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Constitutional Law in Context, Volume 2

Curtis, Parker, Douglas, Finkleman
2nd Edition
ISBN: 1594601976
Page Case Name Citation Court Audio
1561 Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 Supreme Court of the United States, 1896 Download
1582 Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214 Supreme Court of the United States, 1944 Download
1589 Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) 347 U.S. 483 Supreme Court of the United States, 1954 Download
1598 Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 Download
1602 Palmore v. Sidoti 466 U.S. 429 Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 Download
1609 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York 336 U.S. 106 Supreme Court of the United States, 1949 Download
1611 New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer 440 U.S. 568 Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 Download
1619 City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 473 U.S. 432 Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 Download
1637 Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 Download
1659 Craig v. Boren 429 U.S. 190 Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 Download
1666 United States v. Virginia 518 U.S. 515 Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 Download
1683 Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 Supreme Court of the United States, 1976
1689 Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney 442 U.S. 256 Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 Download
1701 Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell 498 U.S. 237 Supreme Court of the United States, 1991
1710 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 515 U.S. 200 Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 Download
1717 Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 Supreme Court of the United States, 2003
1729 Gratz v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 244 Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 Download
1762 Vieth v. Jubelirer 541 U.S. 267 Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 Download
1802 Zablocki v. Redhail 434 U.S. 374 Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 Download
1810 Saenz v. Roe 526 U.S. 489 Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 Download
1831 United States v. Stanley 109 U.S. 3 Supreme Court of the United States, 1883 Download
1849 Katzenbach v. Morgan 384 U.S. 641 Supreme Court of the United States, 1966
1854 City of Boerne v. Flores 521 U.S. 507 Supreme Court of the United States, 1997
1867 Tennessee v. Lane 541 U.S. 509 Supreme Court of the United States, 2004
1886 Shelley v. Kraemer 334 U.S. 1 Supreme Court of the United States, 1948 Download
1891 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 365 U.S. 715 Supreme Court of the United States, 1961 Download
1893 Reitman v. Mulkey 387 U.S. 369 Supreme Court of the United States, 1967
1897 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis 407 U.S. 163 Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 Download
Case Information Fact Summary Rule of Law
Plessy v. Ferguson
Supreme Court of the United States, 1896
163 U.S. 537
Pg. 1561 		Homer Plessy, who was one-eighth black, purchased a first-class ticket on the East Louisiana Railway from New Orleans, challenging an 1890 Jim Crow law in the State of Louisiana, which required blacks and whites to occupy different rail cars. Plessy was arrested and refused to leave his seat. "Separate but equal"
Korematsu v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States, 1944
323 U.S. 214
Pg. 1582 		Fred Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a "Military Area," contrary to a civilian exclusion order, which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area. No question was raised as to petitioner's loyalty to the United States. Classifications based on race are subject to strict scrutiny. During times of war, the protection against espionage can be sufficient to justify race-based classifications and thus satisfy the compelling justification test of strict scrutiny. "It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can."
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)
Supreme Court of the United States, 1954
347 U.S. 483
Pg. 1589 		A group of parents filed a class action suit against the Topeka, Kansas Board of Education in response to segragated elementary schools made possible by an 1879 Kansas law. "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
Loving v. Virginia
Supreme Court of the United States, 1967
388 U.S. 1
Pg. 1598 		The Loving's left Virginia to get married in Washington D.C. When they returned to Virginia, they were prosecuted under a state law prohibiting interacial marriage. "Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival.... To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."
Palmore v. Sidoti
Supreme Court of the United States, 1984
466 U.S. 429
Pg. 1602 		Linda and Anthony Sidoti (both caucasians) divorced in Florida. The mother was awarded custody of their daughter. Subsequently, the mother began cohabitating with an African American man, Clarence Palmore, whom she later married. Anthony Sidoti filed suit to regain custody of his daughter and the Florida Court ruled in his favor. ". . .Such classifications are subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary . . . to the accomplishment' of their legitimate purpose. . . ." In this case, the legitimate purpose asserted was that the child would suffer from growing up in biracial home. However, the Court held that the effects of racial prejudice cannot justify using a racial classification to remove a child from a parent.
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York
Supreme Court of the United States, 1949
336 U.S. 106
Pg. 1609 		Appellant is engaged in a nation-wide express business. It operates 1,900 trucks in New York City and sells space on the side of those trucks for advertising. Appellant was convicted of violating a traffic regulation of New York City that prohibited vehicles from being used mainly or merely for advertising. The fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of distraction but does not touch what may be even greater ones in a different category, such as the vivid displays on Times Square is immaterial. It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer
Supreme Court of the United States, 1979
440 U.S. 568
Pg. 1611 		Petitioner, New York City Transit Authority enforces a general policy against employing persons who use narcotic drugs. TA interprets its drug regulation to encompass current users of methadone, including those receiving methadone maintenance treatment for curing heroin addiction. Respondents, two former employees of TA who were dismissed while they were receiving methadone treatment, and two persons who were refused employment because they were receiving methadone treatment, brought a class action, alleging, inter alia, that TA's blanket exclusion of all former heroin addicts receiving methadone treatments was illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. TA's blanket exclusion of persons who regularly use narcotic drugs, including methadone, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause for failing to include more precise special rules for methadone users who have progressed satisfactorily with their treatment for one year and who, when examined individually, satisfy TA's employment criteria for nonsensitive jobs.
