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Torts: Cases and Questions

Farnsworth, Grady
1st Edition
ISBN: 0735527040
Page Case Name Citation Court Audio
1 Vosburg v. Putney 50 N.W. 403 Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891 Download
97 Ploof v. Putnam 71 A. 188 Supreme Court of Vermont, 1908 Download
100 Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. 124 N.W. 221 Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1910 Download
125 Vaughan v. Menlove 132 Eng. Rep. 490 Court of Common Pleas, 1837 Download
137 Roberts v. Ring 173 N.W. 437 Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1919 Download
140 United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169 United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1947 Download
145 Bolton v. Stone A.C. 850 House of Lords, 1951 Download
148 Eckert v. Long Island R.R. 43 N.Y. 502 Court of Appeals of New York, 1871 Download
158 The T.J. Hooper 60 F.2d 737 U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1932 Download
170 Martin v. Herzog 126 N.E. 814 New York Court of Appeals, 1920 Download
180 Brown v. Shyne 151 N.E. 197 New York Court of Appeals, 1926 Download
184 Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Goodman 275 U.S. 66 Supreme Court of the United States, 1927 Download
185 Pokora v. Wabash Ry. 292 U.S. 98 U.S. Supreme Court, 1934 Download
206 Ybarra v. Spangard 154 P.2d 687 Supreme Court of California, 1944 Download
227 Hurley v. Eddingfield 59 N.E. 1058 Supreme Court of Indiana, 1901 Download
270 Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. 159 N.E. 896 Court of Appeals of New York, 1928 Download
281 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc. 750 N.E.2d 1097 Court of Appeals of New York, 2001 Download
308 New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad 264 F. 334 U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1920 Download
317 Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative 664 P.2d 474 Supreme Court of Washington, 1983 Download
332 Summers v. Tice 199 P.2d 1 Supreme Court of California, 1948 Download
351 In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co. 3 K.B. 560 Court of Appeal, 1921 Download
377 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. 162 N.E. 99 Court of Appeals of New York, 1928 Download
431 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States 398 F.2d 167 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1968 Download
447 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 111 N.E. 1050 New York Court of Appeals, 1916 Download
454 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno 150 P.2d 436 Supreme Court of California, 1944 Download
590 Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co. 166 N.E. 173 New York Court of Appeals, 1929 Download
780 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 257 N.E.2d 870 Court of Appeals of New York, 1970 Download
Case Information Fact Summary Rule of Law
Vosburg v. Putney
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891
50 N.W. 403
Pg. 1 		Fourteen year-old schoolboy (defendant) reaches out his leg and toes the shin of his classmate (plaintiff) while in the classroom. Though the touch is slight, plaintiff experiences pain and swelling in the subsequent days and ultimately loses the use of his leg. "[T]he wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the [intentional] wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him."
Ploof v. Putnam
Supreme Court of Vermont, 1908
71 A. 188
Pg. 97 		Due to a severe storm on the lake, plaintiff was forced to moor his sloop to defendant's dock in order to protect the lives aboard. Defendant's servant unmoored the sloop, which was then destroyed upon the shore. Plaintiff and his family survived, but suffered injuries. "The doctrine of necessity applies with special force to the preservation of human life. One assaulted and in peril of his life may run through the close of another to escape."
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1910
124 N.W. 221
Pg. 100 		Defendant moors his boat to plaintiff's dock, pursuant to contract to unload cargo. A storm develops, however, and defendant keeps boat moored to dock, adhering to custom. Boat buffets the dock and causes $500 damage to the dock. Even when necessity provides a valid defense to trespass, the would-be trespasser must pay compensatory relief for damage caused to property.
Vaughan v. Menlove
Court of Common Pleas, 1837
132 Eng. Rep. 490
Pg. 125 		Defendant consructed a hayrick, or a stack of hay, near the border of the property he rented from the plaintiff. Defendant was repeatedly warned that the hayrick was in danger of catching fire over the course of five weeks. Desipite the warnings, defendant said that "he would chance it." The hay eventually caught fire, burning down both defendant's buildings and the cottages of the plaintiff on a neighboring parcel of land. The reasonable man standard is objective, not subjective; "...you must so enjoy your own property as not to injure that of another."
Roberts v. Ring
Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1919
173 N.W. 437
Pg. 137 		7 year old boy (plaintiff) runs across the street, and old man (defendant) with bad eyesight and hearing runs him over at a speed 5mph. (1) In negligence cases, a child is held to a subjective standard: "the degree of care commonly exercised by the ordinary boy of his age and maturity." (2) The elderly are held to an objective standard: "care usually exercised by the ordinary prudent normal man."
