Trademarks and Unfair Competition: Law and Policy
- Dinwoodie, Janis
- 2nd Edition
- ISBN: 0735568308
| Page | Case Name | Citation | Court | Audio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf | 240 U.S. 403 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1916 |  Download |
| 8 | Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson | 26 F.2d 972 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1928 | Download |
| 8 | Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty | 264 U.S. 359 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1924 | |
| 8 | Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co. | 316 U.S. 203 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 | Download |
| 27 | Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece | 950 F. Supp 783 (S.D. Tex. 1996), rev'd, 141 F.3d 188 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1998 | |
| 45 | Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. | 537 F.2d 4 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1976 | Download |
| 50 | In re Oppedahl & Larson, LLP | 373 F.3d 1171 | United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2004 | Download |
| 54 | Zatarain's Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc. | 698 F.2d 786 | United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit, 1983 | |
| 64 | Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Pubs, Inc. | 198 F.3d 1143 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1999 | Download |
| 67 | Mil-Mar Shoe Co., Inc. v. Shonac Corp. | 75 F.3d 1153 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1996 | Download |
| 69 | Haughton Elevator Company v. Seeberger | 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 | U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Commissioner of Patents, 1950 | Download |
| 70 | Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc. | 874 F.2d 95 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1976 | Download |
| 72 | Blinded Veterans Assn. v. Blinded American Veterans Found. | 872 F.2d 1035 | United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1989 | Download |
| 83 | Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. TY, Inc. | 362 F.3d 986 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2004 | Download |
| 88 | Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., LTD. | 412 F.3d 373 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2005 | |
| 92 | Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. | 505 U.S. 763 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 | Download |
| 99 | Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc. | 514 U.S. 159 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 | |
| 107 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. | 529 U.S. 205 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 | |
| 113 | In re Slokevage | 441 F.3d 957 | United States Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit, 2006 | |
| 116 | Yankee Candle Company, Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Company, LLC | 259 F.3d 25 | United States Court of Appeals First Circuit, 2001 | |
| 124 | In re Clarke | 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 | Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 1990 | |
| 127 | Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc. | 251 F.3d 56 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2001 | |
| 131 | Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. New Line Cinema | 200 F.3d 593 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2000 | |
| 133 | In re First Draft Inc. | 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1183 | Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 2005 | |
| 137 | Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. | 539 U.S. 23 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 | Download |
| 144 | Bretford Mfg., Inc., v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp. | 419 F.3d 576 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2005 | |
| 148 | In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. | 671 F.2d 1332 | United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 1982 | |
| 158 | Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc. | 916 F.2d 76 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1990 | Download |
| 163 | Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd. | 35 F.3d 1527 | United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1994 | |
| 168 | Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp. | 58 F.3d 1498 | United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 1995 | |
| 184 | Traffix Devices, Inc v. Marketing Displays, Inc. | 532 U.S. 23 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 | |
| 192 | Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp. | 278 F.3d 1268 | United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2002 | |
| 197 | Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH | 289 F.3d 351 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2002 | Download |
| 203 | Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle Outfitters | 280 F.3d 619 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 2002 | Download |
| 206 | Automotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswage of America, Inc. | 457 F.3d 1062 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2006 | |
| 218 | Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc. | 261 F.3d 1188 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 2001 | Download |
| 244 | Warnervision Entertainment Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc. | 101 F.3d 259 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1996 | Download |
| 251 | In re Rath | 402 F.3d 1207 | United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2005 | |
| 264 | The Boogie Kings v. Guillory | 188 So. 2d 445, cert. denied, 191 So. 2d 140 | La. Ct. App. 1966 | Download |
| 269 | Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch | 44 F. Supp. 405 | District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1942 | Download |
| 276 | Emergency One, Inc. v. American Fireeagle, Ltd. | 228 F.3d 531 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 2000 | |
| 287 | Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc. | 52 F.3d 867, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 920 | United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 1995 | Download |
| 294 | University Book Store v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents | 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (TTAB 1994) | Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 1994 | |
| 313 | Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc. | 50 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1705 | U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 1999 | |
| 329 | In re Budge Manufacturing Co., Inc. | 857 F.2d 773 | United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1988 | Download |
| 333 | Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc. | 871 F.2d 590 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1989 | |
| 338 | In re California Innovations, Inc. | 329 F.3d 1334 | United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2003 | |
| 348 | In re United Distillers, PLC | 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1220 | Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 2000 | Download |
| 350 | In re Sauer | 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1073 | Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 1993 | Download |
| 356 | Park'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. | 469 U.S. 189 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 | |
| 367 | United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co. | 248 U.S. 90 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1918 | |
| 373 | Dawn Donut Co., Inc. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc. | 267 F.2d 358 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1959 | |
| 376 | What-a-Burger, VA v. Whataburger, Corpus Christie, TX | 357 F.3d 441 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 2004 | Download |
| 380 | National Ass'n for Healthcare Communications, Inc. v. Central Arkansas Area Agency on Aging, Inc. | 257 F.3d 732 | United States Court of Appeals or the Eighth Circuit, 2001 | |
| 388 | Person's Co., LTD. v. Christman | 900 F.2d 1565 | United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1990 | Download |
| 391 | Grupo Gigante v. Dallo & Co., Inc. | 391 F.3d 1088 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2004 | |
| 398 | ITC Limited v. Punchgini, Inc. | 482 F.3d 135 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2007 | |
| 409 | International Bancorp LLC v. Societe Des Bains De Mer Et Du Cercle Des Estrangers A Monaco | 329 F.3d 359 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 2003 | |
| 423 | Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. | 344 U.S. 280 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1952 | Download |
| 425 | Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., Ltd. | 234 F.2d 633, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1956 | |
| 431 | Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG | 14 F.3d 733 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1994 | |
| 433 | McBee v. Delica Co. | 417 F.3d 107 | United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 2005 | |
| 444 | Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co. | 201 F. 510 | 7th Cir. 1912 | |
| 446 | J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Limited Partnership v. Settlement Funding LLC | 2007 WL 40115 | United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2007 | |
| 447 | Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. | 314 F.2d 149, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1963 | Download |
| 454 | Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservations, Inc. | 86 F.3d 619, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1093 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1996 | Download |
| 459 | 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc. | 414 F.3d 400 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2005 | Download |
