Constitutional Law in Context, Volume 1

Curtis, Parker, Douglas, Finkleman
2nd Edition
ISBN: 1594601968

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View Casebook Summary Table

Page	Case Name	Citation	Court
68	McCulloch v. Maryland	17 U.S. 316	Supreme Court of the United States, 1819
104	Gibbons v. Ogden	22 U.S. 1	Supreme Court of the United States, 1824
130	Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case)	188 U.S. 321	Supreme Court of the United States, 1903
133	Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States	234 U.S. 342	Supreme Court of the United States, 1914
136	Hammer v. Dagenhart	247 U.S. 251	Supreme Court of the United States, 1918
146	Carter v. Carter Coal Co.	298 U.S. 238	Supreme Court of the United States, 1936
162	United States v. Darby	312 U.S. 100	Supreme Court of the United States, 1941
167	Wickard v. Filburn	317 U.S. 111	Supreme Court of the United States, 1942
173	Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States	379 U.S. 241	Supreme Court of the United States, 1964
179	Katzenbach v. McClung	379 U.S. 294	Supreme Court of the United States, 1964
184	United States v. Morrison	529 U.S. 598	Supreme Court of the United States, 2000
201	Gonzales v. Raich	545 U.S. 125	Supreme Court of the United States, 2005
221	Jones v. United States	529 U.S. 848	Supreme Court of the United States, 2000
223	Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	531 U.S. 159	Supreme Court of the United States, 2001
228	Buckley v. Valeo	424 U.S. 1	Supreme Court of the United States, 1976
230	South Dakota v. Dole	483 U.S. 203	Supreme Court of the United States, 1987
257	National League of Cities v. Usery	426 U.S. 833	Supreme Court of the United States, 1976
267	Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority	469 U.S. 528	Supreme Court of the United States, 1985
278	Printz v. United States	521 U.S. 898	Supreme Court of the United States, 1997
298	Alden v. Maine	527 U.S. 706	Supreme Court of the United States, 1999
331	Marbury v. Madison	5 U.S. 137	Supreme Court of the United States, 1803
374	Ex Parte McCardle	74 U.S. 506	Supreme Court of the United States, 1868
383	Powell v. McCormack	395 U.S. 486	Supreme Court of the United States, 1969
391	Nixon v. United States	506 U.S. 224	Supreme Court of the United States, 1993
405	Flast v. Cohen	392 U.S. 83	Supreme Court of the United States, 1968
410	Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.	454 U.S. 464	Supreme Court of the United States, 1982
420	City of Los Angeles v. Lyons	461 U.S. 95	Supreme Court of the United States, 1983
442	Craig v. Boren	429 U.S. 190	Supreme Court of the United States, 1976
445	Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife	504 U.S. 555	Supreme Court of the United States, 1992
463	Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer	343 U.S. 579	Supreme Court of the United States, 1952
494	United States v. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States	418 U.S. 683	Supreme Court of the United States, 1974
563	Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona Ex Rel. Sullivan, Attorney General	325 U.S. 761	Supreme Court of the United States, 1945
586	Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin	340 U.S. 349	Supreme Court of the United States, 1951
592	Hunt, Governor of the State of North Carolina v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n	432 U.S. 333	Supreme Court of the United States, 1977
597	City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey	437 U.S. 617	Supreme Court of the United States, 1978
610	Reeves, Inc. v. William Stake	447 U.S. 429	Supreme Court of the United States, 1980
629	Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman	487 U.S. 59	Supreme Court of the United States, 1988
652	Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore	32 U.S. 243	Supreme Court of the United States, 1833
660	Dred Scott v. Sandford	60 U.S. 393	Supreme Court of the United States, 1856
706	Slaughter-House Cases	83 U.S. 36	Supreme Court of the United States, 1873
725	Twining v. New Jersey	211 U.S. 78	Supreme Court of the United States, 1908
732	Adamson v. California	332 U.S. 46	Supreme Court of the United States, 1947
776	Lochner v. New York	198 U.S. 45	Supreme Court of the United States, 1905
795	United States v. Carolene Products Co.	304 U.S. 144	Supreme Court of the United States, 1938
798	Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.	348 U.S. 483	Supreme Court of the United States, 1955
803	Meyer v. Nebraska	262 U.S. 390	Supreme Court of the United States, 1923
806	Buck v. Bell	274 U.S. 200	Supreme Court of the United States, 1927
809	Skinner v. Oklahoma	316 U.S. 535	Supreme Court of the United States, 1942
824	Eisenstadt v. Baird	405 U.S. 438	Supreme Court of the United States, 1972
826	Roe v. Wade	410 U.S. 113	Supreme Court of the United States, 1973
841	Planned Parenthood v. Casey	505 U.S. 833	Supreme Court of the United States, 1992
