Constitutional Law: Cases, History, and Dialogues
- Araiza, Haddon, Roberts
- 3rd Edition
- ISBN: 0820570559
| Page | Case Name | Citation | Court | Audio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Marbury v. Madison | 5 U.S. 137 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1803 |  Download |
| 22 | Katzenbach v. Morgan | 384 U.S. 641 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1966 | Download |
| 35 | Ex Parte McCardle | 74 U.S. 506 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1868 | Download |
| 52 | Baker v. Carr | 369 U.S. 186 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1962 | Download |
| 70 | Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner | 387 U.S. 136 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 | Download |
| 101 | Allen v. Wright | 468 U.S. 737 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 | Download |
| 103 | Singleton v. Wulff | 428 U.S. 106 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | Download |
| 123 | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | 504 U.S. 555 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 | Download |
| 139 | Flast v. Cohen | 392 U.S. 83 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 | Download |
| 154 | Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. | 454 U.S. 464 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 | Download |
| 188 | Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer | 427 U.S. 445 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | Download |
| 201 | Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida | 517 U.S. 44 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 | Download |
| 232 | Slaughter-House Cases | 83 U.S. 36 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1873 | Download |
| 243 | Saenz v. Roe | 526 U.S. 489 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 | Download |
| 252 | Lochner v. New York | 198 U.S. 45 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1905 | Download |
| 255 | Muller v. Oregon | 208 U.S. 412 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1908 | Download |
| 261 | Nebbia v. New York | 291 U.S. 502 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1934 | Download |
| 263 | West Coast Hotel v. Parrish | 300 U.S. 379 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1937 | Download |
| 268 | United States v. Carolene Products Co. | 304 U.S. 144 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1938 | Download |
| 269 | Whalen v. Roe | 429 U.S. 589 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 | Download |
| 273 | Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus | 438 U.S. 234 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 | |
| 279 | United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey | 431 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 | |
| 306 | Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore | 32 U.S. 243 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1833 | Download |
| 311 | Adamson v. California | 332 U.S. 46 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1947 | Download |
| 319 | Meyer v. Nebraska | 262 U.S. 390 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1923 | Download |
| 339 | Roe v. Wade | 410 U.S. 113 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 | Download |
| 355 | Planned Parenthood v. Casey | 505 U.S. 833 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 | |
| 395 | Michael H. v. Gerald D. | 491 U.S. 110 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1989 | |
| 418 | Lawrence v. Texas | 539 U.S. 558 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 | |
| 467 | Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer | 343 U.S. 579 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1952 | Download |
| 485 | Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury | 453 U.S. 654 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 | Download |
| 496 | Nixon v. United States | 506 U.S. 224 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1993 | Download |
| 509 | William Jefferson Clinton v. Paula Corbin Jones | 520 U.S. 681 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 | Download |
| 514 | McCulloch v. Maryland | 17 U.S. 316 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1819 | Download |
| 524 | A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States | 295 U.S. 495 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1935 | Download |
| 533 | Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jagdish Rai Chadha | 462 U.S. 919 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 | |
| 605 | Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States | 234 U.S. 342 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1914 | Download |
| 607 | Hammer v. Dagenhart | 247 U.S. 251 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1918 | Download |
| 612 | Carter v. Carter Coal Co. | 298 U.S. 238 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1936 | Download |
| 615 | NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. | 301 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1937 | Download |
| 617 | United States v. Darby | 312 U.S. 100 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1941 | Download |
| 623 | Wickard v. Filburn | 317 U.S. 111 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 | Download |
| 629 | Katzenbach v. McClung | 379 U.S. 294 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 | Download |
| 637 | United States v. Lopez | 514 U.S. 549 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 | |
| 672 | South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc. | 303 U.S. 177 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1938 | Download |
| 675 | Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona Ex Rel. Sullivan, Attorney General | 325 U.S. 761 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1945 | Download |
| 690 | Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin | 340 U.S. 349 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1951 | Download |
| 697 | City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey | 437 U.S. 617 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 | Download |
| 703 | Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland | 437 U.S. 117 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 | |
| 710 | West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, Commissioner of Massachusetts Dept. of Food and Agriculture | 512 U.S. 186 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 | Download |
| 722 | South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Commissioner, Dept. of Natural Resources of Alaska | 467 U.S. 82 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 | Download |
| 726 | Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commn. | 461 U.S. 190 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 | |
| 734 | Lester Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commn. of Montana | 436 U.S. 371 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 | Download |
| 772 | Printz v. United States | 521 U.S. 898 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 | Download |
| 786 | Alden v. Maine | 527 U.S. 706 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 | |
| 798 | South Dakota v. Dole | 483 U.S. 203 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 | Download |
| 805 | Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York | 336 U.S. 106 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1949 | Download |
| 810 | Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia | 427 U.S. 307 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | |
| 846 | Dred Scott v. Sandford | 60 U.S. 393 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1856 | Download |
| 873 | Plessy v. Ferguson | 163 U.S. 537 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1896 | Download |
| 883 | Korematsu v. United States | 323 U.S. 214 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1944 | Download |
| 893 | Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) | 347 U.S. 483 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1954 | Download |
| 900 | Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II) | 349 U.S. 294 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1955 | Download |
| 926 | Loving v. Virginia | 388 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 | Download |
| 929 | Washington v. Davis | 426 U.S. 229 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | |
| 932 | Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. | 429 U.S. 252 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 | Download |
| 1003 | Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena | 515 U.S. 200 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 | Download |
| 1050 | Frontiero v. Richardson | 411 U.S. 677 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 | Download |
| 1058 | Craig v. Boren | 429 U.S. 190 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | Download |
| 1063 | Geduldig v. Aiello | 417 U.S. 484 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 | Download |
| 1079 | Rostker v. Goldberg | 453 U.S. 57 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 | |
