Cases and Materials on Torts
- Epstein
- 8th Edition
- ISBN: 073554011X
| Page | Case Name | Citation | Court | Audio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | Vosburg v. Putney | 50 N.W. 403 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891 |  Download |
| 9 | Dougherty v. Stepp | 18 N.C. 371 | Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1835 | Download |
| 13 | Intel Corp. v. Hamidi | 71 P.3d 296 | Supreme Court of California, 2003 | Download |
| 20 | Mohr v. Williams | 104 N.W. 12 | Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1905 | Download |
| 26 | Canterbury v. Spence | 464 F.2d 772 | United States Court Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit, 1972 | Download |
| 27 | Hudson v. Craft | 204 P.2d 1 | Supreme Court of California, 1949 | Download |
| 33 | McGuire v. Almy | 8 N.E.2d 760 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1937 | Download |
| 37 | Courvoisier v. Raymond | 47 P. 284 | Supreme Court of Colorado, 1896 | Download |
| 40 | Bird v. Holbrook | 130 Eng. Rep. 911 | C.P. 1825 | Download |
| 46 | Kirby v. Foster | 22 A. 1111 | Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Providence, 1891 | Download |
| 49 | Ploof v. Putnam | 71 A. 188 | Supreme Court of Vermont, 1908 | Download |
| 51 | Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. | 124 N.W. 221 | Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1910 | Download |
| 60 | I. de S. and Wife v. W. de S. | Assisarum, folio 99, placitum 60 | At the Assizes, 1348 or 1349 | Download |
| 60 | Tuberville v. Savage | 86 Eng. Rep. 684 | King's Bench Division, 1669 | Download |
| 63 | Alcorn v. Mitchell | 63 Ill. 553 | Supreme Court of Illinois, Southern Grand Division, 1872 | Download |
| 65 | Bird v. Jones | 115 Eng. Rep. 688 | King's Bench Division, 1845 | Download |
| 68 | Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc. | 268 N.E.2d 860 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1971 | Download |
| 72 | Wilkinson v. Downton | 2 Q.B. 57 | Queen's Bench Division, 1897 | Download |
| 82 | The Thorns Case | Y.B. Mich. 6 Ed. 4, f.7, pl. 18 | King's Bench, 1466 | Download |
| 87 | Weaver v. Ward | 80 Eng. Rep. 284 | King's Bench, England, 1616 | Download |
| 93 | Scott v. Shepherd | 96 Eng. Rep. 525 | Court of Common Pleas, 1773 | Download |
| 100 | Brown v. Kendall | 60 Mass. 292 | Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex, 1850 | Download |
| 107 | Fletcher v. Rylands | L.R. 1 Ex. 265 | In the Exchequer Chamber, 1866 | Download |
| 110 | Rylands v. Fletcher | L.R. 3 H.L. 330 | House of Lords, 1868 | Download |
| 115 | Brown v. Collins | 53 N.H. 442 | Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire, 1873 | Download |
| 128 | Stone v. Bolton | 1 K.B. 201 | Court of Appeal, 1950 | Download |
| 130 | Bolton v. Stone | A.C. 850 | House of Lords, 1951 | Download |
| 137 | Hammontree v. Jenner | 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 | Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, 1971 | Download |
| 145 | Vaughan v. Menlove | 132 Eng. Rep. 490 | Court of Common Pleas, 1837 | Download |
| 151 | Roberts v. Ring | 173 N.W. 437 | Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1919 | Download |
| 153 | Daniels v. Evans | 224 A.2d 63 | Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1966 | Download |
| 158 | Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co. | 173 N.W.2d 619 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1970 | Download |
| 162 | Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen | 338 P.2d 743 | Supreme Court of Washington, Department One, 1959 | Download |
| 163 | Robinson v. Pioche, Bayerque & Co. | 5 Cal. 460 | Supreme Court of California, 1855 | Download |
| 164 | Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. Peterson | 69 P. 578 | Supreme Court of Colorado, 1902 | Download |
| 166 | Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works | 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 | Court of Exchequer, 1856 | Download |
| 167 | Eckert v. Long Island R.R. | 43 N.Y. 502 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1871 | Download |
| 171 | Osborne v. Montgomery | 234 N.W. 372 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1931 | Download |
| 173 | Cooley v. Public Service Co. | 10 A.2d 673 | Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1940 | Download |
| 175 | United States v. Carroll Towing Co. | 159 F.2d 169 | United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1947 | Download |
| 182 | Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transportation Services, Inc. | 928 P.2d 1202 | Supreme Court of Alaska, 1996 | Download |
| 184 | Andrews v. United Airlines | 24 F.3d 39 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1994 | Download |
| 188 | Titus v. Bradford, B. & K. R. Co. | 20 A. 517 | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1890 | Download |
| 190 | Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co. | 76 Me. 100 | Supreme Court of Maine, 1884 | Download |
| 191 | The T.J. Hooper | 60 F.2d 737 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1932 | Download |
| 197 | Lama v. Borras | 16 F.3d 473 | U.S. Court of Appeals for 1st Circuit, 1994 | Download |
| 228 | Osborne v. McMasters | 41 N.W. 543 | Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1889 | Download |
| 233 | Martin v. Herzog | 126 N.E. 814 | New York Court of Appeals, 1920 | Download |
| 235 | Brown v. Shyne | 151 N.E. 197 | New York Court of Appeals, 1926 | Download |
| 242 | Uhr v. East Greenbush Central School District | 720 N.E.2d 886 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1999 | Download |
| 251 | Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Goodman | 275 U.S. 66 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1927 | Download |
| 252 | Pokora v. Wabash Ry. | 292 U.S. 98 | U.S. Supreme Court, 1934 | Download |
| 253 | Jewell v. CSX Transportation, Inc. | 135 F.3d 361 | United States Court Of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit, 1998 | Download |
| 261 | Byrne v. Boadle | 159 Eng. Rep. 299 | Court of Exchequer, 1863 | Download |
| 268 | Colmenares Vivas v. Sun Alliance Insurance Co. | 807 F.2d 1102 | United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 1986 | Download |
| 276 | Ybarra v. Spangard | 154 P.2d 687 | Supreme Court of California, 1944 | Download |
| 289 | Beems v. Chicago, Rock Island & Peoria R.R. | 12 N.W. 222 | Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines, 1882 | Download |
| 293 | Gyerman v. United States Lines Co. | 498 P.2d 1043 | Supreme Court of California, 1972 | Download |
| 300 | LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. | 232 U.S. 340 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1914 | Download |
| 304 | Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co. | 492 P.2d 1030 | Supreme Court of Washington, 1972 | Download |
| 308 | Fuller v. Illinois Central R.R. | 56 So. 783 | Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1911 | Download |
| 313 | Mills v. Armstrong (The Bernina) | 13 App. Cas. 1 | House of Lords, 1888 | Download |
| 318 | Lamson v. American Axe & Tool Co. | 58 N.E. 585 | Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1900 | Download |
| 322 | Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co. | 166 N.E. 173 | New York Court of Appeals, 1929 | Download |
| 330 | Obstetrics & Gynecologists Ltd. v. Pepper | 693 P.2d 1259 | Supreme Court of Nevada, 1985 | Download |
| 337 | Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California | 532 P.2d 1226 | Supreme Court of California, 1975 | Download |
| 355 | Union Stockyard Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. | 196 U.S. 217 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1905 | Download |