869	Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio	431 U.S. 494	Supreme Court of the United States, 1977
878	Michael H. v. Gerald D.	491 U.S. 110	Supreme Court of the United States, 1989
884	Troxel v. Granville	530 U.S. 57	Supreme Court of the United States, 2000
949	Miller v. Schoene	276 U.S. 272	Supreme Court of the United States, 1928
1004	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld	542 U.S. 507	Supreme Court of the United States, 2004

Case Information	Fact Summary	Rule of Law
McCulloch v. Maryland Supreme Court of the United States, 1819 17 U.S. 316 Pg. 68	In an attempt to raise revenue, Congress created the Second Bank of the United States. Maryland responded by enacting a law that taxed any bank not chartered by the state.	The Court held that the Constitution grants Congress implied powers to be used in implementing the express enumerated powers and that state action may not impede a valid constitutional exercise of power by the Federal government.
Gibbons v. Ogden Supreme Court of the United States, 1824 22 U.S. 1 Pg. 104	Defendant had a New York granted monopoly on steamboat operations between New York and New Jersey. Plaintiff began operating like routes, under a license based on a federal Congressional statute. Defendant got a New York injunction forcing plaintiff to stop.	Congress may regulate commerce that has INTERSTATE effects even if the commerce occurs within one state. So, in this case, Congress has the exclusive power, pursuant to the commerce clause, to regulate navigation between the waters of two states.
Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case) Supreme Court of the United States, 1903 188 U.S. 321 Pg. 130	Congress criminalized the interstate transportation of lottery tickets.	The Power to regulate is the Power to exclude.
Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1914 234 U.S. 342 Pg. 133	The Interstate Commerce Commission found that the interstate class rates out of Shreveport to named Texas points were unreasonable, and it established maximum class rates for this traffic. The objection is that this correction was beyond the Comission's power, because the rates should have been maintained under state authority.	Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that the government of the one involves the control of the other, it is the Congress, and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule.
Hammer v. Dagenhart Supreme Court of the United States, 1918 247 U.S. 251 Pg. 136	Father filed bill to enjoin act of Congress which prohibited the shipment in interstate or foreign commerce any product of a cotton mill situated in the United States, in which within 30 days before the removal of the product children under 14 have been employed, or children between 14 and 16 have been employed more than 8 hours in one day, or more than six days in any week, or between 7 in the evening and 6 in the morning.	The Court rules that the making of goods is not commerce. This ruling is later overruled.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1936 298 U.S. 238 Pg. 146	This case challenged the constitutional validity of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. The Act, among other things, levied a tax on the production of coal in an effort to conserve it as a national resource.	The Court held that the relations of employer and employee in this case are of local concern and only have a secondary or indirect relationship upon commerce. Therefore, the evils at issue are local evils, which the federal government has no legislative control over.
United States v. Darby Supreme Court of the United States, 1941 312 U.S. 100 Pg. 162	Darby was a furniture maker who violated Fair Labor Standards Act, which capped employees' hours and set minimum wages. Defended on grounds that the Act exceeded Congress' Commerce Power.	Regulation of labor conditions for production of goods moving interstate IS within Congress' Commerce Power.
Wickard v. Filburn Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 317 U.S. 111 Pg. 167	Fulburn only produces wheat for home consumption and to feed his cattle, which are traded on interstate commerce, to make seeds for next year's crops, and sells a bit locally. Court holds that he is bound by Congress' wheat acreage and production allotment even though none of his wheat is sold in interstate commerce.	Congress may regulate a purely local activity if the cumulative effect of such activitiy is that it would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 379 U.S. 241 Pg. 173	The Heart of Atlanta Motel benefited from interstate commerce, but refused to lodge blacks.	Congress has power to regulate motel practices under the Commerce Power, to the extent that those practices impede the free flow of people traveling in interstate commerce. The fact that Congress was also, if not primarily, legislating against a moral wrong, does not undermine its Commerce Power.
