Cases and Materials on Torts
- Epstein
- 8th Edition
- ISBN: 073554011X
| Page | Case Name | Citation | Court | Audio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | Vosburg v. Putney | 50 N.W. 403 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891 |  Download |
| 9 | Dougherty v. Stepp | 18 N.C. 371 | Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1835 | Download |
| 13 | Intel Corp. v. Hamidi | 71 P.3d 296 | Supreme Court of California, 2003 | Download |
| 20 | Mohr v. Williams | 104 N.W. 12 | Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1905 | Download |
| 26 | Canterbury v. Spence | 464 F.2d 772 | United States Court Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit, 1972 | Download |
| 27 | Hudson v. Craft | 204 P.2d 1 | Supreme Court of California, 1949 | Download |
| 33 | McGuire v. Almy | 8 N.E.2d 760 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1937 | Download |
| 37 | Courvoisier v. Raymond | 47 P. 284 | Supreme Court of Colorado, 1896 | Download |
| 40 | Bird v. Holbrook | 130 Eng. Rep. 911 | C.P. 1825 | Download |
| 46 | Kirby v. Foster | 22 A. 1111 | Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Providence, 1891 | Download |
| 49 | Ploof v. Putnam | 71 A. 188 | Supreme Court of Vermont, 1908 | Download |
| 51 | Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. | 124 N.W. 221 | Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1910 | Download |
| 60 | I. de S. and Wife v. W. de S. | Assisarum, folio 99, placitum 60 | At the Assizes, 1348 or 1349 | Download |
| 60 | Tuberville v. Savage | 86 Eng. Rep. 684 | King's Bench Division, 1669 | Download |
| 63 | Alcorn v. Mitchell | 63 Ill. 553 | Supreme Court of Illinois, Southern Grand Division, 1872 | Download |
| 65 | Bird v. Jones | 115 Eng. Rep. 688 | King's Bench Division, 1845 | Download |
| 68 | Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc. | 268 N.E.2d 860 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1971 | Download |
| 72 | Wilkinson v. Downton | 2 Q.B. 57 | Queen's Bench Division, 1897 | Download |
| 82 | The Thorns Case | Y.B. Mich. 6 Ed. 4, f.7, pl. 18 | King's Bench, 1466 | Download |
| 87 | Weaver v. Ward | 80 Eng. Rep. 284 | King's Bench, England, 1616 | Download |
| 93 | Scott v. Shepherd | 96 Eng. Rep. 525 | Court of Common Pleas, 1773 | Download |
| 100 | Brown v. Kendall | 60 Mass. 292 | Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex, 1850 | Download |
| 107 | Fletcher v. Rylands | L.R. 1 Ex. 265 | In the Exchequer Chamber, 1866 | Download |
| 110 | Rylands v. Fletcher | L.R. 3 H.L. 330 | House of Lords, 1868 | Download |
| 115 | Brown v. Collins | 53 N.H. 442 | Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire, 1873 | Download |
| 128 | Stone v. Bolton | 1 K.B. 201 | Court of Appeal, 1950 | Download |
| 130 | Bolton v. Stone | A.C. 850 | House of Lords, 1951 | Download |
| 137 | Hammontree v. Jenner | 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 | Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, 1971 | Download |
| 145 | Vaughan v. Menlove | 132 Eng. Rep. 490 | Court of Common Pleas, 1837 | Download |
| 151 | Roberts v. Ring | 173 N.W. 437 | Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1919 | Download |
| 153 | Daniels v. Evans | 224 A.2d 63 | Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1966 | Download |
| 158 | Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co. | 173 N.W.2d 619 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1970 | Download |
| 162 | Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen | 338 P.2d 743 | Supreme Court of Washington, Department One, 1959 | Download |
| 163 | Robinson v. Pioche, Bayerque & Co. | 5 Cal. 460 | Supreme Court of California, 1855 | Download |
| 164 | Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. Peterson | 69 P. 578 | Supreme Court of Colorado, 1902 | Download |
| 166 | Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works | 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 | Court of Exchequer, 1856 | Download |
| 167 | Eckert v. Long Island R.R. | 43 N.Y. 502 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1871 | Download |
| 171 | Osborne v. Montgomery | 234 N.W. 372 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1931 | Download |
| 173 | Cooley v. Public Service Co. | 10 A.2d 673 | Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1940 | Download |
| 175 | United States v. Carroll Towing Co. | 159 F.2d 169 | United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1947 | Download |
| 182 | Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transportation Services, Inc. | 928 P.2d 1202 | Supreme Court of Alaska, 1996 | Download |
| 184 | Andrews v. United Airlines | 24 F.3d 39 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1994 | Download |
| 188 | Titus v. Bradford, B. & K. R. Co. | 20 A. 517 | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1890 | Download |
| 190 | Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co. | 76 Me. 100 | Supreme Court of Maine, 1884 | Download |
| 191 | The T.J. Hooper | 60 F.2d 737 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1932 | Download |
| 197 | Lama v. Borras | 16 F.3d 473 | U.S. Court of Appeals for 1st Circuit, 1994 | Download |
| 228 | Osborne v. McMasters | 41 N.W. 543 | Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1889 | Download |
| 233 | Martin v. Herzog | 126 N.E. 814 | New York Court of Appeals, 1920 | Download |
| 235 | Brown v. Shyne | 151 N.E. 197 | New York Court of Appeals, 1926 | Download |
| 242 | Uhr v. East Greenbush Central School District | 720 N.E.2d 886 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1999 | Download |
| 251 | Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Goodman | 275 U.S. 66 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1927 | Download |
| 252 | Pokora v. Wabash Ry. | 292 U.S. 98 | U.S. Supreme Court, 1934 | Download |
| 253 | Jewell v. CSX Transportation, Inc. | 135 F.3d 361 | United States Court Of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit, 1998 | Download |
| 261 | Byrne v. Boadle | 159 Eng. Rep. 299 | Court of Exchequer, 1863 | Download |
| 268 | Colmenares Vivas v. Sun Alliance Insurance Co. | 807 F.2d 1102 | United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 1986 | Download |
| 276 | Ybarra v. Spangard | 154 P.2d 687 | Supreme Court of California, 1944 | Download |
| 289 | Beems v. Chicago, Rock Island & Peoria R.R. | 12 N.W. 222 | Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines, 1882 | Download |
| 293 | Gyerman v. United States Lines Co. | 498 P.2d 1043 | Supreme Court of California, 1972 | Download |
| 300 | LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. | 232 U.S. 340 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1914 | Download |
| 304 | Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co. | 492 P.2d 1030 | Supreme Court of Washington, 1972 | Download |
| 308 | Fuller v. Illinois Central R.R. | 56 So. 783 | Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1911 | Download |
| 313 | Mills v. Armstrong (The Bernina) | 13 App. Cas. 1 | House of Lords, 1888 | Download |
| 318 | Lamson v. American Axe & Tool Co. | 58 N.E. 585 | Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1900 | Download |
| 322 | Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co. | 166 N.E. 173 | New York Court of Appeals, 1929 | Download |
| 330 | Obstetrics & Gynecologists Ltd. v. Pepper | 693 P.2d 1259 | Supreme Court of Nevada, 1985 | Download |
| 337 | Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California | 532 P.2d 1226 | Supreme Court of California, 1975 | Download |
| 355 | Union Stockyard Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. | 196 U.S. 217 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1905 | Download |
| 359 | American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court | 578 P.2d 899 | Supreme Court of California, 1978 | Download |
| 368 | McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde & River Don Castings, Ltd. | 511 U.S. 202 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 | Download |
| 375 | Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States | 398 F.2d 167 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1968 | Download |
| 383 | Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc. | 719 N.E.2d 756 | Supreme Court of Illinois, 1999 | Download |
| 394 | New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad | 264 F. 334 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1920 | Download |
| 398 | Zuchowicz v. United States | 140 F.3d 381 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1998 | Download |
| 404 | General Electric Co. v. Joiner | 522 U.S. 136 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 | Download |
| 412 | Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative | 664 P.2d 474 | Supreme Court of Washington, 1983 | Download |
| 418 | Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. | 211 N.W. 913 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1927 | Download |
| 425 | Summers v. Tice | 199 P.2d 1 | Supreme Court of California, 1948 | Download |
| 428 | Skipworth v. Lead Industries Association | 690 A.2d 169 | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1997 | Download |
| 436 | Ryan v. New York Central R.R. | 35 N.Y. 210 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1866 | Download |
| 440 | Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough | 43 A. 240 | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1899 | Download |
| 444 | Brower v. New York Central & H.R.R. | 103 A. 166 | Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, 1918 | Download |
| 450 | Wagner v. International Ry. | 133 N.E. 437 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1921 | Download |
| 452 | In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co. | 3 K.B. 560 | Court of Appeal, 1921 | Download |
| 456 | Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. | 162 N.E. 99 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1928 | Download |
| 467 | Marshall v. Nugent | 222 F.2d 604 | United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 1955 | Download |
| 471 | Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. | A.C. 388 | Privy Council, 1961 | Download |
| 480 | Mitchell v. Rochester Railway | 45 N.E. 354 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1896 | Download |
| 483 | Dillon v. Legg | 441 P.2d 912 | Supreme Court of California, 1968 | Download |
| 497 | Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co. | 44 A. 809 | Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1897 | Download |
| 499 | Hurley v. Eddingfield | 59 N.E. 1058 | Supreme Court of Indiana, 1901 | Download |
| 507 | Montgomery v. National Convoy & Trucking Co. | 195 S.E. 247 | Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1937 | Download |
| 513 | Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck | A.C. 358 | House of Lords, 1929 | Download |
| 521 | Rowland v. Christian | 443 P.2d 561 | Supreme Court of California, 1968 | Download |
| 534 | Coggs v. Bernard | 92 Eng. Rep. 107 | Queen's Bench, 1703 | Download |
| 536 | Erie R.R. v. Stewart | 40 F.2d 855 | Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 1930 | Download |
| 539 | Marsalis v. LaSalle | 94 So. 2d 120 | Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Orleans, 1957 | Download |
| 541 | Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. | 159 N.E. 896 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1928 | Download |
| 549 | Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. | 439 F.2d 477 | United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1970 | Download |
| 559 | Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California | 551 P.2d 334 | Supreme Court of California, 1976 | Download |
| 569 | Poggi v. Scott | 139 P. 815 | Supreme Court of California, 1914 | Download |
| 581 | Gehrts v. Batteen | 620 N.W.2d 775 | Supreme Court of South Dakota, 2001 | Download |
| 589 | Spano v. Perini Corp. | 250 N.E.2d 31 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1969 | Download |
| 599 | Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co. | 916 F.2d 1174 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1990 | Download |
| 608 | Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Electric Cooperative | 548 N.W.2d 829 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1996 | Download |
| 618 | Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc. | 114 So. 2d 357 | District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, 1959 | Download |
| 622 | Rogers v. Elliott | 15 N.E. 768 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1888 | Download |
| 625 | Ensign v. Walls | 34 N.W.2d 549 | Supreme Court of Michigan, 1948 | Download |
| 629 | Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. | 257 N.E.2d 870 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1970 | Download |
| 641 | 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc. | 750 N.E.2d 1097 | Court of Appeals of New York, 2001 | Download |
| 646 | Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp. | 273 F.3d 536 | United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 2001 | Download |
| 657 | MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. | 111 N.E. 1050 | New York Court of Appeals, 1916 | Download |
| 665 | Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno | 150 P.2d 436 | Supreme Court of California, 1944 | Download |
| 681 | Casa Clara Condominium Association, Inc. v. Charly Toppino & Sons, Inc. | 620 So. 2d 1244 | Supreme Court of Florida, 1993 | Download |
| 689 | Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Services, Inc. | 668 A.2d 521 | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1995 | Download |
| 697 | Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. | 790 N.E.2d 252 | Court of Appeals of New York, 2003 | Download |
| 702 | Campo v. Scofield | 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1951 | Download |
| 704 | Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young | 321 A.2d 737 | Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1974 | Download |
| 712 | Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. | 573 P.2d 443 | Supreme Court of California, 1978 | Download |
| 721 | Linegar v. Armour of America | 909 F.2d 1150 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1990 | Download |
| 725 | Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. | 694 A.2d 1319 | Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1997 | Download |
| 728 | Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co. | 792 A.2d 1145 | Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2002 | Download |
| 731 | MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. | 475 N.E.2d 65 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1985 | Download |
| 741 | Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. | 696 N.E.2d 909 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1998 | Download |
| 748 | Hood v. Ryobi America Corp. | 181 F.3d 608 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 1999 | Download |
| 755 | Daly v. General Motors Corp. | 575 P.2d 1162 | Supreme Court of California, 1978 | Download |