| 1088 | Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney | 442 U.S. 256 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 | Download |
| 1095 | United States v. Virginia | 518 U.S. 515 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 | Download |
| 1122 | Romer v. Evans | 517 U.S. 620 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 | Download |
| 1136 | Reynolds v. Sims | 377 U.S. 533 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 | |
| 1145 | Bush v. Gore | 531 U.S. 98 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 | |
| 1157 | San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez | 411 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 | |
| 1169 | Plyler v. Doe | 457 U.S. 202 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 | |
| 1194 | Schenck v. United States | 249 U.S. 47 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1919 | Download |
| 1198 | Abrams v. United States | 250 U.S. 616 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1919 | |
| 1204 | Whitney v. California | 274 U.S. 357 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1927 | |
| 1209 | Brandenburg v. Ohio | 395 U.S. 444 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1969 | Download |
| 1234 | Roth v. United States | 354 U.S. 476 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1957 | Download |
| 1239 | Stanley v. Georgia | 394 U.S. 557 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1969 | Download |
| 1242 | Miller v. California | 413 U.S. 15 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 | Download |
| 1248 | Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton | 413 U.S. 49 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 | Download |
| 1262 | Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire | 315 U.S. 568 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 | Download |
| 1271 | R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota | 505 U.S. 377 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 | |
| 1284 | Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. | 425 U.S. 748 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | |
| 1311 | Buckley v. Valeo | 424 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | Download |
| 1385 | United States v. O'Brien | 391 U.S. 367 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 | |
| 1400 | Texas v. Johnson | 491 U.S. 397 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1989 | |
| 1435 | Rust v. Sullivan | 500 U.S. 173 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1991 | |
| 1456 | Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson | 283 U.S. 697 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1931 | |
| 1462 | New York Times Co. v. United States | 403 U.S. 713 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 | |
| 1473 | Alexander v. United States | 509 U.S. 544 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1993 | |
| 1488 | Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. | 482 U.S. 569 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 | Download |
| 1490 | NAACP v. State of Alabama, ex rel. Patterson | 357 U.S. 449 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1958 | Download |
| 1554 | Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commn. | 512 U.S. 622 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 | |
| 1565 | Federal Communications Commn. v. Pacifica Foundation | 438 U.S. 726 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 | Download |
| 1575 | Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union | 521 U.S. 844 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 | Download |
| 1704 | City of Boerne v. Flores | 521 U.S. 507 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 | |
| 1719 | Marsh v. Alabama | 326 U.S. 501 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1946 | Download |
| 1725 | Terry v. Adams | 345 U.S. 461 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1953 | Download |
| 1730 | Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. | 419 U.S. 345 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 | Download |
| 1740 | Shelley v. Kraemer | 334 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1948 | Download |
| 1753 | Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis | 407 U.S. 163 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 | Download |
| 1759 | Rendell-Baker v. Kohn | 457 U.S. 830 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 |
| Case Information | Fact Summary | Rule of Law |
|---|---|---|
|
Marbury v. Madison Supreme Court of the United States, 1803 5 U.S. 137 Pg. 3 |
An 1801 Congressional Act (Organic Act) created 42 new federal judgeships called "Justices of the Peace." President Adams appointed several Federalists to these new positions. After the appointees were approved by the Senate, Adams signed the commissions, but the commission was not delivered to William Marbury before President Jefferson entered office. Jefferson's Secretary of State, Madison, refused to deliver Marbury's commission. Marbury sued Madison on a writ of mandamus claim, claiming the Judiciary Act of 1789 - which stated that the U.S. Supreme Court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus - gave the Court the power to issue the writ and compel Marbury to deliver the commission. | If the Supreme Court identifies a conflict between a Constitutional provision and a Congressional statute, the Court has the authority to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. The Constitution is supreme and the Supreme Court has the right to be the final interpreter of it, NOT the legislature. |
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Katzenbach v. Morgan Supreme Court of the United States, 1966 384 U.S. 641 Pg. 22 |
These cases concern the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which provided that no person who has successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public or private school accredited by Puerto Rico, in which the language of instruction was other than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of an inability to read or write in English. | The Court concluded that section 4(e), in the application challenged in this case, is appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. |
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Ex Parte McCardle Supreme Court of the United States, 1868 74 U.S. 506 Pg. 35 |
McCardle was arrested for writing a series of newspaper articles that were highly critical of Reconstruction and military rule in the South following the Civil War. The question of jurisdiction was determined by the Court. | The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases by appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously excercised. |
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Baker v. Carr Supreme Court of the United States, 1962 369 U.S. 186 Pg. 52 |
Tennessee did not reapportion its voting districts for 60 years, resulting in distorted representation, putatively in violation of the US Constitution's guarantee of a "republican form of government to the states. | Political rights can be litigated; they do not per se represented nonjusticiable political questions. For example, a challenge to a state's failure to reapportion voting districts is justiciable. |
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Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 387 U.S. 136 Pg. 70 |
In 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require manufactures of prescription drugs to print the "established name" of the drug prominently on labels. The underlying purpose of the amendment was to bring to the attention of doctors and patients the fact that many of the drugs sold under familiar trade names are actually identical to drugs sold under their "established" or less familiar trade names at significantly lower prices. | The Court held that this case presented a controversy ripe for resolution and remanded it to the lower courts for further adjudication. |
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Allen v. Wright Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 468 U.S. 737 Pg. 101 |
Parents of black public school children allege in this nationwide class action that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has not adopted sufficient standards and procedures to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. They assert that the IRS thereby harms them directly and interferes with the ability of their children to receive an education in desegregated public schools. The issue before us is whether plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit. | The "case or controversy" requirement of Art. III of the Constitution defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded, and the Art. III doctrine of "standing" has a core constitutional component that a plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. The concepts of standing doctrine present questions that must be answered by reference to the Art. III notion that federal courts may exercise power only in the last resort and as a necessity, and only when adjudication is consistent with a system of separated powers and the dispute is one traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process. |