Katzenbach v. McClung Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 379 U.S. 294 Pg. 179	Ollie's Barbecue served blacks in its carry-out window, but refused to seat them, though whites were allowed to dine in. Ollie's Barbecue was not located near an interstate highway, and the majority of its patrons were not travelers in interstate commerce.	Congress' commerce power allows it to forbid non-commercial acts if these acts can be found, if only in the aggregate, to exert a substantial impact on interstate commerce.
United States v. Morrison Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 529 U.S. 598 Pg. 184	Congress included a civil damages provision in the Violence Against Women Act.	In order for Congress to regulate something under it's commerce power, the thing being regulated must be economic in nature.
Gonzales v. Raich Supreme Court of the United States, 2005 545 U.S. 125 Pg. 201	Patients and petitioners grew and consumed marijuana for medicinal purposes. Although their consumption was authorized under a California statute, the federal government, under the CSA, confiscated the drugs. The respondents claimed that enforcing the CSA against them would violate the Commerce Clause, the Due process clause of the 5th amendment, and the ninth and tenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution.	Congress can regulate commodities that in the aggregate may have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Jones v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 529 U.S. 848 Pg. 221	The Court considered whether arson of a dwelling violates the federal law that makes arson of property in interstate commerce a federal crime.	When the Court is able to do so, it will avoid interpreting the Constitution.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 531 U.S. 159 Pg. 223	Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), regulates the discharge of dredged or fill material into "navigable waters." The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, has interpreted section 404(a) to confer federal authority over an abandoned sand and gravel pit in northern Illinois which provides a habitat for migratory birds. The question is whether section 404(a) may be fairly extended to these waters, and, if so, whether Congress could exercise such authority consistent with the Commerce Clause.	Title 33 CFR section 328.3(a)(3), as clarified and applied to petitioner's site pursuant to the Migratory Bird Rule, exceeds the authority granted to respondents under section 404(a) of the CWA.
Buckley v. Valeo Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 424 U.S. 1 Pg. 228	This appeal presented constitutional challenges to key provisions of the Federal Election Campaing Act of 1971.	The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests by imposing significantly more restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions. In addition, the court held that section 608(a)'s restriction on a candidate's personal expenditures is unconstitutional. Furthermore, the court held section 608(c)'s limitations on overall campaign expenditures restricted the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression and thus violated the First Amendment.
South Dakota v. Dole Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 483 U.S. 203 Pg. 230	Congress conditioned funding of federal highways on conforming to national drinking age.	Spending must be (1) in the general welfare (deference is given to Congress on whether the program is in the general welfare); (2) the condition must be clearly and unambiguously stated; and (3) the condition must be clearly related to the federal interest, i.e., there must be a nexus between the condition and the federal interest for a legitimate exercise of spending power.
National League of Cities v. Usery Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 426 U.S. 833 Pg. 257	Congress regulated the working conditions (wages, overtime, labor standards) of public employees of the states.	The Court held that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the State's freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, section 8, cl.3.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 469 U.S. 528 Pg. 267	A Federal District Court concluded that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit system is a traditional governmental function and thus, under National League of Cities, is exempt from the obligations imposed by the FLSA. The Court revisited the issues raised in National League of Cities v. Usery, which held that Congress lacked authority to impose the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and local governments.	The Court held that in affording SAMTA employees the protection of the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA, Congress contravened no affirmative limit on its power under the Commerce Clause. There is nothing in the overtime and minimum-wage requirements of the FLSA, as applied to SAMTA, that is destructive of state sovereignty or violative of any constitutional provision. The Court also concluded that National League of Cities v. Usery is overruled.
Printz v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 521 U.S. 898 Pg. 278	Court compelled states to comply with Brady act by committing state resources.	In exercising its commerce power, Congress can not commandeer local functions.