| 764 | Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. | 529 U.S. 861 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 | Download |
| 774 | McDougald v. Garber | 536 N.E.2d 372 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1989 | Download |
| 783 | O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co. | 677 F.2d 1194 | United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 1982 | Download |
| 793 | Duncan v. Kansas City Southern Railway | 773 So. 2d 670 | Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2000 | Download |
| 809 | Harding v. Town of Townshend | 43 Vt. 536 | Supreme Court of Vermont, Windham County, 1871 | Download |
| 824 | Kemezy v. Peters | 79 F.3d 33 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1996 | Download |
| 831 | State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell | 538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, (Torts Edit) | Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 | Download |
| 845 | Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corp. | 636 So. 2d 700 | Supreme Court of Florida, 1993 | Download |
| 864 | Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. | 426 P.2d 173 | Supreme Court of California, 1967 | Download |
| 879 | Clodgo v. Industry Rentavision, Inc. | 701 A.2d 1044 | Supreme Court of Vermont, 1997 | Download |
| 888 | Wilson v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board | 545 P.2d 225 | Supreme Court of California, 1976 | Download |
| 894 | Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co. | 398 N.W.2d 882 | Supreme Court of Michigan, 1986 | Download |
| 905 | Pinnick v. Cleary | 271 N.E.2d 592 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk, 1971 | Download |
| 922 | Colaio v. Feinberg | 262 F. Supp. 2d 273 | United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2003 | Download |
| 933 | Doe v. Gonzaga University | 24 P.3d 390 | Supreme Court of Washington, 2001 | Download |
| 938 | Firth v. State of New York | 775 N.E.2d 463 | Court of Appeals of New York, 2002 | Download |
| 943 | Wilkow v. Forbes, Inc. | 241 F.3d 552 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2001 | Download |
| 950 | Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp. | 322 F.3d 918 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2003 | Download |
| 964 | E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones | A.C. 20 | Court of Appeal, House of Lords, 1910 | Download |
| 967 | Terwilliger v. Wands | 17 N.Y. 54 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1858 | Download |
| 969 | Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc. | 280 N.W. 879 | Supreme Court of North Dakota, 1938 | Download |
| 972 | Faulk v. Aware, Inc. | 231 N.Y.S.2d 270 | Supreme Court of New York, 1962 | Download |
| 974 | Faulk v. Aware, Inc. | 244 N.Y.S.2d 259 | Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, 1963 | Download |
| 978 | Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes | 67 F.3d 816 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1996 | Download |
| 985 | Watt v. Longsdon | 1 K.B. 130 | King's Bench, 1930 | Download |
| 992 | Kennedy v. Cannon | 182 A.2d 54 | Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1962 | Download |
| 998 | Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson | 713 F.2d 262 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1983 | Download |
| 1005 | New York Times Co. v. Sullivan | 376 U.S. 254 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 | Download |
| 1015 | Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts | 388 U.S. 130 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 | |
| 1024 | Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. | 418 U.S. 323 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 | Download |
| 1033 | Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps | 475 U.S. 767 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1986 | Download |
| 1047 | Nader v. General Motors Corp. | 255 N.E.2d 765 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1970 | Download |
| 1113 | Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank | 42 N.E.2d 808 | Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1942 | Download |
| 1116 | Laidlaw v. Organ | 15 U.S. 178 | U.S. Supreme Court, 1817 | Download |
| Case Information | Fact Summary | Rule of Law |
|---|---|---|
|
Vosburg v. Putney Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891 50 N.W. 403 Pg. 4 |
Fourteen year-old schoolboy (defendant) reaches out his leg and toes the shin of his classmate (plaintiff) while in the classroom. Though the touch is slight, plaintiff experiences pain and swelling in the subsequent days and ultimately loses the use of his leg. | "[T]he wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the [intentional] wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him." |
|
Dougherty v. Stepp Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1835 18 N.C. 371 Pg. 9 |
Defendant enters plaintiff's land with a surveyor and declares the land his own without marking trees or cutting bushes. | "[E]very unauthorized, and therefore unlawful, entry into the close of another is a trespass." |
|
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi Supreme Court of California, 2003 71 P.3d 296 Pg. 13 |
Defendant was an employee at Intel. He email bombed almost everyone in the company. Intel claimed that this was a trespass to chattels because it slowed down the network and interfered with productivity. | An email that does not damage a computer is not a trespass, since it does not interfere with the use or possession of the chattel. |
|
Mohr v. Williams Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1905 104 N.W. 12 Pg. 20 |
Patient (plaintiff) agrees to surgery on her RIGHT ear. During the procedure, surgeon (defendant) discovers problem in LEFT ear and operates (skillfully and successfully) on LEFT ear while plaintiff is unconscious. | If contact is made without plaintiff's consent, then the contact is wrongful, and in turn, unlawful. |
|
Canterbury v. Spence United States Court Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit, 1972 464 F.2d 772 Pg. 26 |
Plaintiff consulted doctor about back pain. After performance of a myelogram, doctor told plaintiff that he needed to undergo a laminectomy. After surgery, plaintiff suffered a fall from his hospital bed. Plaintiff did not recover fully from the surgery and was left with paralysis of the bowels and urinary incontinence. The doctor did not inform the plaintiff before surgery of the risks of possible paralysis. | The court held that physicians have a duty to disclose to patients all information regarding risks of treatment that is reasonable under the circumstances. |
|
Hudson v. Craft Supreme Court of California, 1949 204 P.2d 1 Pg. 27 |
18 year old plaintiff consents to engage in a boxing match, which is conducted by the promoter (defendant) in violation of state rules and regulations. Plaintiff suffers physical injury when struck by opponent. | Court follows minority rule for mutual combat (Restatement First, Section 61)--consent is a valid defense, but with the following EXCEPTION: When a class of persons is unable to "appreciate the consequences of such an invasion", consent is not a defense. Traditionally, the majority position held that consent cannot be a defense in cases of mutual combat. |
|
McGuire v. Almy Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1937 8 N.E.2d 760 Pg. 33 |
Live-in nurse (plaintiff) hears her mental patient (defendant) thrashing about and offers to enter room and help. Patient replies, "If you come in, I will kill you." Nurse enters, and patient beats her with the leg of broken furniture. | If an insane person intends to do the HARM, then she is liable for the intentional tort. (Note the difference from the competent individual, who is liable so long as she merely intends the OFFENSIVE ACT) |
|
Courvoisier v. Raymond Supreme Court of Colorado, 1896 47 P. 284 Pg. 37 |
Jewelry store owner (defendant) awakes to find unknown persons attempting to break into his store. Owner fires warning shot and chases persons out of building. Outside, police apprehend suspects, and one officer (plaintiff) approaches jewelry store. Owner, unaware of approaching man's identity, shoots the officer | In order for a claim of self-defense to be valid, the defendant's fears must be "reasonable under the circumstances" (in addition to a genuine ("honest") belief). Thus, self-defense has both an objective and subjective component. |
|
Bird v. Holbrook C.P. 1825 130 Eng. Rep. 911 Pg. 40 |
Defendant protected his valuable tulip garden with a spring gun. | Using a spring gun to deter trespassers is contrary to common law when done without notice and between sunset and sundown. Although individuals have the right to protect their property, they may not endanger human life while doing so. |
|
Kirby v. Foster Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Providence, 1891 22 A. 1111 Pg. 46 |
50 dollars goes missing from Providence Warehouse Co. and boss (defendant) deducts amount from bookkeeper's pay (plaintiff). Later in time, boss entrusts bookkeeper with money to pay the staff, but bookkeeper takes what he is owed into possession. Boss uses force in an attempt to retake the sum of money. | General Rule: If trespasser takes chattel (1) without right AND (2) against owner's will, then owner may use reasonable force to recapture chattel. However, if trespasser has taken the chattel "honestly though erroneously," owner may not use force to recapture it. |
|
Ploof v. Putnam Supreme Court of Vermont, 1908 71 A. 188 Pg. 49 |
Due to a severe storm on the lake, plaintiff was forced to moor his sloop to defendant's dock in order to protect the lives aboard. Defendant's servant unmoored the sloop, which was then destroyed upon the shore. Plaintiff and his family survived, but suffered injuries. | "The doctrine of necessity applies with special force to the preservation of human life. One assaulted and in peril of his life may run through the close of another to escape." |
|
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1910 124 N.W. 221 Pg. 51 |
Defendant moors his boat to plaintiff's dock, pursuant to contract to unload cargo. A storm develops, however, and defendant keeps boat moored to dock, adhering to custom. Boat buffets the dock and causes $500 damage to the dock. | Even when necessity provides a valid defense to trespass, the would-be trespasser must pay compensatory relief for damage caused to property. |
|
I. de S. and Wife v. W. de S. At the Assizes, 1348 or 1349 Assisarum, folio 99, placitum 60 Pg. 60 |
Defendant struck at plaintiff with a hatchet, but did not touch her. | Assault does not require a touching; There is harm for an assault, and damages are recoverable, even though there is no touching. |
|
Tuberville v. Savage King's Bench Division, 1669 86 Eng. Rep. 684 Pg. 60 |
Man put his hand upon a sword and basically said that the only reason he wasn't going to assault the man that sued him was because it was "assizes-time." | If a threat to harm does not include a present intent to harm, it is not an assault. An assault requires a threat of IMMINENT danger. |
|
Alcorn v. Mitchell Supreme Court of Illinois, Southern Grand Division, 1872 63 Ill. 553 Pg. 63 |
Upon adjournment of a trespass trial, the plaintiff (appellant) spat on the defendant (appellee). | Court may instruct jury to award "vindictive damages where there are circumstances of malice, willfulness, wantonness, outrage and indignity attending the wrong complained of." |
|
Bird v. Jones King's Bench Division, 1845 115 Eng. Rep. 688 Pg. 65 |
Defendant obstructed the path of plaintiff. Plaintiff could have gone around the man if he had wanted. | False imprisonment requires that the area to which one is confined have barriers. |
|
Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1971 268 N.E.2d 860 Pg. 68 |
Elderly man (plaintiff) purchases coat in department store and puts his ascot into the pocket. Store employee (defendant) blocks the exit, suspecting larceny, and grabs elderly man by the arm. The elderly man suffers shock and is hospitalized. | Forced detention constitutes false imprisonment unless the grounds for restraint are reasonable under the circumstances. Note that the standard is objective, rather than subjective. |
|
Wilkinson v. Downton Queen's Bench Division, 1897 2 Q.B. 57 Pg. 72 |
Plaintiff suffered violent nervous shock and physical illness when, as a practical joke, defendant told plaintiff that her husband broke both of his legs in an accident. | A plaintiff has a cause of action where "defendant's act was so plainly calculated to produce [emotional distress] that an intention to produce it ought to be imputed to the defendant, regard being had to the fact that the effect was produced on a person proved to be in an ordinary state of health and mind." |
|
The Thorns Case King's Bench, 1466 Y.B. Mich. 6 Ed. 4, f.7, pl. 18 Pg. 82 |
Defendant cut thorns, which landed on the property of the plaintiff. When the defendant went to retrieve the thorns, he trampled on the defendant's property and caused damage. | One is strictly liable for the damage one causes to another's land, regardless of whether the act was intentional or lawful. This case is illustrative of the origins of strict liability in tort - that civil compensation is proper when damage is done. |
|
Weaver v. Ward King's Bench, England, 1616 80 Eng. Rep. 284 Pg. 87 |
Defendant accidently shot the plaintiff while fighting in front of the king. | ". . .[B]ecause felony must be done animo felonico [with a felonious mind]; yet in trespass, which tends only to give damages according to hurt or loss, it is not so. . ." |
|
Scott v. Shepherd Court of Common Pleas, 1773 96 Eng. Rep. 525 Pg. 93 |
Defendant threw a lighted squib (an explosive device) into a crowded market place. Two men threw the squib out of their stalls before it exploded in plaintiff's eyes. | An action of trespass is maintainable in the present case, where the "natural and probable consequences" of defendant's act were to injure somebody, despite the fact that there were intervening actors. |
|
Brown v. Kendall Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex, 1850 60 Mass. 292 Pg. 100 |
Two dogs are fighting in the presence of their masters. The defendant tries to separate the dogs with a stick beating, and accidentally strikes plaintiff in the eye. | In order to recover for unintentional harm, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that defendant failed to meet at least an ordinary level of care. |
|
Fletcher v. Rylands In the Exchequer Chamber, 1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265 Pg. 107 |
Defendant contracts to build a reservoir on his land, which is located on top of old coal mines that are connected to the mines constructed by the plaintiff on a separate parcel of land. The reservoir fails, and water falls into the old mines, eventually flooding plaintiff's mines. | "[T]hat the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." |
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Rylands v. Fletcher House of Lords, 1868 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 Pg. 110 |