| 474 | Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer | 403 F.3d 672 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2005 | |
| 483 | Virgin Enterprises Ltd. v. Nawab | 335 F. 3d 141 | United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit, 2003 | Download |
| 488 | McDonald's Corp. v. Druck and Gerner D.D.S., P.C. d/b/a McDental | 814 F. Supp. 1127 | United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, 1993 | |
| 494 | Libman Compnay v. Vining Industries, Inc. | 69 F. 3d 1360 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1995 | |
| 521 | GO-TO.COM, Inc. v. Walt Disney Company | 202 F.3d 1199 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2002 | Download |
| 526 | Boston Professional Hockey Association, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc. | 510 f.2d 1004 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1975 | Download |
| 535 | Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp. | 174 F.3d 1036 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1999 | Download |
| 538 | Lamparello v. Falwell | 420 F.3d 309 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 2005 | Download |
| 542 | Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc's Corp. | 354 F.3d 1020 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2004 | Download |
| 551 | Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP | 423 F.3d 539 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 2005 | Download |
| 558 | Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts | 944 F.2d 1235, cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1992 | |
| 565 | A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc. | 237 F.3d 198 | United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 2000 | Download |
| 578 | Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. | 464 U.S. 417 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 | |
| 578 | A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. | 239 F.3d 1004 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2001 | Download |
| 600 | Toys 'R' Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui | 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836 | United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 1996 | Download |
| 601 | Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Feinberg | 26 F. Supp. 2d 639 | United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1998 | |
| 603 | Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. | 191 F.3d 208 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1999 | |
| 611 | Panavision International v. Toeppen | 141 F.3d 1316 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1998 | |
| 615 | Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc. | 202 F.3d 489, cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2000 | |
| 665 | KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. | 543 U.S. 111 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 | |
| 680 | R.G. Smith v. Chanel, Inc. | 402 F.2d 562 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1968 | |
| 683 | Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lending Tree, Inc. | 425 F.3d 211 | United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 2005 | |
| 700 | Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders | 331 U.S. 125 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1947 | Download |
| 701 | Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co. | 341 F.3d 1356 | United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 2003 | |
| 720 | Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications | 28 F.3d 769, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995) | United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1994 | |
| 725 | Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. | 296 F.3d 894, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1171 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2002 |
| Case Information | Fact Summary | Rule of Law |
|---|---|---|
|
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf Supreme Court of the United States, 1916 240 U.S. 403 Pg. 7 |
Hanover Star Milling Co. was sued for trademark infringement and unfair competition. Hanover Milling Co. sold flour using the same name (Tea Rose) and mark as Metcalf, but operated in a different part of the country. | "In short, the trademark is treated as merely a protection for the goodwill, and not the subject of property except in connection with an existing business . . . since it is the trade, and not the mark, that is to be protected, a trademark acknowledges no territorial boundaries of municipalities or states or nations, but extends to every market where the trader's goods have become known and identified by his use of the mark. But the mark, of itself, cannot travel to markets where there is no article to wear the badge and no trader to offer the article." |
|
Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1928 26 F.2d 972 Pg. 8 |
Plaintiff's attempts to register the word, "Yale" were rejected on the grounds that the mark was surname. | An owner's trademark is the owner's seal though which the owner's goods are vouched for; one may not divert customers from another by representing what he sells as coming from the other seller. |
|
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty Supreme Court of the United States, 1924 264 U.S. 359 Pg. 8 |
Justice Holmes decided on whether use of the word COTY as a label on a bottle of perfume constituted a trademark violation. | "A trademark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his." |
|
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 316 U.S. 203 Pg. 8 |
Petitioner sold shoes with a red plug in the heel. The respondent began selling shoes with a similar design. Although there was no evidence that particular purchasers were actually deceived into believing that the heels sold by the respondent were manufactured by the petitioner, the District Court found that there was a "reasonable likelihood" that some purchases might have been induced by the purchaser's belief that he was obtaining the petitioner's product. | "The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trademark is a merchandising shortcut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same -- to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trademark owner has something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress." |
|
Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1998 950 F. Supp 783 (S.D. Tex. 1996), rev'd, 141 F.3d 188 Pg. 27 |
Elvis Presley Enterprises is the testamentary trust created by Elvis and owns all intellectual property in Presley's name and likeness. Capece opened a restaurant and tavern business for which he registered the mark "Velvet Elvis." Elvis Presley Enterprises sued for unfair competition, trademark infringement, and dilution. | "Use of Elvis memorabilia as decor . . . does not amount to any violation as it is not intended for the purpose of advertising, selling, or soliciting the purchase of products, merchandise, goods or services. . . . Additionally, the Court finds Defendants' use of the service mark, 'The Velvet Elvis,' does not amount to an unauthorized commercial exploitation of the identity of Elvis Presley. The service mark represents an art form reflective of an era that Elvis helped to shape. 'The velvet Elvis' became a coined phrase for the art of velvet paintings and was adopted by Defendants for this reason--not because of its identification with Elvis Presley." |
|
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1976 537 F.2d 4 Pg. 45 |
Plaintiff and Defendant sold clothing with the name "Safari." | The validity of the mark ends where suggestion ends and description begins. A terms is suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods. A term is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods. The court found that the term "Safari" was not suggestive, as "the word 'safari' in connection with wearing apparel is widely used by the general pubic and people in the trade." |
|
In re Oppedahl & Larson, LLP United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2004 373 F.3d 1171 Pg. 50 |
Appellant filed an intent-to-use trademark application for the mark "patents.com." The PTO denied registration, finding that the mark was merely descriptive of appellant's business, which was selling software for tracking patents. | "When examining domain name marks, the PTO must evaluate the commercial impression of the mark as a whole, including the TLD [top-level-domain] indicator. The addition of a TLD such as ".com" or ".org" to an otherwise unregistrable mark will typically not add any source identifying significance, similar to the analysis of "Corp. and "Inc." . . . In exceptional circumstances, a TLD may render an otherwise descriptive term sufficiently distinctive for trademark registration. In this case, the mark patents.com, as a whole, is merely descriptive of appellant's goods. . . ." |
|
Zatarain's Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc. United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit, 1983 698 F.2d 786 Pg. 54 |
Zatarain's appealed the ruling that infringers had a "fair use" defense to use of Zatarain's trademarks, "Fish-Fri" and "Chick-Fri." Appellee claimed that the mark was merely descriptive. | A descriptive term "identifies a characteristic or quality of an article or service, such as its color, odor, function, dimensions, or ingredients." If the term is descriptive, then a showing of secondary meaning is necessary to gain trademark protection. Secondary meaning recognizes that words with an ordinary and primary meaning of their own, "may by long use with a particular product, come to be known by the public as specifically designating that product." The burden of proof rests with the party seeking to establish legal protection for the mark - the plaintiff in an infringement suit. In assessing a claim of secondary meaning, the major inquiry is the consumer's attitude towards the mark. The mark must denote to the consumer "a single thing coming from a single source," to support a finding of secondary meaning. Survey evidence is the most direct and persuasive way of establishing secondary meaning. |