| 359 | American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court | 578 P.2d 899 | Supreme Court of California, 1978 | Download |
| 368 | McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde & River Don Castings, Ltd. | 511 U.S. 202 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 | |
| 375 | Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States | 398 F.2d 167 | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1968 | Download |
| 383 | Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc. | 719 N.E.2d 756 | Supreme Court of Illinois, 1999 | |
| 394 | New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad | 264 F. 334 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1920 | Download |
| 398 | Zuchowicz v. United States | 140 F.3d 381 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1998 | Download |
| 404 | General Electric Co. v. Joiner | 522 U.S. 136 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 | Download |
| 412 | Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative | 664 P.2d 474 | Supreme Court of Washington, 1983 | Download |
| 418 | Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. | 211 N.W. 913 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1927 | Download |
| 425 | Summers v. Tice | 199 P.2d 1 | Supreme Court of California, 1948 | Download |
| 428 | Skipworth v. Lead Industries Association | 690 A.2d 169 | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1997 | Download |
| 436 | Ryan v. New York Central R.R. | 35 N.Y. 210 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1866 | Download |
| 440 | Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough | 43 A. 240 | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1899 | Download |
| 444 | Brower v. New York Central & H.R.R. | 103 A. 166 | Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, 1918 | Download |
| 450 | Wagner v. International Ry. | 133 N.E. 437 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1921 | Download |
| 452 | In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co. | 3 K.B. 560 | Court of Appeal, 1921 | Download |
| 456 | Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. | 162 N.E. 99 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1928 | Download |
| 467 | Marshall v. Nugent | 222 F.2d 604 | United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 1955 | Download |
| 471 | Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. | A.C. 388 | Privy Council, 1961 | Download |
| 480 | Mitchell v. Rochester Railway | 45 N.E. 354 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1896 | Download |
| 483 | Dillon v. Legg | 441 P.2d 912 | Supreme Court of California, 1968 | Download |
| 497 | Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co. | 44 A. 809 | Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1897 | Download |
| 499 | Hurley v. Eddingfield | 59 N.E. 1058 | Supreme Court of Indiana, 1901 | Download |
| 507 | Montgomery v. National Convoy & Trucking Co. | 195 S.E. 247 | Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1937 | Download |
| 513 | Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck | A.C. 358 | House of Lords, 1929 | Download |
| 521 | Rowland v. Christian | 443 P.2d 561 | Supreme Court of California, 1968 | Download |
| 534 | Coggs v. Bernard | 92 Eng. Rep. 107 | Queen's Bench, 1703 | Download |
| 536 | Erie R.R. v. Stewart | 40 F.2d 855 | Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 1930 | Download |
| 539 | Marsalis v. LaSalle | 94 So. 2d 120 | Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Orleans, 1957 | Download |
| 541 | Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. | 159 N.E. 896 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1928 | Download |
| 549 | Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. | 439 F.2d 477 | United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1970 | Download |
| 559 | Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California | 551 P.2d 334 | Supreme Court of California, 1976 | |
| 569 | Poggi v. Scott | 139 P. 815 | Supreme Court of California, 1914 | Download |
| 581 | Gehrts v. Batteen | 620 N.W.2d 775 | Supreme Court of South Dakota, 2001 | Download |
| 589 | Spano v. Perini Corp. | 250 N.E.2d 31 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1969 | Download |
| 599 | Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co. | 916 F.2d 1174 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1990 | Download |
| 608 | Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Electric Cooperative | 548 N.W.2d 829 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1996 | |
| 618 | Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc. | 114 So. 2d 357 | District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, 1959 | Download |
| 622 | Rogers v. Elliott | 15 N.E. 768 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1888 | Download |
| 625 | Ensign v. Walls | 34 N.W.2d 549 | Supreme Court of Michigan, 1948 | Download |
| 629 | Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. | 257 N.E.2d 870 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1970 | Download |
| 641 | 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc. | 750 N.E.2d 1097 | Court of Appeals of New York, 2001 | Download |
| 646 | Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp. | 273 F.3d 536 | United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 2001 | Download |
| 657 | MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. | 111 N.E. 1050 | New York Court of Appeals, 1916 | Download |
| 665 | Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno | 150 P.2d 436 | Supreme Court of California, 1944 | Download |
| 681 | Casa Clara Condominium Association, Inc. v. Charly Toppino & Sons, Inc. | 620 So. 2d 1244 | Supreme Court of Florida, 1993 | Download |
| 689 | Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Services, Inc. | 668 A.2d 521 | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1995 | Download |
| 697 | Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. | 790 N.E.2d 252 | Court of Appeals of New York, 2003 | Download |
| 702 | Campo v. Scofield | 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1951 | Download |
| 704 | Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young | 321 A.2d 737 | Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1974 | Download |
| 712 | Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. | 573 P.2d 443 | Supreme Court of California, 1978 | |
| 721 | Linegar v. Armour of America | 909 F.2d 1150 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1990 | Download |
| 725 | Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. | 694 A.2d 1319 | Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1997 | Download |
| 728 | Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co. | 792 A.2d 1145 | Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2002 | Download |
| 731 | MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. | 475 N.E.2d 65 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1985 | Download |
| 741 | Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. | 696 N.E.2d 909 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1998 | Download |
| 748 | Hood v. Ryobi America Corp. | 181 F.3d 608 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 1999 | Download |
| 755 | Daly v. General Motors Corp. | 575 P.2d 1162 | Supreme Court of California, 1978 | Download |
| 764 | Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. | 529 U.S. 861 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 | Download |
| 774 | McDougald v. Garber | 536 N.E.2d 372 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1989 | Download |
| 783 | O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co. | 677 F.2d 1194 | United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 1982 | |
| 793 | Duncan v. Kansas City Southern Railway | 773 So. 2d 670 | Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2000 | Download |
