Renko v. McLean

Opinion by KARWACKI, J.

In Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 650 A.2d 252 (1994), and Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986), this Court declined to create an exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine in motor tort cases based upon the existence of compulsory automobile liability insurance coverage. We are asked in this case to reexamine those decisions. Having done so, we shall reaffirm the vitality of the parent child-immunity doctrine in this State and affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

I.

The facts of this case are brief and undisputed. On December 8, 1992, Natasha Renko suffered serious injuries when her biological mother, Teresa Kaylor McLean, negligently drove the car both women were occupying into the rear of another vehicle. At the time, Natasha Renko was seventeen years old.

[. . .]

Both Teresa and Robert McLean filed Motions to Dismiss. Robert McLean subsequently filed an independent Motion for Summary Judgment. In a hearing on the motions, Renko beseeched the court to recognize an exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine and allow emancipated children to file actions against their parents for injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents occurring in minority between fifteen and eighteen years of age. The court declined to do so and entered judgment in favor of the appellees.

Renko appealed the judgment entered in favor of her mother to the Court of Special Appeals. We issued a writ of certiorari before consideration by the intermediate appellate court of the issues presented in this appeal.


II.

For nearly seventy years, the parent-child tort immunity doctrine has been, with few exceptions, a salient feature of Maryland law.[. . .] It remains so today.


Once an absolute bar to tort actions between parents and their minor children, the parent-child immunity doctrine grew out of an abiding belief that it served the compelling public interest in preserving, under normal circumstances, the internal harmony and integrity of the family unit and parental authority in the parent-child relationship. [. . .] In fact, the special relationship, with its reciprocal duties and obligations, that the minor child shares with his or her parents forms a major component of the foundation upon which the parent-child immunity doctrine is built -- a relationship recognized both at common law 7 and by the General Assembly. Other justifications offered for the rule include the prevention of fraud and collusion among family members to the detriment of third-parties, and the threat that intrafamilial litigation will deplete family resources. [. . .]


Nevertheless, the parent-child immunity doctrine has never stood static where historical experience and common sense dictated that it must yield. Indeed,

"the parent[-]child immunity rule . . . was a creature of the common law. It was judicially conceived, judicially adopted in Maryland, judicially changed in certain significant aspects, and otherwise judicially nurtured and applied in this jurisdiction[.]"

Frye, 305 Md. at 566, 505 A.2d at 839 [. . .] . But our acknowledgment that circumstance sometimes severs the doctrine from its rationale and reason in no way detracts from our fundamental belief that "the parent-child immunity rule [is still] essential to the maintenance of discipline and to the stability of family harmony." Frye, 305 Md. at 561, 505 A.2d at 836 [. . .] .

In Frye, supra, we exhaustively surveyed the creation and refinement of the parent-child immunity doctrine both in this State and across our Country. Despite the growing chorus of criticism surrounding the doctrine, we determined that the parent-child relationship had changed little, if at all, in the ensuing years since our predecessors first recognized parent-child immunity. We thus concluded that "today's parent-child relationship, as recognized by this Court and the Legislature, furnishes no compelling reason to abrogate the rule." Id. at 561, 505 A.2d at 836 [. . .].


III.

Renko nonetheless mounts a three-pronged attack upon the parent-child immunity doctrine. She asserts that (1) adult children should be allowed to maintain actions against their parents for injuries occurring in their minority; (2) no contemporary justification exists to apply the doctrine to the facts of the case sub judice in light of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance; and (3) any such application is violative of Articles 19 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We shall address each of these contentions in turn.

a.

Renko correctly points out that we have permitted suits between parents and their minor children in limited circumstances.

For instance, we have held that a minor child may maintain an action against a father's business partner for alleged negligence arising out of the operation of the partnership. [. . .] That decision was predicated upon our belief that the parent-child relationship, so important to the parent-child immunity rule, would remain inviolate in a suit against the father's business partner. [. . .]