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Singleton v. Wulff Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 428 U.S. 106 Pg. 103 |
This case involves a claim of State's unconstitutional interference with the decision to terminate pregnancy. A Missouri statute excludes abortions that are not "medically indicated" from the purposes for which Medicaid benefits are available to needy persons. The case concerns whether physicians who perform nonmedically indicated abortions, have standing to maintain the suit. | The Court concluded that it is generally appropriate to allow a physician to assert the rights of women patients as against governmental interference with the abortion decision. |
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 504 U.S. 555 Pg. 123 |
The Department of the Interior sought to challenge regulations concerning when the federal government could comply with the Endangered Species Act. Under the regulations, the federal government would comply with the Act only for actions taken in the United States or the high seas. | The Court held that respondents lacked standing to bring this action and that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the summary judgment motion filed by the United States. |
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Flast v. Cohen Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 392 U.S. 83 Pg. 139 |
The Court upheld a taxpayer's standing to challenge federal subsidies to parochial schools as violating the First Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion. Under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the federal government provided funds for instruction in secular subjects in parochial schools. | The Court held that the ability of the plaintiff to sue as a taxpayer depends on whether (1) there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated and whether (2) the taxpayer has established a logical nexus between the status and the precise nature of the Constitutional infringement alleged. |
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Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 454 U.S. 464 Pg. 154 |
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare conveyed a 77-acre tract of land to Valley Forge Christian College. Americans United for Separation of Church and State brought suit to challenge the conveyance as unconstitutional under the First Amendment Establishment Clause. | Respondents do not have standing, either in their capacity as taxpayers or as citizens, to challenge the conveyance in question. |
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Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 427 U.S. 445 Pg. 188 |
In the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress authorized federal courts to award money damages in favor of a private individual against a state government found to have subjected the person to employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The question is whether Congress has this authority under the Constitution. | The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a backpay award to petitioners, since that Amendment and the principle of state sovereignty that it embodies are limited by the enforcement provisions of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress authority to enforce "by appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. |
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Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 517 U.S. 44 Pg. 201 |
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provides that an Indian tribe may conduct certain gaming activities only in conformance with a valid compact between the tribe and the State in which the gaming activities are located. The Act imposes upon a State a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of a compact and authorizes a tribe to bring suit in federal court in order to compel a State to perform that duty. The question is whether the Act abrogates a States' sovereign immunity. | The Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. |
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Slaughter-House Cases Supreme Court of the United States, 1873 83 U.S. 36 Pg. 232 |
The city of New Orleans created a monopoly by granting a contract to a slaughter house, so that the city could accommodate the influx of cattle from Texas. The butchers in New Orleans brought suit, challenging the granting of the monopoly as an impermissible barrier to trade. | The Court refused to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, but did |
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Saenz v. Roe Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 526 U.S. 489 Pg. 243 |
In 1992, California enacted a statute limiting the maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents. The scheme limits the amount payable to a family that has resided in the State for less than 12 months to the amount payable by the State of the family's prior residence. | Section 11450.03 violates the Fourteenth Amendment because the right to travel embraces a citizen's right to be treated equally in her new State of residence, a discriminatory classification is itself a penalty. California's classifications are defined entirely by the period of residency and the location of the disfavored class members' prior residences. |
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Lochner v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1905 198 U.S. 45 Pg. 252 |
The 1895 "Bakeshop Act," enacted by the New York legislature, limited the hours bakers could work. Lochner, a New York baker, was fined for working employees overtime. He appealed his conviction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | The right to enter into a contract is a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the "Bakeshop Act" was not a valid exercise of the State's police powers and therefore was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. NOTE: This is no longer good law. |
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Muller v. Oregon Supreme Court of the United States, 1908 208 U.S. 412 Pg. 255 |
Defendant was convicted for violating a statute that prohibited females from working in a laundary. | "The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long continued labor, particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference justifies a difference in legislation. . ." |
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Nebbia v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1934 291 U.S. 502 Pg. 261 |
The Milk Control Board of New York fixed nine cents as the price to be charged by a store for a quart of milk. Nebbia, the proprietor of a grocery store in Rochester, sold two quarts and a 5 cent loaf of bread for 18 cents; and was convicted for violating the board's order. | The Court found no basis in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for condemning the provisions of the Agriculture and Markets Law here drawn into question. |
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West Coast Hotel v. Parrish Supreme Court of the United States, 1937 300 U.S. 379 Pg. 263 |
Appellee was employed as chambermaid at a hotel. She brought the suit to recover the difference between the wage paid her and the statutory minimum as required by Washington State of $14.50 per week. | The Court overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital and held that the community may direct its law-making power to correct the abuse which springs from an employers selfish disregard of the public interest. Thus, the Washington minimum wage statute was not a violation of the Constitution. |
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United States v. Carolene Products Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1938 304 U.S. 144 Pg. 268 |
The "Filled Milk Act" of Congress prohibited the shipment of certain milk products in interstate commerce. Appellee was indicted for shipping "Milnut," a variant of milk that violated the act. The appellee claimed that the act was a violation of the due process clause and the commerce clause. | Economic regulations will be upheld as long as they are supported by a conceivable rational basis (even if it cannot be proved that it was the legislature's intent). NOTE: Footnote 4 is the most famous part of this opinion. It states that the judiciary will generally defer to the legislature and uphold laws so long as they are reasonable, but such deference will not extent to laws interfering with fundamental rights, discriminating against discrete and insular minorites, or restraining the political process. |
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Whalen v. Roe Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 429 U.S. 589 Pg. 269 |
New York State Department of Health established a database with the names and addresses of all persons who received a prescription for potentially harmful or illegal drugs. | There is no "constitutionally protected 'zone of privacy'" that prohibits "the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files." Such data collection does not oppose any liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 438 U.S. 234 Pg. 273 |
