Evidence: The Objection Method
- Prater, Capra, Saltzburg, Arguello
- 3rd Edition
- ISBN: 9781422411773
| Page | Case Name | Citation | Court | Audio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 63 | Tanner v. United States | 483 U.S. 107 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 |  Download |
| 521 | People v. Collins | 68 Cal.2d 319 | Supreme Court of California, 1968. | Download |
| 564 | Vinyard v. Vinyard Funeral Home, Inc. | 435 S.W.2d 392 | St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri, 1968 | Download |
| 577 | United States v. Zenni | 492 F.Supp. 464 | United States District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky, 1980 | Download |
| 610 | United States v. Owens | 484 U.S. 554 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1988 | Download |
| 622 | United States v. Hoosier | 542 F.2d 687 | United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 1976 | Download |
| 625 | Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc. | 588 F.2d 626 | United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1978 | Download |
| 686 | Williamson v. United States | 512 U.S. 594 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 | Download |
| 735 | Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hillmon | 145 U.S. 285 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1892 | Download |
| 763 | United States v. Vigneau | 187 F.3d 70 | United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 1999 | Download |
| 772 | Palmer v. Hoffman | 318 U.S. 109 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1943 |
| Case Information | Fact Summary | Rule of Law |
|---|---|---|
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Tanner v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 483 U.S. 107 Pg. 63 |
Petitioners were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of committing mail fraud. After the trial, Tanner's attorney received an unsolicited phone call from one of the jurors, who informed Tanner's attorney that several of the jurors consumed alcohol during the lunch breaks at various times throughout the trial, causing them to sleep through the afternoons. Tanner's attorney also received a visit at his house from a second juror who reported "he felt like . . . the jury was on one big party." The second juror additionally reported that jurors used alcohol, marijuana and cocaine during the trial. The issue was whether the District Court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing, including juror testimony, on juror alcohol and drug use during the trial. | Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) states "Competency of Juror as Witness . . . Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention, (2) or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes." In this case, the Court held that the allegations of substance abuse were an internal matter and thus the jury testimony could not be permitted pursuant to F.R.E. 606(b). |
|
People v. Collins Supreme Court of California, 1968. 68 Cal.2d 319 Pg. 521 |
A jury found defendant and his wife defendant guilty of second degree robbery. Defendant husband appealed from the judgment of conviction. Defendant argued that the court erred in admitting, over defendant's objection, evidence pertaining to the mathematical theory of probability. | "Mathematical odds are not admissible as evidence to identify a defendant in a criminal proceeding so long as the odds are based on estimates, where the validity of which has not been demonstrated." |
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Vinyard v. Vinyard Funeral Home, Inc. St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri, 1968 435 S.W.2d 392 Pg. 564 |
Plaintiff slipped and fell in the parking lot of defendant's funeral home. The defendant contended that evidence that the parking lot was slippery when wet was hearsay and should not have been admitted. | "'Where, regardless of the truth or the falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.'" |
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United States v. Zenni United States District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky, 1980 492 F.Supp. 464 Pg. 577 |
While searching the premises of the defendant, government agents answered his telephone. The callers instructed the agents to place bets on sporting events. The government wanted to introduce evidence showing the callers believed the premises were used in betting operations, and the defendant objected on grounds of hearsay. | If an utterance is not assertive, meaning that it is not offered as proof of the truth of a matter, then it is admissible as evidence and not hearsay. IN THIS CASE, the court admitted the evidence, because the calls did not go to the truth of the matter asserted. |
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United States v. Owens Supreme Court of the United States, 1988 484 U.S. 554 Pg. 610 |
John Foster, a correctional counselor at the federal prison in Lompoc, California, was attacked and brutally beaten with a metal pipe. As a result of his injuries, his memory was severely impaired. An FBI agent twice interviewed Foster while Foster was in the hospital. Foster was unable to remember his attacker's name during the first interview, but identified Owens as the attacker in the second interview. He later lost his recollection of the attack, but remembered identifying Owens as the attacker in the hospital. Owens was sentenced to 20 years' improsonment. The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court based on the Confrontation Clause and Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. | Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) "Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-- (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person. . ." In this case, the Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) provided an exception. Although the witness could not remember the attack, the Court held that the witness was subject to cross-examination. The Court further ruled that the statement didn't violate the Confrontation Clause, as it is "sufficient that the defendant has the opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness's bias . . . and even the very fact that he has a bad memory." |