| 809 | Harding v. Town of Townshend | 43 Vt. 536 | Supreme Court of Vermont, Windham County, 1871 | Download |
| 824 | Kemezy v. Peters | 79 F.3d 33 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1996 | Download |
| 831 | State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell | 538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, (Torts Edit) | Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 | |
| 845 | Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corp. | 636 So. 2d 700 | Supreme Court of Florida, 1993 | Download |
| 864 | Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. | 426 P.2d 173 | Supreme Court of California, 1967 | Download |
| 879 | Clodgo v. Industry Rentavision, Inc. | 701 A.2d 1044 | Supreme Court of Vermont, 1997 | Download |
| 888 | Wilson v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board | 545 P.2d 225 | Supreme Court of California, 1976 | Download |
| 894 | Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co. | 398 N.W.2d 882 | Supreme Court of Michigan, 1986 | Download |
| 905 | Pinnick v. Cleary | 271 N.E.2d 592 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk, 1971 | |
| 922 | Colaio v. Feinberg | 262 F. Supp. 2d 273 | United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2003 | Download |
| 933 | Doe v. Gonzaga University | 24 P.3d 390 | Supreme Court of Washington, 2001 | Download |
| 938 | Firth v. State of New York | 775 N.E.2d 463 | Court of Appeals of New York, 2002 | Download |
| 943 | Wilkow v. Forbes, Inc. | 241 F.3d 552 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2001 | Download |
| 950 | Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp. | 322 F.3d 918 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2003 | Download |
| 964 | E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones | A.C. 20 | Court of Appeal, House of Lords, 1910 | Download |
| 967 | Terwilliger v. Wands | 17 N.Y. 54 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1858 | Download |
| 969 | Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc. | 280 N.W. 879 | Supreme Court of North Dakota, 1938 | Download |
| 972 | Faulk v. Aware, Inc. | 231 N.Y.S.2d 270 | Supreme Court of New York, 1962 | Download |
| 974 | Faulk v. Aware, Inc. | 244 N.Y.S.2d 259 | Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, 1963 | Download |
| 978 | Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes | 67 F.3d 816 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1996 | Download |
| 985 | Watt v. Longsdon | 1 K.B. 130 | King's Bench, 1930 | Download |
| 992 | Kennedy v. Cannon | 182 A.2d 54 | Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1962 | Download |
| 998 | Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson | 713 F.2d 262 | United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1983 | Download |
| 1005 | New York Times Co. v. Sullivan | 376 U.S. 254 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 | |
| 1015 | Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts | 388 U.S. 130 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 | |
| 1024 | Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. | 418 U.S. 323 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 | Download |
| 1033 | Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps | 475 U.S. 767 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1986 | Download |
| 1047 | Nader v. General Motors Corp. | 255 N.E.2d 765 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1970 | Download |
| 1113 | Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank | 42 N.E.2d 808 | Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1942 | Download |
| 1116 | Laidlaw v. Organ | 15 U.S. 178 | U.S. Supreme Court, 1817 | Download |
| Case Information | Fact Summary | Rule of Law |
|---|---|---|
|
Vosburg v. Putney Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891 50 N.W. 403 Pg. 4 |
Fourteen year-old schoolboy (defendant) reaches out his leg and toes the shin of his classmate (plaintiff) while in the classroom. Though the touch is slight, plaintiff experiences pain and swelling in the subsequent days and ultimately loses the use of his leg. | "[T]he wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the [intentional] wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him." |
|
Dougherty v. Stepp Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1835 18 N.C. 371 Pg. 9 |
Defendant enters plaintiff's land with a surveyor and declares the land his own without marking trees or cutting bushes. | "[E]very unauthorized, and therefore unlawful, entry into the close of another is a trespass." |
|
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi Supreme Court of California, 2003 71 P.3d 296 Pg. 13 |
Defendant was an employee at Intel. He email bombed almost everyone in the company. Intel claimed that this was a trespass to chattels because it slowed down the network and interfered with productivity. | An email that does not damage a computer is not a trespass, since it does not interfere with the use or possession of the chattel. |
|
Mohr v. Williams Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1905 104 N.W. 12 Pg. 20 |
Patient (plaintiff) agrees to surgery on her RIGHT ear. During the procedure, surgeon (defendant) discovers problem in LEFT ear and operates (skillfully and successfully) on LEFT ear while plaintiff is unconscious. | If contact is made without plaintiff's consent, then the contact is wrongful, and in turn, unlawful. |
|
Canterbury v. Spence United States Court Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit, 1972 464 F.2d 772 Pg. 26 |
Plaintiff consulted doctor about back pain. After performance of a myelogram, doctor told plaintiff that he needed to undergo a laminectomy. After surgery, plaintiff suffered a fall from his hospital bed. Plaintiff did not recover fully from the surgery and was left with paralysis of the bowels and urinary incontinence. The doctor did not inform the plaintiff before surgery of the risks of possible paralysis. | The court held that physicians have a duty to disclose to patients all information regarding risks of treatment that is reasonable under the circumstances. |
|
Hudson v. Craft Supreme Court of California, 1949 204 P.2d 1 Pg. 27 |
18 year old plaintiff consents to engage in a boxing match, which is conducted by the promoter (defendant) in violation of state rules and regulations. Plaintiff suffers physical injury when struck by opponent. | Court follows minority rule for mutual combat (Restatement First, Section 61)--consent is a valid defense, but with the following EXCEPTION: When a class of persons is unable to "appreciate the consequences of such an invasion", consent is not a defense. Traditionally, the majority position held that consent cannot be a defense in cases of mutual combat. |
|
McGuire v. Almy Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1937 8 N.E.2d 760 Pg. 33 |
Live-in nurse (plaintiff) hears her mental patient (defendant) thrashing about and offers to enter room and help. Patient replies, "If you come in, I will kill you." Nurse enters, and patient beats her with the leg of broken furniture. | If an insane person intends to do the HARM, then she is liable for the intentional tort. (Note the difference from the competent individual, who is liable so long as she merely intends the OFFENSIVE ACT) |
|
Courvoisier v. Raymond Supreme Court of Colorado, 1896 47 P. 284 Pg. 37 |
Jewelry store owner (defendant) awakes to find unknown persons attempting to break into his store. Owner fires warning shot and chases persons out of building. Outside, police apprehend suspects, and one officer (plaintiff) approaches jewelry store. Owner, unaware of approaching man's identity, shoots the officer | In order for a claim of self-defense to be valid, the defendant's fears must be "reasonable under the circumstances" (in addition to a genuine ("honest") belief). Thus, self-defense has both an objective and subjective component. |