Under appellant's pension plan, adopted in 1963 and qualified under 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, employees were entitled to retire and receive a pension at age 65 regardless of length of service, and an employee's pension right became vested if he satisfied certain conditions as to length of service and age. Appellant was the sole contributor to the pension trust fund, and each year made contributions to the fund based on actuarial predictions of eventual payout needs. But the plan neither required appellant to make specific contributions nor imposed any sanction on it for failing to make adequate contributions, and appellant retained a right not only to amend the plan but also to terminate it at any time and for any reason. In 1974, Minnesota enacted the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act (Act), under which a private employer of 100 employees or more (at least one of whom was a Minnesota resident) who provided pension benefits under a plan meeting the qualifications of 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, was subject to a "pension funding charge" if he terminated the plan or closed a Minnesota office. Shortly thereafter, in a move planned before passage of the Act, appellant closed its Minnesota office, and several of its employees, who were then discharged, had no vested pension rights under appellant's plan but had worked for appellant for 10 years or more, thus qualifying as pension obligees under the Act. | The impact of the Act upon appellant's contractual obligations was both substantial and severe. Thus, the Act does not possess the attributes of those state laws that have survived challenge under the Contract Clause. It was not even purportedly enacted to deal with a broad, generalized economic or social problem, but has an extremely narrow focus and enters an area never before subject to regulation by the State. |
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United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 431 U.S. 1 Pg. 279 |
A 1962 statutory covenant between New Jersey and New York limited the ability of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to subsidize rail passenger transportation from revenues and reserves pledged as security for consolidated bonds issued by the Port Authority. A 1974 New Jersey statute, together with a concurrent and parallel New York statute, retroactively repealed the 1962 covenant. Appellant, both as a trustee for, and as a holder of, Port Authority bonds, brought suit in the New Jersey Superior Court for declaratory relief, claiming that the 1974 New Jersey statute impaired the obligation of the States' contract with the bondholders in violation of the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. | An impairment of contract such as is involved in this case can only be upheld if it is both reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose, but here the impairment was neither necessary to achieve the States' plan to encourage private automobile users to shift to public transportation nor reasonable in light of changed circumstances. |
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Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Supreme Court of the United States, 1833 32 U.S. 243 Pg. 306 |
Barron owned a wharf in the city of Baltimore. The city deposited sand and gravel near the wharf, rendering it worthless. Barron claimed that he was due compensation pursuant to the 5th Amendment of the Constitution. | The Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government and cannot be applied to the States. |
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Adamson v. California Supreme Court of the United States, 1947 332 U.S. 46 Pg. 311 |
Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree. Appellent did not testify during his trial. The provisions of California law permit the failure of a defendant to testify to be commented upon by court and by counsel and to be considered by court and by jury. | The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not draw all the rights of the federal Bill of Rights under its protection. Thus, there is no error in the California provision that allows the jury and court to consider a defendant's failure to testify. |
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Meyer v. Nebraska Supreme Court of the United States, 1923 262 U.S. 390 Pg. 319 |
Plaintiff was tried and convicted for teaching German to a 10 year-old child. The statute he was tried under prohibited individuals to teach any subjects to any person in any language other than the English language. | Due process guarantees the right to teach and the right of parents to direct the education of their children. The Court held that the statute was arbitrary and without any reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state. |
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Roe v. Wade Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 410 U.S. 113 Pg. 339 |
A Texas woman, who alleged she was raped, challenged a Texas statute which prohibited abortion. | Most State laws prohibiting abortions violate a woman's Constitutional right to privacy. The Court adopts a trimester framework for determining whether the State may regulate abortions, holding that in the third trimester, the fetus is viable and the State has a compelling interest in the fetus. |
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 505 U.S. 833 Pg. 355 |
At issue are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982: section 3205, which requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed; section 3206, which mandates the informed consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but provides a judicial bypass procedure; section 3209, which commands that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband; section 3203, which defines a "medical emergency" that will excuse compliance with the foregoing requirements; and sections 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f), which impose certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services. | To protect the central right recognized by Roe while at the same time accommodating the State's profound interest in potential life, the undue burden standard should be employed. An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. |
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Michael H. v. Gerald D. Supreme Court of the United States, 1989 491 U.S. 110 Pg. 395 |
In May 1981, appellant Victoria D. was born to Carole D., who was married to, and resided with, appellee Gerald D. in California. Although Gerald was listed as father on the birth certificate and has always claimed Victoria as his daughter, blood tests showed a 98.07% probability that appellant Michael H., with whom Carole had had an adulterous affair, was Victoria's father. During Victoria's first three years, she and her mother resided at times with Michael, who held her out as his own, at times with another man, and at times with Gerald, with whom they have lived since June 1984. In November 1982, Michael filed a filiation action in California Superior Court to establish his paternity and right to visitation. Victoria, through her court-appointed guardian ad litem, filed a cross-complaint asserting that she was entitled to maintain filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald. The court ultimately granted Gerald summary judgment on the ground that there were no triable issues of fact as to paternity under Cal. Evid. Code 621, which provides that a child born to a married woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent nor sterile, is presumed to be a child of the marriage, and that this presumption may be rebutted only by the husband or wife, and then only in limited circumstances. | The 621 presumption does not infringe upon the due process rights of a man wishing to establish his paternity of a child born to the wife of another man. |
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Lawrence v. Texas Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 539 U.S. 558 Pg. 418 |
Two consenting adult men were arrested for a sexual act committed in the privacy of the home, and charged with violating Texas's anti-sodomy statute, a Class C misdemeanor. Plaintiffs argued that the law was unconstitutional since it prohibits sodomy between same-sex couples, but not between heterosexual couples, and also violated their right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | The Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment. "A law branding one class of persons as criminal solely based on the State's moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause." |
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer Supreme Court of the United States, 1952 343 U.S. 579 Pg. 467 |
President Truman ordered the federal government to seize control of American steel mills in an effort to avoid a strike that he believed would hinder the ability of the United States to prosecute the conflict in Korea. | The president may take any action not prohibited by the Constitution or a statute. The most frequently cited test for analysis comes from Jackson's delineation of three zones of presidential powers: (1) when the President acts with the authority of Congress, the President's acts are presumptively valid; (2) when there is no Congressional grant or denial of authority, but there is a gray area in which the President and Congress may have concurrent authority, the test of power in this area depends on imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law; (3) when the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, the President must rely on his Constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. In this case, because the president is disobeying a federal law, such presidential actions will be allowed only if the law enacted by Congress is unconstitutional. |