Alden v. Maine Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 527 U.S. 706 Pg. 298	Alden and other probation officers filed suit against the state of Maine asking for damages that arose from FLSA violations.	State immunity in state courts is consistent with structure of constitution because of the essential principles of federalism and role of state courts.
Marbury v. Madison Supreme Court of the United States, 1803 5 U.S. 137 Pg. 331	An 1801 Congressional Act (Organic Act) created 42 new federal judgeships called "Justices of the Peace." President Adams appointed several Federalists to these new positions. After the appointees were approved by the Senate, Adams signed the commissions, but the commission was not delivered to William Marbury before President Jefferson entered office. Jefferson's Secretary of State, Madison, refused to deliver Marbury's commission. Marbury sued Madison on a writ of mandamus claim, claiming the Judiciary Act of 1789 - which stated that the U.S. Supreme Court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus - gave the Court the power to issue the writ and compel Marbury to deliver the commission.	If the Supreme Court identifies a conflict between a Constitutional provision and a Congressional statute, the Court has the authority to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. The Constitution is supreme and the Supreme Court has the right to be the final interpreter of it, NOT the legislature.
Ex Parte McCardle Supreme Court of the United States, 1868 74 U.S. 506 Pg. 374	McCardle was arrested for writing a series of newspaper articles that were highly critical of Reconstruction and military rule in the South following the Civil War. The question of jurisdiction was determined by the Court.	The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases by appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously excercised.
Powell v. McCormack Supreme Court of the United States, 1969 395 U.S. 486 Pg. 383	A congressman (Powell) was "excluded" from taking his seat in Congress for misconduct by a simple majority.	Though the power of "expulsion" has been clearly committed to a coordinate branch (Congress), "exclusion" has not. Since Congress required only a simple majority to "exclude" Powell, the question is justiciable.
Nixon v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1993 506 U.S. 224 Pg. 391	Walter Nixon asked the Court to decide wether Senate Rule XI, which allows a committee of Senators to hear evidence against an individual who has been impeached and to report that evidence to the full Senate, violates the Impeachment Trial Clause. Nixon was convicted by a jury for making false statements before a federal grand jury.	Nixon's claim that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause is nonjusticiable.
Flast v. Cohen Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 392 U.S. 83 Pg. 405	The Court upheld a taxpayer's standing to challenge federal subsidies to parochial schools as violating the First Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion. Under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the federal government provided funds for instruction in secular subjects in parochial schools.	The Court held that the ability of the plaintiff to sue as a taxpayer depends on whether (1) there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated and whether (2) the taxpayer has established a logical nexus between the status and the precise nature of the Constitutional infringement alleged.
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 454 U.S. 464 Pg. 410	The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare conveyed a 77-acre tract of land to Valley Forge Christian College. Americans United for Separation of Church and State brought suit to challenge the conveyance as unconstitutional under the First Amendment Establishment Clause.	Respondents do not have standing, either in their capacity as taxpayers or as citizens, to challenge the conveyance in question.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 461 U.S. 95 Pg. 420	Adolph Lyons filed a complaint alleging that four police officers, without provocation or justification, seized him and applied a chokehold rendering him unconscious and causing damage to his larynx.	The case is not rendered moot even though while it was pending in this Court, city police authorities prohibited use of a certain type of chokehold in any circumstances and imposed a 6-month moratorium on the use of another type of chokehold except under circumstances where deadly force was authorized. The moratorium by its terms was not permanent, and thus intervening events have not irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged misconduct.
Craig v. Boren Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 429 U.S. 190 Pg. 442	Appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20 years of age the equal protection of the laws.	Oklahoma's gender-based differential constitutes an invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 504 U.S. 555 Pg. 445	The Department of the Interior sought to challenge regulations concerning when the federal government could comply with the Endangered Species Act. Under the regulations, the federal government would comply with the Act only for actions taken in the United States or the high seas.	The Court held that respondents lacked standing to bring this action and that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the summary judgment motion filed by the United States.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer Supreme Court of the United States, 1952 343 U.S. 579 Pg. 463	President Truman ordered the federal government to seize control of American steel mills in an effort to avoid a strike that he believed would hinder the ability of the United States to prosecute the conflict in Korea.	The president may take any action not prohibited by the Constitution or a statute. The most frequently cited test for analysis comes from Jackson's delineation of three zones of presidential powers: (1) when the President acts with the authority of Congress, the President's acts are presumptively valid; (2) when there is no Congressional grant or denial of authority, but there is a gray area in which the President and Congress may have concurrent authority, the test of power in this area depends on imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law; (3) when the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, the President must rely on his Constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. In this case, because the president is disobeying a federal law, such presidential actions will be allowed only if the law enacted by Congress is unconstitutional.