Defendant contracts to build a reservoir on his land, which is located on top of old coal mines that are connected to the mines constructed by the plaintiff on a separate parcel of land. The reservoir fails, and water falls into the old mines, eventually flooding plaintiff's mines. | "If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it should escape, may cause damage to his neighbour, he does so at his peril. If it does escape, and cause damage, he is responsible, however careful he may have been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage." |
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Brown v. Collins Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire, 1873 53 N.H. 442 Pg. 115 |
Random sounds spooks defendant's horses. Against defendant's will and intent, the horses trespass onto plaintiff's land and do damage. The defendant had used ordinary care with the horses. | Common social activities--such as transportation by horse in 1873--should be held to a standard of negligence. |
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Stone v. Bolton Court of Appeal, 1950 1 K.B. 201 Pg. 128 |
Plaintiff was struck in the head by a cricket ball. The ball was hit from the cricket grounds adjoining the road she was walking on. Balls had been infrequently hit over the fence surrounding the grounds 6-10 times in the last 30 years. | Where cricket balls had been hit over a fence surrounding a cricket field before, however infrequently, and depsite that fact that no one had been injured before, it was foreseeable that someone might be injured. |
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Bolton v. Stone House of Lords, 1951 A.C. 850 Pg. 130 |
During a cricket match a batsman hit a ball which struck and injured the plaintiff who was standing on a highway adjoining the ground. | For an act to be negligent there must be, not only a reasonable possibility of its happening, but also of injury being caused thereby. According to the facts of this case the risk of injury to a person on the highway resulting from the hitting of a ball out of the ground was so small that the probability of such an injury would not be anticipated by a reasonable man. Therefore, the plaintiff should not be able to recover from defendant. |
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Hammontree v. Jenner Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, 1971 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 Pg. 137 |
Defendant suffers seizure while driving and crashes into plaintiff's business and causes personal injury and property damage. | 1. "Users of the streets and highways" are subject to the principles of negligence. 2. If the risk is not reasonably foreseeable, then the driver is not liable for negligence. |
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Vaughan v. Menlove Court of Common Pleas, 1837 132 Eng. Rep. 490 Pg. 145 |
Defendant consructed a hayrick, or a stack of hay, near the border of the property he rented from the plaintiff. Defendant was repeatedly warned that the hayrick was in danger of catching fire over the course of five weeks. Desipite the warnings, defendant said that "he would chance it." The hay eventually caught fire, burning down both defendant's buildings and the cottages of the plaintiff on a neighboring parcel of land. | The reasonable man standard is objective, not subjective; "...you must so enjoy your own property as not to injure that of another." |
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Roberts v. Ring Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1919 173 N.W. 437 Pg. 151 |
7 year old boy (plaintiff) runs across the street, and old man (defendant) with bad eyesight and hearing runs him over at a speed 5mph. | (1) In negligence cases, a child is held to a subjective standard: "the degree of care commonly exercised by the ordinary boy of his age and maturity." (2) The elderly are held to an objective standard: "care usually exercised by the ordinary prudent normal man." |
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Daniels v. Evans Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1966 224 A.2d 63 Pg. 153 |
Minor (plaintiff) crashes motorcycle into defendant's automobile and dies. | When a minor assumes responsibility for an operation normally undertaken by adults, the individual should be "judged by the same standard of care as an adult." |
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Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1970 173 N.W.2d 619 Pg. 158 |
Insane woman (defendant) drives into oncoming lane of traffic, but claims that God was steering. Defendant's car strikes plaintiff's truck. | Insanity is a defense in a case of negligence ONLY IF (1) the person has no reasonable forewarning that an existing condition could cause such an incident AND (2) the condition acts suddenly and prevents the person from conforming conduct to the standard of the reasonable person. |
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Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen Supreme Court of Washington, Department One, 1959 338 P.2d 743 Pg. 162 |
City construction worker removes barricade for a period of time from the excavation site, and blind man (plaintiff), walking with cane, falls in and suffers injury. | "The person under a physical disability is obliged to use the care which a reasonable person under the same or similar disability would exercise under the circumstances." |
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Robinson v. Pioche, Bayerque & Co. Supreme Court of California, 1855 5 Cal. 460 Pg. 163 |
Defendants leave an uncovered hole in the sidewalk of a public street, and drunk pedestrian (plaintiff) is injured. | "[T]he intoxication of the plaintiff cannot excuse ... gross negligence [by the defendant]." |
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Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. Peterson Supreme Court of Colorado, 1902 69 P. 578 Pg. 164 |
A hackney cart owned by plaintiff was recieved by defendant railroad for the purpose of transporting it to another location. Before plaintiff could retrieve the cart, it was destroyed by fire. | "...the capacity of a warehouseman is not the true test of his liability. The care required of a warehouseman is the same, whether he be rich or poor." |
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Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Court of Exchequer, 1856 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 Pg. 166 |
Plaintiff's house is flooded when a water main bursts during a severe frost. The accident was caused due to encrusted ice around a fire plug connected to the water main. | "A reasonable man would act with reference to the average circumstances of the temperature in ordinary years. The defendants had provided against such frosts as experience would have led men, acting prudently, to provide against; and they are not guilty of negligence, because their precautions proved insufcient against the effects of the extreme severity of the frost of 1856, which penetrated to a greater depth than any which ordinarily occurs south of the polar regions." |
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Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Court of Appeals of New York, 1871 43 N.Y. 502 Pg. 167 |
Man runs across railroad tracks to save a child from certain death and is struck and killed by defendant's train. | There is an exception to the general rule that a person who knowingly and voluntarily places himself in danger of injury is deemed negligent--"the law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it." (unless unreasonable) |
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Osborne v. Montgomery Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1931 234 N.W. 372 Pg. 171 |
Defendant parks car and opens door, which clips the handlebars of bicycling plaintiff. Plaintiff goes for a tumble, suffering injury. | If a person exercises a reasonable standard of care and unintentionally injures another, she is NOT liable for negligence, even if "a reasonably prudent and intelligent [person] should foresee that harm may result." |
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Cooley v. Public Service Co. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1940 10 A.2d 673 Pg. 173 |
During a severe storm, defendant's power cables break and burn through telephone cable. A loud noise surges through the earpiece of plaintiff, and she suffers shock and neurosis. (Note that the available precautions to prevent contact between power and telephone lines would place pedestrians in danger of electrocution.) | A person cannot have two duties to take precaution when "performance of one duty would mean non-performance of the other." |
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United States v. Carroll Towing Co. United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1947 159 F.2d 169 Pg. 175 |
Carroll Towing (defendant) is towing a line of barges, including the "Anna C" (owned by Connors, plaintiff). Connors does not place an employee on board its barge. The "Anna C" breaks away from the line of barges and crashes into a tanker. | The "Hand Formula": if B < P*L, and the actor does not take the adequate precaution (B), then the actor has breached a legal duty. B = "the burden of adequate precautions." P = "the probability" that injury will result. L = "the gravity of the resulting injury" |
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Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transportation Services, Inc. Supreme Court of Alaska, 1996 928 P.2d 1202 Pg. 182 |
Plaintiff, in a Volkswagen van, pulls onto road in front of a commercial truck (owned by defendant). Truck strikes van and kills plaintiff. | "[T]he sudden emergency instruction is a generally useless appendage to the law of negligence. With or without an emergency, the standard of care a person must exercise is still that of a reasonable person under the circumstances." (Note: the sudden emergency doctrine states that "a person confronted with a sudden and unexpected peril, not resulting from that person's own negligence, is not expected to exercise the same judgment and prudence the law requires of a person in calmer and more deliberate moments.") |
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Andrews v. United Airlines United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1994 24 F.3d 39 Pg. 184 |
Suitcase fell on the head of passenger. | Common carriers have a duty of the utmost care. |
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Titus v. Bradford, B. & K. R. Co. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1890 20 A. 517 Pg. 188 |
Railroad brakeman (plaintiff) falls from top of freight car to his death when freight car switches tracks and becomes wobbly. Plaintiff had knowledge of the risk presented by the railroad's (defendant) standard procedure of securing the freight cars with telegraph wire. | Custom ("ordinary usage of business") is the test for determining the standard of care in negligence cases. NOTE: THIS PEDAGOGICAL POINT IS NO LONGER GOOD LAW. The Third Restatement states that neither adhering to custom nor departing from custom is dispositive in determining negligence. Instead, custom serves as EVIDENCE in determining negligence. |
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Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co. Supreme Court of Maine, 1884 76 Me. 100 Pg. 190 |
Inside a mine shaft, the independent mining contractor (plaintiff) falls through an unexpected ladder hole created by defendant. | Custom is not dispositive in determining the standard of ordinary care in negligence cases. "It would be no excuse for a want of ordinary care that carelessness was universal about the matter involved." |
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The T.J. Hooper U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1932 60 F.2d 737 Pg. 191 |
Big storm hits the waters off the coast of New Jersey. The T.J. Hooper tugboat does not have radios aboard and thus misses the broadcasted storm warnings. Sadly, the Hooper succumbs to the whim of Mother Nature. | Custom is not dispositive in determining the standard of ordinary care in negligence cases. "Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is NEVER ITS MEASURE." |
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Lama v. Borras U.S. Court of Appeals for 1st Circuit, 1994 16 F.3d 473 Pg. 197 |
Patient (plaintiff) goes to doctor (defendant) because of back pain. Doctor schedules surgery, but fails to counsel any "conservative treatment" (like bed rest, etc.). Symptoms persist, and doctor performs second surgery without prescribing pre or post-surgical antibiotics. Patient develops a severe infection. | The standard of care for physicians is "that [level of care] which, recognizing the modern means of communication and education, . . . meets the professional requirements generally acknowledged by the medical profession." |
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Osborne v. McMasters Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1889 41 N.W. 543 Pg. 228 |
Defendant's drug store clerk failed to properly label a bottle of poison (per criminal statute) and sold bottle to the plaintiff, who perished. | Breach of a statutory duty "constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence, or in other words, NEGLIGENCE PER SE" when both the following are true: 1) defendant's breach of duty harms those people that the statute was designed to protect, AND 2) the harm is of the "character which the statute or ordinance was designed to prevent." |
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Martin v. Herzog New York Court of Appeals, 1920 126 N.E. 814 Pg. 233 |
Plaintiff's buggy collides with defendant's automobile, and plaintiff dies. Plaintiff is driving without his headlights on, which violates a statute. | Breach of a statutory duty can also constitute CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE PER SE, subject to the same requirements: 1) plaintiff is a member of the class of persons that the statute is designed to protect, AND 2) harm is of the character that the statute is designed to prevent. Finally, Cardozo states that negligence per se, like all negligence, must be causally connected to the injury. |
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Brown v. Shyne New York Court of Appeals, 1926 151 N.E. 197 Pg. 235 |
Unlicensed chiropractor (defendant) treats patient (plaintiff). After several treatments, patient becomes paralyzed. | If a statute is designed to protect against a certain type of threat, then a defendant's violation of that statute does NOT constitute negligence per se if the injury was not caused by this specified type of threat. |
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Uhr v. East Greenbush Central School District Court of Appeals of New York, 1999 720 N.E.2d 886 Pg. 242 |
Plaintiff student was screened for scoliosis as part of a school program in the 7th grade, but not in the 8th grade. In 9th grade, she was screened for scoliosis by her school and tested positive. The condition had progressed to the point where surgery was required. | When determining whether a statute gives rise to an implied private cause of action, a court must determine: "(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme." |