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Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 453 U.S. 654 Pg. 485 |
In 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran was seized and the U.S. diplomatic personnel were captured and held hostage. In response, President Carter declared a national emergency and blocked the removal or transfer of all property and interests in property of the government of Iran. The hostages were later released under an agreement to terminate all litigation between the nationals of each country and bring about the settlement of all such claims through binding arbitration. | The President was authorized to nullify the attachments and order the transfer of Iranian assets by the provision of the IEEPA, which empowers the President to "compel," "nullify," or "prohibit" any "transfer" with respect to, or transactions involving, any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in which any foreign country has any interest. While it is not concluded that the President has plenary power to settle claims, even against foreign governmental entities, nevertheless, where, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between this country and another, and Congress has acquiesced in the President's action, it cannot be said that the President lacks the power to settle such claims. |
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Nixon v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1993 506 U.S. 224 Pg. 496 |
Walter Nixon asked the Court to decide wether Senate Rule XI, which allows a committee of Senators to hear evidence against an individual who has been impeached and to report that evidence to the full Senate, violates the Impeachment Trial Clause. Nixon was convicted by a jury for making false statements before a federal grand jury. | Nixon's claim that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause is nonjusticiable. |
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William Jefferson Clinton v. Paula Corbin Jones Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 520 U.S. 681 Pg. 509 |
Jones claimed that then President Clinton had made abhorrent sexual advances towards her while he was Governor of Arkansas. | The Court held that the the President is not entitled to immunity from liability for his unofficial acts. |
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McCulloch v. Maryland Supreme Court of the United States, 1819 17 U.S. 316 Pg. 514 |
In an attempt to raise revenue, Congress created the Second Bank of the United States. Maryland responded by enacting a law that taxed any bank not chartered by the state. | The Court held that the Constitution grants Congress implied powers to be used in implementing the express enumerated powers and that state action may not impede a valid constitutional exercise of power by the Federal government. |
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A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1935 295 U.S. 495 Pg. 524 |
Petitioners were convicted on eighteen counts of violating the "Live Poultry Code." The Code required sellers to sell only entire coops or half coops of chickens and regulated employment by requiring collective bargaining, prohibiting child labor, and establishing a 40 hour work week. | As far the poultry here in question is concerned, the flow in interstate commerce had ceased. The poultry had come to a permanent rest within the state. Thus, the poultry was not subject to congressional regulation. |
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Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jagdish Rai Chadha Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 462 U.S. 919 Pg. 533 |
Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds a British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the U.S., but stayed longer than his visa allowed. Later an immigration judge suspended his deportation under section 244(a)(1). After that, Representative Eilberg introduced a resolution opposing the granting of permanent residence in the U.S. to certain illegal aliens including Chadha. | We hold that the congressional veto provision in 244(c)(2) is severable from the Act and that it is unconstitutional. |
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Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1914 234 U.S. 342 Pg. 605 |
The Interstate Commerce Commission found that the interstate class rates out of Shreveport to named Texas points were unreasonable, and it established maximum class rates for this traffic. The objection is that this correction was beyond the Comission's power, because the rates should have been maintained under state authority. | Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that the government of the one involves the control of the other, it is the Congress, and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule. |
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Hammer v. Dagenhart Supreme Court of the United States, 1918 247 U.S. 251 Pg. 607 |
Father filed bill to enjoin act of Congress which prohibited the shipment in interstate or foreign commerce any product of a cotton mill situated in the United States, in which within 30 days before the removal of the product children under 14 have been employed, or children between 14 and 16 have been employed more than 8 hours in one day, or more than six days in any week, or between 7 in the evening and 6 in the morning. | The Court rules that the making of goods is not commerce. This ruling is later overruled. |
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Carter v. Carter Coal Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1936 298 U.S. 238 Pg. 612 |
This case challenged the constitutional validity of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. The Act, among other things, levied a tax on the production of coal in an effort to conserve it as a national resource. | The Court held that the relations of employer and employee in this case are of local concern and only have a secondary or indirect relationship upon commerce. Therefore, the evils at issue are local evils, which the federal government has no legislative control over. |
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NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. Supreme Court of the United States, 1937 301 U.S. 1 Pg. 615 |
The National Labor Relations Board found that the respondent had violated the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 by engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce. | The Court concluded that the order of the Board was within its competency and that the act is valid as here applied. |
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United States v. Darby Supreme Court of the United States, 1941 312 U.S. 100 Pg. 617 |
Darby was a furniture maker who violated Fair Labor Standards Act, which capped employees' hours and set minimum wages. Defended on grounds that the Act exceeded Congress' Commerce Power. | Regulation of labor conditions for production of goods moving interstate IS within Congress' Commerce Power. |
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Wickard v. Filburn Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 317 U.S. 111 Pg. 623 |
Fulburn only produces wheat for home consumption and to feed his cattle, which are traded on interstate commerce, to make seeds for next year's crops, and sells a bit locally. Court holds that he is bound by Congress' wheat acreage and production allotment even though none of his wheat is sold in interstate commerce. | Congress may regulate a purely local activity if the cumulative effect of such activitiy is that it would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. |
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Katzenbach v. McClung Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 379 U.S. 294 Pg. 629 |
Ollie's Barbecue served blacks in its carry-out window, but refused to seat them, though whites were allowed to dine in. Ollie's Barbecue was not located near an interstate highway, and the majority of its patrons were not travelers in interstate commerce. | Congress' commerce power allows it to forbid non-commercial acts if these acts can be found, if only in the aggregate, to exert a substantial impact on interstate commerce. |
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United States v. Lopez Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 514 U.S. 549 Pg. 637 |
In the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Congress made it a federal offense for any individual to knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone. The question is whether the Act exceeds congressional authority. | The Court held that the Act exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause authority. |