United States v. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 418 U.S. 683 Pg. 494	The President was issued a subpoena to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aides and advisers. The court rejected the President's claims of absolute privilege, or lack of jurisdiction, and of failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 17(c).	The Court concluded that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona Ex Rel. Sullivan, Attorney General Supreme Court of the United States, 1945 325 U.S. 761 Pg. 563	An Arizona Train Limit Law made it unlawful for any person or corporation to operate within the state a railroad train of more than fourteen passenger or seventy freight cars, and authorizes the state to recover a money penalty for each violation of the Act.	The Court determined that the unchallenged findings leave no doubt that the Arizona Train Limit Law imposes a serious burden on the interstate commerce conducted by appellant.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin Supreme Court of the United States, 1951 340 U.S. 349 Pg. 586	This appeal challenges the validity of a section of an ordinance passed by the City of Madison, Wisconsin. The ordinance regulates the sale of milk and milk products within the municipality's jurisdiction. The section makes it unlawful to sell any milk as pasteurized unless it has been processed and bottled at an approved pasteurization plant.	The Court held that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause and that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.
Hunt, Governor of the State of North Carolina v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 432 U.S. 333 Pg. 592	In order to protect and enhance the reputation of Washington apples, the state legislature adopted a stringent, mandatory inspection program, which required all apples shipped in interstate commerce to be tested under strict quality standards and graded accordingly.	The Court found that the challenged statute has the practical effect of not only burdening interstate sales of Washington apples, but also disriminates against them.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 437 U.S. 617 Pg. 597	A New Jersey law prohibits the importation of most solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the state.	The Court concluded that the Commerce Clause will protect New Jersey in the future, just as it protects her neighbors now, from efforts by one State to isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared by all. Thus, the Court struck down the law.
Reeves, Inc. v. William Stake Supreme Court of the United States, 1980 447 U.S. 429 Pg. 610	Facing a serious cement shortage, South Dakota reaffirmed its policy of supplying all South Dakota's customers first and to honor all contract commitments, with the remaining volume allocated on a first come, first served basis.	South Dakota's resident-preference program for the sale of cement does not violate the Commerce Clause.
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman Supreme Court of the United States, 1988 487 U.S. 59 Pg. 629	Virginia allowed attorneys admitted to practice in other States to the Virginia Bar, on motion, provided that they were Virginia Residents.	The Court holds this as a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. "A state may not discriminate against nonresidents unless it shows that such discrimination bears a close relation to the achievement of substantial state objectives."
Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Supreme Court of the United States, 1833 32 U.S. 243 Pg. 652	Barron owned a wharf in the city of Baltimore. The city deposited sand and gravel near the wharf, rendering it worthless. Barron claimed that he was due compensation pursuant to the 5th Amendment of the Constitution.	The Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government and cannot be applied to the States.
Dred Scott v. Sandford Supreme Court of the United States, 1856 60 U.S. 393 Pg. 660	Dred Scott was a slave purchased by Dr. John Emerson, a surgeon in the U.S. Army. Scott was with Emerson while he served in Illinois and Wisconsin, which were free states. Emerson died, leaving Scott to his wife, Irene Sandford Emerson. Scott tried to buy his freedom, but Irene Emerson rejected him. Scott then sued for his freedom under the theory that since he had been in a free state he had been legally freed and could not later be subjected to slavery.	The Court held that people of African decent could never be citizens of any state, that Congress did not have the power to prohibit slavery in federal territories, and that the Fifth amendment barred the taking of slaves from slaveholders.