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Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Goodman Supreme Court of the United States, 1927 275 U.S. 66 Pg. 251 |
Plaintiff approaches a railroad crossing in his automobile. Instead of getting out of his car and checking for an oncoming train, plaintiff relies on his hearing and drives on. Train (defendant) strikes and kills our hapless plaintiff. | When the standard of care is clear, it should be "laid down once and for all by the Courts" as a question of law. NOTE: THIS IS NO LONGER GOOD LAW. See Pokora v. Wabash Ry. |
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Pokora v. Wabash Ry. U.S. Supreme Court, 1934 292 U.S. 98 Pg. 252 |
Plaintiff approaches a railroad crossing in his automobile. He stops and tries to look, but proceeds without getting out of his car for a better vantage point. Train (defendant) strikes and injures plaintiff. | The standard of care in negligence cases is "for the judgment of a jury". In other words, the determination of duty and breach is a question of fact, not law. |
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Jewell v. CSX Transportation, Inc. United States Court Of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit, 1998 135 F.3d 361 Pg. 253 |
Husband (plaintiff) was driving a pick-up truck with his wife and child. He crossed a train track and was hit by an on-coming train. Husband was killed, wife and child were injured. Husband's estate, wife, and child sue defendant railroad company, alleging that train was negligent in not sounding a whistle, and that the crossing was extra-hazardous. | The train crossing was not extra-hazarous under Kentucky law, because there were no "physical obstructions" to the driver's view of the train, and therefore a directed verdict was proper. "There was substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the whistle was sounded," despite other testimony to the contrary. |
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Byrne v. Boadle Court of Exchequer, 1863 159 Eng. Rep. 299 Pg. 261 |
Plaintiff was walking along a highway when he was struck by a barrel of flour that was being lowered from defendant's window. Defendant was a flour dealer. Plaintiff submitted no evidence of negligence other than the facts above, arguing that negligence was established under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Defendant argued that plaintiff must submit some direct evidence of negligence. | There is a presumption of negligence where "the defendant had the entire possession and exclusive use of this warehouse...", and a barrel of flour, owned by the defendant, was lowered from the warehouse and fell on plaintiff; The burden is on the defendant to show that he was not negligent. |
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Colmenares Vivas v. Sun Alliance Insurance Co. United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 1986 807 F.2d 1102 Pg. 268 |
Plaintiffs were on an escalator when the handrail stopped moving, while the steps continued to move. Co-plaintiff (wife) lost her balance. Other co-plaintiff (husband) lost his balance attempting to catch wife, and fell down the stairs. | Where an escalator handrail stops, and the stairs keep moving, the "inference of negligence" (the first requirement of "res ipsa loquitor") is satsfied, because an escalator handrail probably would not stop moving while the steps continued to move absent negligence. The authority in control of a public area has "exclusive control" (the second requirement of "res ipsa loquitur"), because it has a nondelegable duty to maintain its facilities. Lastly, the accident was not "due to the plaintiff's actions" (the third requirement of "res ipsa loquitur"). |
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Ybarra v. Spangard Supreme Court of California, 1944 154 P.2d 687 Pg. 276 |
Plaintiff was diagnosed with appendicitis. After being rendered unconscious for surgery to correct the problem, he woke up with severe pain in his right sholder. The plaintiff had no previous injury or pain in the sholder area. The pain eventually spread down his arm, and he developed paralysis and atrophy in the sholder. Two doctors subsequently examined him and determined that the condition was caused by trauma. | The doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" may be applied "where a plaintiff recieves unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, [and] all those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct." |
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Beems v. Chicago, Rock Island & Peoria R.R. Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines, 1882 12 N.W. 222 Pg. 289 |
Man was killed while attempting to uncouple a railroad car. When he went to uncouple the cars, the cars were travelling at an improper and unusual rate of speed. The defense charges that this finding establishes contributory negligence. | "His act, therefore, in going between the cars after having made the signal to check their speed, was not necessarily contributory negligence," because he was authorized to belief that his signal to check the speed of the cars would be obeyed. "... defendant is liable, notwithstanding intestate's negligence, if ordinary care was not exercised to prevent the accident, after the intestate's negligence was known to defendant's employes... . Whatever was the intestate's condition at the time of the accident, whether free to move, or fastened to the place, the defendant is liable if its cars were negligently driven over him." |
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Gyerman v. United States Lines Co. Supreme Court of California, 1972 498 P.2d 1043 Pg. 293 |
Plaintiff was employed as a longshoreman. He was working in a warehouse owned by the defendant. His job was to move pallets with sacks of fishmeal stacked on top of them. Upon discovering that the fishmeal on a shipment of pallets was stacked improperly, plaintiff notified the chief marine clerk of the warehouse, but not his immediate supervisor at his own employer. The clerk told plaintiff that there was nothing to be done about the pallets, and that he should continue to work. After a number of days on the job, a large number of sacks fell off one of the pallets, and injured the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued defendant for negligently stacking the sacks of fishmeal. Defendant alleged contributory negligence on the grounds that plaintiff never notified his immediate supervisor of the problem. | The burden is on the defendant to show that there was contributory negligence, and that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. |
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LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Supreme Court of the United States, 1914 232 U.S. 340 Pg. 300 |
Plaintiff stacked flax straw on his land, within 70 feet of defendant's railroad tracks. Sparks from a passing train were blown onto the flax straw and burned all of the flax. Defendant alleged contributory negligence, due to Plaintiff stacking the straw too close to the railroad tracks. | As a matter of law, a plaintiff cannot be guilty of contributory negligence for using his land in a lawful manner. |
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Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co. Supreme Court of Washington, 1972 492 P.2d 1030 Pg. 304 |
Defendant makes an illegal left hand turn and hits plaintiff's car. Plaintiff is not wearing seatbelt. | Court reject the "seat belt defense." In other words, a plaintiff's failure to buckle up does not constitute contributory negligence. |
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Fuller v. Illinois Central R.R. Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1911 56 So. 783 Pg. 308 |
Old man (plaintiff) rides his wagon onto the railroad tracks and pauses. Train (defendant) has plain view of the man from a distance, but does not slow down. It blows a warning whistle far too late. Train delivers fatal blow to the old man. | "Last clear chance" doctrine states that "the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it is shown that the defendant might by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence have avoided the consequence of the injured party's negligence." |
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Mills v. Armstrong (The Bernina) House of Lords, 1888 13 App. Cas. 1 Pg. 313 |
Two ships, the Bushire and the Bernina, were both piloted negligently in colliding with each other. As a result of the collision, a passenger and crew member on the Bushire were drowned. The plaintiffs, the family memebers of the decedents, sued the defendants, the owners of the Bernina. | The passenger of a vehicle is not so identified with the operator of the vehicle that the operator's contibutory negligence is a bar to recovery. |
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Lamson v. American Axe & Tool Co. Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1900 58 N.E. 585 Pg. 318 |
Employee (plaintiff) is injured when a hatchet falls from the new and poorly constructed hatchet rack. Employee had been working in defendant's store for many years and had previously complained about the faulty new racks. | Assumption of risk: If plaintiff willingly and deliberately encounters a known risk created by defendant's negligence, then plaintiff cannot recover for the harm resulting from that risk. |
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Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co. New York Court of Appeals, 1929 166 N.E. 173 Pg. 322 |
Young man (plaintiff) visits amusement park (defendant) and steps onto a ride called the "Flopper." He indeed flops, and suffers injury. | "One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary." |
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Obstetrics & Gynecologists Ltd. v. Pepper Supreme Court of Nevada, 1985 693 P.2d 1259 Pg. 330 |
Respondent went to Appellant clinic to obtain oral contraception. Respondent's signature appeared on an arbitration agreement, but she did not remember signing it. Respondent subsequently became partly paralyzed, allegedly due to negligence by the clinic in prescribing the contraception. Respondent filed suit, Appellant moved to stay the lawsuit pending arbitration. | The proponent of an arbitration agreement must prove that it is a valid contract when its existence is denied by the other party. A contract of adhesion "limiting the liabilities and duties of the stronger party" will not be enforced "absent plain and clear notification of the terms and an understanding consent." |
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Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California Supreme Court of California, 1975 532 P.2d 1226 Pg. 337 |
Two cars collide at an intersection. Both drivers are in some way negligent. | California adopts the system of "pure" comparative negligence, "the fundamental purpose of which shall be to assign responsibility and liability for damage in DIRECT PROPORTION to the amount of negligence of each of the parties," even if the plaintiff is more at fault than the defendant. NOTE: This is the minority position. The majority of comparative negligence jurisdictions use the "50% System" (Impure Form), in which the plaintiff recovers in proportion to the respective levels of negligence, but only if the plaintiff is LESS THAN 50% AT FAULT. Otherwise, she recovers nothing. |
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Union Stockyard Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Supreme Court of the United States, 1905 196 U.S. 217 Pg. 355 |
An employee of the plaintiff (a terminal company) is injured due to a defective brake on a car delivered by the defendant (a railroad company). Employee gets a judgment for damages against the plaintiff company due to its failure to inspect. Plaintiff sues defendant for contribution, alleging that defendant was also negligent in failing to inspect. | Contribution will only be allowed between tortfeasors where one is principally responsible for the injury; Where the negligence of the joint tortfeasors is of a like kind, there will be no contribution. |
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American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court Supreme Court of California, 1978 578 P.2d 899 Pg. 359 |
The plaintiff, a teenage boy, was seriously injured while participating in a novice motorcycle race. The plaintiff sued defendants, the American Motorcyle Association and the Viking Motorcycle Club, claiming that the defendants negligently organized and operated the race. The defendants sought leave from the court to file a cross-complaint against the plaintiff's parents, alleging contributory negligence. | Under the common law equitable indemnity doctrine a concurrent tortfeasor may obtain partial indemnity from cotortfeasors on a comparative fault basis. Additionally, the court concluded (1) that the doctrine subjecting multiple defendants to "joint and several liability" to a single plaintiff was not abolished or limited; (2) that partial equitable indemnity should be adopted to permit apportionment of loss among codefendants on pure comparative principles; (3) that California contribution statutes do not "preclude" the development of comparative indemnity; and (4) that under equitable contribution any defendant may maintain an action against any other party, whether or not that party was joined in the original suit. |
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McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde & River Don Castings, Ltd. Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 511 U.S. 202 Pg. 368 |
After a construction accident in the Gulf of Mexico, the plaintiff settled with three defendants for $ 1 million. A fourth defendant, the respondent, did not settle. At trial, a jury awarded the petitioner $ 2.1 million and allocated 32% of the damages to respondent AmClyde and 38% to respondent River Don Castings, Ltd. The question presented is whether the liability of the nonsettling defendants should be calculated with reference to the jury's allocation of proportionate responsibility, or by giving the nonsettling defendants a credit for the dollar amount of the settlement. | The nonsettling defendants' liability should be calculated with reference to the jury's allocation of proportionate responsibility, not by giving them a credit for the dollar amount of the settlement |
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Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1968 398 F.2d 167 Pg. 375 |
Coast Guard sailor arrived back at his ship drunk. The ship was undergoing repairs on a drydock owned by plaintiff. On way back up to ship, sailor turned three wheels on the drydock, which opened up valves and eventually caused the drydock to list to one side, damaging both the ship and the drydock. | "The employer should be held to expect risks, to the public also, which arise 'out of and in the course of' his employment of labor." It is foreseeable that a drunken sailor might cause damage while crossing a drydock on the way back to his ship. |