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
Supreme Court of the United States, 1985
473 U.S. 432
Pg. 1619 		Respondent Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC), which anticipated leasing a certain building for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded, was informed by petitioner city that a special use permit would be required, the city having concluded that the proposed group home should be classified as a "hospital for the feebleminded" under the zoning ordinance covering the area in which the proposed home would be located. Accordingly, CLC applied for a special use permit, but the City Council, after a public hearing, denied the permit. "To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. . . . The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. . . ." The Court goes on to hold that the home does not threaten legitimate interests of the city and therefore the ordinance is invalid.
Romer v. Evans
Supreme Court of the United States, 1996
517 U.S. 620
Pg. 1637 		Various Colorado municipalities passed ordinances banning discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, health and welfare services, and other transactions and activities. In response, Colorado voters adopted by statewide referendum "Amendment 2" to the State Constitution, which precludes all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the status of persons based on their "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Respondents, who include aggrieved homosexuals and municipalities, commenced this litigation to declare Amendment 2 invalid and enjoin its enforcement. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Craig v. Boren
Supreme Court of the United States, 1976
429 U.S. 190
Pg. 1659 		Appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20 years of age the equal protection of the laws. Oklahoma's gender-based differential constitutes an invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
United States v. Virginia
Supreme Court of the United States, 1996
518 U.S. 515
Pg. 1666 		Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is the sole single-sex school among Virginia's public institutions of higher learning. VMI's distinctive mission is to produce "citizen-soldiers," men prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service. Using an "adversative method" of training not available elsewhere in Virginia, VMI endeavors to instill physical and mental discipline in its cadets and impart to them a strong moral code. The United States sued Virginia and VMI, alleging that VMI's exclusively male admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Virginia's categorical exclusion of women from the educational opportunities that VMI provides denies equal protection to women.
Washington v. Davis
Supreme Court of the United States, 1976
426 U.S. 229
Pg. 1683 		Respondents Harley and Sellers, both Negroes, whose applications to become police officers in the District of Columbia had been rejected, in an action against District of Columbia officials and others, claimed that the Police Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test, were racially discriminatory and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Though the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting the Government from invidious discrimination, it does not follow that a law or other official act is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact regardless of whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose.
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney
Supreme Court of the United States, 1979
442 U.S. 256
Pg. 1689 		During her 12-year tenure as a state employee, appellee, who is not a veteran, had passed a number of open competitive civil service examinations for better jobs, but because of Massachusetts' veterans' preference statute, she was ranked in each instance below male veterans who had achieved lower test scores than appellee. Under the statute, all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans. Appellee brought an action in Federal District Court, alleging that the absolute-preference formula established in the Massachusetts statute inevitably operates to exclude women from consideration for the best state civil service jobs and thus discriminates against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Massachusetts, in granting an absolute lifetime preference to veterans, has not discriminated against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell
Supreme Court of the United States, 1991
498 U.S. 237
Pg. 1701 		In 1972, finding that previous efforts had not been successful at eliminating de jure segregation, the District Court entered a decree imposing a school desegregation plan on petitioner Oklahoma City Board of Education. In 1977, finding that the school district had achieved "unitary" status, the court issued an order terminating the case which respondents, black students and their parents, did not appeal. In 1984, the Board adopted its Student Reassignment Plan, under which a number of previously desegregated schools would return to primarily one-race status for the asserted purpose of alleviating greater busing burdens on young black children caused by demographic changes. The Court of Appeals' test for dissolving a desegregation decree is more stringent than is required either by this Court's decisions dealing with injunctions or by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
Supreme Court of the United States, 1995
515 U.S. 200
Pg. 1710 		Petitioner was the low-bidder on a sub-contract to a prime governmental contract. However, the contract was awarded to another business, because of a governmental program, which incentivized prime contractors to hire minority controlled businesses. Strict scrutiny is the proper review to apply to all cases that involve race-based classifications. Raced-based classifications are only constitutional if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.
Grutter v. Bollinger
Supreme Court of the United States, 2003
539 U.S. 306
Pg. 1717 		The University of Michigan Law School follows an official admissions policy that seeks to achieve student body diversity. The policy requires admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on all the information available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of recommendation, an essay describing how the applicant will contribute to Law School life and diversity, and the applicant's undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School Admission Test (LSAT) score. The policy does not define diversity solely in terms of racial and ethnic status and does not restrict the types of diversity contributions eligible for "substantial weight," but it does reaffirm the Law School's commitment to diversity with special reference to the inclusion of African-American, Hispanic, and Native-American students, who otherwise might not be represented in the student body in meaningful numbers. By enrolling a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students, the policy seeks to ensure their ability to contribute to the Law School's character and to the legal profession. When the Law School denied admission to petitioner Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT score, she filed this suit, alleging that respondents had discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body is not prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.
