Vaughan v. Menlove

[Defendant consructed a hayrick, or a stack of hay, near the border of the property he rented from the plaintiff. Defendant was repeatedly warned that the hayrick was in danger of catching fire over the course of five weeks. Despite the warnings, defendant said that "he would chance it." The hay eventually caught fire, burning down both defendant's buildings and the cottages of the plaintiff. The judge let the jury decide whether the defendant was guilty of gross negligence, under the reasonably prudent man standard, and they returned a verdict for the plaintiff.]

TINDAL, CJ. I agree that this is a case primae impressionis; but I feel no difficulty in applying to it the principles of law as laid down in other cases of a similar kind. Undoubtedly this is not a case of contract such as a bailment or the like where the bailee is responsible in consequence of the remuneration he is to receive. There is, however, a rule of law which says you must so enjoy your own property as not to injure that of another, and according to that rule the defendant is liable for the consequence of his own neglect; and though the defendant did not himself light the fire, yet mediately, he is as much the cause of it as if he had himself put a candle to the rick, for it is well known that hay will ferment and take fire if it be not carefully stacked. It has been decided that if an occupier burns weeds so near the boundary of his own land that damage ensues to the property of his neighbour, he is liable to an action for the amount of injury done, unless the accident were occasioned by a sudden blast which he could not foresee. Turberville v Stamp (1). But put the case of a chemist making experiments with ingredients singly innocent, but when combined, liable to ignite; if he leaves them together and injury is thereby occasioned to the property of his neighbour, can any one doubt that an action on the case would lie?

It is contended, however, that the judge was wrong in leaving this to the jury as a case of gross negligence, and that the question of negligence was so mixed up with reference to what would be the conduct of a man of ordinary prudence that the jury might have thought the latter the rule by which they were to decide; that such a rule would be too uncertain to act on; and that the question ought to have been whether the defendant had acted honestly and bona fide to the best of his own judgment. That, however, would leave so vague a line as to afford no rule at all, the degree of judgment belonging to each individual being infinitely various; and although it has been urged that the care which a prudent man would take, is not an intelligible proposition as a rule of law, yet such has always been the rule adopted in cases of bailment, as laid down by LORD KENYON in Coggs v Bernard, although in some cases a greater degree of care is exacted than in others. LORD KENYON says . . . :

"the second sort of bailment, namely, commodatum or lending gratis, the borrower is bound to the strictest care and diligence to keep the goods so as to restore them back again to the lender; because the bailee has a benefit by the use of them, so as if the bailee be guilty of the least neglect he will be answerable; as if a man should lend another a horse to go westward, or for a month; . . . if the bailee put his horse in his stable, and be were stolen from thence, the bailee shall not be answerable for him: but if he or his servant leave the house or stable doors open, and the thieves take the opportunity of that, and steal the horse, he will be chargeable, because the neglect gave the thieves the occasion to steal the horse."

The care taken by a prudent man has always been the rule laid down; and as to the supposed difficulty of applying it, a jury has always been able to say, whether, taking that rule as their guide, there has been negligence on the occasion in question. Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe. That was, in substance, the criterion presented to the jury in this case and, therefore, the present rule must be discharged.

PARK, J. I entirely concur in what has fallen from Chief Justice TINDAL. Although the facts in this case are new in specie, they fall within a principle long established, that a man must so use his own property as not to injure that of others. In Turberville v Stamp, which was "an action on the case upon the custom of the realm. . . ." After verdict pro Quer it was objected that the custom extended only to fire in his house, or curtilage (like goods of guests) which were in his power: Non alloc For the fire in his field was his fire as well as that in his house; he made it, and must see that it did no harm, and must answer the damage if he did. Every man must use his own so as not to hurt another: but if a sudden storm had risen which he could not stop, it was matter of evidence, and he should have shown it. . . .

That case, in its principles, applies closely to the present.

As to the direction of the judge, it was perfectly correct. In the circumstances of the case it was proper to leave it to the jury whether, with reference to the caution which would have been observed by a man of ordinary prudence, the defendant had not been guilty of gross negligence. After he had been warned repeatedly during five weeks as to the consequences likely to happen, there is no colour for altering the verdict, unless it were to increase the damages.

VAUGHAN, J. The principle on which this action proceeds, is by no means new. It has been urged that the defendant in such a case, takes no duty on himself but I do not agree in that position. Everyone takes on himself the duty of so dealing with his own property as not to injure the property of others. It was, if anything, too favourable to the defendant to leave it to the jury whether he had been guilty of gross negligence; for when the defendant, on being warned as to the consequences likely to ensue from the condition of the rick, said, "he would chance it," it was manifest that he adverted to his interest in the insurance office. The conduct of a prudent man has always been the criterion for the jury in such cases but it is by no means confined to them. In insurance cases, where a captain has sold his vessel after damage too extensive for repairs, the question has always been whether he has pursued the course which a prudent man would have pursued in the same circumstances. Here, there was not a single witness whose testimony did not go to establish gross negligence in the defendant. He had repeated warnings of what was likely to occur, and the whole calamity was occasioned by his procrastination.

Rule discharged.