|
Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Pubs, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1999 198 F.3d 1143 Pg. 64 |
Filipino Yellow Pages sold a consumer directory named "Filipino Yellow Pages" into the California market. Asian Journal Pubs published the "Filipino Consumer Directory" into the California market. Filipino Yellow Pages filed a complaint, alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition. Asian Journal Pubs successfully moved for summary judgment. Filipino Yellow Pages appealed. | "If a supposedly valid mark is not federally registered, . . . the plaintiff has the burden of proving nongenericness once the defendant asserts genericness as a defense. . . . If a mark is unregistered, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the mark it not generic." Test for genericness: if the mark describes the type of product rather than the producer, it's a generic term and not protectable as a valid trademark. I.e., a mark answers the questions "Where do you come from?" and "Who vouches for you?" But, a generic term answers the question "What are you?" Under this test, "if the primary significance of the trademark is to describe the type of product rather than the producer, the trademark is a generic term and cannot be a valid trademark." However, words which are not protectable as marks standing alone may become protectable as marks when combined. The Court held that the term is generic. |
|
Mil-Mar Shoe Co., Inc. v. Shonac Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1996 75 F.3d 1153 Pg. 67 |
Mil-Mar Shoe Company, Inc. brought a restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent Shonac from using the name "DSW Shoe Warehouse." Mil-Mar had been using the name "Warehouse Shoes" in connection with its retail shoe stores. | What separates a generic from a descriptive term is the degree of distinctiveness, i.e., their relative ability to serve as a source identifier. "The question is whether the term is being used in a common or generic sense, not whether a particular use represents the most common use of that term." The Court held that the term is generic. |
|
Haughton Elevator Company v. Seeberger U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Commissioner of Patents, 1950 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 Pg. 69 |
Charles D. Seeberger registered the mark "Escalator" and Haughton Elevator Company sought to cancel the mark on the grounds that the term "elevator" had become a generic term. | Use of a mark as a generic term by the company that holds the registration, is evidence of assent to use. The Court held that elevator had become a generic term. |
|
Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1976 874 F.2d 95 Pg. 70 |
At the turn of the 20th century, William Lawrence Murphy designed a bed that could be concealed in a wall closet. He incorporated in 1925 under the name "Murphy Door Bed Company" and began selling "Murphy" beds. The USPTO denied Murphy Co.'s attempts to trademark the name. In 1981, Frank Zarcone, entered into an exclusive distributorship agreement with Murphy Co. The agreement expired and then Zarcone began selling beds under the name "Murphy," which were manufactured by his own company. | Where a term has become generic because of expropriation, the burden is on the defendant to show that the term has become generic. Several factors play into whether a term has become generic in the eyes of the public. In this case, the court looked at the following factors: "First, the decision of the PTO, and certainly the TTAB, is to be accorded great weight. . . . The district court explicitly rejected the decisions of the PTO and TTAB finding genericness, despite acknowledging their persuasive force. Second, the term Murphy bed is included in many dictionaries as a standard description of a wall-bed. . . . While dictionary definitions are not conclusive proof of a mark's generic nature, they are influential because they reflect the general public's perception of a mark's meaning and implication. . . . Third, Zarcone introduced as evidence numerous examples of newspaper and magazine use of the phrase Murphy bed to describe generally a type of bed. Again, such evidence is not proof positive, but it is a strong indication of the general public's perception that Murphy bed connotes something other than a bed manufactured by the Murphy Co." Also, the Court gives weight to the efforts to police the mark, but the once the mark has "entered the public domain beyond recall," policing is of no consequence to a resolution of whether a mark is generic. |
|
Blinded Veterans Assn. v. Blinded American Veterans Found. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1989 872 F.2d 1035 Pg. 72 |
The Blinded Veterans Association sought to enjoin the Blinded American Veterans Foundation from using the words "blinded" and "veterans" in its name and from using the initials "BVA." | If a producer's name is generic, a competitor's use thereof is not, according to Sec. 43(a), unfair competition unless a likelihood of consumer confusion arises because a party fails to adequately identify itself as a source of the product. Only where there is a likelihood that the newcomer producer might try to pass its product off as the original producer's can a court require the newcomer to distinguish its product. To succeed on a passing-off claim, the plaintiff must prove the likely effect of the defendant's actions is to make the public think the defendant is the plaintiff. The Court held that BVA is generic and not protectable as a mark, but that the plaintiff may be entitled to protection from passing off. |
|
Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. TY, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2004 362 F.3d 986 Pg. 83 |
Peaceable Planet, a small company, produced a stuffed animal camel named "Niles." They only sold a few thousand. Ty, the manufacturer of Beanie Babies, also produced a stuffed animal camel named "Niles." Ty sold almost two million camels in one year. Peaceable Planet brought suit against Ty for trademark infringement. | The rule that personal names are not protected as trademarks until they acquire secondary meaning does not apply if the public is unlikely to understand the personal name as a personal name. The Court concluded that Peaceable Planet has a valid trademark in the name "Niles." |
|
Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., LTD. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2005 412 F.3d 373 Pg. 88 |
Star Industries began producing orange flavored vodka packaged with a large "O" on the label. Later, Bacardi began marketing orange flavored rum and used a large "O" on its bottle. | "'Common basic shapes' or letters are, as a matter of law, not inherently distinctive. However, stylized shapes or letters may qualify, provided the design is not commonplace but rather unique or unusual in the relevant market. The guiding principle in distinguishing protectable from unprotectable marks is that no one enterprise may be allowed to attain a monopoly on designs that its competitors must be able to use in order to effectively communicate information regarding their products to consumers. Trademark protection of a sufficiently stylized version of a common shape or letter will not hamper effective competition because competitors remain free to use nonstylized forms or their own alternative stylizations of the same shape or letter to communicate information about their products. A design used in conjunction with other marks is separately protectable in its own right if it creates a separate and distinct impression from the impression created by the other marks. This will be true if either the mark is itself inherently distinctive, or if the consuming public has come to associate the separate mark in itself with the particular product, vesting it with its own distinct secondary meaning." |
|
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 505 U.S. 763 Pg. 92 |
Taco Cabana operated a chain of restaurants in San Antonio. Two Pesos began operating a chain, which had a similar atmosphere. Taco Cabana brought a trademark infringement action under the Lanham Act, asserting that the totality of its ambiance was "trade dress." | Inherently distinctive trade dress may be subject to trademark protection even if it has not acquired a secondary meaning. |
|
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 514 U.S. 159 Pg. 99 |
Qualitex sold pads used by dry cleaners that had a distinctive green-gold color. Jacobson Products also sold pads of the same color. Qualitex brought an unfair competition action and sought to register the color as a trademark. | "The Lanham Act permits the registration of a trademark that consists, purely and simply, of a color." |
|
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 529 U.S. 205 Pg. 107 |
Samara Brothers is a manufacturer of children's clothes. Wal-Mart sent pictures of Samara's line of children's clothing to a manufacturer, had a line nearly identical to Samara's line produced, and sold the clothing through Wal-Mart stores. | "In a [Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act] action for infringement of unregistered trade dress, a product's design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning." Product packaging trade dress MAY BE inherently distinctive, and thus protectable without a showing of secondary meaning. Plaintiffs claiming rights in product feature trade dress under Sec. 43(a) must ALWAYS demonstrate secondary meaning as a prerequisite to relief. The court rejected arguments that product feature trade dress could be inherently distinctive, noting the lack of a workable standard for evaluating the distinctiveness of product features; doubts that consumers rely on product features (as opposed to labels and packaging) to indicate source; and concerns about the anticompetitive effects of making Lanham Act protection for product features readily available. "To the extent that there are close cases, courts should err on the side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design thereby requiring secondary meaning." A mark has acquired distinctiveness, even if it is not inherently distinctive, if it has developed secondary meaning, which occurs when, "in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a mark is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself." Inwood laboratories. |
