Reed v. McCord

OPINION BY: MARTIN.
This action was to recover damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff's intestate which occasioned his death and was based upon the alleged negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff had a verdict which was not directed by the court. From the judgment entered thereon an appeal was taken to the Appellate Division where it was unanimously affirmed, as appears by the order of affirmance contained in the record. The Appellate Division subsequently made an order granting the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, and certified that in its opinion questions of law were involved which should be reviewed by that court. No definite questions of law were, however, stated or certified. . . .

The only remaining question is whether the statements of the defendant of the circumstances and cause of the accident to the plaintiff's intestate made while a witness before the coroner were competent and properly received. The defendant was called and sworn as a witness and gave evidence as to the accident. Upon the trial of this action the official stenographer for the board of coroners was called and permitted, under the defendant's objection and exception, to testify that upon the hearing before the coroner the defendant gave evidence to the effect that all machines of the make of the one in use when the decedent was killed were alike; that at the time of the injury the dog of the machine was not in position, which caused the accident; and that "the man who had charge of it supposed the dog was in position, and he released his hold on the thing and it commenced to revolve, and then he got down so as to put his foot on it, and it was going so rapidly that it slipped past." It was admitted that the defendant was not present when the accident occurred, and, hence, it is obvious that his statement before the coroner was not based upon his personal knowledge, but upon what he had learned as to the situation and how the accident occurred. The contention of the appellant is that as his admissions were not based upon his personal knowledge, proof of them should have been excluded, and that his exception to their admission was well taken. The defendant being a party to this action, his admissions against his own interest were evidence in favor of his adversary, if of a fact material to the issue. If he had merely admitted that he heard that the accident occurred in the manner stated, it would have been inadmissible as then it would only have amounted to an admission that he had heard the statement which he repeated and not to an admission of the facts included in it. That would have been in no sense an admission of any fact pertinent to the issue, but a mere admission of what he had heard without adoption or indorsement. Such evidence is clearly inadmissible. . . . But the admissions proved in this case were not of that character. They were plain admissions of facts and circumstances which attended the intestate's injury. In a civil action the admissions by a party of any fact material to the issue are always competent evidence against him, wherever, whenever or to whomsoever made. . . .

The theory upon which this class of evidence is held to be competent is that it is highly improbable that a party will admit or state anything against himself or against his own interest unless it is true. As the admissions testified to by the stenographer were of facts and circumstances which were material to the issue in this action, they were clearly competent, although not conclusive evidence of the facts admitted.

We find no error in the admission of this evidence and as no other questions are raised that we have jurisdiction to review, our conclusion is that the judgment should be affirmed.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.