We further observed that (1) assuming the existence of a business liability insurance policy, the father had already paid his share of liability through his contribution to policy premium payments; or (2) it would otherwise be unrealistic to assume that the father did not take his partnership contribution obligation into account when the familial decision was made to initiate a suit against his partner; and (3) although the ultimate decision to sue may impair or even destroy the relationship between the partners, that relationship is not the focus or concern of the parent-child immunity rule. [. . .] Thus, despite the possible financial impact upon the father (and therefore, the family) by the successful prosecution of a suit against his business partner by a minor child, we concluded that "preservation of the family interests [justifying the parent-child immunity doctrine] does not require [the extension of the doctrine] to bar any recovery from a parent's partner." [. . .]


Recognizing that reality sometimes belies the ideal of family life, our predecessors also deemed permissible a suit by a minor child against her father's estate for alleged injuries she sustained when, within the span of one week, the father both murdered the child's mother and committed suicide in the child's presence. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). The Court reasoned that

"in these circumstances, there can be no basis for the contention that the daughter's suit against her father's estate would be contrary to public policy, for the simple reason that there is no home at all in which discipline and tranquility are to be preserved. . . . When . . . the parent is guilty of acts which show complete abandonment of the parental relation, the rule giving him immunity from suit by the child, on the ground that discipline should be maintained in the home, cannot logically be applied, for when he is guilty of such acts he forfeits his parental authority and privileges, including his immunity from suit. . . . Justice demands that a minor child shall have a right of action against a parent for injuries resulting from cruel and inhuman treatment or for malicious and wanton wrongs."

Id. at 67-68, 77 A.2d at 926.

Renko contends that since this Court has already permitted children to maintain actions against their parents for acts occurring after the child reaches the age of majority, see Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1957), we should take the logical step of allowing otherwise adult children to sue their parents for wrongful acts that occur during minority. We see no such logic. In fact, Renko's proffered solution to her particular dilemma would result in a de facto abrogation of the parent-child immunity doctrine in its entirety.

Maryland Code (1995 Repl. Vol., 1996 Supp.), § 5-201 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article permits minors to bring tort actions for injuries sustained in minority at the hands of another within three years after reaching the age of majority. Thus, an injured minor child could simply wait until reaching the age of majority before initiating a suit that is otherwise barred in his or her infancy. In that circumstance, the parent-child immunity doctrine would serve not as a bar to actions between parent and child, but rather as an obstacle easily overcome with the passage of time. The looming specter of a lawsuit is as surely detrimental to family peace and harmony and parental authority as is the actual suit itself. Given this Court's long commitment to the parent-child immunity doctrine, we refuse to create an exception that would effectively negate the rule and open courthouse doors to every conceivable dispute between parent and child. [. . .] Indeed, the rule was fashioned to prevent just that.

b.

Renko alternatively contends that "with mandatory automobile insurance creating universal coverage for auto torts, there can be no rational objection to recovery by an emancipated child in" the case sub judice.

[. . .]

At the time we issued the Warren opinion, "only eight states, including Maryland, continued to adhere to the doctrine of parent-child immunity without exception for motor torts." 336 Md. at 621 n.1, 650 A.2d at 254 n.1. Those same jurisdictions continue to stand their ground.

Other jurisdictions, however, have found persuasive arguments calling for the abolition of the parent-child immunity doctrine in motor tort cases. The seminal decision in this area is Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975). There, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed:

"In dealing with an automobile accident in which two passengers, one an unemancipated minor child of the defendant driver and the other a minor who had no familial relationship to the defendant driver, are injured, it would be incongruous to permit recovery against a parent and the parent's insurance company by the unrelated child but to deny recovery to the parent's child when culpability is admitted or established."

Id. at 360, 339 N.E.2d at 913. Noting the basis of the parent-child immunity doctrine, the court commented that

"the primary disruption to harmonious filial relations is not the lawsuit brought for damages after the injury but the injury itself, resulting from the misconduct of a parent. [. . .] When the wrong has been committed, the harm to the basic fabric of the family has already been done and the source of rancor and discord already introduced into family relations. [. . .] It can hardly aid family reconciliation to deny the injured child access to the courts and, through them, to any liability insurance which the family might maintain."

Considering the same issue, the Supreme Court of Delaware concluded, that with the almost universal existence of motor vehicle liability insurance,

"the domestic tranquility argument is, at best, hollow. Liability insurance impersonalizes the suit and negates the possible disruption of family harmony by easing the financial repercussions of the accident. In short 'when insurance is involved, the action between parent and child is not truly adversary; both parties seek recovery from the insurance carrier to create a fund for the child's medical care and support without depleting the family's other assets.'"

Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 672 (Del. 1979)(citing Sorensen, 369 Mass. at 362-63, 339 N.E.2d at 914); see also Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979)(affirming abrogation of parent-child immunity in auto tort cases where insurance coverage exists). Stated otherwise, "domestic peace and harmony may be more threatened by denying the cause of action than by permitting one, especially where there is insurance." Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906, 911 (Miss. 1992). Thus, the argument goes, abrogating parent-child immunity where automobile liability insurance exists furthers the objectives of the rule by relieving the family of the financial burden of an adverse judgment while at the same time providing a means of recovery for the injured child. Numerous other jurisdictions concur in this view.

The Delaware court added that the "domestic-tranquility justification" also lacked merit in light of the fact that other courts have permitted various types of intrafamilial litigation, including, inter alia, suits between siblings. Williams, 369 A.2d at 672 (citing Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960)(suit brought by a minor against his unemancipated brother for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident)[. . .].

The fraud-collusion justification for the parent-child immunity doctrine too has suffered its critics, among them, the Mississippi Supreme Court -- the birthplace of the parent-child immunity doctrine. [. . .] In Glaskox, supra, the court majority observed that

"'the possibility of collusion exists to a certain extent in any case. Every day we depend on juries and trial judges to sift evidence in order to determine the facts and arrive at proper verdicts. Experience has shown that the courts are quite adequate for this task. In litigation between parent and child, judges and juries would naturally be mindful of the relationship and would be even more on the alert for improper conduct.'"

614 So. 2d at 912 (quoting Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768-69, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980)). In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has added:

"In the last analysis it is much to be preferred that we depend upon the efficacy of the judicial process to ferret out the meritorious from the fraudulent rather than using a broad broom to sweep away a class of claims, a number of which are admittedly meritorious."

Falco v. Pados, supra, 444 Pa. at 381, 282 A.2d at 356.

Recognizing the continuing need to protect parental authority and family harmony, some jurisdictions have attempted to limit immunity to negligent conduct arising out of an "exercise of parental authority . . . [or] an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care." Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963) [. . .].

California and New York have adopted their own unique brands of parent-child immunity. California courts apply a "reasonable parent" standard to determine the viability of tort actions between parent and child. [. . .] New York, on the other hand, seems to permit all such actions, except those arising out of a parent's failure to properly supervise the child. Under New York law, parents owe no legal duty to their children to supervise them properly. [. . .]

Despite the majority trend, even those most critical of the rule must acknowledge that its abrogation is not a panacea. At least with respect to motor tort cases, the argument for abrogation suffers from several infirmities.

In a normal case, liability insurance becomes relevant only after an insured's liability is fixed in an appropriate legal proceeding. Yet as between parent and child, it becomes the raison d'etre of the suit. Thus, unlike a true adversarial proceeding, an insurer is forced into the unenviable position of attempting to defend a suit that its insured has every incentive to lose.

[. . .]

Also, the insurance-based argument in favor of abrogation fails to assess the consequences of an award that exceeds available coverage. Is the child then to proceed against the assets of the family? If that is so, it is hard to believe that the rancor and discord the insurance is said to obviate would not find its way back into the mix. [. . .]

Further, many families carry medical insurance that would necessarily compensate the injured child, and therefore, his or her family, for injury-related expenses. Allowing children then to proceed to court and recover for pain and suffering and other noneconomic damages, which often far exceed medical costs, might potentially saddle a family with a judgment that they can ill-afford to pay because, as previously indicated, it exceeds available insurance.

[. . .]

In light of the foregoing observations and on balance, we remain convinced that the parent-child immunity rule "is still in the best interests of both children and parents to retain . . . [and that] abrogating immunity would result only in further discord within the family and would interfere with the exercise of parental discretion in raising and disciplining children." Warren, 336 Md. at 626, 650 A.2d at 255.

c.

Renko lastly contends that the parent-child immunity doctrine as applied in motor vehicle torts is "irrational and arbitrary and violates Articles 19and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the [Fourteenth Amendment to the] United States Constitution." We find these assertions to be meritless.

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JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.