|
In re Slokevage United States Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit, 2006 441 F.3d 957 Pg. 113 |
Joanne Slokevage filed a trademark application for the configuration of her clothing design. The trademark examiner refused registration because clothing configuration is not inherently distinctive and Slokevage did not submit evidence of acquired distinctiveness. | "Determining whether trade dress is product design is a factual finding because it is akin to determining whether a trademark is inherently distinctive or whether a mark is descriptive, which are questions of fact. . . . [I]n such cases when the purchase implicates a utilitarian or aesthetic purpose, rather than a source-identifying function, it is appropriate to require proof of distinctiveness." The Court affirmed the trademark examiner's ruling and held that Slokevage's trade dress was product design and therefore she needed to prove acquired distinctiveness. |
|
Yankee Candle Company, Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Company, LLC United States Court of Appeals First Circuit, 2001 259 F.3d 25 Pg. 116 |
Yankee Candle Company claimed that Bridgewater candle Candle Company infringed Yankee's trade dress by copying their method of shelving, by copying the overall look and feel of a line of candles, and by copying the design of Yankee's merchandising catalog. | Detachable labels, as product packaging, may be inherently distinctive. "In Seabrook, inherent distinctiveness was determined by reference to: (i) whether the design was a common or basic one; (ii) whether it was 'unique or unusual' in the field; (iii) whether it was a refinement of a common form of ornamentation; and (iv) whether it was capable of creating a commercial impression distinct from the accompanying words. . . . In reality [the question is] whether the [dress] is so unique, unusual or unexpected in this market that it will automatically be perceived by customers as an indicator of origin." A trade dress plaintiff seeking to protect a series or line of products faces a particularly difficult challenge, as it must show that the appearance of the several products is "sufficiently distinct and unique to merit protection." Proof of secondary meaning requires evidence that consumers associate the trade dress with the source. The Court held that Yankee's trade dress was not distinctive, and thus could not be afforded protection. |
|
In re Clarke Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 1990 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 Pg. 124 |
Celia Clarke, doing business as Clarke's OSEWEZ, appealed from the refusal to register her mark. Her mark consisted of scented sewing thread and embroidery yarn. | A fragrance is capable of serving as a trademark to identify and distinguish a certain type of product. The Court held that scent is not an inherent attribute of the goods, but a feature supplied by the applicant. She emphasized the attribute in her advertising, and consumers associate the scent with her products. Therefore, applicant made a prima facie case of distinctiveness. |
|
Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2001 251 F.3d 56 Pg. 127 |
Astrud Oliveira appeals from the dismissal of her suit. . . . The defendants are Frito-Lay, Inc., a well-known seller of potato chips. . . . Among numerous claims, the complaint alleged that the defendants infringed her trademark rights under Sec. 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1125(a), by using a famous 1964 recording of Gilberto singing "The Girl from Ipanema" in a television commercial. . . . With respect to the federal claim under the Lanham Act, the district court dismissed based on its conclusion that no reasonable jury could find that defendants' use of plaintiff's performance in their commercial implied an endorsement by plaintiff of Frito-Lay's potato chips. With respect to the state law claims, the court ruled that, upon the publication of her recorded performance in 1964, plaintiff lost her common law rights in the recording. | That musical compositions are protected by copyright doesn't mean they don't qualify for trademark protection, but a singer doesn't obtain trademark status in a song just because she/he is well-known for performing a particular song. The claim was dismissed on summary judgment for defendant. |
|
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. New Line Cinema United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2000 200 F.3d 593 Pg. 131 |
A clip from The Three Stooges' short film "Disorder in the Court," plays in the background of the motion picture, "The Long Kiss Goodnight." Comedy III Productions, Inc. own all rights and interests in The Three Stooges and sued New Line under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The district court granted a motion dismissing the complaint. Comedy III appeals. | To prove infringement, plaintiff must show (a) the mark is valid, and (b) the use of the mark by another in a manner likely to create consumer confusion. Validity can be established in one of two ways: (1) a showing that the symbol is inherently distinctive, or (2) a showing that the symbol has acquired secondary meaning. The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Comedy III's complaint. |
|
In re First Draft Inc. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 2005 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1183 Pg. 133 |
The PTO denied the registration of the name FERN MICHAELS as a trademark for a series of fictional books, because FERN MICHAELS "only identifies the author of applicant's books and does not also function as a mark." | Titles and names are generally not protected by mark status, but are not necessarily barred from protection. When a name is used for a series of works and not just a single work, and used in a manner that assures the public of the quality of the writing and thus as an indicator of source, and isn't just the designation of the writer of the work, the name is a mark. The Court found that the series requirement was satisfied, but not the quality indicator, so the refusal to register was affirmed. |
|
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 539 U.S. 23 Pg. 137 |
TIme, Inc. produced a television series based on General Dwight D. Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe. Time assigned its copyright in the series to Fox. Fox failed to renew the copyright on the series, leaving the television series in the public domain. Dastar copied the series, edited the works and then sold them. Fox, SFM, and New Line brought an action alleging that Dastar's sale of the videos constitutes a "reverse passing off" in violation of Sec. 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that "Dastar's 'bodily appropriation' of Fox's original series is sufficient to establish the reverse passing off." | The phrase "origin of goods" under Lanham Act Sec. 43(a) refers to the manufacturer of the physical goods, not to the person who created the ideas or communications embodied in the goods. The Court concluded that Dastar was the "origin" of the videos for the purposes of Sec. 43(a). |
|
Bretford Mfg., Inc., v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2005 419 F.3d 576 Pg. 144 |
Between 1990 and 1997 Bretford was the sole manufacturer and seller of computer tables with a V-shaped heigh-adjustment system. In 1997, one of Bretford's competitors, Smith System copied the design and sold the product to the Dallas school system. Bretford sued under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The district court held that the V-shaped legs do not signal Bretford as a source. | Use of components in assembly does not constitute trademark infringement. |
|
In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 1982 671 F.2d 1332 Pg. 148 |
Morton-Norwich appealed the denial of their trademark application for the shape and design of their spray bottle. | "[F]unctionality is determined in light of 'utility,' which is determined in light of 'superiority of design,' and rests upon the foundation 'essential to effective competition.'" In this case, the court held that the shape of the spray bottle was not essential to competition. |
|
Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1990 916 F.2d 76 Pg. 158 |
Wallace manufactured and sold a "baroque" style of silverware and had been doing so for over 100 years. Godinger, a New York corporation produced a similar line. Wallace claimed Godinger's line infringed its trademark in the style. | "[W]here an ornamental feature is claimed as a trademark and trademark protection would significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of adequate alternative designs, the aesthetic functionality doctrine denies such protection." |
|
Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1994 35 F.3d 1527 Pg. 163 |
Mercury, a manufacturer of black outboard marine engines, filed a trademark application for the color black for outboard engines. British Seagull opposed. | The Court found a competitive need for the color black, as it exhibits color compatibility with a wide variety of boat colors. |
|
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 1995 58 F.3d 1498 Pg. 168 |
Vornado had a utility patent on its spiral shaped fan grill, which was copied by Duracraft. | "We hold that where a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a utility patent, and the configuration is a described, significant inventive aspect of the invention, so that without it the invention could not fairly be said to be the same invention, patent law prevents its protection as trade dress, even if the configuration is nonfunctional." |
|
Traffix Devices, Inc v. Marketing Displays, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 532 U.S. 23 Pg. 184 |