|
Bird v. Holbrook C.P. 1825 130 Eng. Rep. 911 Pg. 40 |
Defendant protected his valuable tulip garden with a spring gun. | Using a spring gun to deter trespassers is contrary to common law when done without notice and between sunset and sundown. Although individuals have the right to protect their property, they may not endanger human life while doing so. |
|
Kirby v. Foster Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Providence, 1891 22 A. 1111 Pg. 46 |
50 dollars goes missing from Providence Warehouse Co. and boss (defendant) deducts amount from bookkeeper's pay (plaintiff). Later in time, boss entrusts bookkeeper with money to pay the staff, but bookkeeper takes what he is owed into possession. Boss uses force in an attempt to retake the sum of money. | General Rule: If trespasser takes chattel (1) without right AND (2) against owner's will, then owner may use reasonable force to recapture chattel. However, if trespasser has taken the chattel "honestly though erroneously," owner may not use force to recapture it. |
|
Ploof v. Putnam Supreme Court of Vermont, 1908 71 A. 188 Pg. 49 |
Due to a severe storm on the lake, plaintiff was forced to moor his sloop to defendant's dock in order to protect the lives aboard. Defendant's servant unmoored the sloop, which was then destroyed upon the shore. Plaintiff and his family survived, but suffered injuries. | "The doctrine of necessity applies with special force to the preservation of human life. One assaulted and in peril of his life may run through the close of another to escape." |
|
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1910 124 N.W. 221 Pg. 51 |
Defendant moors his boat to plaintiff's dock, pursuant to contract to unload cargo. A storm develops, however, and defendant keeps boat moored to dock, adhering to custom. Boat buffets the dock and causes $500 damage to the dock. | Even when necessity provides a valid defense to trespass, the would-be trespasser must pay compensatory relief for damage caused to property. |
|
I. de S. and Wife v. W. de S. At the Assizes, 1348 or 1349 Assisarum, folio 99, placitum 60 Pg. 60 |
Defendant struck at plaintiff with a hatchet, but did not touch her. | Assault does not require a touching; There is harm for an assault, and damages are recoverable, even though there is no touching. |
|
Tuberville v. Savage King's Bench Division, 1669 86 Eng. Rep. 684 Pg. 60 |
Man put his hand upon a sword and basically said that the only reason he wasn't going to assault the man that sued him was because it was "assizes-time." | If a threat to harm does not include a present intent to harm, it is not an assault. An assault requires a threat of IMMINENT danger. |
|
Alcorn v. Mitchell Supreme Court of Illinois, Southern Grand Division, 1872 63 Ill. 553 Pg. 63 |
Upon adjournment of a trespass trial, the plaintiff (appellant) spat on the defendant (appellee). | Court may instruct jury to award "vindictive damages where there are circumstances of malice, willfulness, wantonness, outrage and indignity attending the wrong complained of." |
|
Bird v. Jones King's Bench Division, 1845 115 Eng. Rep. 688 Pg. 65 |
Defendant obstructed the path of plaintiff. Plaintiff could have gone around the man if he had wanted. | False imprisonment requires that the area to which one is confined have barriers. |
|
Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1971 268 N.E.2d 860 Pg. 68 |
Elderly man (plaintiff) purchases coat in department store and puts his ascot into the pocket. Store employee (defendant) blocks the exit, suspecting larceny, and grabs elderly man by the arm. The elderly man suffers shock and is hospitalized. | Forced detention constitutes false imprisonment unless the grounds for restraint are reasonable under the circumstances. Note that the standard is objective, rather than subjective. |
|
Wilkinson v. Downton Queen's Bench Division, 1897 2 Q.B. 57 Pg. 72 |
Plaintiff suffered violent nervous shock and physical illness when, as a practical joke, defendant told plaintiff that her husband broke both of his legs in an accident. | A plaintiff has a cause of action where "defendant's act was so plainly calculated to produce [emotional distress] that an intention to produce it ought to be imputed to the defendant, regard being had to the fact that the effect was produced on a person proved to be in an ordinary state of health and mind." |
|
The Thorns Case King's Bench, 1466 Y.B. Mich. 6 Ed. 4, f.7, pl. 18 Pg. 82 |
Defendant cut thorns, which landed on the property of the plaintiff. When the defendant went to retrieve the thorns, he trampled on the defendant's property and caused damage. | One is strictly liable for the damage one causes to another's land, regardless of whether the act was intentional or lawful. This case is illustrative of the origins of strict liability in tort - that civil compensation is proper when damage is done. |
|
Weaver v. Ward King's Bench, England, 1616 80 Eng. Rep. 284 Pg. 87 |
Defendant accidently shot the plaintiff while fighting in front of the king. | ". . .[B]ecause felony must be done animo felonico [with a felonious mind]; yet in trespass, which tends only to give damages according to hurt or loss, it is not so. . ." |
|
Scott v. Shepherd Court of Common Pleas, 1773 96 Eng. Rep. 525 Pg. 93 |
Defendant threw a lighted squib (an explosive device) into a crowded market place. Two men threw the squib out of their stalls before it exploded in plaintiff's eyes. | An action of trespass is maintainable in the present case, where the "natural and probable consequences" of defendant's act were to injure somebody, despite the fact that there were intervening actors. |
|
Brown v. Kendall Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex, 1850 60 Mass. 292 Pg. 100 |
Two dogs are fighting in the presence of their masters. The defendant tries to separate the dogs with a stick beating, and accidentally strikes plaintiff in the eye. | In order to recover for unintentional harm, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that defendant failed to meet at least an ordinary level of care. |
|
Fletcher v. Rylands In the Exchequer Chamber, 1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265 Pg. 107 |
Defendant contracts to build a reservoir on his land, which is located on top of old coal mines that are connected to the mines constructed by the plaintiff on a separate parcel of land. The reservoir fails, and water falls into the old mines, eventually flooding plaintiff's mines. | "[T]hat the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." |
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Rylands v. Fletcher House of Lords, 1868 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 Pg. 110 |
Defendant contracts to build a reservoir on his land, which is located on top of old coal mines that are connected to the mines constructed by the plaintiff on a separate parcel of land. The reservoir fails, and water falls into the old mines, eventually flooding plaintiff's mines. | "If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it should escape, may cause damage to his neighbour, he does so at his peril. If it does escape, and cause damage, he is responsible, however careful he may have been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage." |
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Brown v. Collins Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire, 1873 53 N.H. 442 Pg. 115 |
Random sounds spooks defendant's horses. Against defendant's will and intent, the horses trespass onto plaintiff's land and do damage. The defendant had used ordinary care with the horses. | Common social activities--such as transportation by horse in 1873--should be held to a standard of negligence. |