Gratz v. Bollinger
Supreme Court of the United States, 2003
539 U.S. 244
Pg. 1729 		Petitioners Gratz and Hamacher, both of whom are Michigan residents and Caucasian, applied for admission to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts in 1995 and 1997, respectively. Although the LSA considered Gratz to be well qualified and Hamacher to be within the qualified range, both were denied early admission and were ultimately denied admission. The current admission guidelines to the program use a selection method under which every applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group is automatically awarded 20 points of the 100 needed to guarantee admission. Petitioners filed this class action alleging that the University's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted interest in diversity, the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Vieth v. Jubelirer
Supreme Court of the United States, 2004
541 U.S. 267
Pg. 1762 		Plaintiffs, registered democrats who vote in Pennsylvania, brought suit seeking to enjoin implementation of Act 1, a redistricting plan passed by republicans. Political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable because no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating such claims exist.
Zablocki v. Redhail
Supreme Court of the United States, 1978
434 U.S. 374
Pg. 1802 		A Wisconsin statute requires individuals to obtain a court order granting permission to marry if they have a child who they are responsible for paying child support on behalf of. The right to marry is a fundamental right, which will require that any regulation that interferes with that right meet the strict scrutiny challenge.
Saenz v. Roe
Supreme Court of the United States, 1999
526 U.S. 489
Pg. 1810 		In 1992, California enacted a statute limiting the maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents. The scheme limits the amount payable to a family that has resided in the State for less than 12 months to the amount payable by the State of the family's prior residence. Section 11450.03 violates the Fourteenth Amendment because the right to travel embraces a citizen's right to be treated equally in her new State of residence, a discriminatory classification is itself a penalty. California's classifications are defined entirely by the period of residency and the location of the disfavored class members' prior residences.
United States v. Stanley
Supreme Court of the United States, 1883
109 U.S. 3
Pg. 1831 		These cases arise out of denying accommodations to persons of color at a hotel and denying colored persons a seat in a theater. The Court held that until some state law is passed, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said Amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity, for the prohibitions of the Amendment are against state laws and acts done under state authority.
Katzenbach v. Morgan
Supreme Court of the United States, 1966
384 U.S. 641
Pg. 1849 		These cases concern the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which provided that no person who has successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public or private school accredited by Puerto Rico, in which the language of instruction was other than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of an inability to read or write in English. The Court concluded that section 4(e), in the application challenged in this case, is appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.
City of Boerne v. Flores
Supreme Court of the United States, 1997
521 U.S. 507
Pg. 1854 		A catholic Archbishop brought this suit challenging a permit denial to expand a church in the city of Boerne. The Archbishop relied upon the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as one basis for relief. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeds Congress' power.
Tennessee v. Lane
Supreme Court of the United States, 2004
541 U.S. 509
Pg. 1867 		Respondents allege past and ongoing violations of Title II. They claim they were denied access to, and the services of, the state court system by reason of their disabilities. One respondent had to crawl up two flights of stairs to get to the courtroom. As it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, Title II constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce that Amendment's substantive guarantees.
Shelley v. Kraemer
Supreme Court of the United States, 1948
334 U.S. 1
Pg. 1886 		In 1911, numerous owners of property fronting both sides of Labadie Avenue in the City of St. Louis signed an agreement restricting the use of that property to every person not of the Caucasian race. The Court held that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the states have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority
Supreme Court of the United States, 1961
365 U.S. 715
Pg. 1891 		Eagle Coffee Shop, a restuarant located within a parking building, refused to serve appellant food or drink solely because he was a negro. The parking building was owned and operated by an agency of the State of Deleware. In view of all the circumstances of this case, including the facts that the restaurant was physically and financially an integral part of a public building, built and maintained with public funds, devoted to a public parking service, and owned and operated by an agency of the State for public purposes, the State was a joint participant in the operation of the restaurant, and its refusal to serve appellant violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Reitman v. Mulkey
Supreme Court of the United States, 1967
387 U.S. 369
Pg. 1893 		Respondents, husband and wife, sued alleging that petitioners denied to rent them an apartment solely on account of their race. The Court held that the potential passage and impact of section 26 would involve the State in private racial discriminations to an unconstitutional degree.
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis
Supreme Court of the United States, 1972
407 U.S. 163
Pg. 1897 		Appellee Irvis, a negro, was denied service by appellant Moose Lodge, a local branch of the national fraternal organization located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Appellant claimed that because the Pennsylvania liquor board had issued Moose Lodge a license authorizing the sale of liquor that the club's refusal to serve him was state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The operation of Pennsylvania's regulatory scheme enforced by the state liquor board, except as noted below, does not sufficiently implicate the State in appellant's discriminatory guest practices so as to make those practices "state action" within the purview of the Equal Protection Clause, and there is no suggestion in the record that the State's regulation of the sale of liquor is intended overtly or covertly to encourage discrimination.