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*Note: The following opinion was edited by AudioCaseFiles' staff.
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Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education
453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1973

Opinion by: ROBERTS, J.

Appellants, William Ayala and William Ayala, Jr., instituted this action to recover damages for injuries suffered by William, Jr., when his arm was caught in a shredding machine in the upholstery class of the Carrol School in Philadelphia. As a result of these injuries, the 15 year old student's arm was amputated.

Appellants alleged that appellee school district, through its employees, was negligent in failing to supervise the upholstery class, in supplying the machine for use without a proper safety device, in maintaining the machine in a dangerous and defective condition, and in failing to warn the children of the dangerous condition. Appellee, the Philadelphia Board of Public Education, interposed preliminary objections asserting the defense of governmental immunity. These objections were sustained and the Superior Court affirmed in a per curiam order. Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 171, 297 A. 2d 495 (1972). We granted allocatur.

We now hold that the doctrine of governmental immunity -- long since devoid of any valid justification -- is abolished in this Commonwealth. In so doing, we join the ever-increasing number of jurisdictions which have judicially abandoned this antiquated doctrine. [. . .]
I.

It is generally agreed that the historical roots of the governmental immunity doctrine are found in the English case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). [. . .] There, the court, in extending immunity to an unincorporated county, expressed the fear that if suits against such political subdivisions were permitted, there would be "an infinity of actions." Russell v. Men of Devon, supra at 672, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. That court was also influenced by the absence of a fund "out of which satisfaction is to be made." Id. Finally, Justice Ashurst, expressing the eighteenth century societal evaluation of the individual and local governmental interests, observed that "it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience." Id.

While some attribute the immunity of municipal corporations and quasi-corporations to an extension of the theory that "the King can do no wrong", it has been noted that in Russell v. Men of Devon there is no mention of that phrase. [. . .]Rather, "[e]very reason assigned by the court [in Russell] is born of expediency. The wrong to plaintiff is submerged in the convenience of the public. No moral, ethical, or rational reason for the decision is advanced by the court except the practical problem of assessing damages against individual defendants." Id.

Additionally, it has been suggested that the doctrine of governmental immunity was a result of the English courts' difficulties with the principle of respondeat superior.

"The attribution of an officer's torts to the state was not obvious on general principle. If the judges found it difficult to attribute to a private principal the tort of an agent chosen by him to work within rather limited confines, how much more difficult to attribute to that undefinable entity, the state, the illegal acts of its various officers performing as a body a most disparate collection of functions.

"In short, the source of the 'mystery' lay not solely in the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Respondeat superior had caused difficulties as early as the nineteenth century in England, when the question arose whether the King, who by that time could be sued in contract whenever 'right should be done,' should be held for his officers' torts. The courts denied such relief, reasoning that respondeat superior was based on the identity of principal and agent, because the King could not himself commit a tort, the attribution failed for want of a competent principal." Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 209, 210 (1963) (footnote omitted).

Whatever may have been the actual basis for Russell v. Men of Devon, the doctrine it advanced was soon applied in the United States. [. . .]

Pennsylvania joined the numerous states adopting the immunity doctrine and, in Ford v. School District, 121 Pa. 543, 15 Atl. 812 (1888), held that school districts, as quasi-corporations, are not liable for the tortious conduct of employees. The Court's decision was motivated by factors similar to those which influenced the English court in Russell. Initially, the Court noted that school districts are agents of the Commonwealth "and are made quasi-corporations for the sole purpose of the administration of the commonwealth's system of public education." Id. at 547, 15 Atl. at 815. More importantly, the Court was reluctant to impose liability because "the act of assembly provides no fund out of which the directors can pay damages resulting from their own misconduct or that of their officers." Id. The Court further stated that "individual advantage must give way to the public welfare." Id. at 549, 15 Atl. at 815-16.

[. . .] In Morris v. Mount Lebanon Township School District, 393 Pa. 633, 636, 144 A. 2d 737, 738 (1958), the Court refused to completely abrogate the immunity doctrine, but held that school districts, like municipal corporations, "are not immune from liability in tort for the negligent acts of their servants committed in the course of the [school district's] proprietary functions." [. . .]

Thus, until the present action, we have retained the archaic and artificial distinction between tortious conduct arising out of the exercise of a proprietary function and tortious conduct arising out of exercise of a governmental function.