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Stone v. Bolton Court of Appeal, 1950 1 K.B. 201 Pg. 128 |
Plaintiff was struck in the head by a cricket ball. The ball was hit from the cricket grounds adjoining the road she was walking on. Balls had been infrequently hit over the fence surrounding the grounds 6-10 times in the last 30 years. | Where cricket balls had been hit over a fence surrounding a cricket field before, however infrequently, and depsite that fact that no one had been injured before, it was foreseeable that someone might be injured. |
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Bolton v. Stone House of Lords, 1951 A.C. 850 Pg. 130 |
During a cricket match a batsman hit a ball which struck and injured the plaintiff who was standing on a highway adjoining the ground. | For an act to be negligent there must be, not only a reasonable possibility of its happening, but also of injury being caused thereby. According to the facts of this case the risk of injury to a person on the highway resulting from the hitting of a ball out of the ground was so small that the probability of such an injury would not be anticipated by a reasonable man. Therefore, the plaintiff should not be able to recover from defendant. |
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Hammontree v. Jenner Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, 1971 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 Pg. 137 |
Defendant suffers seizure while driving and crashes into plaintiff's business and causes personal injury and property damage. | 1. "Users of the streets and highways" are subject to the principles of negligence. 2. If the risk is not reasonably foreseeable, then the driver is not liable for negligence. |
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Vaughan v. Menlove Court of Common Pleas, 1837 132 Eng. Rep. 490 Pg. 145 |
Defendant consructed a hayrick, or a stack of hay, near the border of the property he rented from the plaintiff. Defendant was repeatedly warned that the hayrick was in danger of catching fire over the course of five weeks. Desipite the warnings, defendant said that "he would chance it." The hay eventually caught fire, burning down both defendant's buildings and the cottages of the plaintiff on a neighboring parcel of land. | The reasonable man standard is objective, not subjective; "...you must so enjoy your own property as not to injure that of another." |
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Roberts v. Ring Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1919 173 N.W. 437 Pg. 151 |
7 year old boy (plaintiff) runs across the street, and old man (defendant) with bad eyesight and hearing runs him over at a speed 5mph. | (1) In negligence cases, a child is held to a subjective standard: "the degree of care commonly exercised by the ordinary boy of his age and maturity." (2) The elderly are held to an objective standard: "care usually exercised by the ordinary prudent normal man." |
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Daniels v. Evans Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1966 224 A.2d 63 Pg. 153 |
Minor (plaintiff) crashes motorcycle into defendant's automobile and dies. | When a minor assumes responsibility for an operation normally undertaken by adults, the individual should be "judged by the same standard of care as an adult." |
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Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1970 173 N.W.2d 619 Pg. 158 |
Insane woman (defendant) drives into oncoming lane of traffic, but claims that God was steering. Defendant's car strikes plaintiff's truck. | Insanity is a defense in a case of negligence ONLY IF (1) the person has no reasonable forewarning that an existing condition could cause such an incident AND (2) the condition acts suddenly and prevents the person from conforming conduct to the standard of the reasonable person. |
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Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen Supreme Court of Washington, Department One, 1959 338 P.2d 743 Pg. 162 |
City construction worker removes barricade for a period of time from the excavation site, and blind man (plaintiff), walking with cane, falls in and suffers injury. | "The person under a physical disability is obliged to use the care which a reasonable person under the same or similar disability would exercise under the circumstances." |
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Robinson v. Pioche, Bayerque & Co. Supreme Court of California, 1855 5 Cal. 460 Pg. 163 |
Defendants leave an uncovered hole in the sidewalk of a public street, and drunk pedestrian (plaintiff) is injured. | "[T]he intoxication of the plaintiff cannot excuse ... gross negligence [by the defendant]." |
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Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. Peterson Supreme Court of Colorado, 1902 69 P. 578 Pg. 164 |
A hackney cart owned by plaintiff was recieved by defendant railroad for the purpose of transporting it to another location. Before plaintiff could retrieve the cart, it was destroyed by fire. | "...the capacity of a warehouseman is not the true test of his liability. The care required of a warehouseman is the same, whether he be rich or poor." |
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Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Court of Exchequer, 1856 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 Pg. 166 |
Plaintiff's house is flooded when a water main bursts during a severe frost. The accident was caused due to encrusted ice around a fire plug connected to the water main. | "A reasonable man would act with reference to the average circumstances of the temperature in ordinary years. The defendants had provided against such frosts as experience would have led men, acting prudently, to provide against; and they are not guilty of negligence, because their precautions proved insufcient against the effects of the extreme severity of the frost of 1856, which penetrated to a greater depth than any which ordinarily occurs south of the polar regions." |
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Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Court of Appeals of New York, 1871 43 N.Y. 502 Pg. 167 |
Man runs across railroad tracks to save a child from certain death and is struck and killed by defendant's train. | There is an exception to the general rule that a person who knowingly and voluntarily places himself in danger of injury is deemed negligent--"the law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it." (unless unreasonable) |
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Osborne v. Montgomery Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1931 234 N.W. 372 Pg. 171 |
Defendant parks car and opens door, which clips the handlebars of bicycling plaintiff. Plaintiff goes for a tumble, suffering injury. | If a person exercises a reasonable standard of care and unintentionally injures another, she is NOT liable for negligence, even if "a reasonably prudent and intelligent [person] should foresee that harm may result." |
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Cooley v. Public Service Co. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1940 10 A.2d 673 Pg. 173 |
During a severe storm, defendant's power cables break and burn through telephone cable. A loud noise surges through the earpiece of plaintiff, and she suffers shock and neurosis. (Note that the available precautions to prevent contact between power and telephone lines would place pedestrians in danger of electrocution.) | A person cannot have two duties to take precaution when "performance of one duty would mean non-performance of the other." |