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Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc. Supreme Court of Illinois, 1999 719 N.E.2d 756 Pg. 383 |
Plaintiff brought medical malpractice action against her treating physician and others for their alleged negligence in failing to diagnose her oral cancer in timely manner. The plaintiff also included her health maintenance organization (HMO) as a named defendant. The issue is whether plaintiff's HMO can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent-contractor physicians under agency law. | An HMO may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent-contractor physicians under both the doctrines of apparent authority and implied authority. |
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New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1920 264 F. 334 Pg. 394 |
Captain of barge (plaintiff) falls overboard and drowns. Defendant had failed to equip barge with life-preservers. | Cause in fact ("but for" causation) does not exist when a jury is "left to pure conjecture and speculation." |
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Zuchowicz v. United States U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1998 140 F.3d 381 Pg. 398 |
Defendant prescribes an overdose of drug to plaintiff, who fills and consumes the prescription for a period of a month. Thereafter, plaintiff begins taking the correct dosage, but ultimately develops lung disease as a side effect and dies. | Test for "but for" causation: If (1) "a negligent act [is] deemed wrongful because that act INCREASES THE CHANCES that a particular type of accident [will] occur", and (2) "a mishap of that very sort [does] happen": THEN there is a rebuttable PRESUMPTION that the negligent behavior caused the harm, and the BURDEN shifts to the defendant to "bring in evidence denying but for cause and suggesting that in the actual case the wrongful conduct had not been a substantial factor." |
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General Electric Co. v. Joiner Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 522 U.S. 136 Pg. 404 |
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the issue of what standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit expert testimony. | Abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard that an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit expert testimony. |
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Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative Supreme Court of Washington, 1983 664 P.2d 474 Pg. 412 |
Group Health Cooperative negligently failed to diagnose Herskovits cancer on his first trip to the hospital, reducing his chance of survival by 14 percent. At all times Herskovits had less than a 50 percent chance of survival. The issue is whether Herskovits can maintain a cause of action against Group Health Cooperative, in light of his low chance of survival. | The court held that medical testimony of a reduction of chance of survival from 39 percent to 25 percent is sufficient evidence to allow the proximate cause issue to go to the jury. Causing reduction of the opportunity to recover (loss of chance) by one's negligence, however, does not necessitate a total recovery against the negligent party for all damages caused by the victim's death. Damages should be awarded to the injured party or his family based only on damages caused directly by premature death, such as lost earnings and additional medical expenses, etc. |
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Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1927 211 N.W. 913 Pg. 418 |
A fire started by the sparks of the defendant's locomotive and a fire of unknown origin united near plaintiff's property. Shortly thereafter the blaze destroyed plaintiff's property. Either fire in and of itself would have been strong enough to destroy plaintiff's property. | The fact that one of the fires was set by the railroad company, which fire was a proximate cause of plaintiff's damage is sufficient to affirm a judgment against the defendant. The fire of unknown origin is not a superseding cause that could save the defendant from liability. |
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Summers v. Tice Supreme Court of California, 1948 199 P.2d 1 Pg. 425 |
Plaintiff and two defendants were hunting quail on the open range. Both defendants shot at the quail, firing in the plaintiff's direction. As a result, the plaintiff sustained injuries to his eye and upper lip. | In situations where plaintiff is injured as a result of defendants negligence, yet it is impossible for plaintiff to determine which defendant caused what injury, the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the whole injury to plaintiff as joint tort feasors. The burden is on the defendants to explain the cause of the injury. |
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Skipworth v. Lead Industries Association Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1997 690 A.2d 169 Pg. 428 |
Dominique Skipworth, the plaintiff, was hospitalized on three separate occasions for lead poisoning between September 1990 and May 1991. Testing of Skipworth's home revealed the presence of lead-based paint at various locations throughout the home. As a result, Skipworth filed an action against several manufacturers of lead pigment as well as their successors. | The tort based recovery theory of market share liability as applied to manufacturers of "DES" does not apply to manufactures of lead paint. Defendant is also not liable under the alternative liability theory. |
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Ryan v. New York Central R.R. Court of Appeals of New York, 1866 35 N.Y. 210 Pg. 436 |
Defendant, by his negligence, set fire to his woodshed. As a result, the plaintiff's home, which was 130 feet from the shed, also took fire and was consumed. | The court ruled that the damage sustained by the plaintiff was too remote from defendant's negligence, and therefore the plaintiff could not recover. |
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Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1899 43 A. 240 Pg. 440 |
Plaintiff was running his car on borough street in a violent wind storm. As he passed under a tree, it was blown down crushing the roof of his car and causing him serious injury. Plaintiff was running his car in excess of the speed limit as permitted by a borough ordinance. | Plaintiff's rate of speed did not cause or contribute to the harm that he suffered. His actions did not increase the foreseeable likelihood that a tree would fall on his car. It cannot be said that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Thus, Plaintiff's recovery is sustained. |
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Brower v. New York Central & H.R.R. Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, 1918 103 A. 166 Pg. 444 |
A wagon gets in an accident due to negligence resulting in the disorientation of the driver and the scattering of goods in the street. Shortly after the accident, thieves steal the goods. Plaintiff, owner of the goods, files suit. | Defendant cannot escape liability because the loss of the goods was the natural and probable result of the negligent act. |
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Wagner v. International Ry. Court of Appeals of New York, 1921 133 N.E. 437 Pg. 450 |
In attempt to rescue his cousin who had fallen from a train as a result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff fell from a bridge to his death. | Plaintiff's rescue attempt was a natural and probable consequence of defendant's negligence. |
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In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co. Court of Appeal, 1921 3 K.B. 560 Pg. 452 |
A ship carrying a cargo of petrol was set fire and destroyed. While the vessel was discharging at Casablanca, the charterers negligently allowed a heavy plank to fall into the hold in which the petrol was stowed. The plank caused an explosion, which set fire to the vessel. | The fall of the board was due to the negligence of the charterers' servants, the charterers were liable for all the direct consequences of the negligent act, even though those consequences could not reasonably have been anticipated; and they were therefore liable for the loss of the ship by fire. |
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Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Court of Appeals of New York, 1928 162 N.E. 99 Pg. 456 |
Two guards, employed by defendant, helped a man get on a moving train. The man was holding a package, which he dropped. The package was full of fireworks and exploded, causing a scale to fall many feet away and injure plaintiff. There was no way for the guards to know the contents of the package. | For an act to be negligent, unless that act is imminently dangerous, a duty of care is owed to a foreseeable plaintiff. There is a split of authority on duty of care. Cardozo, writing for the majority, adopted a narrow view of the duty of care: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension. . . ." Andrews, dissenting, adopts a broad view: "Where there is the unreasonable act, and some right that may be affected there is negligence whether damage does or does not result. . . . Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone. There needs be duty due the one complaining but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as to him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those in fact injured may complain." |
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Marshall v. Nugent United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 1955 222 F.2d 604 Pg. 467 |
A truck owned by the defendant, cut the corner as it headed north around a sharp curve on an icy highway forcing off the road a southbound car driven by the plaintiff's son-in-law, Harriman. The driver of the truck offered to pull Harriman's car back on the road and suggested to the plaintiff that he go around the curve to warn oncoming cars of the expected danger. As the plaintiff was getting into position, the defendant Nugent, who was driving northbound suddenly saw his way blocked by the truck on one side, and the driver and Harriman on the other. In an effort to avoid those obstacles, Nugent pulled over to the left, went into a skid, and ended up hitting the plaintiff causing the plaintiff serious injury. | The tortfeasor is liable under the thoery of proximate cause if the injury incurred was a foreseeable result of the tortfeasor's negligence, even if the injury was remote. |
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Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. Privy Council, 1961 A.C. 388 Pg. 471 |
Defendants had carelessly let oil spill from their ship into Sydney harbor. Oil was carried to wharf, which was used for repair work on other ships. The oil caught fire, and caused great damage. | The test of liability for the damage done by fire was the foreseeability of the injury by fire and, as a reasonable man would not, on the facts of this case, have foreseen such injury, the appellants were not liable in negligence for the damage, although their servants' carelessness was the direct cause of the damage. |
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Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Court of Appeals of New York, 1896 45 N.E. 354 Pg. 480 |
Plaintiff was almost trampled by a horse drawn carriage. Plaintiff claimed that the resulting fright caused her to have a miscarriage and subsequent illness. | No recovery can be had for injuries sustained by fright occasioned by the negligence of another, where there is no immediate personal injury. |
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Dillon v. Legg Supreme Court of California, 1968 441 P.2d 912 Pg. 483 |
An automobile driven by the defendant struck and killed a child as the child was crossing a public street. Both the mother and a sister of the child brought a claim for nervous shock and serious mental pain for witnessing the accident. | The court overruled Amaya v. Home Ice, holding that the plaintiff could recover for serious emotional distress for witnessing the accident, even if she was only in "close proximity" to the accident and not within the "zone of danger." |
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Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1897 44 A. 809 Pg. 497 |
A child of eight years trespassed into defendants mill and got his hand caught caught in a machine, causing the child serious injury. | There does not exist any legal duty to protect trespassing children from foreseeable harm. |
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Hurley v. Eddingfield Supreme Court of Indiana, 1901 59 N.E. 1058 Pg. 499 |
Family physician refused to treat patient that had sent for his aid. Patient died. Family of patient sued physician claiming wrongful refusal to enter into a contract of employment. | The law does not require a physician to come to patient's aid. Thus, the plaintiff had no basis on which to recover. |
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Montgomery v. National Convoy & Trucking Co. Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1937 195 S.E. 247 Pg. 507 |
Two trucks stalled in the middle of an icy highway, blocking the road. Another car, containing plaintiff, approached the two trucks, and due to the icy road could not stop in time to avoid a collision. | The passengers in the two trucks had a duty to warn potential travelers of the danger. Not fulfilling this duty amounted to negligence. |
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Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck House of Lords, 1929 A.C. 358 Pg. 513 |
Plaintiff's son was killed when he wandered onto defendant's land and got caught in a wheel mechanism. Defendant had a no trespassing sign posted on the premises, but was aware that people, including children, disregarded the sign. | The occupier of land has no duty towards a trespasser to take reasonable care for his protection or even to protect him from concealed danger. The trespasser comes on to the premises at his own risk. An occupier is liable to a trespasser only where the injury suffered by the trespasser is due to some wilful act involving something more than the absence of reasonable care. |
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Rowland v. Christian Supreme Court of California, 1968 443 P.2d 561 Pg. 521 |
Plaintiff, a social guest of defendant, injures his hand on a faulty porcelain handle on a water faucet. Defendant had complained to her landlord of the defect two weeks prior to the incident. | "The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land ... is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative." |
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Coggs v. Bernard Queen's Bench, 1703 92 Eng. Rep. 107 Pg. 534 |
