E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones

LORD ALVERSTONE CJ. The action was brought by the plaintiff, a member of the Bar, in respect of a libel published in the "Sunday Chronicle," on 12 July 1908, which appeared in an article in the defendants' paper purporting to describe what the Paris correspondent of the paper had witnessed at Dieppe, and the particular passage on which the question really turns was in these words:

"'Whist! there is Artemus Jones with a woman who is not his wife, who must be, you know - the other thing!' whispers a fair neighbour of mine excitedly into her bosom friend's ear. Really is it not surprising how certain of our fellow-countrymen behave when they come abroad?"

It was alleged by the plaintiff that this passage was a libel upon him.

The material facts which were proved in evidence at the trial were as follows. The plaintiff, whose real name is Thomas Jones, is thirty-seven years old, and since

1901 has been a member of the Bar, practising on the North Wales Circuit. His baptismal name was Thomas Jones, but ever since he was at school he has been known by the name of Artemus Jones or Thomas Artemus Jones. He was confirmed in the latter name in 1886, and it appears to have been given him by his father in order to distinguish him from other persons of the name of Jones. The defendants alleged that the name was used as a fictitious name adopted by the writer of the article without any knowledge of the existence of the plaintiff or of any person named Artemus Jones; and both the writer and the editor, who were called as witnesses by the defendants, stated that they had no knowledge whatever of the plaintiff, and had no intention to refer to him, and that so far as they were concerned the name was entirely an imaginary name. The counsel for the plaintiff accepted the explanation given by the writer, Mr Dawbarn, and the editor, Mr Woodbridge, and expressly stated that he did not, after their evidence, allege that they or either of them were in fact actuated by malice or intended to refer to the plaintiff in their article. Some question was raised both at the trial and on the appeal before us as to the possibility of there being other individuals in the employment of the defendant company who were actuated by express malice towards the plaintiff, but for the purpose of my judgment I assume that no evidence was given of malice in fact on the part of any agent or servant of the defendants. The plaintiff called five witnesses who stated that upon reading the article they thought that it referred to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was prepared to call further witnesses to give evidence to the same effect, but, at the suggestion of the learned judge, he abstained from calling them.

LORD LOREBURN LC:

I think that this appeal must be dismissed. A question in regard to the law of libel has been raised which does not seem to me to be entitled to the support of your Lordships. Libel is a tortious act. What does the tort consist in? It consists in using language which others knowing the circumstances would reasonably think to be defamatory of the person complaining of and injured by it. A person charged with libel cannot defend himself by showing that he intended in his own breast not to defame the plaintiff. He has none the less imputed something disgraceful, and has none the less injured the plaintiff. A man may publish a libel in good faith believing it to be true, and it may be found by the jury that he acted in good faith believing it to be true, and reasonably believing it to be true, but that in fact the statement was false. Under those circumstances he has no defence to the action.

It was suggested that there was a misdirection by the learned judge in the present case. I see none. He laid down the law in his summing-up as follows:

"The real point upon which your verdict must turn is: Ought or ought not sensible and reasonable people reading this article to think that it was a mere imaginary person such as I have said - Tom Jones, Mr Pecksniff as a humbug, Mr Stiggins, or any name of that sort which one reads of in literature used as a type? If you think that any reasonable person would think that, it is not actionable at all. If, on the other hand, you do not think that, but think that people would suppose it to mean some real person - those who did not know the plaintiff, of course, would not know who the real person was, but those who did know of the existence of the plaintiff would think that it was the plaintiff - then the action is maintainable, subject to such damages as you think under all the circumstances are fair and right to give to the plaintiff."

I see no objection in law to that passage. The damages are certainly heavy, but I think that your Lordships ought to remember two things. The first is that the jury were entitled to think, in the absence of proof satisfactory to them - and they were the judges of it - that some ingredient of recklessness entered into the publication and the writing of this article, especially as the respondent had been employed on this very newspaper, and his name was well known in the paper and also in the district in which the paper circulated. In the second place, the jury were entitled to say: "This kind of article is a kind of article to be condemned."

There is no tribunal more fitted or more competent to decide in regard to publications - especially publications in the newspaper press - whether they bear a stamp and character which ought to enlist sympathy and to secure protection. If they think that the licence is not fairly used, and that the tone and the style of the article and the libel in question is one that is reprehensible and ought to be checked. It is for the jury to say so; and for my part, although I think that the damages are certainly high in this case, I am not prepared to advise your Lordships to interfere, especially as the Court of Appeal have not thought it right to interfere, with the verdict which is now seeking confirmation.