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United States v. Carroll Towing Co. United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1947 159 F.2d 169 Pg. 175 |
Carroll Towing (defendant) is towing a line of barges, including the "Anna C" (owned by Connors, plaintiff). Connors does not place an employee on board its barge. The "Anna C" breaks away from the line of barges and crashes into a tanker. | The "Hand Formula": if B < P*L, and the actor does not take the adequate precaution (B), then the actor has breached a legal duty. B = "the burden of adequate precautions." P = "the probability" that injury will result. L = "the gravity of the resulting injury" |
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Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transportation Services, Inc. Supreme Court of Alaska, 1996 928 P.2d 1202 Pg. 182 |
Plaintiff, in a Volkswagen van, pulls onto road in front of a commercial truck (owned by defendant). Truck strikes van and kills plaintiff. | "[T]he sudden emergency instruction is a generally useless appendage to the law of negligence. With or without an emergency, the standard of care a person must exercise is still that of a reasonable person under the circumstances." (Note: the sudden emergency doctrine states that "a person confronted with a sudden and unexpected peril, not resulting from that person's own negligence, is not expected to exercise the same judgment and prudence the law requires of a person in calmer and more deliberate moments.") |
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Andrews v. United Airlines United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1994 24 F.3d 39 Pg. 184 |
Suitcase fell on the head of passenger. | Common carriers have a duty of the utmost care. |
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Titus v. Bradford, B. & K. R. Co. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1890 20 A. 517 Pg. 188 |
Railroad brakeman (plaintiff) falls from top of freight car to his death when freight car switches tracks and becomes wobbly. Plaintiff had knowledge of the risk presented by the railroad's (defendant) standard procedure of securing the freight cars with telegraph wire. | Custom ("ordinary usage of business") is the test for determining the standard of care in negligence cases. NOTE: THIS PEDAGOGICAL POINT IS NO LONGER GOOD LAW. The Third Restatement states that neither adhering to custom nor departing from custom is dispositive in determining negligence. Instead, custom serves as EVIDENCE in determining negligence. |
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Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co. Supreme Court of Maine, 1884 76 Me. 100 Pg. 190 |
Inside a mine shaft, the independent mining contractor (plaintiff) falls through an unexpected ladder hole created by defendant. | Custom is not dispositive in determining the standard of ordinary care in negligence cases. "It would be no excuse for a want of ordinary care that carelessness was universal about the matter involved." |
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The T.J. Hooper U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1932 60 F.2d 737 Pg. 191 |
Big storm hits the waters off the coast of New Jersey. The T.J. Hooper tugboat does not have radios aboard and thus misses the broadcasted storm warnings. Sadly, the Hooper succumbs to the whim of Mother Nature. | Custom is not dispositive in determining the standard of ordinary care in negligence cases. "Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is NEVER ITS MEASURE." |
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Lama v. Borras U.S. Court of Appeals for 1st Circuit, 1994 16 F.3d 473 Pg. 197 |
Patient (plaintiff) goes to doctor (defendant) because of back pain. Doctor schedules surgery, but fails to counsel any "conservative treatment" (like bed rest, etc.). Symptoms persist, and doctor performs second surgery without prescribing pre or post-surgical antibiotics. Patient develops a severe infection. | The standard of care for physicians is "that [level of care] which, recognizing the modern means of communication and education, . . . meets the professional requirements generally acknowledged by the medical profession." |
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Osborne v. McMasters Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1889 41 N.W. 543 Pg. 228 |
Defendant's drug store clerk failed to properly label a bottle of poison (per criminal statute) and sold bottle to the plaintiff, who perished. | Breach of a statutory duty "constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence, or in other words, NEGLIGENCE PER SE" when both the following are true: 1) defendant's breach of duty harms those people that the statute was designed to protect, AND 2) the harm is of the "character which the statute or ordinance was designed to prevent." |
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Martin v. Herzog New York Court of Appeals, 1920 126 N.E. 814 Pg. 233 |
Plaintiff's buggy collides with defendant's automobile, and plaintiff dies. Plaintiff is driving without his headlights on, which violates a statute. | Breach of a statutory duty can also constitute CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE PER SE, subject to the same requirements: 1) plaintiff is a member of the class of persons that the statute is designed to protect, AND 2) harm is of the character that the statute is designed to prevent. Finally, Cardozo states that negligence per se, like all negligence, must be causally connected to the injury. |
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Brown v. Shyne New York Court of Appeals, 1926 151 N.E. 197 Pg. 235 |
Unlicensed chiropractor (defendant) treats patient (plaintiff). After several treatments, patient becomes paralyzed. | If a statute is designed to protect against a certain type of threat, then a defendant's violation of that statute does NOT constitute negligence per se if the injury was not caused by this specified type of threat. |
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Uhr v. East Greenbush Central School District Court of Appeals of New York, 1999 720 N.E.2d 886 Pg. 242 |
Plaintiff student was screened for scoliosis as part of a school program in the 7th grade, but not in the 8th grade. In 9th grade, she was screened for scoliosis by her school and tested positive. The condition had progressed to the point where surgery was required. | When determining whether a statute gives rise to an implied private cause of action, a court must determine: "(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme." |
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Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Goodman Supreme Court of the United States, 1927 275 U.S. 66 Pg. 251 |
Plaintiff approaches a railroad crossing in his automobile. Instead of getting out of his car and checking for an oncoming train, plaintiff relies on his hearing and drives on. Train (defendant) strikes and kills our hapless plaintiff. | When the standard of care is clear, it should be "laid down once and for all by the Courts" as a question of law. NOTE: THIS IS NO LONGER GOOD LAW. See Pokora v. Wabash Ry. |
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Pokora v. Wabash Ry. U.S. Supreme Court, 1934 292 U.S. 98 Pg. 252 |
Plaintiff approaches a railroad crossing in his automobile. He stops and tries to look, but proceeds without getting out of his car for a better vantage point. Train (defendant) strikes and injures plaintiff. | The standard of care in negligence cases is "for the judgment of a jury". In other words, the determination of duty and breach is a question of fact, not law. |
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Jewell v. CSX Transportation, Inc. United States Court Of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit, 1998 135 F.3d 361 Pg. 253 |