Defendant gratuitously undertakes to move barrels of plaintiff's brandy from one basement to another. Due to defendant's negligence, one of the barrels breaks and the brandy is lost. | A gratuitious bailor can be held liable for his negligence in keeping the goods he was entrusted with. |
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Erie R.R. v. Stewart Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 1930 40 F.2d 855 Pg. 536 |
Plaintiff was riding in the passenger seat of a truck that was struck by a train. The watchman failed to give a timely warning that a train was approaching. A watchman was regularly employed at the railroad crossing where the accident occured, and this fact was known to the plaintiff. | A railroad company has a positive duty to a person crossing a railway when they employ a watchman to watch the railway, and this employment is known and relied upon by the plaintiff. Where there is voluntary employment of a watchman, knowledge of this by the plaintiff, and reliance by the plaintiff, a presumption of negligence arises that must be rebutted by the defendant. |
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Marsalis v. LaSalle Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Orleans, 1957 94 So. 2d 120 Pg. 539 |
Plaintiff wife was scratched by a cat owned by defendant's son while in defendant's store. Plaintiff requested that defendant keep the cat under observation for 14 days to determine if it had rabies. Though the defendant attempted to keep the cat in the basement of the store, it escaped after a few days, and was not seen again for a month. After learning that the cat escaped, plaintiff was administered a course of vaccination injections. Plaintiff reacted poorly, allegedly due to the vaccinations. | There is no liability for injury caused by a domestic animal where it has never exhibited vicious traits or tendancies. When a person "voluntarily undertakes to care for or to afford relief or assistance to an injured or distressed person," his actions give rise to a duty of care, even though none existed before his affirmative act. |
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Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. Court of Appeals of New York, 1928 159 N.E. 896 Pg. 541 |
Plaintiff sues defendant, a water works company, for its failure to supply adequate water to stop a fire from spreading to his warehouse. Defendant had a contract with the city to supply water. | "A member of the public may not maintain an action [for breach of contract]... against one contracting with the city ... unless the intention appears that the promisor is to be answerable to indvidual members of the public..." A duty of care is not owed to the public by the promisor that contracts with a city to supply water; failure to supply adequate water is merely a denial of a benefit. There is no statuory duty on the part of the promisor to the intended benficiaries of a contract with the city. |
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Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1970 439 F.2d 477 Pg. 549 |
Plaintiff suffered injuries from a criminal assault & battery occuring in the common hallway of her apartment building. Security measures in the building had decreased significantly from 1959, when plaintiff signed her lease, to 1966, despite an increasing number of crimes committed against tenants. | "There is a duty of protection owed by the landlord to the tenant in an urban multiple unit apartment dwelling ...[The] standard of protection may be taken as that commonly provided in apartments of this character and type in this community ... [The landlord's] duty is to take those measures of protection which are within his power and capacity to take, and which can reasonably be expected to mitigate the risk of intruders assaulting and robbing tenants." |
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Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California Supreme Court of California, 1976 551 P.2d 334 Pg. 559 |
On October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff. Plaintiffs, Tatiana's parents, allege that two months earlier Poddar confided his intention to kill Tatiana to Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist. They allege that on Moore's request, the campus police briefly detained Poddar, but released him when he appeared rational. They further claim that Dr. Harvey Powelson, Moore's superior, then directed that no further action be taken to detain Poddar. No one warned plaintiffs of Tatiana's peril. | Court concluded that public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins. |
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Poggi v. Scott Supreme Court of California, 1914 139 P. 815 Pg. 569 |
Plaintiff was a sublessee of a basement, in which he stored barrels of wine. The entire building was subsequently sold to defendant. Defendant proceeded to sell the barrels, believing they were junk. | There is strict liability for unlawful conversion. The absence of wrongful intent is irrelevant. |
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Gehrts v. Batteen Supreme Court of South Dakota, 2001 620 N.W.2d 775 Pg. 581 |
Plaintiff, a 14-year old girl, asked defendant if she could pet her dog, a St. Bernard, which was restrained in the back of defendant's truck. Defendant consented, and the dog bit plaintiff. | "Owners of domesticated animals may ... be held liable for harm caused by their pet if the owner knows or has reason to know that the animal has abnormally dangerous propensities." The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that defendant knew about such propensities. "When the owner does not know of the animal's dangerous propensities, the ordinary negligence standard of foreseeability will still be applied." |
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Spano v. Perini Corp. Court of Appeals of New York, 1969 250 N.E.2d 31 Pg. 589 |
Plaintiff suffered damage when defendant blasted. | Because of the dangerousness of the activity, one who blasts is strictly liable for the activity. |
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Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1990 916 F.2d 1174 Pg. 599 |
Defendant is a manufacturer of acrylonitrile, a highly flammable and toxic chemical. Defendant contracted to ship 20,000 gallons of acrylonitrile by railroad. While the car filled with the chemical was being switched to a different line at plaintiff's railroad yard, a leak was discovered. 4,000 gallons of acrylonitrile was spilled in the rail yard before the leak could be stopped. Plaintiff was ordered by the state of Illinois to pay for decontamination measures. | A shipper/manufacturer of acrylonitrile should not be held strictly liable for a spill occuring during transportation; A negligence liability standard is adequate. |
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Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Electric Cooperative Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1996 548 N.W.2d 829 Pg. 608 |
Plaintiff's herd of cows exhibited erratic and violent behavior, suffered from chronic mastitis, and produced low amounts of milk. The problems were traced to excessive stray voltage from the electricity supplied by defendant. | "We conclude that nuisance law is applicable to stray voltage claims because excessive levels of stray voltage may invade a person's private use and enjoyment of land. Although excessive levels of stray voltage may be found to constitute a nuisance in certain circumstances, we do not hold that it constitutes a nuisance under all circumstances. The determination of whether stray voltage unreasonably interferes with a person's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land is reserved for the trier of fact."; While excessive stray voltage may be an intentional invasion, the invasion must still interfere with the private use and enjoyment of land; "... A nuisance claim based on an unintentional invasion is properly subject to the defense of contributory negligence..." |
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Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, 1959 114 So. 2d 357 Pg. 618 |
Two hotels (Fontainebleau and Eden Roc) are battling it out over whether Fontainebleau can build an addition that will block Eden Roc's light, air, and Miami Beach view. The extension could have gone somewhere else, but Fontainebleau is building it where it will cast shadows over Eden Roc's swimming pool and sunbathing areas after 2pm. | "A nuisance only exists when it interferes with the lawful rights of another, and absent some sort of easement or other agreement, a landowner has no legal right to the free flow of light and air across the adjoining land of the neighbors." |
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Rogers v. Elliott Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1888 15 N.E. 768 Pg. 622 |
Plaintiff was resting in his father's house after suffering from sun-stroke. Plaintiff's physician and father informed the defendant, a clergyman, that the noise from the church bells would cause him to convulse, and asked him not to ring them. Defendant refused, and rang the bells on the next Sunday. Plaintiff suffered a series of convulsions due to the ringing of the bell. | "The right to make a noise for a proper purpose must be measured in reference to the degree of annoyance which others may reasonably be required to submit to. In connection with the importance of the business from which it proceeds, that must be determined by the effect of noise upon people generally, ..." not upon a particular plaintiff. |
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Ensign v. Walls Supreme Court of Michigan, 1948 34 N.W.2d 549 Pg. 625 |
Defendant ran a business breeding St. Bernard dogs. Plaintiffs were neighboring homeowners, and claimed that defendant's business constituted a nuisance. Defendant had run the business for a number of years before plaintiffs had moved into the neighborhood. | To establish a right to continue a nuisance by prescription, defendant must show that the nuisance has been of the same character and effect for the entire prescriptive period. A court will consider equitable factors when deciding whether to give injunctive relief, such as the length of time the nuisance had been in existence, and whether the creator of the nuisance was there before the complaining landowners, but the presence of such factors is not determinative. |
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Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. Court of Appeals of New York, 1970 257 N.E.2d 870 Pg. 629 |
Defendant is the operator of a cement plant. Plaintiff sues for private nuisance, due to dirt, smoke, vibration, and particulate contamination coming from defendant's plant. | Where the benefit of an injuction against a nuisance is greatly outweighed by its costs, a court may allow payment of permenant damages to the plaintiff in lieu of injuctive relief. |
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532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc. Court of Appeals of New York, 2001 750 N.E.2d 1097 Pg. 641 |
In two separate incidents, falling building materials and the collapse of a construction elevator let to the closing of a number of city blocks. Businesses located on the closed streets sued for purely economic damages (lost business). | "Negligence claims based on economic loss alone fall beyond the scope of the duty owed ... and should be dismissed"; The plaintiff must allege personal injury or property damage. To support a claim of damages for public nuisance, plaintiff must suffer a special injury. |
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Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 2001 273 F.3d 536 Pg. 646 |
Plaintiff county sues gun manufacturers, contending "that handgun manufacturers, because of their marketing and distribution policies and practices, are liable under a public nuisance theory for the governmental costs associated with the criminal use of handguns..." | For interference with a public right to be actionable, "the defendant must exert a certain degree of control over its source." Otherwise, there is no valid cause of action for public nuisance. |
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MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. New York Court of Appeals, 1916 111 N.E. 1050 Pg. 657 |
Buick (defendant) sells car to dealer. Dealer sells car to customer (plaintiff). Customer suffers injury because of a car defect that could have been detected by Buick's reasonable inspection. | Manufacturer negligence liability is based on three elements, as stated by Cardozo in the opinion: "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a THING OF DANGER. If to the element of danger there is added KNOWLEDGE THAT THE THING WILL BE USED BY PERSONS OTHER THAN THE PURCHASER, and used WITHOUT NEW TESTS, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully." |
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Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno Supreme Court of California, 1944 150 P.2d 436 Pg. 665 |
Coca Cola bottle explodes in waitress's (plaintiff) hand as she is stocking the refrigerator. | Traynor's concurrence is the key takeaway from this case: "a manufacturer incurs an ABSOLUTE LIABILITY when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings." |
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Casa Clara Condominium Association, Inc. v. Charly Toppino & Sons, Inc. Supreme Court of Florida, 1993 620 So. 2d 1244 Pg. 681 |
Defendant supplied concrete for numerous construction projects. Some of the concrete contained a high content of salt that caused the reinforced steel inserted in the concrete to rust, which, in turn, caused the concrete to crack and break off. The broken concrete caused substantial damage to many condominium units. | Plaintiff's cannot recover in tort for purely economic damages. The economic loss rule applies and bars tort recovery in this case. |
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Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Services, Inc. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1995 668 A.2d 521 Pg. 689 |
Albert Cafazzo underwent surgery for implantation of a mandibular prosthesis. Later, it was discovered that this device was defective. Albert filed suit against the physician that performed the surgery and the hospital where the operation took place claiming that they should be held strictly liable for having provided, sold, or otherwise placed the defective device in the stream of commerce. | Defendants are not sellers as defined in Restatement Section 402A, and even if defendants could be shown to have marketed the defective device, strict liability would not apply to the facts of this case. |
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Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. Court of Appeals of New York, 2003 790 N.E.2d 252 Pg. 697 |