Robert Sarkinsian designed a dual-spring mechanism to attach to road signs so they would not be blown over by gusts of wind. Marketing displays, Inc. acquired the patents and began selling the road signs that utilized the dual-spring design under the name "WindMaster." When the patents expired, Traffix Devices began selling the same product under the name "WindBuster." | The Court pronounced a two-part test. First, in determining product features, the court must apply the Inwood Laboratories test: Is the feature essential to the use or purpose of the article, or does it affect the cost or quality of the article? If the answer is yes, then the product feature is functional. If the answer is no, then the court must then apply the second test, the Qualitex standard: Would the exclusive use of the feature put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage. If yes, then there is aesthetic functionality and the feature is not protected. The feature can only be protected as trade dress if it is non-functional under both tests. The Court also elaborated on the relevance of a utility patent, stating that a utility patent is "strong evidence that the features claimed in it are functional," and adds "great weight" to the statutory presumption that product features are functional. To overcome this presumption, the person claiming trade dress rights in these patented product features "must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device." |
|
Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2002 278 F.3d 1268 Pg. 192 |
Valu Engineering, Inc. appeals a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board sustaining Rexnord Corporation 's opposition to registration of Valu's cross-sectional designs of conveyor guide rails as trademarks on the Principal Register. The TTAB concluded that the designs were de jure functional. | The Court found that the Traffix decision (http://www.audiocasefiles.com/cases/detail/case/9993/) did not alter the Morton-Norwich test for functionality. The Court found that although Traffix focused the analysis on the effect of trademark protection on competition, this does not preclude the court from looking at the availability of alternatives in making the Inwood Laboratories determination. The Court concluded that under Traffix, a product feature can still be protected as trade dress even though it plays a useful function in the product other than identifying source. |
|
Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2002 289 F.3d 351 Pg. 197 |
Eppendorf, a medical and labritory equipment manufacturer, filed suit under the Lanham Act against Ritter for trademark infringement of its disposable pipettes. | The Court held that "[t]he availability of alternative designs is irrelevant" under the Inwood Laboratories test. This is at odds with the pronouncement in Value Engineering v. Rexnord Corp. |
|
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle Outfitters United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 2002 280 F.3d 619 Pg. 203 |
Abercrombie & Fitch brought a trade dress claim against American Eagle, alleging that American Eagle had copied its garments. | The Court applies two test of aesthetic functionality under the competition theory: (1) the test for comparable alternatives, which asks whether trade-dress protection of certain features would nevertheless leave a variety of comparable alternative features that competitors may use to compete in the market. If such alternatives do not exist, the feature is functional; but if such alternatives do exist, then the feature is not functional; and (2) The effective competition test, which asks whether trade dress protection for a product's feature would hinder the ability of another manufacturer to compete effectively in the market for the product. If such hinderance is probable, then the feature is functional and unsuitable for protection. If the feature is not a likely impediment to market competition, then the feature is nonfunctional and may receive trademark protection. |
|
Automotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswage of America, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2006 457 F.3d 1062 Pg. 206 |
Automotive Gold produced key chains and automotive accessories using Audi and Volkswagen's logos. | "A feature which merely associates goods with a particular source may be, like a trademark or trade name, a substantial factor in increasing the marketability of the goods. But if that is the entire significance of the feature, it is non-functional; for its value then lies only in the demand for goods associated with a particular source rather than for goods of a particular design." Restatement of Torts Sec. 742 comment a (1938). |
|
Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 2001 261 F.3d 1188 Pg. 218 |
In 1994, Byron Darrah developed an email application named "CoolMail." In 1995 a German company successfully sought permission to distribute CoolMail in a compilation of UNIX-based programs. In 1998, Appellant, Carson, formed a company named Techsplosion, which offered an email service named "CoolMail." In 1999, Darrah transferred all rights in the CoolMail software to Planetary Motion who sued Techsplosion under the Lanham Act, alleging infringement of the mark CoolMail. | "The court in Mendes set forth a two part test to determine whether a party has established 'prior use' of a mark sufficient to establish ownership: Evidence showing, first, adoption, and, second, use in a way sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked goods in an appropriate segment of the public mind as those of the adopter of the mark, is competent to establish ownership, even without evidence of actual sales." |
|
Warnervision Entertainment Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1996 101 F.3d 259 Pg. 244 |
Empire acquired from a company named TLV an "intent-to-use" application, which was filed on September 9, 1994, for a trademark in connection with a product that used the mark "REAL WHEELS." WarnerVision's application for registration was filed on January 3, 1995. The district court granted a preliminary injunction which barred Empire from completing the ITU process by filing a factually supported statement of use. | "The ITU provisions permit the holder of an ITU application to use the mark in commerce, obtain registration, and thereby secure priority retroactive to the date of filing of the ITU application. Of course, this right or privilege is not indefinite; it endures only for the time allotted by the statute. But as long as an ITU applicant's privilege has not expired, a court may not enjoin it from making the use necessary for registration on the grounds that another party has used the mark subsequent to the filing of the ITU application. To permit such an injunction would eviscerate the ITU provisions and defeat their very purpose." |
|
In re Rath United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2005 402 F.3d 1207 Pg. 251 |
Rath's attempt at registering a trademark with his surname was denied. He held a trademark on his name in Germany and claimed that the United States should recognize the mark pursuant to the Paris Convention. The USPTO claimed that the Paris Conventions' exception, that marks with no distinctive character will not be afforded protection, applied to Rath. | "Section 44(e) of the Lanham Act provides: '(e) Registration on principal or supplemental register; copy of foreign registration.--A mark duly registered in the country of origin of the foreign applicant may be registered on the principal register if eligible, otherwise on the supplemental register herein provided. Such applicant shall submit, within such time period as may be prescribed by the Director, a certification or a certified copy of the registration in the county of origin of the applicant. The application must state the applicant's bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce, but use in commerce shall not be required prior to registration.'" The Court held that although Sec. 44 impacts the prior use requirement, it does not eviscerate other eligibility requirements. The Court affirmed the PTO's rejection of Rath's trademark application. |
|
The Boogie Kings v. Guillory La. Ct. App. 1966 188 So. 2d 445, cert. denied, 191 So. 2d 140 Pg. 264 |
"The Boogie Kings" was a musical group formed by Douglas Ardoin and Harriss Miller in 1955. The defendant, Guillory, joined the group in 1963 as lead vocalist and was elected leader in May, 1964. Guillory acquired an interest in the Moulin Rouge Club and the group began playing there regularly. The group became dissatisfied with playing at the Moulin Rouge Club and Guillory separeted from the group. The group continued under the name "The Boogie Kings." However, Guillory also continued and formed a new group named "Clint West and The Boogie Kings." The original group claimed the name belonged to them as an unincorporated association and Guillory claimed that the name was vested in Ardoin and Miller and that Miller gave Guillory exclusive right to use the name. | The first use of a mark by an entity controlled by the registrant or applicant inures to the benefit of the controlling entity. In this case, the Court found that the band held the trade name as an unincorporated association and that Guillory's rights to the name were extinguished when he left the organization. |
|
Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1942 44 F. Supp. 405 Pg. 269 |
Coca-Cola sued to enjoin Busch from selling a product named "Koke-Up." | "[T]he abbreviation of the trademark which the public has used and adopted as designating the product of the complainant is equally as much to be protected as the trademark itself and while the name of the defendant's product is "Koke-Up" it is not to be doubted from the evidence in the case that "Koke" is the dominant word which is attempted to be impressed upon the public, since the word "Koke" on the label of the bottle of the product is much larger in size than the other lettering." |
|
Emergency One, Inc. v. American Fireeagle, Ltd. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 2000 228 F.3d 531 Pg. 276 |