Husband (plaintiff) was driving a pick-up truck with his wife and child. He crossed a train track and was hit by an on-coming train. Husband was killed, wife and child were injured. Husband's estate, wife, and child sue defendant railroad company, alleging that train was negligent in not sounding a whistle, and that the crossing was extra-hazardous. | The train crossing was not extra-hazarous under Kentucky law, because there were no "physical obstructions" to the driver's view of the train, and therefore a directed verdict was proper. "There was substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the whistle was sounded," despite other testimony to the contrary. |
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Byrne v. Boadle Court of Exchequer, 1863 159 Eng. Rep. 299 Pg. 261 |
Plaintiff was walking along a highway when he was struck by a barrel of flour that was being lowered from defendant's window. Defendant was a flour dealer. Plaintiff submitted no evidence of negligence other than the facts above, arguing that negligence was established under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Defendant argued that plaintiff must submit some direct evidence of negligence. | There is a presumption of negligence where "the defendant had the entire possession and exclusive use of this warehouse...", and a barrel of flour, owned by the defendant, was lowered from the warehouse and fell on plaintiff; The burden is on the defendant to show that he was not negligent. |
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Colmenares Vivas v. Sun Alliance Insurance Co. United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 1986 807 F.2d 1102 Pg. 268 |
Plaintiffs were on an escalator when the handrail stopped moving, while the steps continued to move. Co-plaintiff (wife) lost her balance. Other co-plaintiff (husband) lost his balance attempting to catch wife, and fell down the stairs. | Where an escalator handrail stops, and the stairs keep moving, the "inference of negligence" (the first requirement of "res ipsa loquitor") is satsfied, because an escalator handrail probably would not stop moving while the steps continued to move absent negligence. The authority in control of a public area has "exclusive control" (the second requirement of "res ipsa loquitur"), because it has a nondelegable duty to maintain its facilities. Lastly, the accident was not "due to the plaintiff's actions" (the third requirement of "res ipsa loquitur"). |
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Ybarra v. Spangard Supreme Court of California, 1944 154 P.2d 687 Pg. 276 |
Plaintiff was diagnosed with appendicitis. After being rendered unconscious for surgery to correct the problem, he woke up with severe pain in his right sholder. The plaintiff had no previous injury or pain in the sholder area. The pain eventually spread down his arm, and he developed paralysis and atrophy in the sholder. Two doctors subsequently examined him and determined that the condition was caused by trauma. | The doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" may be applied "where a plaintiff recieves unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, [and] all those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct." |
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Beems v. Chicago, Rock Island & Peoria R.R. Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines, 1882 12 N.W. 222 Pg. 289 |
Man was killed while attempting to uncouple a railroad car. When he went to uncouple the cars, the cars were travelling at an improper and unusual rate of speed. The defense charges that this finding establishes contributory negligence. | "His act, therefore, in going between the cars after having made the signal to check their speed, was not necessarily contributory negligence," because he was authorized to belief that his signal to check the speed of the cars would be obeyed. "... defendant is liable, notwithstanding intestate's negligence, if ordinary care was not exercised to prevent the accident, after the intestate's negligence was known to defendant's employes... . Whatever was the intestate's condition at the time of the accident, whether free to move, or fastened to the place, the defendant is liable if its cars were negligently driven over him." |
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Gyerman v. United States Lines Co. Supreme Court of California, 1972 498 P.2d 1043 Pg. 293 |
Plaintiff was employed as a longshoreman. He was working in a warehouse owned by the defendant. His job was to move pallets with sacks of fishmeal stacked on top of them. Upon discovering that the fishmeal on a shipment of pallets was stacked improperly, plaintiff notified the chief marine clerk of the warehouse, but not his immediate supervisor at his own employer. The clerk told plaintiff that there was nothing to be done about the pallets, and that he should continue to work. After a number of days on the job, a large number of sacks fell off one of the pallets, and injured the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued defendant for negligently stacking the sacks of fishmeal. Defendant alleged contributory negligence on the grounds that plaintiff never notified his immediate supervisor of the problem. | The burden is on the defendant to show that there was contributory negligence, and that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. |
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LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Supreme Court of the United States, 1914 232 U.S. 340 Pg. 300 |
Plaintiff stacked flax straw on his land, within 70 feet of defendant's railroad tracks. Sparks from a passing train were blown onto the flax straw and burned all of the flax. Defendant alleged contributory negligence, due to Plaintiff stacking the straw too close to the railroad tracks. | As a matter of law, a plaintiff cannot be guilty of contributory negligence for using his land in a lawful manner. |
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Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co. Supreme Court of Washington, 1972 492 P.2d 1030 Pg. 304 |
Defendant makes an illegal left hand turn and hits plaintiff's car. Plaintiff is not wearing seatbelt. | Court reject the "seat belt defense." In other words, a plaintiff's failure to buckle up does not constitute contributory negligence. |
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Fuller v. Illinois Central R.R. Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1911 56 So. 783 Pg. 308 |
Old man (plaintiff) rides his wagon onto the railroad tracks and pauses. Train (defendant) has plain view of the man from a distance, but does not slow down. It blows a warning whistle far too late. Train delivers fatal blow to the old man. | "Last clear chance" doctrine states that "the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it is shown that the defendant might by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence have avoided the consequence of the injured party's negligence." |
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Mills v. Armstrong (The Bernina) House of Lords, 1888 13 App. Cas. 1 Pg. 313 |
Two ships, the Bushire and the Bernina, were both piloted negligently in colliding with each other. As a result of the collision, a passenger and crew member on the Bushire were drowned. The plaintiffs, the family memebers of the decedents, sued the defendants, the owners of the Bernina. | The passenger of a vehicle is not so identified with the operator of the vehicle that the operator's contibutory negligence is a bar to recovery. |
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Lamson v. American Axe & Tool Co. Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1900 58 N.E. 585 Pg. 318 |
