to defraud the owner of the property, and that the owner was in fact defrauded. These elements are apparent here, and so the conviction is affirmed. |
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Nelson v. United States United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1955 227 F.2d 21 Pg. 965 |
Appellent, from time to time, for purposes of resale had purchased merchandise from Potomac Distributors. Later, in an attempt to obtain credit from the distributor, the appellant falsified the amount of debt that he owed on a vehicle that he used as collateral to secure the credit. | The court found that the appellant did have the requisite "intent to defraud" necessary to sustain the conviction. |
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State v. Harrington Supreme Court of Vermont, 1969 128 Vt. 242, 260 A.2d 692 Pg. 969 |
Defendant, a Vermont attorney, was convicted of extortion for threatening to unveil sordid details of a marital affair in order to obtain money for his client. | The court held that a person who maliciously threatens to accuse another of a crime or offense, or with an injury to his person or property, with intent to extort money, shall be be guilty of extortion. |
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People v. Fichtner New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, 1953 281 A.D. 159, 118 N.Y.S.2d 392, aff'd without opinion, 305 N.Y. 864, 114 N.E.2d 212 Pg. 973 |
Defendants, the manager and assistant manager of Hill Supermarket, were convicted of extortion for obtaining 25$ from the victim by threatening to accuse the victim of petit larceny, and expose the victim to the disgrace of the community. | The court held that the extortion statutes were intended to prevent the collection of money by the use of fear induced by means of threats to accuse a debtor of a crime, and it makes no difference whether the debtor stole any goods, nor how much he stole, and that the defendants may be convicted even though they believed that the complainant was guilty of the theft of their employer's goods equal to or greater than any sum of money obtained from the complainant. |
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State v. Miller Supreme Court of Oregon, 1951 192 Or. 188, 233 P.2d 786 Pg. 979 |
Defendant induced complaining witness to agree to guarantee his indebtedness to another on his false representation that he owned a tractor free of encumbrance. He was convicted of obtaining property by false pretenses. | The provisions of statute which make unlawful the obtaining of the signature of any person with intent to defraud, and the making of a bill of sale or assignment or mortgage of personal property for the purpose of obtaining credit or to secure existing indebtedness, indicate that such an intangible thing as credit was not considered by the legislature to be property. Thus, the conviction should be reversed because the indictment does not allege a crime. |
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United States v. Girard United States Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit, 1969 601 F.2d 69 Pg. 983 |
Appellants were convicted of the unauthorized sale of government property based on the sale of information. Appellants claim that the statute covers only tangible property or documents and is not violated by the sale of information. | The court held that information is a "thing of value" as intended by the statute. Therfore, the convictions were affirmed. |
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Regina v. Stewart Supreme Court of Canada, 1988 50 D.L.R.4th 1, 41 C.C.C.2d 481 Pg. 987 |
The appellant offered a security guard at a hotel money in order to receive confidential names and addresses of hotel employees. | The Court held that confidential information should not be property for the purposes of s. 283 of the Code. To the extent that protection is warranted for confidential information, it should be granted through legislative enactment and not through judicial extension of the concept of property. |
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United States v. Siegel United States Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit, 1983 717 F.2d 9 Pg. 989 |
Defendants were officers and directors of Mego International. They were convicted of violating the the wire fraud statute by engaging in a scheme to defraud Mego and its stockholders by violating their fiduciary duties to act honestly and faithfully in the best interests of the corporation and to account for the sale of all Mego property entrusted to them. The scheme involved a hidden cash fund that was created by "off the books" sales. | The court held that the jury could have inferred that the defendants used some of the proceeds for their own benefit and that it was a scheme to misappropriate the proceeds from the sale of Mego assets for self-enrichment. |
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People v. Brown Supreme Court of California, 1894 105 Cal. 66, 38 P. 518 Pg. 996 |
Appellant entered an acquaintance's house and took a bicycle. Appellant claimed that he didn't intend to keep the bicycle, he just wanted to get even with the owner. Appellant was convicted and appeals on account of error in an instruction given to the jury. | The court held that the jury instruction contained error because it implied that the boy could be convicted even if his intent was to deprive the owner only temporarily of the bicycle. The court held, however, that in order for the conviction to be sustained intent must be to deprive the owner of the property permanently. |
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People v. Reid New York Court of Appeals, 1987 69 N.Y.2d 469, 508 N.E.2d 661 Pg. 1002 |
Appellants were convicted of armed robberies of money from their victims, despite evidence that they were only trying to collect money that was owed to them. | The court concluded that the claim of right defense is not available in these cases, since such forcible conduct is not merely a transgression against property, but also entails the risk of physical or mental injury to individuals. Thus, the defendants' requests to assert claim of right defenses were properly denied. |
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