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1947
159 F.2d 169
Pg. 140 		Carroll Towing (defendant) is towing a line of barges, including the "Anna C" (owned by Connors, plaintiff). Connors does not place an employee on board its barge. The "Anna C" breaks away from the line of barges and crashes into a tanker. The "Hand Formula": if B < P*L, and the actor does not take the adequate precaution (B), then the actor has breached a legal duty. B = "the burden of adequate precautions." P = "the probability" that injury will result. L = "the gravity of the resulting injury"
Bolton v. Stone
House of Lords, 1951
A.C. 850
Pg. 145 		During a cricket match a batsman hit a ball which struck and injured the plaintiff who was standing on a highway adjoining the ground. For an act to be negligent there must be, not only a reasonable possibility of its happening, but also of injury being caused thereby. According to the facts of this case the risk of injury to a person on the highway resulting from the hitting of a ball out of the ground was so small that the probability of such an injury would not be anticipated by a reasonable man. Therefore, the plaintiff should not be able to recover from defendant.
Eckert v. Long Island R.R.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1871
43 N.Y. 502
Pg. 148 		Man runs across railroad tracks to save a child from certain death and is struck and killed by defendant's train. There is an exception to the general rule that a person who knowingly and voluntarily places himself in danger of injury is deemed negligent--"the law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it." (unless unreasonable)
The T.J. Hooper
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1932
60 F.2d 737
Pg. 158 		Big storm hits the waters off the coast of New Jersey. The T.J. Hooper tugboat does not have radios aboard and thus misses the broadcasted storm warnings. Sadly, the Hooper succumbs to the whim of Mother Nature. Custom is not dispositive in determining the standard of ordinary care in negligence cases. "Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is NEVER ITS MEASURE."
Martin v. Herzog
New York Court of Appeals, 1920
126 N.E. 814
Pg. 170 		Plaintiff's buggy collides with defendant's automobile, and plaintiff dies. Plaintiff is driving without his headlights on, which violates a statute. Breach of a statutory duty can also constitute CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE PER SE, subject to the same requirements: 1) plaintiff is a member of the class of persons that the statute is designed to protect, AND 2) harm is of the character that the statute is designed to prevent. Finally, Cardozo states that negligence per se, like all negligence, must be causally connected to the injury.
Brown v. Shyne
New York Court of Appeals, 1926
151 N.E. 197
Pg. 180 		Unlicensed chiropractor (defendant) treats patient (plaintiff). After several treatments, patient becomes paralyzed. If a statute is designed to protect against a certain type of threat, then a defendant's violation of that statute does NOT constitute negligence per se if the injury was not caused by this specified type of threat.
Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Goodman
Supreme Court of the United States, 1927
275 U.S. 66
Pg. 184 		Plaintiff approaches a railroad crossing in his automobile. Instead of getting out of his car and checking for an oncoming train, plaintiff relies on his hearing and drives on. Train (defendant) strikes and kills our hapless plaintiff. When the standard of care is clear, it should be "laid down once and for all by the Courts" as a question of law. NOTE: THIS IS NO LONGER GOOD LAW. See Pokora v. Wabash Ry.
Pokora v. Wabash Ry.
U.S. Supreme Court, 1934
292 U.S. 98
Pg. 185 		Plaintiff approaches a railroad crossing in his automobile. He stops and tries to look, but proceeds without getting out of his car for a better vantage point. Train (defendant) strikes and injures plaintiff. The standard of care in negligence cases is "for the judgment of a jury". In other words, the determination of duty and breach is a question of fact, not law.
Ybarra v. Spangard
Supreme Court of California, 1944
154 P.2d 687
Pg. 206 		Plaintiff was diagnosed with appendicitis. After being rendered unconscious for surgery to correct the problem, he woke up with severe pain in his right sholder. The plaintiff had no previous injury or pain in the sholder area. The pain eventually spread down his arm, and he developed paralysis and atrophy in the sholder. Two doctors subsequently examined him and determined that the condition was caused by trauma. The doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" may be applied "where a plaintiff recieves unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, [and] all those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct."
Hurley v. Eddingfield
Supreme Court of Indiana, 1901
59 N.E. 1058
Pg. 227 		Family physician refused to treat patient that had sent for his aid. Patient died. Family of patient sued physician claiming wrongful refusal to enter into a contract of employment. The law does not require a physician to come to patient's aid. Thus, the plaintiff had no basis on which to recover.
Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1928
159 N.E. 896
Pg. 270 		Plaintiff sues defendant, a water works company, for its failure to supply adequate water to stop a fire from spreading to his warehouse. Defendant had a contract with the city to supply water. "A member of the public may not maintain an action [for breach of contract]... against one contracting with the city ... unless the intention appears that the promisor is to be answerable to indvidual members of the public..." A duty of care is not owed to the public by the promisor that contracts with a city to supply water; failure to supply adequate water is merely a denial of a benefit. There is no statuory duty on the part of the promisor to the intended benficiaries of a contract with the city.
532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc.
Court of Appeals of New York, 2001
750 N.E.2d 1097
Pg. 281 		In two separate incidents, falling building materials and the collapse of a construction elevator let to the closing of a number of city blocks. Businesses located on the closed streets sued for purely economic damages (lost business). "Negligence claims based on economic loss alone fall beyond the scope of the duty owed ... and should be dismissed"; The plaintiff must allege personal injury or property damage. To support a claim of damages for public nuisance, plaintiff must suffer a special injury.