Employee (plaintiff) is injured when a hatchet falls from the new and poorly constructed hatchet rack. Employee had been working in defendant's store for many years and had previously complained about the faulty new racks. | Assumption of risk: If plaintiff willingly and deliberately encounters a known risk created by defendant's negligence, then plaintiff cannot recover for the harm resulting from that risk. |
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Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co. New York Court of Appeals, 1929 166 N.E. 173 Pg. 322 |
Young man (plaintiff) visits amusement park (defendant) and steps onto a ride called the "Flopper." He indeed flops, and suffers injury. | "One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary." |
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Obstetrics & Gynecologists Ltd. v. Pepper Supreme Court of Nevada, 1985 693 P.2d 1259 Pg. 330 |
Respondent went to Appellant clinic to obtain oral contraception. Respondent's signature appeared on an arbitration agreement, but she did not remember signing it. Respondent subsequently became partly paralyzed, allegedly due to negligence by the clinic in prescribing the contraception. Respondent filed suit, Appellant moved to stay the lawsuit pending arbitration. | The proponent of an arbitration agreement must prove that it is a valid contract when its existence is denied by the other party. A contract of adhesion "limiting the liabilities and duties of the stronger party" will not be enforced "absent plain and clear notification of the terms and an understanding consent." |
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Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California Supreme Court of California, 1975 532 P.2d 1226 Pg. 337 |
Two cars collide at an intersection. Both drivers are in some way negligent. | California adopts the system of "pure" comparative negligence, "the fundamental purpose of which shall be to assign responsibility and liability for damage in DIRECT PROPORTION to the amount of negligence of each of the parties," even if the plaintiff is more at fault than the defendant. NOTE: This is the minority position. The majority of comparative negligence jurisdictions use the "50% System" (Impure Form), in which the plaintiff recovers in proportion to the respective levels of negligence, but only if the plaintiff is LESS THAN 50% AT FAULT. Otherwise, she recovers nothing. |
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Union Stockyard Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Supreme Court of the United States, 1905 196 U.S. 217 Pg. 355 |
An employee of the plaintiff (a terminal company) is injured due to a defective brake on a car delivered by the defendant (a railroad company). Employee gets a judgment for damages against the plaintiff company due to its failure to inspect. Plaintiff sues defendant for contribution, alleging that defendant was also negligent in failing to inspect. | Contribution will only be allowed between tortfeasors where one is principally responsible for the injury; Where the negligence of the joint tortfeasors is of a like kind, there will be no contribution. |
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American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court Supreme Court of California, 1978 578 P.2d 899 Pg. 359 |
The plaintiff, a teenage boy, was seriously injured while participating in a novice motorcycle race. The plaintiff sued defendants, the American Motorcyle Association and the Viking Motorcycle Club, claiming that the defendants negligently organized and operated the race. The defendants sought leave from the court to file a cross-complaint against the plaintiff's parents, alleging contributory negligence. | Under the common law equitable indemnity doctrine a concurrent tortfeasor may obtain partial indemnity from cotortfeasors on a comparative fault basis. Additionally, the court concluded (1) that the doctrine subjecting multiple defendants to "joint and several liability" to a single plaintiff was not abolished or limited; (2) that partial equitable indemnity should be adopted to permit apportionment of loss among codefendants on pure comparative principles; (3) that California contribution statutes do not "preclude" the development of comparative indemnity; and (4) that under equitable contribution any defendant may maintain an action against any other party, whether or not that party was joined in the original suit. |
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McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde & River Don Castings, Ltd. Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 511 U.S. 202 Pg. 368 |
After a construction accident in the Gulf of Mexico, the plaintiff settled with three defendants for $ 1 million. A fourth defendant, the respondent, did not settle. At trial, a jury awarded the petitioner $ 2.1 million and allocated 32% of the damages to respondent AmClyde and 38% to respondent River Don Castings, Ltd. The question presented is whether the liability of the nonsettling defendants should be calculated with reference to the jury's allocation of proportionate responsibility, or by giving the nonsettling defendants a credit for the dollar amount of the settlement. | The nonsettling defendants' liability should be calculated with reference to the jury's allocation of proportionate responsibility, not by giving them a credit for the dollar amount of the settlement |
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Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1968 398 F.2d 167 Pg. 375 |
Coast Guard sailor arrived back at his ship drunk. The ship was undergoing repairs on a drydock owned by plaintiff. On way back up to ship, sailor turned three wheels on the drydock, which opened up valves and eventually caused the drydock to list to one side, damaging both the ship and the drydock. | "The employer should be held to expect risks, to the public also, which arise 'out of and in the course of' his employment of labor." It is foreseeable that a drunken sailor might cause damage while crossing a drydock on the way back to his ship. |
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Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc. Supreme Court of Illinois, 1999 719 N.E.2d 756 Pg. 383 |
Plaintiff brought medical malpractice action against her treating physician and others for their alleged negligence in failing to diagnose her oral cancer in timely manner. The plaintiff also included her health maintenance organization (HMO) as a named defendant. The issue is whether plaintiff's HMO can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent-contractor physicians under agency law. | An HMO may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent-contractor physicians under both the doctrines of apparent authority and implied authority. |
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New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1920 264 F. 334 Pg. 394 |
Captain of barge (plaintiff) falls overboard and drowns. Defendant had failed to equip barge with life-preservers. | Cause in fact ("but for" causation) does not exist when a jury is "left to pure conjecture and speculation." |
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Zuchowicz v. United States U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1998 140 F.3d 381 Pg. 398 |
Defendant prescribes an overdose of drug to plaintiff, who fills and consumes the prescription for a period of a month. Thereafter, plaintiff begins taking the correct dosage, but ultimately develops lung disease as a side effect and dies. | Test for "but for" causation: If (1) "a negligent act [is] deemed wrongful because that act INCREASES THE CHANCES that a particular type of ac |