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United States v. Hoosier United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 1976 542 F.2d 687 Pg. 622 |
Hoosier was conviceted of armed robery of a federally insured bank. At the trial, a witness - Robert E. Rogers - testified that Hoosier told him he was going to rob the bank and that three weeks after the robbery, he "saw defendant with money and what he thought were diamond rings." When he commented, Hoosier's girlfriend said, "That ain't nothing, you should have seen the money we had in the hotel room. . ." The appellant's contention is that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay. | Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B) reads: "A statement is not hearsay if -- (2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is . . . (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth . . ." |
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Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc. United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1978 588 F.2d 626 Pg. 625 |
Plaintiff was bitten by a wolf (named Sophie) maintained at the home of Kenneth Poos, the Director of Education of Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc. Poos left a note on the door of the President of the company, which stated, ". . . Sophie bit a child that came in our back yard. . . ." | Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) "Statements which are not hearsay. . . . A statement is not hearsay if-- . . . (2)Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is . . . (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. . . ." In addition, there is no implied requirement that the declarant have personal knowledge of the facts underlying his statement. |
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Williamson v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 512 U.S. 594 Pg. 686 |
Williamson's employee, Harris, was stopped by the police with 19 kilograms of cocaine in his car. A DEA agent interviewed Harris after his arrest. Harris told the agent that he was transporting the cocaine for Williamson. Harris freely implicated himself, but did not want his story to be recorded and refused to sign a written version of the statement. Harris refused to testify at trial and the judge admitted Harris's statements pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), as a self-inculpatory statement and exception to the hearsay rule. | Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) "does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory." |
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Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hillmon Supreme Court of the United States, 1892 145 U.S. 285 Pg. 735 |
Mrs. Hillmon sought to collect on life insurance policies for the death of her husband. The insurance companies refused to pay alleging that it could not adequately be established that Mrs. Hillmon's husband had died, as the remains of her husband (found at Crooked Creek) could have been mistaken for those of one Walters. The defendants offered letters showing that Walters had intended to go to Crooked Creek at the time the body was discovered. | ". . . When the intention to be proved is important only as qualifying an act, its connection with that act must be shown, in order to warrant the admission of declarations of the intention. But whenever the intention is of itself a distinct and material fact in a chain of circumstances, it may be proved by contemporaneous oral or written declarations of the party." In this case, the letters could be used to show that Walters INTENDED to go to Crooked Creek and not that he actually did go there. His intention was material because it allowed for the inference to be drawn that it was more likely than not that he did go to Crooked Creek. |
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United States v. Vigneau United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 1999 187 F.3d 70 Pg. 763 |
Defendants are two brothers, Patrick and Mark Vigneau, who were convicted on their participation in a drug distribution scheme. On appeal they claim that the trial court erred in allowing the government to introduce Western Union "To Send Money" forms, in support of the money laundering charges. "These forms, as a Western Union custodian testified, are handed by the sender of money to a Western Union agent after the sender completes the left side of the form by writing (1) the sender's name, address and telephone number; (2) the amount of the transfer; and (3) the intended recipient's name and location." | Business records will only be eligible for the hearsay exception if there are safeguards of regularity or business checks that would automatically assure the truth of statements therein. Those records contributed to by strangers to the business do not meet this requirement. |
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Palmer v. Hoffman Supreme Court of the United States, 1943 318 U.S. 109 Pg. 772 |
This case arises out of a grade crossing accident which occurred in Massachusetts, on the night of December 25, 1940. Two days after the accident, the engineer of the train who died before the trial, made a statement at a freight office which was then offered into evidence by petitioner. It was offered to that the statement was signed in the regular course of business, it being the regular course of such business to make such a statement. Respondents objected to the introduction and the objection was sustained. | "'[R]egular course' of business must find its meaning in the inherent nature of the business in question and in the methods systematically employed for the conduct of the business as a business." Records that are prepared in preparation for litigation are not business records. |
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