New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1920
264 F. 334
Pg. 308 		Captain of barge (plaintiff) falls overboard and drowns. Defendant had failed to equip barge with life-preservers. Cause in fact ("but for" causation) does not exist when a jury is "left to pure conjecture and speculation."
Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative
Supreme Court of Washington, 1983
664 P.2d 474
Pg. 317 		Group Health Cooperative negligently failed to diagnose Herskovits cancer on his first trip to the hospital, reducing his chance of survival by 14 percent. At all times Herskovits had less than a 50 percent chance of survival. The issue is whether Herskovits can maintain a cause of action against Group Health Cooperative, in light of his low chance of survival. The court held that medical testimony of a reduction of chance of survival from 39 percent to 25 percent is sufficient evidence to allow the proximate cause issue to go to the jury. Causing reduction of the opportunity to recover (loss of chance) by one's negligence, however, does not necessitate a total recovery against the negligent party for all damages caused by the victim's death. Damages should be awarded to the injured party or his family based only on damages caused directly by premature death, such as lost earnings and additional medical expenses, etc.
Summers v. Tice
Supreme Court of California, 1948
199 P.2d 1
Pg. 332 		Plaintiff and two defendants were hunting quail on the open range. Both defendants shot at the quail, firing in the plaintiff's direction. As a result, the plaintiff sustained injuries to his eye and upper lip. In situations where plaintiff is injured as a result of defendants negligence, yet it is impossible for plaintiff to determine which defendant caused what injury, the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the whole injury to plaintiff as joint tort feasors. The burden is on the defendants to explain the cause of the injury.
In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co.
Court of Appeal, 1921
3 K.B. 560
Pg. 351 		A ship carrying a cargo of petrol was set fire and destroyed. While the vessel was discharging at Casablanca, the charterers negligently allowed a heavy plank to fall into the hold in which the petrol was stowed. The plank caused an explosion, which set fire to the vessel. The fall of the board was due to the negligence of the charterers' servants, the charterers were liable for all the direct consequences of the negligent act, even though those consequences could not reasonably have been anticipated; and they were therefore liable for the loss of the ship by fire.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1928
162 N.E. 99
Pg. 377 		Two guards, employed by defendant, helped a man get on a moving train. The man was holding a package, which he dropped. The package was full of fireworks and exploded, causing a scale to fall many feet away and injure plaintiff. There was no way for the guards to know the contents of the package. For an act to be negligent, unless that act is imminently dangerous, a duty of care is owed to a foreseeable plaintiff. There is a split of authority on duty of care. Cardozo, writing for the majority, adopted a narrow view of the duty of care: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension. . . ." Andrews, dissenting, adopts a broad view: "Where there is the unreasonable act, and some right that may be affected there is negligence whether damage does or does not result. . . . Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone. There needs be duty due the one complaining but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as to him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those in fact injured may complain."
Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1968
398 F.2d 167
Pg. 431 		Coast Guard sailor arrived back at his ship drunk. The ship was undergoing repairs on a drydock owned by plaintiff. On way back up to ship, sailor turned three wheels on the drydock, which opened up valves and eventually caused the drydock to list to one side, damaging both the ship and the drydock. "The employer should be held to expect risks, to the public also, which arise 'out of and in the course of' his employment of labor." It is foreseeable that a drunken sailor might cause damage while crossing a drydock on the way back to his ship.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
New York Court of Appeals, 1916
111 N.E. 1050
Pg. 447 		Buick (defendant) sells car to dealer. Dealer sells car to customer (plaintiff). Customer suffers injury because of a car defect that could have been detected by Buick's reasonable inspection. Manufacturer negligence liability is based on three elements, as stated by Cardozo in the opinion: "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a THING OF DANGER. If to the element of danger there is added KNOWLEDGE THAT THE THING WILL BE USED BY PERSONS OTHER THAN THE PURCHASER, and used WITHOUT NEW TESTS, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully."
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno
Supreme Court of California, 1944
150 P.2d 436
Pg. 454 		Coca Cola bottle explodes in waitress's (plaintiff) hand as she is stocking the refrigerator. Traynor's concurrence is the key takeaway from this case: "a manufacturer incurs an ABSOLUTE LIABILITY when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings."
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.
New York Court of Appeals, 1929
166 N.E. 173
Pg. 590 		Young man (plaintiff) visits amusement park (defendant) and steps onto a ride called the "Flopper." He indeed flops, and suffers injury. "One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary."
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1970
257 N.E.2d 870
Pg. 780 		Defendant is the operator of a cement plant. Plaintiff sues for private nuisance, due to dirt, smoke, vibration, and particulate contamination coming from defendant's plant. Where the benefit of an injuction against a nuisance is greatly outweighed by its costs, a court may allow payment of permenant damages to the plaintiff in lieu of injuctive relief.