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*Note: The following opinion was edited by AudioCaseFiles' staff.
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City of Webster Groves v. Quick
323 S.W.2d 386
St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri, 1959

OPINION BY: Justice Anderson.
This case arose upon the filing of a complaint against defendant in the City Court of Webster Groves, Missouri, for the violation of a speed ordinance of said city. . . .

On March 4, 1957, about 8:00 o'clock a.m., appellant was driving westwardly on Kirkham Boulevard in Webster Groves. As he proceeded westwardly he was driving toward a parked police car which was headed eastward. When appellant reached a point about opposite the police car he was stopped by a police officer and informed he was driving 40 miles per hour in a 30 mile an hour zone. Appellant was advised that an electric timer which was operated by the police showed he was driving at that speed. . . .

There is no merit to the point made. The officer himself testified to the reading of the mechanism in question and not to what someone else had told him; thus, the hearsay rule does not apply. The witness when testifying was under oath, and was thoroughly cross-examined, thus satisfying the principal requirements of the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. It is an extra judicial utterance, including both oral statements and writings. The hearsay rule cannot be applied to what the witness, on the stand and subject to cross-examination, observed, either through his own senses or through the use of scientific instruments. If appellant's contention were sound then results of the use of a measuring device on some object to ascertain its length would be inadmissible; a doctor could not testify to what a fluoroscope revealed concerning the condition of his patient, and, likewise, he would not be permitted to testify as to the results heard through a stethoscope. Many other examples of the absurdity of such a rule could be cited. In such cases, as in the case at bar, the evidence as to the results obtained by the witness is not dependent on the perception, memory, and sincerity of an absent declarant. The circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness is satisfied by the exercise of the right of cross-examination of the witness on the stand, both as to the results obtained and his testimony as to the reliability and accuracy of the device used. As to the latter, there was sufficient evidence in the case at bar. A police vehicle was operated through the device the morning defendant was arrested, and the device was found to be operating properly. In addition, the stop watch was tested during that week and the first week of the preceding and subsequent months. The witnesses to those facts were produced and were subjected to rigorous cross-examination. We rule there was no error in the court's ruling on the admission of the evidence in question. . . .

Finding no error in the record, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

JOHN J. WOLFE, P.J., Concurs.

E. M. RUDDY, J., Concurs.

This case is in these books

• Evidence: Cases and Materials
• Waltz, Park
• 10th Edition