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South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1938 303 U.S. 177 Pg. 672 |
South Carolina forbade trucks exceeding size and weight limits from operating on South Carolina roads. | States may burden interstate commerce only if the burden serves a legitimate police power interest (it cannot merely favor intrastate industry). |
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Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona Ex Rel. Sullivan, Attorney General Supreme Court of the United States, 1945 325 U.S. 761 Pg. 675 |
An Arizona Train Limit Law made it unlawful for any person or corporation to operate within the state a railroad train of more than fourteen passenger or seventy freight cars, and authorizes the state to recover a money penalty for each violation of the Act. | "The decisive question is whether in the circumstances the total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it and subject it to local regulation which does not have a uniform effect on the interstate train journey which it interrupts." |
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Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin Supreme Court of the United States, 1951 340 U.S. 349 Pg. 690 |
This appeal challenges the validity of a section of an ordinance passed by the City of Madison, Wisconsin. The ordinance regulates the sale of milk and milk products within the municipality's jurisdiction. The section makes it unlawful to sell any milk as pasteurized unless it has been processed and bottled at an approved pasteurization plant. | The Court held that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause and that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation. |
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City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 437 U.S. 617 Pg. 697 |
A New Jersey law prohibits the importation of most solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the state. | The Court concluded that the Commerce Clause will protect New Jersey in the future, just as it protects her neighbors now, from efforts by one State to isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared by all. Thus, the Court struck down the law. |
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Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 437 U.S. 117 Pg. 703 |
A Maryland statute provided that a producer or refiner of petroleum products may not operate any retail service station within the state, and must extend all "voluntary allowances" uniformly to all service stations it supplies. | The Court concluded that the Commerce Clause was intended to protect the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations. Thus, the Court held that the statute was not invalid. |
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West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, Commissioner of Massachusetts Dept. of Food and Agriculture Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 512 U.S. 186 Pg. 710 |
A Massachusetts pricing order imposed an assessment on all fluid milk sold by dealers to Massachusetts retailers. About two-thirds of that milk is produced out of state. The entire assessment, however, is distributed to Massachusetts dairy farmers. | The Court held that the pricing order unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce. |
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South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Commissioner, Dept. of Natural Resources of Alaska Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 467 U.S. 82 Pg. 722 |
In September 1980, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources published a notice that it would sell approximately 49 million board-feet of timber in the area of Icy Cape. The notice of sale provided that primary manunfacturer within Alaska will be required as a special provision of the contract. The purpose of the requirement was to protect existing industries, provide for the establishment of new industries, derive revenue from all timber resources, and manage the State's forests on a sustained yield basis. | The Court concluded that the State may not avail itself of the market-participant doctrine to immunize its downstream regulation of the timber-processing market in which it is not a participant. Thus, Alaska's requirement that timber taken from Alaska lands be processed within Alaska before export was not authorized by Congress and is a violation of the Commerce Clause. |
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Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commn. Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 461 U.S. 190 Pg. 726 |
At issue in this case was whether provisions in the 1976 amendments to California's Warren-Alquist Act, which condition the construction of nuclear plants on findings by the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission that adequate storage facilities and means of disposal are available for nuclear waste, are preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. | The Court held that Congress has left sufficient authority in the States to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons, and that the courts should not assume the role that our system assigns to Congress. |
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Lester Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commn. of Montana Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 436 U.S. 371 Pg. 734 |
Montana required that a non-resident purchase a hunting license for $225 in order to hunt elk. A resident of Montana could purchase a similar license for only $30. Appellants argue this is a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. | Access by nonresidents to recreational big-game hunting in Montana does not fall within the category of rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Only with respect to those "privileges" and "immunities" bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must a State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally, and here equality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union. |
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Printz v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 521 U.S. 898 Pg. 772 |
Court compelled states to comply with Brady act by committing state resources. | In exercising its commerce power, Congress can not commandeer local functions. |
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Alden v. Maine Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 527 U.S. 706 Pg. 786 |
Alden and other probation officers filed suit against the state of Maine asking for damages that arose from FLSA violations. | State immunity in state courts is consistent with structure of constitution because of the essential principles of federalism and role of state courts. |
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South Dakota v. Dole Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 483 U.S. 203 Pg. 798 |
Congress conditioned funding of federal highways on conforming to national drinking age. | Spending must be (1) in the general welfare (deference is given to Congress on whether the program is in the general welfare); (2) the condition must be clearly and unambiguously stated; and (3) the condition must be clearly related to the federal interest, i.e., there must be a nexus between the condition and the federal interest for a legitimate exercise of spending power. |
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Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1949 336 U.S. 106 Pg. 805 |
Appellant is engaged in a nation-wide express business. It operates 1,900 trucks in New York City and sells space on the side of those trucks for advertising. Appellant was convicted of violating a traffic regulation of New York City that prohibited vehicles from being used mainly or merely for advertising. | The fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of distraction but does not touch what may be even greater ones in a different category, such as the vivid displays on Times Square is immaterial. It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all. |
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Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 427 U.S. 307 Pg. 810 |
A Massachusetts state law requires that a uniformed police officer retire at the age of fifty. | "Equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." The Court held that a Massachusetts statute making it mandatory for a uniformed state police officer to retire at age 50 does not to deny equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the right to earn a living is not a fundamental right and police officers are not a suspect class. |
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Dred Scott v. Sandford Supreme Court of the United States, 1856 60 U.S. 393 Pg. 846 |