Emergency One, Inc. (E-One) acquired rights to an American Eagle trademark. The trademark was used sparingly over the next several years in the manufacturing of firetrucks. The company stopped using the trademark for the manufacturing of firetrucks and only used the trademark on promotional items. A former employee of E-One started American Fireeagle, Ltd. (AFE). AFE began using the trademark in the manufacturing of firetrucks believing that E-One had abandoned its rights to the trademark. Customers began calling both companies with questions about the new company, asking whether E-One had started a new company or distribution arm. E-One sued and the trial court found in favor of E-One. AFE appealed. | Once a challenger shows discontinued use, the owner must produce evidence of intent to resume use "within the reasonably foreseeable future." The meaning of "reasonably foreseeable future" varies depending on the industry and particular circumstances of the case. The court found that in this case fire trucks have very long lives and thus the good will value of the mark persists long after production of trucks. Thus, the court held, that the it might be reasonable for a fire truck manufacturer to spend five or six years considering the reintroduction of a brand. Thus, AFE was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of abandonment. |
|
Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 1995 52 F.3d 867, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 920 Pg. 287 |
Stanfield developed agricultural products that he presented to a bank. A company was incorporated, Osborne, which licensed the name Stanfield from the plaintiff. | "Naked (or uncontrolled) licensing of a mark occurs when a licensor allows a licensee to use the mark on any quality or type of good the licensee chooses. Such uncontrolled licensing can cause the mark to lose its significance. When 'a trademark owner engages in naked licensing, without any control over the quality of goods produced by the licensee, such a practice is inherently deceptive and constitutes abandonment of any rights to the trademark by the licensor.' Thus, the licensor must 'take some reasonable steps to prevent misuses of his trademark in the hands of others.' 'The critical question . . . is whether the plaintiff sufficiently policed and inspected its licensee['s] operations to guarantee the quality of the products [the licensee] sold.' Because a finding of insufficient control results in the forfeiture of a mark, a party asserting insufficient control by a licensor must meet a high burden of proof." |
|
University Book Store v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 1994 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (TTAB 1994) Pg. 294 |
The University of Wisconsin was opposed by the University Bookstore and other local retailers when it attempted to register the "Bucky Badger" logo and the word mark WISCONSIN BADGERS for clothing items, educational services, and entertainment related services, including sporting events. The opposers claimed that the University had abandoned rights in the mark. | Abandonment occurs only when a mark loses its significance as a mark. |
|
Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 1999 50 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1705 Pg. 313 |
A group of Native Americans challenged the trademark "Washington Redskins" under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act on the grounds that the mark was scandalous and disparaging. | Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act provides: "No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it - - (a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute. . . . " The court discussed the legal standards for scandalous matter and matter which may disparage. The scandalous matter standard requires a two-part inquiry: 1) the likely meaning of the matter in question; and 2) whether, in view of the likely meaning, the matter is scandalous to a substantial composite of the general public. The standard for matter which may disparage involves a similar inquiry, except that the standard doesn't look to the views of the general public. The standard looks at whether the targeted group is disparaged. The court found that the mark was disparaging but not scandalous. |
|
In re Budge Manufacturing Co., Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1988 857 F.2d 773 Pg. 329 |
Budge Manufacturing Co., Inc., appeals from the final decision of the United States Trademark Trial and Appeal Board refusing registration of LOVEE LAMB for automotive seat covers. The basis for rejection is that the term LAMB is used in a deceptive manner, as the goods are made wholly from synthetic fibers. | Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act bars registration of a mark which: "Consists of or comprises . . . deceptive . . . matter. . . ." The Court used the following standard for deceptiveness: (1) is the term misdescriptive of the character, quality, function, composition or use of the goods? (2) If so, are prospective purchasers likely to believe that the misdescription actually describes the goods? (3) If so, is the misdescription likely to affect the decision to purchase? The burden is on the PTO to put forth evidence that meats the criteria. In this case, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of deceptiveness. |
|
Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1989 871 F.2d 590 Pg. 333 |
Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. (BPB) is a log structure manufacturer using the name "Appalachian Log Structures" since 1980, registering the trademark in 1981. Defendant Appalachian Log Homes, Inc. began using its name in 1981. BPB sued for trademark infringement and the district court held that the mark was geographic. | "Where it is determined that the mark as perceived by potential purchasers describes the geographic origin of the goods the mark is primarily geographically descriptive." The Lanham Act does not protect primarily geographically descriptive marks. "A trademark that is primarily geographically descriptive must have acquired secondary meaning to invoke the protection of the Lanham Act." |
|
In re California Innovations, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2003 329 F.3d 1334 Pg. 338 |
California Innovations filed an ITU trademark application for a composite mark including the words CALIFORNIA INNOVATIONS. California Innovations did not manufacture its products in California. | To deny a geographic mark protection on grounds of geographic deceptiveness, the PTO must show that the mark is primarily geographically descriptive of a generally known place, the description misrepresents the place of origin, and the misrepresentation would materially affect the decision to buy. The case was remanded because the lower court applied the wrong test. |
|
In re United Distillers, PLC Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 2000 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1220 Pg. 348 |
United Distillers filed an ITU application to register the mark HACKLER for alcoholic beverages. | The burden is on the PTO to make a prima facie case that a mark is primarily a surname. The factors to consider are: "if the surname is rare, whether anyone connected with the applicant has the term as a surname, whether the term has any other recognized meaning, and whether the term has the 'look and feel' of a surname." In this case the Court held that the term has other meanings, is rare as a surname, and isn't perceived as a surname; refusal to register reversed. |
|
In re Sauer Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 1993 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1073 Pg. 350 |
Debbie Sauer applied to register the mark "Bo Ball," for an oblong shaped ball made of white leather with red stitching at the seams. The PTO refused based on the contention that the mark falsely suggests a connection with Bo Jackson, a well-known professional athlete. | [T]he test for determining the propriety of a refusal to register based on Section 2(a) has four parts. The mark must be shown to be the same as or a close approximation of the person's previously used name or identity. It must be established that the mark (or part of it) would be recognized as such. It must be shown that the person in question is not connected with the goods or services of the applicant, and finally, the person's name or identity must be of sufficient fame that when it is used as part or all of the mark on applicant's goods, a connection with that person is likely to be made by someone considering purchasing the goods. The Court affirmed the refusal. |
|
Park'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 469 U.S. 189 Pg. 356 |
Park 'N Fly operated long-term parking near airports in several states. It had established a trademark consisting of a logo of an airplane and the words "Park 'N Fly." Dollar Park and Fly used a similar mark and contented that Park 'N Fly's mark should be cancelled on the grounds that it is merely descriptive. | "We hold that the holder of a registered mark may rely on incontestability to enjoin infringement and that such an action may not be defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive." |
|
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1918 248 U.S. 90 Pg. 367 |
In 1877, a woman from Massachusetts began using the word "Rex" in connection with a medicinal product she sold through her store. Her business was acquired along with the rights to the word "Rex." The acquiring company began distributing the product in different states, with four stores in Louisville, Kentucky. Meanwhile, in 1883, Theodore Rectanus, employed the word "Rex" as a trade-mark for a medicinal product. He continued using the word to a considerable extent in Louisville and vicinity. | "[W]here two parties independently are employing the same mark upon goods of the same class, but in separate markets wholly remote the one from the other, the question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant, unless at least it appear that the second adopter has selected the mark with some design inimical to the interests of the first user, such as to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to forestall the extension of his trade, or the like." The Court affirmed the Circuit Court of Appeal's holding that the woman from Massachusetts had done nothing to make her mark known outside New England states and therefore her successor was estopped to ask for an injunction against the continued use of the mark in Louisville and vicinity by the Rectanus Company. |