Plaintiffs' decedent Sandra Speller died in a house fire that also injured her seven-year-old son. It was undisputed that the fire originated in the kitchen. Plaintiffs alleged that the fire was caused by faulty wiring in a refigerator and commenced this action against Sears, Roebuck and Co., Whirlpool Corporation and the property owner alleging negligence, strict products liability and breach of warranty. | "[A] plaintiff 'is not required to prove the specific defect' and that '[p]roof of necessary facts may be circumstantial.' In order to proceed in the absence of evidence identifying a specific flaw, a plaintiff must prove that the product did not perform as intended and exclude all other causes for the product's failure that are not attributable to defendants. " |
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Campo v. Scofield Court of Appeals of New York, 1951 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 Pg. 702 |
Plaintiff badly injured his hands when they were caught in an onion feeding machine. Plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer of the machine alleging that they had been negligent by not providing the machine with a guard. | The duty owed by a manufacturer to remote users does not require him to guard against hazards apparent to the casual observer or to protect against injuries resulting from the user's own patently careless and improvident conduct. |
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Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1974 321 A.2d 737 Pg. 704 |
The vehicle of plaintiffs' decedent was struck in the rear by a Ford negligently driven by William Benjamin Benson. Immediately upon collision the car driven by plaintiffs' decedent was propelled forward and the seat assembly unit, seat frame, seat bracing pieces, seat adjustment mechanism, seat reinforcements and metal tracks to which the seat itself was fastened, failed to withstand the impact against the rear of the vehicle with the direct and proximate result that the driver's seat separated from the floor of the car causing it and James C. Young, deceased, to be thrown violently into the rear portion of said car where his head, body and torso impacted into and was impacted by various inadequate and defectively designed passenger compartment structures, surfaces and protrusions. | In order to avoid tort liability under a theory of negligence an automobile manufacturer does not have to design a crash-proof car. A manufacturer must, however, use reasonable care in the design of a vehicle in order to avoid subjecting a user to an unreasonable risk of injury in a collision. |
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Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. Supreme Court of California, 1978 573 P.2d 443 Pg. 712 |
Plaintiff was injured while operating a Lull High-Lift Loader. While attempting to lift a load of lumber on uneven ground, the plaintiff lost control of the loader and as he attempted to jump to safety was struck and serioulsy injured by some falling timber. | A product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. |
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Linegar v. Armour of America United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1990 909 F.2d 1150 Pg. 721 |
A police officer was shot and killed in the line of duty. He was hit several times, but none of the bullets that hit his bullet-proof vest caused injury. The wounds the officer suffered were all by shots that struck his body in places not protected by the vest. The issue is whether the vest was defectively designed. | A manufacturer is not obliged to market only one version of a product, that being the very safest design possible in order to avoid being held liable under strict liability for product design. |
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Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1997 694 A.2d 1319 Pg. 725 |
The plaintiffs claim that they were injured in the course of their employment as shipyard workers at the General Dynamics Corporation Electric Boat facility in Groton as a result of using pneumatic hand tools manufactured by the defendants. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the tools were defectively designed because they exposed the plaintiffs to excessive vibration, and because the defendants failed to provide adequate warnings with respect to the potential danger presented by excessive vibration | The courts continued to adhere to the rule rule that a product's defectiveness is to be determined by the expectations of an ordinary consumer, nevertheless the court recognized that there may be instances involving complex product designs in which an ordinary consumer may not be able to form expectations of safety. In such cases, a consumer's expectations may be viewed in light of various factors that balance the utility of the product's design with the magnitude of its risks. The court found persuasive the reasoning of those jurisdictions that have modified their formulation of the consumer expectation test by incorporating risk-utility factors into the ordinary consumer expectation analysis. |
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Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2002 792 A.2d 1145 Pg. 728 |
In June, 1999, plaintiff's son Jordon, shot himself while playing with his father's handgun. Plaintiff sought to hold the manufacturer of the gun liable for her son's death. | In determining whether a productive is defective, in its design or manufacture, Courts have generally applied the "consumer expectation" test, in which "a manufacturer may not be held liable for design defect on a risk-utility analysis unless the gun malfunctions." |
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MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1985 475 N.E.2d 65 Pg. 731 |
After taking contraceptive pills for three years, the plaintiff suffered a stroke. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the pills claiming she was not sufficiently warned of the fact that her consumption of the pills could lead to a stroke. | "[A] prescribing physician acts as a 'learned intermediary' between the manufacturer and the patient, and 'the duty of the ethical drug manufacturer is to warn the doctor, rather than the patient, [although] the manufacturer is directly liable to the patient for a breach of such duty.'. . . [T]he manufacturer of oral contraceptives is not justified in relying on warnings to the medical profession to satisfy its common law duty to warn, and that the manufacturer's obligation encompasses a duty to warn the ultimate user. Thus, the manufacturer's duty is to provide to the consumer written warnings conveying reasonable notice of the nature, gravity, and likelihood of known or knowable side effects, and advising the consumer to seek fuller explanation from the prescribing physician or other doctor of any such information of concern to the consumer." |
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Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1998 696 N.E.2d 909 Pg. 741 |
The plaintiff claimed that silicone breast implants, which had been implanted in her had been negligently designed causing her serious injury. | A defendant will not be held liable under an implied warranty of merchantability for failure to warn or provide instructions about risks that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of sale or could not have been discovered by way of reasonable testing prior to marketing the product. A manufacturer will be held to the standard of knowledge of an expert in the appropriate field, and will remain subject to a continuing duty to warn of risks discovered following the sale of the product at issue. |
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Hood v. Ryobi America Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 1999 181 F.3d 608 Pg. 748 |
Plaintiff lost part of his thumb and lacerated his leg when he removed the blade guards from his new Ryobi miter saw and then used the unguarded saw for home carpentry. | Maryland does not require and encyclopedic warning. Instead, a warning need only be one that is reasonable under the circumstances. |
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Daly v. General Motors Corp. Supreme Court of California, 1978 575 P.2d 1162 Pg. 755 |
The decedent struck a metal divider while driving on the freeway. The car spun around and the decedent was thrown from the car, sustaining fatal head injuries. Plaintiffs alleged that the door lock was defectively designed. If the decedent had stayed in the car, it is likely he would have sustained only minor injuries. | "[A] system of comparative fault [as expressed in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.] should be and it is hereby extended to actions founded on strict products liability." |
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Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 529 U.S. 861 Pg. 764 |
Plaintiff, while driving a 1987 Honda Accord, collided with a tree and was seriously injured. The car was equipped with manual shoulder and lap belts, which the plaintiff had buckled up, but the car was not equipped with airbags or other passive restraint devices. | The court applied a narrow reading of the pre-emption provision, excluding common law actions. Thus, the court held that a common law "no airbag" action, conflicted with FMVSS 208. |
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McDougald v. Garber Court of Appeals of New York, 1989 536 N.E.2d 372 Pg. 774 |
Plaintiff underwent a Caesarean section and tubal ligation at New York Infirmary. During the surgery the plaintiff suffered oxygen deprivation which resulted in severe brain damage and left her in a permanent comatose condition. The dispute concerned what nonpecuniary damages should have been awarded to the plaintiff. | Cognitive awareness is a prerequiste to recovery for loss of enjoyment of life. There must be some type of awareness in order for a plaintiff to recover this type of damage award. |
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O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 1982 677 F.2d 1194 Pg. 783 |
While getting off a harbor boat, the plaintiff fell and sustained an injury. The defendant, Riverway Towing Company, was found negligent. Defendent appealed from the finding that there was no contributory negligence, and from the damage award compensating the plaintiff for her future lost wages. | The calculation of lost wages should be an analytical rather than an intuitive undertaking. Inflation should be taken into account in calculating future lost wages. |
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Duncan v. Kansas City Southern Railway Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2000 773 So. 2d 670 Pg. 793 |
The case arises out of a collision between a train and a locomotive. As a result of the collision, one sister was killed, another was rendered a quadriplegic, and a third suffered less serious injuries. | Court reduced the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiffs holding that the awarded amounts were excessive and that the trier of fact abused its discretion by awarding such a large amount. |
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Harding v. Town of Townshend Supreme Court of Vermont, Windham County, 1871 43 Vt. 536 Pg. 809 |
The plaintiff received payment of $130 from an insurance policy that he purchased for $7. The court charged the jury that it should reduce the amount of recovery by the net proceeds of the insurance, $123. | Court refused to reduce the plaintiff award by the amount of the salary paid by the plaintiff's employer pursuant to their employment contract. |
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Kemezy v. Peters United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1996 79 F.3d 33 Pg. 824 |
Plaintiff sued an Indiana policeman claiming that the policemen had wantonly beaten him with a nightstick in an altercation at a bowling alley. Defendant appealed challenging the award of punitive damages. | "A plaintiff is not required to seek punitive damages in the first place, so he should not be denied an award of punitive damages merely because he does not present evidence that if believed would persuade the jury to award him even more than he is asking." |
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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, (Torts Edit) Pg. 831 |
Although investigators and witnesses concluded that Curtis Campbell caused an accident in which one person was killed and another permanently disabled, his insurer, petitioner State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contested liability, declined to settle the ensuing claims for the $ 50,000 policy limit, ignored its own investigators' advice, and took the case to trial, assuring Campbell and his wife that they had no liability for the accident, that State Farm would represent their interests, and that they did not need separate counsel. In fact, a Utah jury returned a judgment for over three times the policy limit, and State Farm refused to appeal. | A punitive damages award of $ 145 million, where full compensatory damages are $ 1 million, is excessive and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment |
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Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corp. Supreme Court of Florida, 1993 636 So. 2d 700 Pg. 845 |
Dimmit Chevrlet operated two car dealerships which sold the used crankcase oil generated by its business to Peak Oil Company. The Environmental Protection Agency found substantial pollution at Peak's disposal site, and designated Dimmit as a potentially responsible party. The issue set forth was whether Dimmit's comprehensive liability insurance policy covered the cost of the hazardous pollution. | The court held that the pollution damage was not within the scope of Southeastern's policy. The pollution took place over a period of many years and most of it occurred gradually. Thus, it could not have occurred suddenly, as the policy prescribed. |
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Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. Supreme Court of California, 1967 426 P.2d 173 Pg. 864 |
Plaintiff's tenant brought suit against her for physical injuries and severe psychosis suffered when tenant was hurt on the plaintiff's premises. After much negotiation, plaintiff's insurer refused to settle the case for the $ 10,000 policy limit, even though they had been warned that the tenant could receive over $ 100,000. Tenant was awarded around $ 100,000 and plaintiff's insurer refused to pay above the policy limit. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued her insurer for bad faith. | The court held that the insurer knew that there was a considerable risk of a substantial recovery beyond the policy limits, and that the insurer did not give as much consideration to the financial interests of its insured as it gave its own interests. Thus, the insurer was held liable to the plaintiff. |
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Clodgo v. Industry Rentavision, Inc. Supreme Court of Vermont, 1997 701 A.2d 1044 Pg. 879 |
Claimant was injured when he was hit in the eye by a staple shot with a staple gun. The incident occurred while claimant and another employee were "horsing around" on the job. | The accident occurred at at time when the employees had substantially deviated from their work duties. Thus, the court held that workers compensation did not cover the injury. |