Dred Scott was a slave purchased by Dr. John Emerson, a surgeon in the U.S. Army. Scott was with Emerson while he served in Illinois and Wisconsin, which were free states. Emerson died, leaving Scott to his wife, Irene Sandford Emerson. Scott tried to buy his freedom, but Irene Emerson rejected him. Scott then sued for his freedom under the theory that since he had been in a free state he had been legally freed and could not later be subjected to slavery. | The Court held that people of African decent could never be citizens of any state, that Congress did not have the power to prohibit slavery in federal territories, and that the Fifth amendment barred the taking of slaves from slaveholders. |
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Plessy v. Ferguson Supreme Court of the United States, 1896 163 U.S. 537 Pg. 873 |
Homer Plessy, who was one-eighth black, purchased a first-class ticket on the East Louisiana Railway from New Orleans, challenging an 1890 Jim Crow law in the State of Louisiana, which required blacks and whites to occupy different rail cars. Plessy was arrested and refused to leave his seat. | "Separate but equal" |
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Korematsu v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1944 323 U.S. 214 Pg. 883 |
Fred Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a "Military Area," contrary to a civilian exclusion order, which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area. No question was raised as to petitioner's loyalty to the United States. | Classifications based on race are subject to strict scrutiny. During times of war, the protection against espionage can be sufficient to justify race-based classifications and thus satisfy the compelling justification test of strict scrutiny. "It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can." |
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Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) Supreme Court of the United States, 1954 347 U.S. 483 Pg. 893 |
A group of parents filed a class action suit against the Topeka, Kansas Board of Education in response to segragated elementary schools made possible by an 1879 Kansas law. | "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." |
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Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II) Supreme Court of the United States, 1955 349 U.S. 294 Pg. 900 |
The Supreme Court considered implementing, as a practical matter, desegragation. | Desegregation must occur "with all deliberate speed. . ." |
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Loving v. Virginia Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 388 U.S. 1 Pg. 926 |
The Loving's left Virginia to get married in Washington D.C. When they returned to Virginia, they were prosecuted under a state law prohibiting interacial marriage. | "Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival.... To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State." |
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Washington v. Davis Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 426 U.S. 229 Pg. 929 |
Respondents Harley and Sellers, both Negroes, whose applications to become police officers in the District of Columbia had been rejected, in an action against District of Columbia officials and others, claimed that the Police Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test, were racially discriminatory and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. | Though the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting the Government from invidious discrimination, it does not follow that a law or other official act is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact regardless of whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose. |
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Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 429 U.S. 252 Pg. 932 |
Respondent Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC), a nonprofit developer, contracted to purchase a tract within the boundaries of petitioner Village in order to build racially integrated low- and moderate-income housing. The contract was contingent upon securing rezoning as well as federal housing assistance. After the Village denied rezoning, MHDC and individual minority respondents filed this suit for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act. | Official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. "[Such] impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination." A racially discriminatory intent, as evidenced by such factors as disproportionate impact, the historical background of the challenged decision, the specific antecedent events, departures from normal procedures, and contemporary statements of the decisionmakers, must be shown. |
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 515 U.S. 200 Pg. 1003 |
Petitioner was the low-bidder on a sub-contract to a prime governmental contract. However, the contract was awarded to another business, because of a governmental program, which incentivized prime contractors to hire minority controlled businesses. | Strict scrutiny is the proper review to apply to all cases that involve race-based classifications. Raced-based classifications are only constitutional if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. |
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Frontiero v. Richardson Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 411 U.S. 677 Pg. 1050 |
A married woman Air Force officer sought increased benefits for her husband as a "dependent." When her application was denied for failure to satisfy the statutory dependency standard, her and her husband brought this suit in District Court, contending that the statutes deprived servicewomen of due process. | By according differential treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience, the challenged statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment insofar as they require a female member to prove the dependency of her husband. |
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Craig v. Boren Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 429 U.S. 190 Pg. 1058 |
Appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20 years of age the equal protection of the laws. | Oklahoma's gender-based differential constitutes an invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. |
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Geduldig v. Aiello Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 417 U.S. 484 Pg. 1063 |
California has a disability insurance system for private employees temporarily disabled from working by an injury or illness not covered by workmen's compensation, under which an employee contributes to an Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund one percent of his salary up to an annual maximum of $85. A disability lasting less than eight days is not compensable, except when the employee is hospitalized. Benefits are not payable for a single disability exceeding 26 weeks. A disability resulting from an individual's court commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict, or sexual psychopath is not compensable, nor are certain disabilities attributable to pregnancy. Appellees, four women otherwise qualified under the program who have suffered employment disability because of pregnancies, only one of which was normal, challenged the pregnancy exclusion. | California's decision not to insure under its program the risk of disability resulting from normal pregnancy does not constitute an invidious discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause. |
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Rostker v. Goldberg Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 453 U.S. 57 Pg. 1079 |
The Military Selective Service Act authorizes the President to require the registration for possible military service of males but not females, the purpose of registration being to facilitate any eventual conscription under the Act. Registration for the draft was discontinued by Presidential Proclamation in 1975, but as the result of a crisis in Southwestern Asia, President Carter decided in 1980 that it was necessary to reactivate the registration process. Although agreeing that it was necessary to reactivate the registration process, Congress allocated only those funds necessary to register males and declined to amend the Act to permit the registration of women. Thereafter, the President ordered the registration of specified groups of young men. In a lawsuit brought by several men challenging the Act's constitutionality, a three-judge District Court ultimately held that the Act's gender-based discrimination violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and enjoined registration under the Act. | The Act's registration provisions do not violate the Fifth Amendment. Congress acted well within its constitutional authority to raise and regulate armies and navies when it authorized the registration of men and not women. |
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Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney Supreme Court of the United States, 1979 442 U.S. 256 Pg. 1088 |