|
Dawn Donut Co., Inc. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1959 267 F.2d 358 Pg. 373 |
A wholesale distributer of doughnuts, which had federally registered trademarks 'Dawn' and 'Dawn Donut,' sought to enjoin the defendant from using the mark 'Dawn' in connection with the retail sale of doughnuts and baked goods. Although the plaintiff actively uses the trademarks, it has not used its trademarks at the retail level in defendant's market area for 30 years. | ". . . 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1127, which provides for abandonment in certain cases of non-use, applies only when the registrant fails to use his mark, within the meaning of Sec. 1127, anywhere in the nation." |
|
What-a-Burger, VA v. Whataburger, Corpus Christie, TX United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 2004 357 F.3d 441 Pg. 376 |
Two What-a-Burger restaurants, which had been doing business, each ignorant of the name of the other, dispute trademark rights over the name. The Texas Whataburger, operating exclusively in Texas, Mexico, and some other Southern states, sued the Virginia What-a-Burger, on the theory that its' registered trademark extended into the area where Virginia What-a-Burger was operating. The district court applied the doctrine of laches, as the Texas What-a-Burger had known about the Virginia What-a-Burger for 30 years. | Estoppel by laches generally applies in a trademark infringement action to preclude relief for an owner of a mark who has unreasonably slept on his rights. "Courts may apply the doctrine of estoppel by laches to deny relief to a plaintiff who, though having knowledge of an infringement, has, to the detriment of the defendant, unreasonably delayed in seeking redress." Thus, a court's consideration of laches in the trademark context should encompass at least these questions: "(1) whether the owner of the mark knew of the infringing use; (2) whether the owner's delay in challenging the infringement of the mark was inexcusable or unreasonable; and (3) whether the infringing user was unduly prejudiced by the owner's delay." "there is no likely confusion for a court to enjoin unless and until the senior user shows a likelihood of entry into the junior user's trade territory." . . . "The injunctive remedy does not ripen until the registrant shows a likelihood of entry" into the territory in question. . . . In such a scenario, "a likelihood of confusion flows directly from the proof of likelihood of entry by the registrant." |
|
National Ass'n for Healthcare Communications, Inc. v. Central Arkansas Area Agency on Aging, Inc. United States Court of Appeals or the Eighth Circuit, 2001 257 F.3d 732 Pg. 380 |
The National Association for Healthcare Communications, Inc. (NAHC) was the first to use the mark "CareLink" nationally. The Central Arkansas Area Agency on Aging, Inc. (CA) was the first to use the mark in six counties in central Arkansas and registered its mark under the Arkansas trademark statutes. The district court held that CA as first user prevailed in its six-county trade area and that CA's state registration entitled it to statewide relief. NAHC appealed arguing that CA's injunctive relief should be limited to the six Arkansas counties where it used the mark. | "Tea Rose/Rectanus doctrine -- the first user of a common law trademark may not oust a later user's good faith use of an infringing mark in a market where the first user's products or services are not sold. . . . The rationale is a core principle of trademark law: the owner of a mark may not 'monopolize markets that his trade has never reached and where the mark signifies not his goods but those of another.' . . . That essential principle applies even when the first user has federally registered its mark under the Lanham Act, with one important modification: the owner of a registered mark has the right to expand its use into a new market unless an infringing user had penetrated that market prior to registration. . . ." The Court held that CA was entitled to an injunction against an infringing use likely to cause confusion as to origin. However, the Court limited the injunction to the six county area. |
|
Person's Co., LTD. v. Christman United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1990 900 F.2d 1565 Pg. 388 |
Christman visited a Person's Co. retail shop while on a business trip in Japan. Christman copied the logo and began selling his own products with the Person's mark and logo. | Use of a mark in another country doesn't establish a mark owner as a good faith senior user in U.S. commerce. Bad faith on the junior user's part may be found if the foreign mark were already famous in the U.S., or the junior user's use was nominal and made only to block the senior user's expansion into the U.S. The Court held that Christman's use was not in bad faith and PCL's use was not senior, so there was no cancellation of registration. |
|
Grupo Gigante v. Dallo & Co., Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2004 391 F.3d 1088 Pg. 391 |
Trademark dispute between a large Mexican grocery store that had long used the mark in dispute, but not in the U.S., and a small American chain that was the first to use the mark in the United States, but did so, long after the Mexican chain began using it, in a locality where shoppers were familiar with the Mexican mark. | "Under the principle of first in time equals first in right, priority ordinarily comes with earlier use of a mark in commerce. It is 'not enough to have invented the mark first or even to have registered it first.' . . . The territoriality principle, as stated in a treatise, says that 'priority of trademark rights in the United States depends solely upon priority of use in the United States, not on priority of use anywhere in the world.' Earlier use in another country usually just does not count. . . . We hold, however, that there is a famous mark exception to the territoriality principle. While the territoriality principle is a long-standing and important doctrine within trademark law, it cannot be absolute." |
|
ITC Limited v. Punchgini, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2007 482 F.3d 135 Pg. 398 |
Plaintiff ITC Limited is an Indian Corporation owning and operating several restaurants named "Bukhara." Plaintiff opened several restaurants internationally, including restaurants in New York and Chicago. The New York restaurant closed in 1991 and the Chicago restaurant closed in 1997. In 1999, defendants, who each worked at a Bukhara restaurant, formed a restaurant in New York, naming it the Bukhara Grill and copying the restaurant in several respects. The plaintiffs sued for trademark infringement, unfair competition and false advertising. The defendants asserted abandonment and filed a counterclaim seeking rejection of ITC's U.S. trademark of the name Bukhara, which ITC had obtained in 1987. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of defendants and ITC appealed. | The famous marks doctrine is NOT an exception to the territoriality principle for foreign marks that, even if not used in the United States by their owners, have achieved a certain measure of fame within this country. |
|
International Bancorp LLC v. Societe Des Bains De Mer Et Du Cercle Des Estrangers A Monaco United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 2003 329 F.3d 359 Pg. 409 |
Societe Des Bains De Mer Et Du Cercle Des Estrangers A Monaco (SBM) owns and operates a casino named "Casino de Monte Carlo," which has operated under a trademark in the name since 1863. Appellants operate more than 150 web sites devoted to online gambling, including 53 web sites that incorporate some portion of the term "Casino de Monte Carlo." The sites also exhibit pictures of the Casino de Monte Carlo, implying they offer online gambling as an alternative to their Monaco-based casino. The district court ruled for SBM on its trademark infringement claim. | "The term 'use in commerce' means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be used in commerce - . . . . (2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.' Consistent with this definition of the statutory 'use in commerce' requirement, the Supreme Court has said that 'there is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed. . . . The right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption. Because a mark is used in commerce only if it accompanies services rendered in commerce, i.e., it is employed appurtenant to an established business or trade that is in commerce, 'mere advertising' of that mark does not establish its protectibility, though advertising is itself commerce that Congress may regulate." The Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to SBM. |
|
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1952 344 U.S. 280 Pg. 423 |
Petitioner produced Bulova watches in Mexico with the intent of deceiving the public into thinking that the watches were produced by the Bulova Watch Company, Inc., a New York Corporation. The issue is whether a United States District Court has jurisdiction to award relief to an American corporation against acts of trademark infringement and unfair competition consummated in a foreign country by a citizen and resident of the United States. | The United States can always regulate the conduct of its citizens abroad, so long as the interest that the U.S. has is greater than the interest of the foreign country. When infringing activity outside the US has a substantial effect in the U.S., the infringing activity was by a U.S. citizen, and there was no valid claim of rights under foreign law, rights under Lanham Act can be enforced. |
|
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., Ltd. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1956 234 F.2d 633, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 Pg. 425 |