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Wilson v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board Supreme Court of California, 1976 545 P.2d 225 Pg. 888 |
Plaintiff sustained injury in an automobile accident driving to her school. Her car contained a small bag of thread spools for use in art class, materials graded at home the previous evening, and a few books, including her teaching manual. The question arose whether the plaintiff's injuries were covered by worker's compensation. | The "going and coming" rule does not ordinarily compensate injuries sustained while the employee travels to and from work. The facts of this case are no exception. |
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Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co. Supreme Court of Michigan, 1986 398 N.W.2d 882 Pg. 894 |
Plaintiff was employed for two years as a research chemist by defendant Dow Chemical Company. He applied for workers compensation benefits, alleging impairment of normal bodily functions caused by exposure to dangerous chemicals. | Court held that any contract claim by the plaintiff is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers Disability Compensation Act. |
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Pinnick v. Cleary Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk, 1971 271 N.E.2d 592 Pg. 905 |
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident caused soley by the negligence of the defendant. His tort action sought damages in excess of those allowed under the Massachusetts no-fault statute, c. 670. | The court held that the inclusion of pedestrian harms does not invalidate c. 670 since they too receive the benefit of the certainty of a prompt recovery of a limited amount and limited exemption from liability instead of the necessity of tort proceedings or no compensation at all and liability to an unlimited amount. |
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Colaio v. Feinberg United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2003 262 F. Supp. 2d 273 Pg. 922 |
Plaintiffs bring action against those responsible for administering the "compensation fund" for those families that had a relative die in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. Plaintiff's claim that the Special Master's proposed awards fail to reflect that many who died in the World Trade Center were earning, and would have continued to earn, much more than the Special Master was prepared to recognize. | The Special Master's regulations and policies were lawful and valid, and therefore denied plaintiff's motion. The fund, as administered by Special Master Kenneth R. Feinberg, "reasonably and properly" implemented the congressional act that created it. |
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Doe v. Gonzaga University Supreme Court of Washington, 2001 24 P.3d 390 Pg. 933 |
Plaintiff brought a defamation claim against Gonzago University due to an investigation they conducted regarding a sexual relationship the plaintiff had with a fellow student. As a result of the investigation, the university would not support the plaintiff's application for teacher certification. | There is a qualified privilege for communications made between coemployees, but that privilege may be lost if the employees are not acting in the ordinary course of their work. The privilege may also be lost by showing that the defendant made the defamatory statement with actual malice. |
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Firth v. State of New York Court of Appeals of New York, 2002 775 N.E.2d 463 Pg. 938 |
Plaintiff filed a suit claiming that an article posted in the Internet by the State had defamed him. | "The mere addition of unrelated information to a Web site cannot be equated with the repetition of defamatory matter in a separately published edition of a book or newspaper. . . The justification for the republication exception has no application at all to the addition of unrelated material on a Web site, for it is not reasonably inferable that the addition was made either with the intent or the result of communicating the earlier and separate defamatory information to a new audience." |
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Wilkow v. Forbes, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2001 241 F.3d 552 Pg. 943 |
Plaintiff brought suit claiming that Forbes magazine defamed him by asserting in an article that he was in poverty, and had filched a bank's money. | The court concluded that an opinion about business ethics isn't defamatory under Illinois law. Therefore, the plaintiff's claim was dismissed. |
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Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2003 322 F.3d 918 Pg. 950 |
Plaintiff argues that the way a fictional character was portrayed in a paramount film defamed him. | In a per se defamation action, a plaintiff may recover only if the defendant's statements "fit into one of the limited categories of statements or imputations that Illinois considers actionable per se: (1) commission of a criminal offense; (2) infection with a venereal disease; (3) inability to perform or want of integrity in the discharge of duties of public office; (4) fornication or adultery; or (5) words that prejudice a party in her trade, profession, or business. Even if a statement falls into a recognized category, it will not be actionable per se if the statement 'may reasonably be innocently interpreted or reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff.'" |
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E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones Court of Appeal, House of Lords, 1910 A.C. 20 Pg. 964 |
Plaintiff sued newspaper that ran story claiming that plaintiff was with another woman that was not his wife. The newspaper claimed that it was only using a ficticious name. | The court concluded that the newspaper indeed intended to use a ficticious name and that a man cannot be held responsible for remote and improbable results of its actions. |
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Terwilliger v. Wands Court of Appeals of New York, 1858 17 N.Y. 54 Pg. 967 |
Plaintiff proved that defendant disclosed that plaintiff was having sexual intercourse with Mrs. Fuller, and that plaintiff would do all that he could to keep Mrs. Fuller's husband in jail so that he could continue to enjoy her favors. This disclosure caused plaintiff to become very ill, so that he could not work. | To award special damages, the damages must be the natural, immediate, and legal consequences of the defamation. In this case, the court held that plaintiff's illness was not the natural result of the defamation. |
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Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc. Supreme Court of North Dakota, 1938 280 N.W. 879 Pg. 969 |
Plaintiff claims that defendant misstated his professional and financial rating in a legal directory causing his reputation and business to suffer. | Plaintiff should be allowed to show a diminution in his business income after the publication of the misstatement as evidence for special damages. The court, however, does not address whether the plaintiff can make proof in support of his allegations. |
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Faulk v. Aware, Inc. Supreme Court of New York, 1962 231 N.Y.S.2d 270 Pg. 972 |
In a libel action, the jury awarded plaintiff one million dollars in compensatory damages and a similar amount in punitive damages. The court reviewed the damage award to determine if there was a rational basis for the jury's awards. | The court upheld the awards, holding that in light of the record, the jury's awards were supported under a rational basis. |
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Faulk v. Aware, Inc. Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, 1963 244 N.Y.S.2d 259 Pg. 974 |
The court heard the case on appeal in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensatory and punitive damages. The lower courts had upheld a one million dollar compensatory damage award and a punitive damage award above one million dollars. | The court held that the record left too much room for speculation in the calculation of the compensatory damages and thus reduced the amount awarded to $ 400,000. The court also reduced the punitive damage award to $ 150,000. |
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Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1996 67 F.3d 816 Pg. 978 |
Plaintiff's sued CBS and "60 Minutes" for a segment they aired concerning cancer causing chemicals used to make apples stay on the tree longer and look better. | "To survive [a] motion for summary judgment, the [plaintiff] must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." |
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Watt v. Longsdon King's Bench, 1930 1 K.B. 130 Pg. 985 |
Plaintiff sued for libel and defamation regarding disparaging statements made about his character in letters from his company's manager to the chairman of the board of directors. These statements were also disclosed to plaintiff's wife. | "By the law of England there are occasions on which a person may make defamatory statements about another which are untrue without incurring any legal liability for his statements. These occasions are called privileged occasions. . . . But communications made on these occasions may lose their privilege: (1.) they may exceed the privilege of the occasion by going beyond the limits of the duty or interest, or (2.) they may be published with express malice, so that the occasion is not being legitimately used, but abused. " |
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Kennedy v. Cannon Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1962 182 A.2d 54 Pg. 992 |
Defendant, a lawyer for a negro man accused of rape, had published in a local newspaper that his client denied the charge because the white woman he had sexaul intercourse with had done so consensually. | "The scope of [absolute] privilege is restricted to communications such as those made between an attorney and his client, or in the examination of witnesses by counsel, or in statements made by counsel to the court or jury. . . an attorney who wishes to litigate his case in the press will do so at his own risk." |
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Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1983 713 F.2d 262 Pg. 998 |
Plaintiff, the manufacturer of Viceroy cigarettes, sued CBS and Walter Jacobson for libel due to a broadcast regarding the cigarette manufacturer's supposed targeting of youth in a salicious ad campaign. | "The fact that there are discrepancies between a libel and the government report on which it is based need not defeat the privilege of fair summary. Unless the report is published verbatim it is bound to convey a somewhat different impression from the original, no matter how carefully the publisher attempts to summarize or paraphrase or excerpt it fairly and accurately." |
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 376 U.S. 254 Pg. 1005 |
Plaintiff claimed he was defamed in a full-page ad taken out in the New York Times. The ad charged that the plaintiff, among others, had been involved with an unprecedented wave of terror against members of the civil rights movement in the south. The court determined the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. | The court held that the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. |
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Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 388 U.S. 130 Pg. 1015 |
Plaintiff sued for libel because of an article in the Saturday Evening Post stating that plaintiff had conspired with Paul Bryant, coach of the University of Alabama, to rig a football game. | The court held that a public figure, who is not a public official may recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. |
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 418 U.S. 323 Pg. 1024 |
The principle issue in this case is whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for the injury inflicted by those statements. The case arose from an article that falsely accused plaintiff of being a communist and engaging in communist activities. | "[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." |
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Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps Supreme Court of the United States, 1986 475 U.S. 767 Pg. 1033 |
The court had to define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedom of speech and press protected by the First Amendment. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant published five false stories about him, stories which claimed the plaintiff had ties to organized crime. | To ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred, the court held that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern. Therefore, the court required the plaintiff to show falsity of statement in order to prove defamation. With this opinion, the court insulated speech that is not even demonstrably false. |
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Nader v. General Motors Corp. Court of Appeals of New York, 1970 255 N.E.2d 765 Pg. 1047 |
The plaintiff had for some years been an articulate and severe critic of General Motors' products from the standpoint of safety and design. Plaintiff complained that defendant, General Motors, engaged in intimidation tactics against him in order to suppress plaintiff's criticism and prevent his disclosure of damaging information. Plaintiff claims these intimidation tactics were an invasion of his privacy. | The court held that the mere gathering of information about a particular individual does not give rise to a cause of action under this theory. Privacy is invaded only if the information sought is of a confidential nature and the defendant's conduct was unreasonably intrusive. |
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Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1942 42 N.E.2d 808 Pg. 1113 |
Defendant knows that house is infested with termites, but sells the house to plaintiff without disclosing the infestation. | Failure to disclose a defect during a sale does NOT make seller liable, unless the buyer can establish a "fiduciary relation between the parties." NOTE: The modern courts have largely eroded the Swinton position on non-disclosure. (See Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 551) |
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Laidlaw v. Organ U.S. Supreme Court, 1817 15 U.S. 178 Pg. 1116 |
Buyer (plaintiff) learns that War of 1812 will soon end, and thus, tobacco prices will rise. Buyer then contracts to purchase a large amount of tobacco from defendant. Defendant delivers tobacco, war ends, and prices rise. Defendant takes back tobacco by force. | Buyer is not bound by law to disclose relevant information to seller. |
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