Slaughter-House Cases Supreme Court of the United States, 1873 83 U.S. 36 Pg. 706	The city of New Orleans created a monopoly by granting a contract to a slaughter house, so that the city could accommodate the influx of cattle from Texas. The butchers in New Orleans brought suit, challenging the granting of the monopoly as an impermissible barrier to trade.	The Court refused to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, but did
Twining v. New Jersey Supreme Court of the United States, 1908 211 U.S. 78 Pg. 725	In this case, the jury was instructed that they could draw an unfavorable inference against the defendant from his failure to testify. The question, therefore, is whether such instruction violates the 14th Amendment.	The State had the authority to issue the jury instruction as long as it only infringed upon the right of self-incrimination. The 14th Amendment applies to fundamental principles of liberty and justice.
Adamson v. California Supreme Court of the United States, 1947 332 U.S. 46 Pg. 732	Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree. Appellent did not testify during his trial. The provisions of California law permit the failure of a defendant to testify to be commented upon by court and by counsel and to be considered by court and by jury.	The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not draw all the rights of the federal Bill of Rights under its protection. Thus, there is no error in the California provision that allows the jury and court to consider a defendant's failure to testify.
Lochner v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1905 198 U.S. 45 Pg. 776	The 1895 "Bakeshop Act," enacted by the New York legislature, limited the hours bakers could work. Lochner, a New York baker, was fined for working employees overtime. He appealed his conviction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.	The right to enter into a contract is a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the "Bakeshop Act" was not a valid exercise of the State's police powers and therefore was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. NOTE: This is no longer good law.
United States v. Carolene Products Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1938 304 U.S. 144 Pg. 795	The "Filled Milk Act" of Congress prohibited the shipment of certain milk products in interstate commerce. Appellee was indicted for shipping "Milnut," a variant of milk that violated the act. The appellee claimed that the act was a violation of the due process clause and the commerce clause.	Economic regulations will be upheld as long as they are supported by a conceivable rational basis (even if it cannot be proved that it was the legislature's intent). NOTE: Footnote 4 is the most famous part of this opinion. It states that the judiciary will generally defer to the legislature and uphold laws so long as they are reasonable, but such deference will not extent to laws interfering with fundamental rights, discriminating against discrete and insular minorites, or restraining the political process.
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1955 348 U.S. 483 Pg. 798	An Oklahoma statute made it unlawful for any person not a licensed optometrist or opthalmologist to fit lenses to a face or to duplicate or replace into frames lenses or other optical appliances, except upon written prescriptive authority of an Oklahoma licensed opthamologist or optometrist.	The Court upheld the statute. The Court says that even though this law may be wasteful, it is not for the court to determine the economic advantages and disadvantages. "The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought." The Supreme Court held that business regulation will be subject to mere rational basis review.
Meyer v. Nebraska Supreme Court of the United States, 1923 262 U.S. 390 Pg. 803	Plaintiff was tried and convicted for teaching German to a 10 year-old child. The statute he was tried under prohibited individuals to teach any subjects to any person in any language other than the English language.	Due process guarantees the right to teach and the right of parents to direct the education of their children. The Court held that the statute was arbitrary and without any reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state.
Buck v. Bell Supreme Court of the United States, 1927 274 U.S. 200 Pg. 806	The superintendent of the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded, was ordered to perform a salpingectomy upon Carrie Buck, a feeble-minded white woman who was committed to the State Colony above mentioned.	The statute authorizing the surgery was held not to violate due process or equal protection of the laws.
Skinner v. Oklahoma Supreme Court of the United States, 1942 316 U.S. 535 Pg. 809	Under Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, felons were subjected to compulsory sterilization. Petitioner was convicted of stealing chickens and of armed robbery. He was subject to a judgment directing a vasectomy.	A law that permits a state attorney general to have habitual criminals sterilized, unless the felonies arise from violations of prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political acts, violates the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. The right to procreate is viewed as a fundamental right. Therefore the statute is subject to strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling purpose with means necessary for that purpose.