During her 12-year tenure as a state employee, appellee, who is not a veteran, had passed a number of open competitive civil service examinations for better jobs, but because of Massachusetts' veterans' preference statute, she was ranked in each instance below male veterans who had achieved lower test scores than appellee. Under the statute, all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans. Appellee brought an action in Federal District Court, alleging that the absolute-preference formula established in the Massachusetts statute inevitably operates to exclude women from consideration for the best state civil service jobs and thus discriminates against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | Massachusetts, in granting an absolute lifetime preference to veterans, has not discriminated against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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United States v. Virginia Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 518 U.S. 515 Pg. 1095 |
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is the sole single-sex school among Virginia's public institutions of higher learning. VMI's distinctive mission is to produce "citizen-soldiers," men prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service. Using an "adversative method" of training not available elsewhere in Virginia, VMI endeavors to instill physical and mental discipline in its cadets and impart to them a strong moral code. The United States sued Virginia and VMI, alleging that VMI's exclusively male admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. | Virginia's categorical exclusion of women from the educational opportunities that VMI provides denies equal protection to women. |
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Romer v. Evans Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 517 U.S. 620 Pg. 1122 |
Various Colorado municipalities passed ordinances banning discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, health and welfare services, and other transactions and activities. In response, Colorado voters adopted by statewide referendum "Amendment 2" to the State Constitution, which precludes all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the status of persons based on their "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Respondents, who include aggrieved homosexuals and municipalities, commenced this litigation to declare Amendment 2 invalid and enjoin its enforcement. | Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause. |
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Reynolds v. Sims Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 377 U.S. 533 Pg. 1136 |
The number of congresspersons in the House of Representatives is generally reapportioned on the basis of a ten-year population census. But some states (such as Alabama, Delaware and Tennessee) had not enacted reapportionment for decades. As County populations changed over time, some rural minorities commanded disproportionate political power at the state level. | "To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen. The weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives. Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for judgement in legislative apportionment controversies. A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm. This is the clear and strong command of our Constitution's Equal Protection Clause." |
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Bush v. Gore Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 531 U.S. 98 Pg. 1145 |
The 2000 Presidential election was narrowly determined, especially in the State of Florida. There, a ballot recount began in certain counties to establish "the intent of the voter" on questionable ballots. However, the recount itself was challenged due to Equal Protection issues arising from the lack of a reliable standards across counties. Bush argued that there was not enough time to establish such standards before the State's deadline for certifying the election. | "The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right. Florida's basic command for the count of legally cast votes is to consider the "intent of the voter." However, "[t]he recount process . . . is [unable] to protect the fundamental right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single state judicial officer. . . ." Thus, "it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work." |
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San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 411 U.S. 1 Pg. 1157 |
Is education was a fundamental right entitled to protection from wealth-based discrimination? Residents of poor Texas districts were taxed at higher rates than residents of a wealthier districts. Those in the poor district were unable to raise local revenues for that district's schools and were thus given the minimum amount of state funding. The wealthy district enjoyed the maximum amount. A class action suit sought to equalize funding for the public education system. | "Education . . . is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution." Thus, Texas' system to fund public schools by reliance on local taxes is permissible even if it causes inter-district expenditure disparities. Equality of education funding is not a fundamental right that is protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Plyler v. Doe Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 457 U.S. 202 Pg. 1169 |
Texas law denied free public education to undocumented school-age children. The law was challenged as an Equal Protection violation of the Constitution. | A Texas statute which withholds from local school districts any state funds for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States, and which authorizes local school districts to deny enrollment to such children, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
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Schenck v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1919 249 U.S. 47 Pg. 1194 |
Schenck mailed 15,000 circulars to WWI draftees urging them to resist the Conscription Act. | Utterances that are tolerable in peacetime may be punishable during a time of war. Speech that presents or advocates a clear and present danger may lawfully be restricted. |
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Abrams v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1919 250 U.S. 616 Pg. 1198 |
For printing two leaflets (one in Yiddish) that chiefly expressed solidarity with the Russian Revolution, and then distributing these leaflets mostly by heaving them out a window, defendants were charged with violating the Espionage Act, convicted for inciting resistance to the war effort and sentenced to 20 years in prison. | Punishing criticism of U.S. war efforts outweigh First Amendment protections. However, this case is known today for Justice Holmes' eloquent dissent: "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. . . I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe . . ., unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country." |
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Whitney v. California Supreme Court of the United States, 1927 274 U.S. 357 Pg. 1204 |
A co-founder of the Communist Labor Party ("C.L.P.") was convicted and imprisoned under California's 1919 Criminal Syndicalism Act, on a charge of teaching and advocating violent overthrow of the government, despite protesting that the C.L.P. did not contemplate or condone violence. | "[F]reedom of speech . . . does not confer an absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose" and "a State . . . may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means." In his much lauded concurrence, Justice Brandeis notes, "Whenever the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly are alleged to have been invaded, it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue whether there actually did exist at the time a clear danger; whether the danger, if any, was imminent; and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial as to justify the stringent restriction interposed by the legislature." |
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Brandenburg v. Ohio Supreme Court of the United States, 1969 395 U.S. 444 Pg. 1209 |
An Ohio Ku Klux Klan leader invited a local TV station to one of his rallies. The film documented epithets of race hatred and calls for "revengeance." The KKK leader was subsequently arrested and convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law for advocating violence. The KKK leader protested, however, that he was exercising his right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. | "Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act cannot be sustained [because it] . . . purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action. Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." |
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Roth v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1957 354 U.S. 476 Pg. 1234 |
Certain book-sellers were convicted of mailing lewd and obscene materials, a federal offense. The book-sellers argued that their businesses should enjoy the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment. | "[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. . . . {However,] it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance. This phrasing did not prevent this Court from concluding that libelous utterances are |