II.

Today we conclude that no reasons whatsoever exist for continuing to adhere to the doctrine of governmental immunity. Whatever may have been the basis for the inception of the doctrine, it is clear that no public policy considerations presently justify its retention.

Governmental immunity can no longer be justified on "an amorphous mass of cumbrous language about sovereignty . . . ." Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1363, 1364 (1954). As one court has stated: "'. . . it is almost incredible that in this modern age of comparative sociological enlightenment, and in a republic, the medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit in the maxim, "the King can do no wrong," should exempt the various branches of the government from liability for their torts, and that the entire burden of damage resulting from the wrongful acts of the government should be imposed upon the single individual who suffers the injury, rather than distributed among the entire community constituting the government, where it could be borne without hardship upon any individual, and where it justly belongs.' Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P. 2d 480, 482. [. . .] Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, supra at 21-22, 163 N.E. 2d at 94. [. . .]

Moreover, we are unwilling to perpetuate the notion that "it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience." Russell v. Men of Devon, supra at 673, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. This social philosophy of nonliability is "an anachronism in the law of today." [. . .] As has been noted: "The social climate which fostered the growth of absolutism and the divine right of kings in England has long since been tempered with the warm winds of humanitarianism and individual freedom. The changes which have occurred in the last century with respect to the imposition of liability upon private corporate enterprises of any kind are well known. Workmen's compensation laws have replaced the old theories which permitted the corporate organizations to escape liability under the fellow-servant rule or the doctrine of assumption of risk. Liability may now be predicated without fault merely on grounds that potential injuries to individuals must be calculated as a part of the cost of doing business, and must be paid for by the business enterprise.

[. . .]

"As we have stated many times before, today cities and states are active and virile creatures capable of inflicting great harm, and their civil liability should be co-extensive. Even though a governmental entity does not profit from its projects, the taxpaying public nevertheless does, and it is the taxpaying public which should pay for governmental maladministration. If the city operates or maintains injury-inducing activities or conditions, the harm thus caused should be viewed as a part of the normal and proper costs of public administration and not as a diversion of public funds. The city is a far better loss-distributing agency than the innocent and injured victim. [. . .]

We must also reject the fear of excessive litigation as a justification for the immunity doctrine. Empirically, there is little support for the concern that the courts will be flooded with litigation if the doctrine is abandoned.

[. . .T]he empirical data does not support the fear that governmental functions would be curtailed as a result of liability for tortious conduct. [. . .]The availability of public insurance removes what was the underlying reason for Men of Devon. [. . .]

[. . .]

Thus, we must agree with Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court that "the rule of governmental immunity for tort is an anachronism, without rational basis, and has existed only by the force of inertia." [. . .] Moreover, the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions "is probably one of the most unsatisfactory known to the law, for it has caused confusion not only among the various jurisdictions but almost always within each jurisdiction." Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 25.07 at 460 (1958).

[. . .]

In now rejecting the immunity doctrine and the "legalistic distinctions that have only remote relationship to the fundamental considerations of muncipal tort responsibility" (Fuller and Casner, supra at 443), we recognize, as did Dean Prosser, that: "Virtually all writers have agreed that no one of these reasons for denying liability is sound, and all of them can be found to have been rejected at one time or another in the decided cases. The current of criticism has been that it is better that the losses due to tortious conduct should fall upon the municipality rather than the injured individual, and that the torts of public employees are properly to be regarded, as in other cases of vicarious liability, as a cost of the administration of government, which should be distributed by taxes to the public." Prosser, supra at 1004-05 (footnotes omitted).

Imposition of tort liability will, thus, be more responsive to current concepts of justice. Claims will be treated as a cost of administration and losses will be spread among all those benefited by governmental action. [. . .]

Moreover, "where governmental immunity has had the effect of encouraging laxness and a disregard of potential harm, exposure of the government to liability for its torts will have the effect of increasing governmental care and concern for the welfare of those who might be injured by its actions."

[. . .]

V.

[. . .]
Having concluded that local governmental units -- municipal corporations and quasi-corporations -- are no longer immune from tort liability, the order sustaining appellee's preliminary objections is reversed and the record remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CONCUR BY: MANDERINO

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