Eisenstadt v. Baird Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 405 U.S. 438 Pg. 824	Appellee attacks his conviction of violating Massachusetts law for giving a woman a contraceptive foam at the close of his lecture to students on contraception. That law makes it a felony for anyone to give away a drug, medicine, instrument, or article for the prevention of conception except in the case of (1) a registered physician administering or prescribing it for a married person or (2) an active registered pharmacist furnishing it to a married person presenting a registered physician's prescription.	By providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated, the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Roe v. Wade Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 410 U.S. 113 Pg. 826	A Texas woman, who alleged she was raped, challenged a Texas statute which prohibited abortion.	Most State laws prohibiting abortions violate a woman's Constitutional right to privacy. The Court adopts a trimester framework for determining whether the State may regulate abortions, holding that in the third trimester, the fetus is viable and the State has a compelling interest in the fetus.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 505 U.S. 833 Pg. 841	At issue are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982: section 3205, which requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed; section 3206, which mandates the informed consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but provides a judicial bypass procedure; section 3209, which commands that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband; section 3203, which defines a "medical emergency" that will excuse compliance with the foregoing requirements; and sections 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f), which impose certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services.	To protect the central right recognized by Roe while at the same time accommodating the State's profound interest in potential life, the undue burden standard should be employed. An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 431 U.S. 494 Pg. 869	Appellant lives in her East Cleveland, Ohio, home with her son and two grandsons (who are first cousins). An East Cleveland housing ordinance limits occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family, but defines "family" in such a way that appellant's household does not qualify. Appellant was convicted of a criminal violation of the ordinance. Her conviction was upheld on appeal over her claim that the ordinance is unconstitutional.	The ordinance deprived appellant of her liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Michael H. v. Gerald D. Supreme Court of the United States, 1989 491 U.S. 110 Pg. 878	In May 1981, appellant Victoria D. was born to Carole D., who was married to, and resided with, appellee Gerald D. in California. Although Gerald was listed as father on the birth certificate and has always claimed Victoria as his daughter, blood tests showed a 98.07% probability that appellant Michael H., with whom Carole had had an adulterous affair, was Victoria's father. During Victoria's first three years, she and her mother resided at times with Michael, who held her out as his own, at times with another man, and at times with Gerald, with whom they have lived since June 1984. In November 1982, Michael filed a filiation action in California Superior Court to establish his paternity and right to visitation. Victoria, through her court-appointed guardian ad litem, filed a cross-complaint asserting that she was entitled to maintain filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald. The court ultimately granted Gerald summary judgment on the ground that there were no triable issues of fact as to paternity under Cal. Evid. Code 621, which provides that a child born to a married woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent nor sterile, is presumed to be a child of the marriage, and that this presumption may be rebutted only by the husband or wife, and then only in limited circumstances.	The 621 presumption does not infringe upon the due process rights of a man wishing to establish his paternity of a child born to the wife of another man.
Troxel v. Granville Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 530 U.S. 57 Pg. 884	Washington Rev. Code section 26.10.160(3) permits "[a]ny person" to petition for visitation rights "at any time" and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child's best interest. Petitioners Troxel petitioned for the right to visit their deceased son's daughters. Respondent Granville, the girls' mother, did not oppose all visitation, but objected to the amount sought by the Troxels. The Superior Court ordered more visitation than Granville desired, and she appealed. The State Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the Troxels' petition. In affirming, the State Supreme Court held, inter alia, that section 26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally infringes on parents' fundamental right to rear their children.	The Court concluded that section 26.10.160(3), as applied to Granville and her family, violates her due process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters.
Miller v. Schoene Supreme Court of the United States, 1928 276 U.S. 272 Pg. 949	The State ordered the plaintiffs to cut down a large number of ornamental red cedar trees growing on their property, as a means of preventing the communication of a rust or plant disease with which they were infected to the apple orchards in the vicinity.	The state was under the necessity of making a choice between the preservation of one class of property and that of another wherever both existed in dangerous proximity. Thus, the Court held that the reasonable exercise of state power, controlled by considerations of social policy, did not involve any denial of due process.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 542 U.S. 507 Pg. 1004	Hamdi was detained after the U.S. government determined that he took up arms with the Taliban. The government contends that Hamdi is an enemy combatant, and that this status justifies holding him indefinitely.	The Court conclued that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged in this case, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.

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