Plaintiff, Vanity Fair Mills, Inc., has manufactured and sold women's underwear under the trademark VANITY FAIR since 1914 in the United States. Defendant, T. Eaton Co., is a Canadian company that filed an application for registration in Canada of the trademark VANITY FAIR, in connection with women's clothing, and was granted application of that mark in 1915. For a period of time defendant ceased using the trademark and instead purchased plaintiff's wares to sell in Canada while mentioning the goods were of United States origin. In 1953 defendant resumed manufacture and objected to plaintiffs selling underwear to a main Canadian competitor. After that competitor ceased business dealings with plaintiff, due to defendants threats of infringement suits, plaintiff brought this action seeking injunctive relief against use by the defendant of the trademark, and claims superior rights to the name. | Several factors are relevant to whether the Lanham Act is to be applied extraterritorially: (i) whether the defendant is a United States citizen; (ii) whether there exists a conflict between the defendant's trademark rights under foreign law and the plaintiff's trademark rights under domestic law; and (iii) whether the defendant's conduct has a substantial effect on United States commerce. |
|
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1994 14 F.3d 733 Pg. 431 |
Sterling Drug owned the United States rights to the BAYER mark and brought an action to restrain the German company, Bayer AG, from using the mark in the United States. The German company owned the rights to the BAYER mark in most other countries in the world. | Where there is a foreign senior international user of a mark, a court may fashion an appropriately limited injunction with only those extraterritorial provisions reasonably necessary to protect against significant trademark-impairing effects on American commerce. |
|
McBee v. Delica Co. United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 2005 417 F.3d 107 Pg. 433 |
Delica Co. is a Japanese corporation that adopted the name "Cecil McBee" for its adolescent female clothing line. Cecil McBee, plaintiff, is an American citizen and well-known American jazz musician. McBee sued Delica Co. for false endorsement and dilution under the Lanham Act. | "We hold that the Lanham Act grants subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct by foreign defendants only where the conduct has a substantial effect on United States commerce. Absent a showing of such a substantial effect, at least as to foreign defendants, the court lacks jurisdiction over the Lanham Act claim. . . . The substantial effects test requires that there be evidence of impacts within the United States, and these impacts must be of a sufficient character and magnitude to give the United States a reasonably strong interest in the litigation. . . The 'substantial effects' test must be applied in light of the core purposes of the Lanham Act, which are both to protect the ability of American consumers to avoid confusion and to help assure a trademark's owner that it will reap the financial and reputational rewards associated with having a desirable name or product. . . . The goal of the jurisdictional test is to ensure that the United States has a sufficient interest in the litigation, as measured by the interests protected by the Lanham Act, to assert jurisdiction." |
|
Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co. 7th Cir. 1912 201 F. 510 Pg. 444 |
In 1857, Gail Borden founded Borden's Condensed Milk Co. Borden became synonymous with milk products and acquired value as a trade-name. In 1911, the Appellants Charles F. Borden, George W. Brown, and Edgar Stanley incorporated the 'Borden Ice Cream Company.' Charles Borden had one share of 50 shares of stock and had never been in the ice cream business. | In the absence of competition, the doctrine of unfair competition cannot be invoked. |
|
J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Limited Partnership v. Settlement Funding LLC United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2007 2007 WL 40115 Pg. 446 |
J.G. Wentworth, a finance company, alleges that defendant has used its trademark through Google's AdWords program and in the "meta tags" for the defendant's website. Plaintiff further claims that defendant has purposefully used the trademark in order to appear proximate to plaintiff in Internet searches. | The initial-interest confusion theory is not applicable with regard to search engine results, where there are separate and distinct links. |
|
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1963 314 F.2d 149, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 Pg. 447 |
Plaintiff manufactured and sold Black & White scotch and held a federal registration of the name. Defendant, a low-end manufacturer of beer, marketed and sold Black & White beer. | The Lanham Act prohibits use without the registrant's consent of any registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or services. |
|
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservations, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1996 86 F.3d 619, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1093 Pg. 454 |
Holiday Inns, Inc, filed a Lanham Act suit against defendants for infringing their trademark on the telephone number, 1-800-HOLIDAY. The defendant set up a number that substituted the number zero for the letter "O." Customers would occasionally mistakenly call the 1-800 number maintained by the defendant. | The Lanham Act forbids only the "use in commerce of any reporduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark which is likely to cause confusion." In this case the defendants never used Holiday Inn's trademark and did not cause the confusion. The confusion already existed. The Court reversed summary judgment for the plaintiff. |
|
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2005 414 F.3d 400 Pg. 459 |
WhenU.com caused pop-up ads to appear on a users desktop when the user accessed 1-800 Contact's web site. The pop-ups advertised 1-800's competitors. | "WhenU does not "use" 1-800's trademarks within the meaning of the Lanham Act, when it (1) includes 1-800's website address, which is almost identical to 1-800's trademark, in an unpublished directory of terms that trigger delivery of WhenU's contextually relevant advertising to C-users; or (2) causes separate, branded pop-up ads to appear on a C-user's computer screen either above, below, or along the bottom edge of the 1-800 website window." |
|
Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2005 403 F.3d 672 Pg. 474 |
Kremer, dissatisfied with the surgical hair replacement services provided by Bosley, established Web sites with the Bosley name. The sites listed complaints against Bosley and provided information about Bosley's competition. | "Infringement claims are subject to a commercial use requirement. The infringement section of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1114, states that any person who 'uses in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . .' can be held liable for such use." The Court held that the use of the Bosley name was not commercial and therefore there was no trademark infringement. |
|
Virgin Enterprises Ltd. v. Nawab United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit, 2003 335 F. 3d 141 Pg. 483 |
Virgin Enterprises sells consumer electronics, has an airline, and sells other products through retail outlets. Defendant Nawab established a cell phone company using the name "Virgin." | The Court applied six of the Polaroid likelihood of confusion factors: (1) the strength of the mark, which encompasses two different concepts, the inherent distinctiveness and the acquired distinctiveness, or fame; (2) the similarity of the marks; (3) the proximity of the products sold under the mark; (4) the likelihood that plaintiff will sell the products being sold by defendants; (5) the existence of actual confusion among consumers; and (6) the sophistication of consumers. The Court held that Virgin's mark was sufficiently strong to cause confusion, that the marks were similar, and that the proximity of the products were likely to cause confusion, as the leap from consumer electronics to cellular phones is not so great. |
|
McDonald's Corp. v. Druck and Gerner D.D.S., P.C. d/b/a McDental United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, 1993 814 F. Supp. 1127 Pg. 488 |
McDonald's restaurant corporation sued dentists for using the name "McDental," in connection with their mall-based dental business. | Evidence of actual confusion is highly persuasive. In this case, the plaintiff presented evidence through surveys that 30% of the population associated the defendant's name with plaintiff. The court found that this percentage was "substantial." Also, the Court found that there was bad faith on the part of the defendant in choosing the name. The Court found that the there was a trademark infringement that warranted the issuance of an injunction. |
|
Libman Compnay v. Vining Industries, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1995 69 F. 3d 1360 Pg. 494 |
The Libman Company brought suit against Vining Industries for infringement of a federally registered trademark on a broom. Libman produced a broom, which had bristles with distinctive colors. Vining began producing a brooms with distinctive colors. | When it is not obvious that customers would confuse products, specific evidence is needed to show trademark infringement. The Court held: "It should not have been very hard for Libman to find some satisfied owners of its brooms and confront them with the Vining broom and see whether they thought it was the same brand of broom. Without such evidence it would be pure speculation to conclude that anyone, let alone a significant fraction of the broom-buying public, could have been misled into believing that the Vining broom and the Libman broom were one and the same brand." |
|
GO-TO.COM, Inc. v. Walt Disney Company United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2002 202 F.3d 1199 Pg. 521 |
Disney designed a logo for its Go Network, which was very similar to the logo of existing s |